| dc.description.abstract | This study investigates the determinants of ESG reporting quality in the banking
sector, examining governance mechanisms and the moderating role of institutional
context across Indonesia and the United Kingdom. Using panel data from 31 banks
(118 firm-year observations, 2020-2024), Fixed-Effects regression was employed
to test main effects, while Pooled OLS with interaction terms was used to examine
moderation. Research evaluates whether board meeting frequency, audit
committee independence score, and audit expertise score influence ESG disclosure,
and whether the UK context moderates these relationships. The findings show that
higher audit committee quality is associated with better ESG reporting (β = 0.12,
p < 0.05), highlighting the value of strong oversight. Audit expertise has a slightly
positive effect (β = 0.09, p < 0.10). More frequent board meetings, however, have
a significant negative effect (β = -0.11, p < 0.10), which runs counter to the expected
positive link and does not support H1. The moderation analysis shows that meeting
frequency has opposite effects in the two countries: it is positive in Indonesia but
negative in the UK (interaction β = -0.53, p<0.05). Audit committee quality has a
stronger positive effect in the UK (interaction β = 0.50, p<10), while audit expertise
has similar effects in both countries. Company size and emissions also play a role
in ESG reporting quality. These results add to agency theory by showing that
oversight quality matters more than the number of meetings, and to institutional
theory by showing that governance varies by context. The study suggests that
Indonesian banks should focus on improving committee quality and expertise,
while the UK banks should prioritize effective meetings over more frequent ones.
Improving governance structures is important to prevent greenwashing and ensure
reliable sustainability reporting. | en_US |
