

**THE ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION INDONESIA-MALAYSIA  
MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS IN 2023 DURING JOKO  
WIDODO'S SECOND TERM (2019-2024)  
UNDERGRADUATE THESIS**



**UNIVERSITAS  
ISLAM  
INDONESIA**

Written by:

**HASYSYAL MAHHAR**

21323239

**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
FACULTY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIO-CULTURAL SCIENCES  
UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INDONESIA**

**2025**

**THE ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION INDONESIA-MALAYSIA  
MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS IN 2023 DURING JOKO  
WIDODO'S SECOND TERM (2019-2024)**

**UNDERGRADUATE THESIS**

Proposed to the Department of International Relations  
Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences  
Universitas Islam Indonesia  
As a partial fulfillment of requirement to earn  
Bachelor Degree in International Relations



Written by:

**HASYSYAL MAHHAR**

21323239

**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
FACULTY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIO-CULTURAL SCIENCES  
UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INDONESIA**

**2025**

**AUTHORIZATION PAGE**

**THE ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION INDONESIA-MALAYSIA  
MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS IN 2023 DURING JOKO  
WIDODO'S SECOND TERM (2019-2024)**

Defended in front of Board of Examiners  
in the Department of International Relations  
Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences  
Universitas Islam Indonesia

As a partial fulfillment of requirement to earn  
Bachelor Degree of International Relations

Date

30 April 2025

Validated by  
Department of International Relations  
Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences  
Universitas Islam Indonesia

Head of Department



*Karina*  
Karina Utami Dewi, S.I.P., M.A.

Board of Examiners

1. Enggar Furi Herdianto, S.I.P., M.A.
2. Ayu Heryati Naqsabandiyah, S.IP., M.A.
3. Alfredha Shinta Putri, S.IP., M.H.I.

Signature

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*[Handwritten signature]*  
*[Handwritten signature]*

## STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

I hereby declare that this undergraduate thesis is the result of my own independent scientific work, and that all material from the work of others (in books, articles, essays, dissertations, and on the internet) has been stated, and quotations and paraphrases are clearly indicated.

No other materials are used other than those contained. I have read and understood the university's rules and procedures regarding plagiarism.

Making false statements is considered a violation of academic integrity.

*20 April 2025*



---

*Hasysyal Mahhar*

## TABLE OF CONTENT

<b>UNDERGRADUATE THESIS .....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>AUTHORIZATION PAGE.....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY.....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENT.....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES .....</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>ABSTRACT .....</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1.1 Background.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1.2 Research Question.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1.3 Research Objectives .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1.4 Research Scope .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1.5 Literature Review .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1.6 Research Framework.....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>(Two-Level Game Theory by Robert D. Putnam) .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>1.7 Provisional Argument.....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>1.8 Research Method.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>1.8.1 Type of the Research .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>1.8.2 Subject and Object of the Research .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>1.8.3 Method of Data Collection.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>1.8.4 Process of the Research .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>1.9 Thesis Outline .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2 .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>THE ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION INDONESIA-MALAYSIA MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS IN 2023 DURING JOKO WIDODO’S SECOND TERM (2019-2024).....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>2.1 Negotiating Maritime Boundaries: The Indonesia-Malaysia Case</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>2.2 Negotiation Strategy .....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>2.2.1 Bilateral Negotiations .....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>2.2.2 Reliance on International Legal Framework .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>2.2.3 Deployment of Special Envoy.....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>2.3 Indonesia’s “Win-Set” Analysis.....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>2.3.1 Indonesia’s National Interest .....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>2.3.2 The Importance of a Balance Win-Set .....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>CHAPTER 3 .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>LEVEL II DOMESTIC ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS</b>	<b>27</b>

<b>3.1</b>	<b>Power</b> .....	<b>28</b>
<b>3.2</b>	<b>Preferences</b> .....	<b>31</b>
<b>3.3</b>	<b>Coalitions</b> .....	<b>37</b>
<b>CHAPTER 4</b>	<b>.....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>4.1</b>	<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>43</b>
<b>4.2</b>	<b>Recommendation</b> .....	<b>45</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>.....</b>	<b>46</b>

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Map of Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary: 1969-1971	4
Figure 2. Map of the Northwestern Corner of the Celebes (Sulawesi) Sea.	5
Figure 3. Win-Set Concept Illustration	26
Figure 4. Win-Set feasible agreement illustration	27
Figure 5. Political indifference curves for two-issues negotiation	34
Figure 6. Standard Two-Level Game between sides A and B	39

## ABSTRACT

This study examines the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement, which was finalized during President Joko Widodo's second term. The agreement, which successfully delimited part of territorial waters in the Malacca strait and Sulawesi Sea, is analysed using Robert Putnam's Two-Level Game theory. This framework helps analyse how international negotiations (Level I) and domestic politics (Level II) interplayed throughout the process. The agreement's success wasn't only the product of diplomatic efforts but also Indonesia's ability to secure strong domestic support through a well-managed distribution of power, preferences, and coalitions among domestic actors. This study finds that Indonesia's negotiation strategy, that based on legal norms (UNCLOS) and proactive bilateral diplomacy, allowed for possible overlapping win-sets between both states. In addition, coordination among ministries and agencies will ensure a smooth ratification process and minimized risk of involuntary defection. This case overview the role of domestic politics in shaping international maritime diplomacy and can be a lesson for future boundary negotiations in Southeast Asia.

**Keywords:** Maritime boundary, negotiation, Indonesia-Malaysia, two-level game theory, international diplomacy, Southeast Asia.

# **CHAPTER 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Background**

A country's maritime boundaries are something that cannot be underestimated. Indonesia and Malaysia are both archipelagic countries that border many other countries both on land and at sea. Geographically, Indonesia is surrounded by sea, especially on its borders. At least ten countries share the same maritime areas as Indonesia, including Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Australia, Timor Leste, and India. In order to avoid potential conflicts at its borders, especially sea borders, Indonesia needs to settle maritime boundaries with each of the Ten States, including Malaysia. Agreed upon boundaries with the neighboring countries will reduce the risk of conflict, because when there is uncertainty in maritime boundaries, it can lead to misunderstandings, tensions, and even military involvement. When defined boundaries have been set, it stability and peaceful co-existence between states occurs as once boundary treaties once have been signed, they cannot be terminated or suspended.

The region has seen a long history of maritime disputes since the era of European colonization, which impacted on the maritime boundaries in Southeast Asia. Overlapping claims often happen because, in the past, the Europeans drew arbitrary lines without consideration. As a result, the borders that separate Indonesia and Malaysia were determined by those drawn by the Netherlands and Great Britain (Pratomo 2016). Then, after the era of colonization, countries in Southeast Asia

defined their sovereignty and also made territorial claims, including on maritime zones.

Boundary agreements have special protection in the 1969 Law of Treaties and the 1978 Succession of States with Respect to Treaties of the Vienna Conventions. Indonesia and its neighboring countries have also concluded several maritime boundary agreements. Indonesia and Malaysia share three primary maritime border areas, which are the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea and the Celebes Sea. The 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia maritime boundary agreement regards two of these areas, the Southern part of Malacca Strait and part of the Sulawesi Seas. Indonesia and Malaysia have agreed to delimitate these two territorial waters.

The conflict around the disputed areas were not limited to legal disputes over territorial claims only, but there were tensions marked by near-military confrontations in the past. In 2005, Indonesia deployed naval vessels into the overlapping claims area, because of Malaysia's issuance of oil exploration concessions in one of the contented zones in the Sulawesi Sea. The Indonesian government was forced to take protective action to protect Indonesia's maritime sovereignty and pressured the Malaysian government by strong diplomatic protest. On the other hand, the boundary in the southern part of the Malacca Strait had remained unresolved for years that created an ambiguity in navigation rights and law enforcement jurisdiction. This area is among the busiest maritime routes in the world, so having lack of clear boundaries in the strait posed a risk for both countries like, illegal fishing, smuggling that threatened both countries security.

The negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia for the 2023 Maritime Boundary Agreement was a culmination of 18 years of negotiations, where both

countries have agreed to delimitate their territorial seas in the southern part of the Malacca Strait and the Sulawesi Sea. This agreement will be a strong foundation for the upcoming unresolved maritime disputes that Indonesia and Malaysia still need to negotiate. This agreement can help other disputes be resolved faster without compromising each other's sovereignty.

Maritime boundary disputes regularly occur over commercial and economic resources and security dynamics (Newman, N.). The faster countries can resolve their maritime disputes, the faster they can move forward with their resources and explore their territories within the clearly defined boundaries. This has the potential to boost their economies. The good thing about an agreement is that both countries are focusing on peaceful resolutions, prioritizing negotiations and dialogue. A maritime dispute is said to be prolonged if it is not resolved quickly (Hasan et al. 2019).

The Law of the Sea Convention states that the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is 200 nautical miles from the baseline, the contiguous zone is 24 nautical miles, and the territorial sea is 12 nautical miles (UNCLOS1982, Art. 3, 33, and 57). But in reality, there are much bigger claims from every state regarding maritime zones and jurisdictions for their own interests and this often results in disputes between coastal states. Undoubtedly, coastal states want bigger claims over sea territories because maritime areas are the places where their valuable resources are, such as fish, oil and even gas. Preventing conflict over resource access is done through the establishment of clear ownership by defining clear boundaries.

The Ambalat block dispute can be used as an example of a notable dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Sulawesi Sea. Tensions and provocation between the two navies escalated to the potential for war (Hadi 2014). This happened because of overlapping claims by both countries over a potential oil and gas reserve in that area. This situation highlighted the need for defined maritime boundaries to prevent disputes and conflicts. Regional security is also at risk when there are too many undefined maritime boundaries in a region, in this case Southeast Asia. Regional stability should be maintained by having countries peacefully negotiate maritime boundaries that will result in a more defined maritime zone.

Figure 1. Map of Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary: 1969-1971




Source: Sovereign Limits Website (2023)

To better understand the location of the geographical areas of the two maritime areas that are being resolved in the 2023 boundary agreement, it is important to examine the areas involved in the agreements. Figure 1 shows a Map

of Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundaries that were agreed upon between 1969 and 1971. It also includes the area that was recently agreed in the 2023 treaty, specifically the southern part of the Malacca Strait, which borders the territorial waters of Sumatra (Indonesia) and Peninsular Malaysia. The area is less militarized than the one near the Sulawesi Sea, but it is vital for international shipping and fisheries. That way, ambiguities in the area have to be cleared by delimitation of the maritime borders.

Figure 2. Map of the Northwestern Corner of the Celebes (Sulawesi) Sea.



Source: Melbourne Asia Review (2023).

While the second map highlights the area that lies off the coast of North Kalimantan, near Malaysia’s Sabah region. The area is rich in oil and gas resources that have already been a disputed area for a very long time, especially surrounding the Amabalat blocks and Malaysia ND6 and ND7 exploration area. This area is very strategic and important economically for both countries.

Examining the negotiation dynamics of the 2023 agreement provides insights into the factors that facilitate international agreements, including negotiation strategies, power distribution, actor preferences and coalitions. The resolution of these maritime boundaries serves as a case study in international diplomacy, offering lessons for future negotiations in the region. This research analyzes the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement, focusing on the key international and domestic factors that led to its successful conclusion. Understanding these elements can contribute to broader discourse on maritime diplomacy and conflict resolution in Southeast Asia.

## **1.2 Research Question**

How did international and domestic factors interact in the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement?

## **1.3 Research Objectives**

The objectives of this research were:

1. to analyze the negotiation process that led to the signing of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement;
2. to identify international factors that influenced the negotiation process;
3. to identify domestic factors that influenced the negotiation process.

## **1.4 Research Scope**

This research focuses on analyzing the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement, particularly the interplay between international negotiations and domestic political dynamics. The study is limited to the second term of President Joko Widodo's administration (2019–2024), during which the agreement was finalized and signed.

Geographically, this research concentrates on the maritime boundary delimitation in the southern part of the Malacca Strait and the part of Sulawesi Sea (Sulawesi Sea), as these areas historically have been areas of unresolved maritime claims and overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Southern part of Malacca strait is a strategic international shipping lane, whereas the part of the Sulawesi sea is located near Ambalat block which is a hydrocarbon rich zone that brought tension on its exploration competition. This study aimed to assess the negotiation process leading up to the agreement's signing and the subsequent developments that followed.

The analysis explores how international and domestic political factors influenced Indonesia's negotiation strategy, including the roles of key chief negotiators, government ministries, institutions and security agencies. To ensure a comprehensive evaluation, this research utilized data from books, academic journals, official documents, legal instruments, and other credible sources related to maritime boundary negotiations and Indonesia-Malaysia relations.

## **1.5 Literature Review**

"Indonesia's Delimited Maritime Boundaries", a book by Vivian Louis Forbes has provided a comprehensive analysis of the legal framework and rationale behind Indonesia's claim for its jurisdictional maritime territories. In the beginning of the book, the discussion mainly highlights the geographical features that influence Indonesia's maritime boundaries (Forbes 2014). Then, the author discusses the impact of climate change, as well as economic and social factors to understand how all these factors contributed to Indonesia's jurisdictional claims. The political challenges and legal framework Indonesia faced when delimiting its

maritime boundaries are also analyzed in the book. The book also covers a wide range of issues surrounding the maritime boundaries between Indonesia and its neighbors and the dynamics of these issues. Overall, this piece of literature provides important and complex insights into Indonesia's maritime dynamics and what efforts Indonesia made to delimit its boundaries with its neighboring countries (Forbes 2014).

Eddy Pratomo in his journal titled "Indonesia–Malaysia Maritime Boundaries Delimitation: A Retrospective", thinks that maritime boundary delimitation is a very interesting issue both in international law and international relations (Pratomo 2016). He has said that countries take a very long time to negotiate their maritime boundaries, because once an agreement has been reached it will basically exist forever. A treaty that sets a boundary cannot be withdrawn or terminated due to a fundamental change in circumstances, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This journal specifically discusses the issues regarding the Indonesia-Malaysia maritime boundary, developments made and how the future of the negotiations was expected to proceed. Already determined maritime boundaries, such as the 1969 Continental Shelves and 1970 Territorial Seas Treaty, are being briefly introduced as supporting detail (Pratomo 2016). The most important aspect that the author included are the challenges faced when determining a maritime boundary, which supports this present research which aimed to identify the challenges that the 2023 agreement also faced.

Further supporting literature comes from a book edited by Alfred Gerstl and Maria Strasakova, called "Unresolved Border, Land and Maritime Disputes in Southeast Asia" which critically examined aspects like sovereignty, resource

security and regional stability. The authors stated that having a clear maritime boundary is crucial to maintaining a state's sovereignty and preventing conflicts (Gerstl and Strašáková 2016). Resource security is also mentioned as growing competition of the available resources often occurs in overlapping territories, because of a lack of clarity over the delimitation of maritime boundaries between countries. Regional security is the product of peace and stability and can be achieved through delimitation of maritime boundaries between Southeast Asian countries (Gerstl and Strašáková 2016).

In conclusion, these pieces of 3 literature offer a solid overall understanding of the Indonesia-Malaysia maritime boundary dynamics. They provide a background of the influencing factors, historical factors, challenges and future potential relations of Indonesia-Malaysia. The gap present in the existing literature lies in the comprehensiveness of the analysis of how the negotiation process between the two nations was influenced by international and domestic factors. This is the novel aspect of this research. The influence of domestic politics on international negotiations helps explain the negotiation process of the 2023 agreement. This research will contribute to the discussion of the complex dynamics of maritime settlement boundaries in the Southeast Asia region.

## **1.6 Research Framework**

### **(Two-Level Game Theory by Robert D. Putnam)**

The theory used for analysis in this research is the two-level game theory by Robert Putnam. Putnam's theory was used to explore the connection between international negotiations and domestic politics during the negotiation and up until the acceptance of the maritime boundary agreement. The analysis has been

conducted in two levels: international (Level I) and domestic (Level II). This theory is appropriate for the analysis of the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia - Malaysia maritime boundary agreement, as it can encompass the link between international negotiations and Indonesian domestic politics. The theory states that, on an international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments (Putnam 1988). It is important to recognize that international agreements are deeply influenced by political dynamics within the country.

Putnam stated a very important concept in his Two-Level Games theory called "Win-set". Win-set should be present in both the international and domestic level analysis. The term "win-set" describes the collection of all potential international agreements (Level I) that have a high probability of being approved or ratified at the national level (Level II) (Putnam 1988). The idea is essential to understanding the success or failure of international negotiations because it emphasizes the interplay between domestic and foreign political limitations. The win-set has to satisfy the interest from international level and the positions of the negotiating states. The agreement made internationally should be acceptable to the domestic level stakeholders, like political leaders, legislative bodies, interest groups, relevant agencies.

As for the application of the theory, there are two different levels of analysis: Level I and Level II. In the Level One analysis, the author of this study dissects the bilateral negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia. The dynamics of the negotiation process, which involve understanding Indonesia's negotiation strategy and its win-set, are explained thoroughly. The goal of the agreement's

negotiation process was to find a settlement that takes the core priorities of both nations seriously while also finding overlapping claims, potential concessions, and shared benefits.

Level II of the analysis focuses on Indonesia's domestic political influence on the international negotiations. The framework identified and analyzed the functions of important domestic players, such as ministries, agencies, the military, and stakeholders in the maritime sector. Every actor had different interests, which may have affected the national position in the international negotiation. For example, the primary concerns of the Indonesian Coast Guard and Navy were maritime boundary defense and national security. Access to fishing grounds and economic interests were prioritized by local governments and fishing communities. Power distribution, preferences and coalitions between domestic constituents were comprehensively analyzed to understand their influence on the international agreement and how the domestic politic dynamic affected the ratification process.

The influence of the different levels of analysis in Putnam's theory is vital for examination, because both international negotiations and domestic politics influenced one another. Agreements that are to be agreed upon internationally can gain attention from domestic actors and trigger them, which then pressures the government to prolong the negotiations to gain domestic approval. When there is strong support domestically, the government has more favorable bargaining power at the international level.

## **1.7 Provisional Argument**

The negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement was not solely determined by international diplomatic

interactions but also had a heavy influence from domestic political factors, as can be described by Robert Putnam's Two-Level Games Theory. The success of the agreement resulted from Indonesia's ability to navigate domestic power distributions, competing constituent preferences, and shifting political coalitions, which directly influenced the international bargaining process. Strong domestic support allowed Indonesia to present a cohesive stance at the international level, increasing the likelihood of reaching an agreement with Malaysia. The interplay of international and domestic factors was decisive leading to the successful conclusion of this maritime boundary agreement.

## **1.8 Research Method**

### *1.8.1 Type of the Research*

This research used qualitative methods as it explained the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia maritime boundary agreement. The research examined the interactions between international negotiations and domestic politics.

### *1.8.2 Subject and Object of the Research*

The subject for this research is the Government of Indonesia, while the object is the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement.

### *1.8.3 Method of Data Collection*

Primary data was gathered from government reports and official statements, while secondary data was taken from articles, books, news reports, and other databases related to the topic.

#### *1.8.4 Process of the Research*

The research was conducted as a thorough review of the governmental reports, official documents, reputable articles, books and news. Then, the data collected was analyzed along with other findings from other sources. After the data had been collected, the findings were discussed and explained comprehensively to the readers.

### **1.9 Thesis Outline**

Chapter 1 of this research is an introduction to the overall thesis discussion, including background, research question, research objectives, scope, literature review, framework and method.

Chapter 2 starts by analyzing the dynamics of the negotiation process at the international level. Level 1 analysis of Putnam's theory enhances the reader's understanding about the dynamics of international negotiation processes in maritime boundary agreements, Indonesia's negotiation strategy and "Win-Set".

Chapter 3 explains the next level of analysis which is domestic analysis. Level 2 analysis consists of explanation of the distribution of power, preferences and coalitions of the different actors that have influence on the international negotiations.

Chapter 4 provides a summary of the findings from previous chapters and draws a conclusion on the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement.

**CHAPTER 2**  
**THE ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION INDONESIA-MALAYSIA**  
**MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS IN 2023 DURING JOKO**  
**WIDODO'S SECOND TERM (2019-2024)**

In this chapter, the author uses the Robert Putnam Two-Level Games theory (Level 1) to start the analysis of the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement, which occurred during Mr. Joko Widodo's second term presidency. The explanation focuses on the international negotiation process including an explanation of contextual data and information to support this thesis. The environment in which the negotiation process happened is one of the aspects the author emphasizes because it provides an understanding of the international dynamics during the negotiation of the agreement, especially in terms of maritime boundary and dispute resolution. The author also explains who the actors involved were during the level 1 negotiation and what their role was in the negotiation process. Thus, the analysis chapter presents a detailed and clear understanding. The second aspect strengthening this analysis chapter is an explanation of the strategy employed by the Indonesian government during the negotiation process up until both parties signed it. Negotiation strategy is a factor that Putnam also puts attention on in his Win-Set theory. The third focus of this chapter is on the analysis of the "Win-set" concept and how it works during a negotiation process.

## **2.1 Negotiating Maritime Boundaries: The Indonesia-Malaysia Case**

Indonesia and Malaysia have seen a number of maritime boundary disputes in the past. Since 1969 Indonesia and Malaysia have been involved in negotiations of their territorial sea waters because of their 2 borders which are in the Malacca Strait and Sulawesi Sea. The 2 borders were the location of maritime delimitation in this maritime boundary agreement. They have been conducting countless negotiations, some of which have succeeded and some of which have failed. Negotiations of maritime zones have to be done carefully, since they are related to the state's sovereignty. The state has to maintain a peaceful discussion while also maintaining its sovereignty.

The negotiation process of the 2023 agreement involved an international political process and also a domestic political process. Therefore, using Putnam's Two-Level Games as the basic theory for the analysis of this negotiation process gives the readers a full overview and understanding of the connection between the two level analysis. In a negotiation process, international actors and domestic actors are all connected and must solidify objectives and goals. Choosing Indonesia's national position in the negotiation process needed to be done before the meeting with the counterpart team of Malaysia. Indonesia needed to also make sure that they had a clear sustained policy in the negotiation (Pratomo 2018).

Negotiating maritime boundaries is not something easy. Many factors can influence and affect the negotiation process as well as the aftermath. Negotiation has to be done carefully and needs detailed preparation. One agreement could take decades to complete. Approaches in settling maritime disputes differ in every state, and each place has its own characteristic also. In the ASEAN region, Indonesia has

to contribute actively to reduce maritime disputes and tensions because its location is very strategic.

Correct political orientation of states during negotiations is key to a successful negotiation and can avoid further conflict. The United Nations Charter, in Article 2 paragraph 3 and Article 33 paragraph 1 stipulated that disputes should be settled in peaceful means, which includes negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement (United Nations 1945). Indonesia knows and understands that delimiting maritime boundaries should be a priority because of the strategic locations of its nation and the possibility of maximizing sea resources for the country's benefit. Negotiations upon maritime disputes have to be tough, yet it needs to follow the United Nations Charter that stipulates any disputes should be resolved in a peaceful manner, which include negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or even judicial settlement.

It should be noted that Indonesia and Malaysia have recognized/ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This means that the rights and authorities of the two countries over the sea are based on UNCLOS. Both are entitled to territorial sea (12 nautical miles), additional zone (24 nautical miles), exclusive economic zone (EEZ, 200 nautical miles), and continental shelf (sea floor) that can exceed 200 nautical miles. One nautical mile is equivalent to 1.852 kilometers. Based on UNCLOS, Indonesia and Malaysia have rights over a vast sea area. However, the two countries are located in close proximity to each other. As a result, it is not possible for Indonesia or Malaysia to fully control all maritime zones allowed by UNCLOS without overlapping each other. This overlapping is what causes both countries to need to share their waters through the establishment

(delimitation) of maritime boundaries in the southern part of the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and the Sulawesi Sea. This is also the reason why both countries need several agreements.

At Level 1, the national interests of Indonesia and Malaysia diverged, with Indonesia emphasizing maritime security and sovereignty, while Malaysia prioritized economic access and resource control. Indonesia has seen a shift in the national interest regarding maritime delimitation. At first, the main interest was to maximize the resources available in the areas, like oil and gas. The negotiating team was led by the one and only Ms. Retno Marsudi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs since the first period of President Joko Widodo. The team was not from a single agency since the maritime domain is handled sectorial in various ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Coordinating Ministry for Maritime and Investment Affairs, Indonesia Maritime Security Agency and other related agencies. This system of bureaucracy that has various ministries to deal with maritime issues can be a disadvantage, but it is understandable that different actors that take part in the negotiation had their own concern on the issue.

Pratomo in one of his articles highlights that Indonesia should have two important things before negotiating maritime boundaries: a solid national position and a clear policy to handle maritime boundary delimitation. States have to form a specific team of negotiators but it reflects all of the interest of the sectorial or departments position in the maritime borders segment. Indonesia's national interest in the maritime segment changed after the growing interest in maritime domain, which include navigation, fisheries, as well as legal and security affairs. Then in 2004, the Technical Maritime Boundaries Team was established by the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Indonesia to satisfy the new national interest with expertise from their own respective fields.

Putnam stated that each side of the negotiating party will be represented by their 'Chief Negotiators' and that each national political leader in the nations has to be involved in all of the two level games process either directly or indirectly (Putnam 1988). Indonesia has its President, Mr Joko Widodo and Mrs. Retno Marsudi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the lead negotiator, and the Technical Maritime Boundary team as the negotiating team during the negotiation process. The negotiating team could consist of officials from different sectors of the ministry and relevant agencies/institutions, but they are equipped with the knowledge of maritime boundary dispute and resolution. According to Eddy Pratomo, Indonesia has shifted its main interest in the maritime delimitation sector from interest in oil and gas, to a wider aspect, like navigation, fisheries and security affairs (Pratomo 2018).

Putnam stated that "Bargaining between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement; call that Level I". Tentative agreements during the negotiation process of the two maritime boundaries came all the way back to 1969, when the first ever treaty between Indonesia and Malaysia of the Delimitation of Territorial Seas in the Strait of Malacca Agreement happened, but it left several areas undefined. The treaty was an initial delimitation of territorial seas in the Straits of Malacca. Then, from 2005 onward, the negotiations continued on the unresolved areas and countless Joint Technical Committee meetings were held with focus on the delimitation of boundaries in the southern part of Malacca Strait and Sulawesi Sea. Provisional deals during the negotiations at Level I are considered tentative

agreements and later, the formal signing of the SOM treaty and Sulawesi Sea Treaty was conducted on 8 June 2023.

As stated earlier, former president Mr. Joko Widodo was involved in the negotiations process. This shows the relevance of the Putnam Two level games theory here as it states that political leaders must be directly or indirectly involved in the process. The former president had indirect involvement by sending the negotiating team to the negotiation table while also having direct involvement by conducting several visits to Malaysia and, most importantly, signing the joint statement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia: *Treaty between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia Relating to the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries in the Southernmost Part of the Straits of Melaka* (signed 8 June 2023) and *Treaty between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia Relating to the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries in the Sulawesi Sea* (signed 8 June 2023). This involvement of the president brought more confidence to the domestic actors to ratify and accept the maritime agreement.

During Joko Widodo's second term as the president of Indonesia which was the period off 2019-2024, the vision of Indonesia in respect to maritime issues still used the Global Maritime Fulcrum (Poros Maritim Dunia), which was introduced in the first term of President Joko Widodo in 2014. It is a vision that placed Indonesia's national position as a pivotal maritime power in the region that connects the Pacific Oceans and the Indian Ocean. This vision aims to strengthen Indonesia's geopolitical power especially related to securing maritime boundaries with other nations. The Global Maritime Fulcrum is not only a foreign policy element, but it

also included domestic elements that were later embedded in the President Regulation on National Sea Policy (Laksmana 2024). This application of the maritime position of Indonesia through GMF foreign policy allows the regional powers to shift and align their maritime policies that benefit Indonesia in cooperative projects in maritime sectors (Laksmana 2024).

However, the doctrine of this foreign policy hasn't shown Indonesia being more active and acting as a leader in huge maritime issues like US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific or the South China Sea disputes. The issue of maritime delimitation between Indonesia and Malaysia in the two maritime zones may not be seen as significant as other maritime issues, but the authors believe that it is as important to enhance Indonesia's national sovereignty and diplomacy power. The close relation of President Joko Widodo and Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, and by following the vision of the GMF, Indonesia and its negotiating team was able to secure the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement.

Additionally, Indonesia and Malaysia have created a bilateral mechanism to facilitate meetings and negotiations of boundary disputes called the "Joint Indonesia-Malaysia Boundary Committee (JIM)". This was established in 1973. The JIM is still being used and very much instrumental today in finding peaceful resolutions to both land and maritime boundary disputes between the two countries, especially surveying and the demarcation of international boundaries. The committee also has several different technical teams, namely the Technical Working Group Indonesia-Malaysia (JWG IMT), the Advisor Team and the Expert Team. The technical team consists of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Ministry of Transportation, the Director of Defense Areas of the Ministry of Defense, the territorial staff of the Indonesian National Army, the Operations Staff of the Indonesian National Army Headquarters, representatives of the Geospatial Information Agency, the naval operations staff, and the Naval Hydro-Oceanography Center (PUSHIDROSAL). The actions of the Joint Indonesia-Malaysia Committee acts very crucial in the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement in the two segmented areas, the Malacca Strait and Sulawesi Sea.

## **2.2 Negotiation Strategy**

A negotiation strategy refers to a structured and planned approach that parties use to achieve their objectives in a negotiation process. Choosing particular strategies, utilizing strengths, controlling weaknesses, and carefully weighing the interests of all parties involved are all part of it. Effective negotiation demands careful planning, specific goals, adaptability, and a dedication to a peaceful conclusion. International negotiations, particularly those related to maritime boundary delimitation, require a strategy that takes into account historical claims, geopolitical factors, legal frameworks like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the economic effects of maritime zones. Other factors that affect successful marine discussions include diplomatic relations, political will, technical know-how, and the capacity to control conflict while pursuing win-win solutions.

### 2.2.1 Bilateral Negotiations

The negotiation approach used in the Indonesia-Malaysia maritime border talks included a mix of political, legal, technical tactics. Indonesia chose to rely on bilateral negotiations to solve the territorial dispute in the two areas. Due to the prolonged and complicated nature of maritime conflicts, Indonesia took a proactive but cautious stance, making sure that every action was well thought out in order to protect Indonesia's national interests and prevent needless tensions from rising. Indonesia sought to protect its sovereignty, guarantee financial gains from resource extraction, and enhance maritime security in strategically significant waters like the Sulawesi Sea and the Strait of Malacca, all of which were at the center of the negotiations (Singh 2020).

Indonesia chose to conduct the negotiations with Malaysia in the most peaceful way possible, in line with what is stated in the UNCLOS Article 279:

*“States parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by peaceful means...”*

This means that both Indonesia and Malaysia had full control of the case without the involvement of any other third parties. This allowed Indonesia to get as much as possible of their win-set, which would not have been the case if it had been submitted through the international court. Both Indonesia and Malaysia were able to get what they wanted, because the nature of negotiations made all parties sacrifice something in the interest of making room for the best solution for both sides. The process of negotiations could go for a long time, and it will be very intensive for both because every party wants the best result possible for their country and negotiations will be just right to bring out those benefits to the settlement (Pratomo and Kwik 2020).

### **2.2.2 Reliance on International Legal Framework**

Indonesia's reliance on international legal frameworks has become their bargaining power, especially UNCLOS, which offered specific requirements for defining territorial waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and continental shelf, which was an essential part of its negotiating approach. Indonesia strengthened its negotiating credibility and made sure that all agreements were binding by international law by upholding UNCLOS. Since both nations had previously accepted UNCLOS and were bound by its principles, this legal basis was crucial in guiding conversations with Malaysia.

### **2.2.3 Deployment of Special Envoy**

High-level diplomatic ambassadors or special envoys frequently served as negotiators in the arranged talks between Indonesia and Malaysia. In 2015, with the growing concern of the situation regarding negotiations effort for their territorial waters between Indonesia and Malaysia that showed no tangible result, Indonesia President and the Malaysian Prime Minister agreed to build a special envoy for the specific case of Indonesia-Malaysia maritime boundaries establishment (Pratomo 2018). The appointment of this special envoy shows that Indonesia is very serious about pursuing bilateral negotiations and preventing maritime boundary cases from having to be submitted to the International Court of Justice. Indonesia showed its commitment to peaceful conflict resolution while simultaneously looking for workable solutions that both countries could agree with by upholding a polite and collaborative discussion.

### **2.3 Indonesia's "Win-Set" Analysis**

Win-Set is a concept introduced by Putnam that will be used in the Level 1 analysis. Win-set refers to the strategy used by Indonesia in the negotiation table that includes sets of different possible outcomes of the negotiations that may gain approval from both the domestic negotiating teams. Domestic factors such as the distribution of power, preferences, political coalitions and institutions will form the size of Indonesia's win-set. Indonesia's strategy into the negotiation has seen approval from the domestic side with the hope of getting acceptance in the international and domestic level from the other negotiating team, in this case the Malaysian representative.


#### **2.3.1 Indonesia's National Interest**

Indonesia's top priority is to preserve national sovereignty and its territorial integrity, because Indonesia has faced disputes over their maritime boundaries in the past, such as disputes in the Sulawesi Sea over potential resource areas that resulted in naval standoffs. It shows that securing clear boundaries with its neighboring states could prevent potential conflicts and can enhance Indonesia's control over strategic maritime zones that could benefit Indonesia politically, economically and environmentally (Forbes 2014). Ensuring and prioritizing a clearly defined territorial waters, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf is in line with Indonesia's right under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In order for Indonesia to strengthen their national positions in international forums, they have to apply UNCLOS principles that have been recognized and respected internationally.

### 2.3.2 The Importance of a Balance Win-Set

Before arriving at the negotiation table, Indonesia first set their strategy or in this case the “Win-set”. Win-set has to be crafted to balance the need of domestic expectations with the international realities. Indonesia had to carefully identify core issues and align these with the national position and Indonesia's maritime foreign policy. Therefore, Indonesia had to determine its acceptable compromise of its territorial waters in order to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity. Figure 3 below explains how the win-set concept works at the negotiation table. In this figure, Indonesia is represented by variable X and Malaysia represented by variable Y. So, if Indonesia’s win-set is set from  $X_1$ - $X_M$ , this means that Indonesia will only accept offers that meet the requirements in that range. Similarly, Malaysia will only accept offers if they meet its win-set, which is in the range of  $Y_1$ - $Y_M$ . Thus,  $X_1$  and  $Y_1$  are the minimal outcomes for both parties to consider ratification.


Figure 3. *Win-Set* Concept Illustration



Source: *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games* (Putnam 1988)

Therefore, if we look at the diagram again, the ranges between  $X_1$  (Indonesia) and  $Y_1$  (Malaysia) can be seen as the only possible outcomes for both countries.

Figure 4. *Win-set* feasible agreement illustration



Source: *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games*

The successful signing of the two treaties in the Joint Statement clearly shows that the win-set of both countries overlapped between  $X_1$  and  $Y_1$ . Indonesia and Malaysia would not have come to an agreement if the result of the negotiations couldn't satisfy the negotiating team and its domestic constituents because ratifying the agreement is after a successful Level One agreement.

The 2019-2024 period is considered the crucial finalization process of the agreement negotiations. Any move at one board could trigger realignments on the other board that can put Indonesia at a disadvantage (Putnam 1988). The agreed territorial sea boundary line connecting Points 8, 8A, 88 and 8C in the Malacca Straits Treaty, and the territorial sea boundary line connecting Points M, B1, B, C and P in the Sulawesi Sea Agreement were finalized in the 34th meeting of the Malaysia-Indonesia Maritime Boundary Delimitation Negotiation Team on 17-18 November 2018 (“Kemlu Malaysia Jelaskan Traktat Batas Laut Terbaru Indonesia-Malaysia - ANTARA News,” n.d.).

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **LEVEL II DOMESTIC ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS**

Domestic and international elements interplay in a complicated way to form international negotiations. In particular, domestic politics have a significant influence on how state players engage during negotiations. Leaders and representatives who participate in international negotiations are subject to domestic political institutions, interest groups, and the public in addition to their international counterparts. A state's internal political dynamics must therefore be understood in order to analyze the results of diplomatic negotiations. Depending on how governance is set up, how important stakeholders' preferences are shared, and whether institutional mechanisms that either support or restrict the executive's decision-making power are in place, domestic political possibilities and limitations may benefit or harm international cooperation (Milner 1997).

Robert Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory (1988) provides a useful analytical framework for understanding international negotiations, particularly in cases where domestic and international factors simultaneously influence decision-making. According to Putnam's theory, negotiations take place on two interconnected levels: Level I, where national governments engage in negotiations with foreign counterparts to reach an international agreement, and Level II, where the agreement must be ratified or accepted by domestic actors like political elites, interest groups, and public constituencies (Putnam 1988). According to this concept, the negotiating process and the results of international accords are shaped by three essential components: power, preferences, and coalitions. Another

important aspect that is worth to be analyzed is how the political institutions also take part in influencing the negotiation process.

### **3.1 Power**

Power in Putnam's two-level game is the capacity of a negotiating player, be it a coalition, state leader, or institution, to direct the negotiation process and affect the results. The 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement involved distinct forms of power exercise at Level I, or the international level, and Level II, or the domestic level. At Level II, power was shared among a number of domestic parties with an interest in the final agreement, such as government ministries, legal professionals, the military (Indonesian Navy and Maritime Security Agency), and business sectors. The Indonesian Navy and the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), for instance, had significant influence because of their role in upholding maritime sovereignty, while the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of formulating negotiation strategies. In order to reach an agreement that protected Indonesia's economic interests and national security while remaining committed to international law, these domestic actors put pressure on the negotiators.

The Indonesian government that was led by the former President Joko Widodo during the 2019-2024 period was the key power that shaped Indonesian negotiation strategy. Aligning with the vision of “Global Maritime Fulcrum”, the priority of Jokowi’s administration was to protect the country’s sovereignty and its national resources. The coordinator for Indonesia’s diplomatic strategy was The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Retno Marsudi, which made sure that

Indonesia's stance was aligned with domestic priorities. The mandate to negotiate boundaries was given to the Technical Team, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pratomo 2018). In addition, the two treaties were signed by the respective Foreign Ministers of both countries and included in the joint statement between *His Excellency President of the Republic of Indonesia* and the *Honourable Prime Minister of Malaysia* on 8 June 2023. This shows that the president and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held very important power during the bilateral discussions of the 2023 agreement in the 2019-2024 period. A good relationship between President Joko Widodo and Malaysian Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim also facilitated the success of the negotiation.

The distribution of power was also present among other domestic actors in the negotiation. The Technical Team of the negotiation process was filled with various chosen officials from different ministries and agencies, but the objective remained the same which is to uphold Indonesia maritime sovereignty and its territorial waters while enhancing potential resources available in the maritime zones. Each representative of the different ministries and agencies had equal opportunity to share their perspectives and interests regarding the maritime boundaries treaty. If we look at some examples of the meetings that were being conducted, such as the 40th and 41st Technical Meeting for Determining Maritime Boundaries between Indonesia and Malaysia, on 20-22 July 2023 and on 14-15 November 2023, these meetings were a continuation of discussion of the joint statement issued by the Indonesian and Malaysian government. At the 40th meeting, the discussion was related to the settlement of the Intertidal Area from East Pillar to Low Water Line (LWL) on Sebatik Island. The discussion of this

settlement involved the Land Boundary Team and the Maritime Boundary Team (“Direktorat Jenderal Strategi Pertahanan Kemhan RI” 2023a). Meanwhile, the 41st meeting was a meeting of the Technical Working Group that discussed the decision of Indonesia to maintain a dual line position and Malaysia a single line position. The 41st meeting was attended by Indonesian and Malaysian delegations. The Indonesian delegation was led by the Director of Legal Affairs and Territorial Agreements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Chair of the Maritime Boundaries Technical Team whose members were from the Directorate of ASEAN cooperation (MoFA), representatives from the Directorate of General of Strategic Defense (Ministry of Defense), Directorate of Navigation (Ministry of Transportation), representatives from the Geospatial Information Agency, Indonesian National Army Operations Staff, Territorial staff of the Indonesian National Army, and representatives of The Naval Hydro-Oceanography Center (Pushidrosal) (“Direktorat Jenderal Strategi Pertahanan Kemhan RI” 2023b).

The parliamentary body holds responsibility for the ratification process of the 2023 Maritime Boundary Agreement. Ratification means the adoption/endorsement of a state document by parliament, especially ratification of laws, agreements between countries and international legal agreements. Thus, after Indonesia and Malaysia agreed to sign the two treaties through the joint statement, the 2023 Maritime Boundary Agreement went through the process of ratification so that the treaty would be applicable to the country as the subject of international law (Dinata 2021). The two treaties were then implemented in law or other forms of policy.

Each domestic actor has their own interest for the good of their constituents. These domestic actors and their different interests have power to either expand or constrain the “win-set”. The win-set should meet needs at the domestic level before it taken to the negotiation table. As Putnam’s stated, the win-set that gets the most approval at the domestic level, will have the greatest chance of being accepted by the other counterpart during the negotiation process. The size of the win-set itself is determined by the distribution of power, preferences and coalitions among Level II actors (Putnam 1988). Indonesia’s negotiators at the international level had to consider the political interest and landscape to make sure that the final treaty was accepted and ratified at the domestic level.

### **3.2 Preferences**


According to Robert Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory, domestic political interests and constraints influence international negotiations. Preferences in the two-level game framework are the particular goals, priorities, and interests of the domestic and foreign parties engaged in the negotiation process. The way domestic actors, including the lead negotiators, ministries, relevant agencies, security forces and parliament, are in formulating their preferences affects the win-set or the range of acceptable agreements at the international level. Domestic politics and actors in Indonesia influenced the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement by shaping the final deal that would serve the interests of the country while still being acceptable to important domestic players. In order to show how their interests affected the negotiation's conclusion and the

size of the win-set, this section examines the preferences of Indonesia's ministries, agencies, security forces, and parliaments.

It can be agreed that the 2023 agreement on the treaty of maritime delimitation in the Malacca Strait and Sulawesi Sea was not a one issue negotiation. It involved multi-issue negotiations that were also happening at other negotiation tables. Putnam said that “*Various groups at Level II are likely to have quite different preferences on the several issues involved in a multi-issue negotiation*” (Putnam 1988). This situation means the chief negotiator has to face trade-offs across different issues: how much to sacrifice on resource protection in order to get as much as territorial water zones, how much to yield on investment promotion to get a better deal on fishermen rights, and so on. The term to define the dynamic of the trade-offs for each respective win-set is called “*political indifference*”.

Figure 5 provides an illustrative analysis of these trade-offs. Let's say that A is Indonesia and B is Malaysia and both are pursuing approval from their domestic sides.

Figure 5. *Political indifference curves for two-issues negotiation*



Source: *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games*

Figure 5 shows ongoing multi-issue negotiations. The most preferred outcome for A that can automatically win approval is represented by  $(A_M)$ , and each concave curve to point  $(A_M)$  represents the possible trade-offs between the interests of ministries, agencies and security forces. The net vote here will be in favor of ratification of A's (Indonesia) Level II is constant. The bold contour  $A_1$ - $A_2$  represents the minimal vote Indonesia needs for ratification by the parliament, and Indonesia's win set is placed in the wedge-shaped area northeast of  $A_1$ - $A_2$ . For Malaysia,  $B_1$ - $B_2$  is the minimum outcome that can be ratified by their domestic constituencies, and the lens-shaped area between Indonesia's win-set  $A_1$ - $A_2$  and Malaysia's win-set  $B_1$ - $B_2$  represents the set of feasible agreements. In two level games, the possibility of package deals, such as those that happened in the joint

statement between Indonesia and Malaysia, help negotiators to provide a rich array of strategic alternatives.

The role of the negotiators at the domestic level is just as important as at the international level. To be able to win domestically and gain support from the different actors involved, negotiators must be able to consider the best determinants that can win support domestically. Preferences and coalitions are decisive factors that influenced the international win-set of Indonesia. The presence of the different ministries, agencies and security forces inside the Maritime Boundary Team for Indonesia showed that maritime boundary delimitation is very crucial. In the Indonesian domestic politics, there were a number of important players with different preferences involved in the negotiation process, including those outlined in the following paragraphs.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs which acted as the most important key player of the international negotiations process because the leaders of the negotiating team during the negotiation meetings were mostly representatives from this ministry. The negotiating team was called the Technical Maritime Boundaries Team, established in 2004, and it included several different experts from various fields in one team. The composition of Indonesia's negotiation team is a result of internal coordination between different ministries, agencies and security forces. Each institution will contribute based on their unique capabilities, for example, the Navy and BAKAMLA provided maritime operational insights, while the Ministry of Defense has expertise in security implications of the boundary delimitation process. Involving these different actors happened because the interest of the Indonesian government in maritime negotiations has shifted to broader aspects that

need careful consideration from various parties involved in order to protect Indonesia's national interest.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the lead representative of Indonesia in the bilateral negotiations and they had to ensure the country's interests and sovereignty were upheld. They held very important authority in maritime boundary negotiations, coordination between ministries, representation of the nation, formulation of policies and active engagement in high level discussions (Pratomo 2018). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Transportation emphasized maritime safety and the regulation of navigation routes, ensuring smooth and secure sea transport. In contrast, the Ministry of Defense concentrated on national security and territorial integrity, ensuring that Indonesia's maritime sovereignty remained protected.

The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) had interest in the negotiation process to safeguard the fishing zones and protect local fishermen by pushing the higher up levels of government to ratify policy in their favor. Chosen officials from this ministry brought the aspirations of Indonesia's fishing community and marine conservation efforts to the attention of the negotiating team. KKP has the technical data and expertise in their respective fields, which is very important in forming negotiations positions and strategies. They have the power to enforce and regulate maritime policies in Indonesia's jurisdiction (Suryadi et al. 2024)

The Indonesian National Army Forces (TNI) is responsible for safeguarding maritime sovereignty by deterring illegal activities near disputed waters. They are also took part in the negotiating team, because they had firsthand insights into what Indonesia was actually facing in the maritime borders, in terms of territorial

disputes and maritime threats. They understand the situation in the field better than any other individual, ministries or agencies. Their opinion gave an even stronger stance for Indonesia in the negotiations process. Defense considerations should be top priority for integration into the negotiation framework (Budiman, Abdurachman, and Nurhaliza 2023).

In addition to the actors mentioned above, there are other security agencies that have interest in safeguarding Indonesia's maritime interests. The Indonesian Navy and the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) focus on patrolling and securing Indonesia's vast maritime territories, particularly in areas vulnerable to smuggling, illegal fishing, and other unlawful activities. The Naval Hydro-Oceanography Center (PUSHIDROSAL) and the Geospatial Information Agency contributed their expertise in data collection and mapping, ensuring that maritime boundary negotiations were based on precise and accurate geographic coordinates. By combining diplomatic, economic, security, and technical expertise, these institutions worked together to protect Indonesia's interests in the 2023 maritime boundary agreement.

As for the Parliament, they act as the legislative body, which means they are responsible for the ratification process and their opinion will highly influence the Indonesian domestic constitutions. Parliament is also responsible for overseeing the process of the negotiation and discussing the updates in parliamentary meetings. They also have to make sure the negotiations align with national interests and legal framework.

During the negotiation of the two treaties, as outlined above, negotiations of other issues also occurred, such as: border crossings, border trade, investment

promotion, halal certification for domestic products, and protection of the fishermen. This shows that the agreement of the two maritime treaties could finally be agreed upon by the two nations after 18 years of negotiations because it also involved other agreements that had approval and support within the realm of domestic politics during ratification. The success of the negotiation at the international level cannot be separated from the distribution of preferences within the domestic constituents of the country.


### **3.3 Coalitions**

Putnam's two-level game theory defines coalitions as alliances or groups of individuals that affect the bargaining process, either within a single nation (domestic coalitions) or between nations (international coalitions) (Putnam, 1988). Because they might strengthen negotiating positions, demand particular results, or limit negotiators' flexibility, coalitions are essential. The Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement of 2023 involved both internal and international coalition operations. Domestic coalitions of the negotiating team are picked and managed through ministerial coordination. By involving representatives from ministries, agencies and security forces, the Indonesian government received strong political backing during President Joko Widodo's second term regarding the 2023 maritime boundary agreement. Coalitions during this period were also picked to reduce internal resistance and create a supportive environment for domestic negotiations. Indonesia's negotiation approach was shaped at the domestic level by

a collaboration of government ministries, agencies, and military forces. Internal factions or domestic constituents may support or block Level One agreement.

Figure 6 above represents a standard negotiation process between party A and party B in the Two Level Game theory. International negotiation between party A and B happens “at the table” with the objective of reaching a tentative agreement between the two negotiating teams of each country. Later on, the level one agreement is then subject to level two ratification on each “side” of the table (Sebenius 2013). The focus of the figure above is to highlight the Level Two domestic constituents or other “internal” factions, which can be referred to as the coalitions of each side. Level two domestic opponents/opposition are represented as A- and B- in the figure, while those pro-agreement are represented as A+ and B+. These domestic oppositions can block the deal that has been agreed on Level One because although they might represent a small group, their interests are influential enough to pressure Level One negotiators.

Figure 6. Standard Two-Level Game between Sides A and B



Source: Level Two Negotiations (Sebenius 2013)

During President Joko Widodo’s second term in 2019-2024, it can be said that there were no individuals, groups or coalitions that opposed the two treaties that delimitate territorial sea boundaries in the Malacca Strait and Sulawesi Sea.

Indonesia is moving towards ratification efforts by conducting separate discussions and meetings through their respective internal/domestic procedures. The following is a list of negotiations that happened after the joint statement on 8 June 2023:

1. 40th Technical Meeting on Determination of RI-Malaysia Maritime Boundaries, Melaka, Malaysia, 20-22 July 2023;
2. 1st Special Technical Meeting (STM) on Settlement of Intertidal Areas and Gaps in the RI-Malaysia Sulawesi Sea, Bandung, Indonesia, 1 September 2023;
3. Special Intersessional Technical Working Group (ITWG) Meeting on Coordinate/Datum Transformation, Bandung, Indonesia, 5-6 September 2023;
4. 1st Special Technical Working Group (STWG) Meeting on Settlement of Intertidal Areas and Gaps in the RI-Malaysia Sulawesi Sea, Bandung, Indonesia, 7 September 2023;
5. 2nd Special Technical Meeting (STM) on Settlement of Intertidal Areas and Gaps in the RI-Malaysia Sulawesi Sea, Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia, 28-29 September 2023;
6. 41st Technical Meeting on Maritime Boundary Determination, Tangerang, Indonesia, 14-15 November 2023; and
7. 3rd Special Technical Meeting (STM) on Settlement of Intertidal Areas and Gap in the RI-Malaysia Sulawesi Sea, Tangerang, Indonesia, 16-17 November 2023. (“Laporan Kinerja Ditjen HPI” 2023)

Level 1 analysis was conducted quite successfully and the two sides finally agreed to sign the agreement. From here and on, there will be countless meetings

and discussions between the two countries and, most importantly, discussions seeking domestic approval.

We have seen that Indonesia's domestic interests vary a lot according to their priorities and this can be an opportunity for Indonesia to create international cooperation. An internal debate or domestic conflicting interest will result in a divided domestic landscape but it actually gives the negotiators ability to build concessions on one issue whilst securing gains in another. In contrast, when the interest domestically is homogenous, this leads to a more rigid and difficult negotiation. As for the leader, having strong support is not always the answer, as Putnam has said. There is a paradoxical fact that when a leader has strong domestic support, it could lead to the counterparts demanding a greater concession because of the leader's power position. Meanwhile if a leader seems to be faced with a significant amount of domestic opposition and internal constraint, this condition can be used as a strategy to argue that any deal has to be acceptable to the skeptical opposition, and thus, it can sometimes lead to more favorable international outcomes.

Putnam mentioned in his theory that there is a possibility of failed ratification because of *voluntary* and *involuntary defection*. Voluntary defection is simply a situation in which a country chooses to abandon an agreement, because they think it is no longer in line with their national interests and by abandoning the agreement will help the country to gain more benefits, rather than staying in the agreement. If a country chooses to do this, it is also because there are no strong enforcement mechanisms that could prevent defection from a party. Involuntary defection, on the other hand, happens when a country wants to follow through with

the agreement but is unable to do so because there is not enough approval from domestic institutions and they refuse to ratify or implement the agreement.

Looking at the 2023 agreement situation, there is only a very small chance that one of the parties will voluntarily defect to the other party because during President Joko Widodo's second term, Indonesia and Malaysia had a good bilateral relationship. The consequences of voluntary defection are considerable and can result in loss of trust that could affect future agreements and the relationship of the two countries. In addition, the probability of an involuntary defection is also very small in the ratification process of the 2023 agreement because 80 percent of the House of Representative is to be said in President Jokowi's coalition (The Jakarta Post 2024), but approval from domestic institutions could still go either way for the Indonesian side. If it fails to gain domestic approval from parliament, then this would be considered an act of involuntary defection because the negotiator failed to deliver their commitments. Seeing the situation surrounding the 2023 agreement in Indonesian domestic politics, where the ministries, agencies and security forces that were involved in the negotiation have all benefited from the joint statement and agreements signed, there should be strong support domestically to pressure the parliament to ratify the 2023 agreement.

### **The Current State of Ratification**

As of early 2024, the ratification process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreements remains underway, with continuations meeting taking place after the signing of the Joint Statement. The agreement will need approval from the Indonesian Parliament before it is fully in force. The ratification

process is influenced by domestic actors, aside from the President himself. The Commission 1 of the House of Representatives (DPR) that is responsible to oversee matters related to foreign affairs and defense will have to review and discuss the agreement in a parliamentary meeting later on. Their opinions are considered pivotal since the main tasks of Commission 1 include: to oversee defence policies, oversight foreign policies, diplomatic relations, international agreements, etc. Other key stakeholders that probably will influence the ratification process are:

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: will serve as policy facilitator and communicator in the ratification process, as they have the legal, strategic and technical documentation of the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreements.
2. Ministry of Defense and the Indonesia Navy (TNI AL): both will also be participating in the hearings as they have a strong stake in boundary agreements. TNI AL will make sure that the agreement doesn't have a negative effect on Indonesia's maritime posture. Military perspective will have influence on the ratification process because they can see whether the agreements are strengthening or weakening Indonesia's position.
3. Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs: This ministry will participate during the ratification process with the House of Representative, since the parliament will need opinions regarding maritime economic zones, fisheries access and resource management. This ministry will provide input and justification on how the treaties will affect the exclusive economic zones (EEZs), shipping routes and investment opportunities.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **CONCLUSION**

#### **4.1 Conclusion**

This thesis set out to examine the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement during President Joko Widodo's second term, with focus on the interplay between international factors and domestic politics during international negotiations. By applying Robert Putnam's Two Level Game theory, this study has demonstrated how Level 1 international analysis interplay with Level 2 domestic politics influenced international negotiations, and vice versa.

At Level 1, the negotiation process involved multiple actors from the Indonesian constituents, including the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Technical Maritime Boundaries Team, and several government agencies, all working under the leadership of President Joko Widodo (2019-2024) and Minister Retno Marsudi. Indonesia's national interest saw a shift from a focus on resource maximization to broader interests, including navigation, fisheries, legal and security affairs. During Level 1 negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Joint Indonesia-Malaysia (JIM) Boundary Committee was used to facilitate the negotiation process.

Indonesia's strategy in the negotiation process was to uphold the UNCLOS framework and use it as its bargaining power. In addition to that, Indonesia also prepared a set of possible agreements before coming to the negotiation table that Putnam referred to as "Win-Set". Win-Set ensured that the 2023 maritime boundary

agreement reached at the international level was accepted domestically, preventing backlash or rejection. Level 1 negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia resulted in the signing of the *Treaty between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia Relating to the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries in the Southernmost Part of the Straits of Melaka* (signed 8 June 2023) and *Treaty between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia Relating to the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries in the Sulawesi Sea* (signed 8 June 2023).

Level 2 analysis highlights how domestic actors shape international negotiations. Domestic politics influenced Indonesia's *win-set* in negotiation with Malaysia through three important factors: distribution of power, preferences and coalitions. Government ministries, security forces and agencies have the power to directly influence the negotiations process because of their direct involvement in the Technical Maritime Boundaries Team, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Each representative has a different interest and perspective on the issue, and it is important to balance these interests in order to gain domestic support for the ratification process.

However, during President Joko Widodo's second term, the ratification process was yet to be finalized but looking at the continuation of meetings after the agreement was signed, this is positive progress towards ratification. The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia will be the institution that is responsible to review and determine whether the international agreement will be formally adopted and implemented. Seeing the involvement of different parties during the negotiation process and how they gained benefits from the joint

statement, there is clearly strong support from domestic coalitions that will facilitate the ratification process.

This study contributes to the broader discourse on maritime boundary negotiations by demonstrating how the domestic political dynamics of Indonesia influence its international agreements. It also provides insights into how Indonesia's strategic approach to solving territorial disputes may be used as a reference for future diplomatic negotiations.

## **4.2 Recommendation**

This study analyzed the negotiation process of the 2023 Indonesia-Malaysia Maritime Boundary Agreement during President Joko Widodo's second term, particularly the interplay of international factors and domestic politics during the international negotiations. However, research remains open in many areas, such as policy impact and the evolving domestic political landscape. Future research could explore the impact of the agreement on Indonesia's maritime security and sovereignty. Furthermore, changes in leadership that could influence Indonesia's domestic politics and the shaping of its foreign policy decisions could also be investigated.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Book

- Arsana, I. Made Andi. 2007. *Batas Maritim Antarnegara: Sebuah Tinjauan Teknis Dan Yuridis*. Cet. 1. Bulaksumur, Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press.
- Boşilcă, Ruxandra-Laura, Susana de Sousa Ferreira, and Barry J. Ryan, eds. 2022. *Routledge Handbook of Maritime Security*. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
- Bradford, John F., Jane Chan, Stuart B. Kaye, Clive H. Schofield, Geoffrey Till, and W. S. G. Bateman, eds. 2022. *Maritime Cooperation and Security in the Indo-Pacific Region: Essays in Honour of Sam Bateman*. Leiden ; Boston: Brill Nijhoff.
- Elferink, A.G.O., T. Henriksen, and S.V. Busch. 2018. *Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Case Law: Is It Consistent and Predictable?* Cambridge University Press. <https://books.google.co.id/books?id=d3VKDwAAQBAJ>.
- Febrica, Senia. 2017. *Maritime Security and Indonesia: Cooperation, Interests and Strategies*. 1st ed. New York : Routledge, 2017. | Series: Routledge contemporary Southeast Asia series ; 86: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315541815>.
- Forbes, Vivian Louis. 2014. *Indonesia's Delimited Maritime Boundaries*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54395-1>.
- Gerstl, Alfred, and Mária Strašáková, eds. 2016. *Unresolved Border, Land and Maritime Disputes in Southeast Asia: Bi- and Multilateral Conflict Resolution Approaches and ASEAN's Centrality*. BRILL. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004312180>.
- Kwa, Chong Guan, and John Kristen Skogan, eds. 2008. *Maritime Security in Southeast Asia*. Reprint. Routledge Security in Asia Series 4. London: Routledge.
- Leng, L.Y. n.d. *The Razor's Edge: Boundaries and Boundary Dispute in Southeast Asia*. Institute of Southeast Asian. <https://books.google.co.id/books?id=OE4UPRuyNtoC>.
- Milner, Helen V. 1997. *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42 (3): 427–60. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027697>.
- Singh, D. S. Ranjit. 2020. *The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute Concerning Sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands: Historical Antecedents and the International Court of Justice Judgment*. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.

### Government Report

- "Annual Press Statement Of The Minister For Foreign Affairs Of The Republic Of Indonesia 2021 | Portal Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia." n.d. Accessed May 22, 2024. <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/2048/berita/annual-press-statement-of->

[the-minister-for-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-2021](#).

“Laporan Kinerja Ditjen HPI.” 2023. Direktorat Jenderal Hukum dan Perjanjian Internasional. <https://kemlu.go.id/files-service/storage/repositori/65413/LKJ%20DITJEN%20HPI%20TA%202023.pdf>.

### **Journal Article**

Amer, Ramses. 1998. “Expanding ASEAN’s Conflict Management Framework in Southeast Asia: The Border Dispute Dimension.” *Asian Journal of Political Science* 6 (2): 33–56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185379808434124>.

Bernard, Leonardo. 2012. “Whose Side Is It On? – The Boundaries Dispute in the North Malacca Strait.” *Indonesian Journal of International Law* 9 (3). <https://doi.org/10.17304/ijil.vol9.3.352>.

Bradford, Lieutenant John F. 2005. “THE GROWING PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.” *Naval War College Review* 58 (3): 63–86.

Budiman, Imam, Bulbul Abdurachman, and Aura Nurhaliza. 2023. “THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL NAVY (TNI AL) IN STRENGTHENING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS IN INDONESIA” 13 (1).

Dinata, Ari Wirya. 2021. “THE DYNAMICS OF RATIFICATION ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TREATY UNDER INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM.” *Jurnal Hukum Dan Peradilan* 10 (2): 197. <https://doi.org/10.25216/jhp.10.2.2021.197-218>.

Gindarsah, Iis, and Adhi Priamarizki. 2015. “INDONESIA’S MARITIME DOCTRINE AND SECURITY CONCERNS.” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05869>.

Hadi, Syamsul. 2014. “THE DISPUTE OF AMBALAT IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-NEW ORDER ERA.” *Indonesian Journal of International Law* 12 (1). <https://doi.org/10.17304/ijil.vol12.1.589>.

Hasan, Md. Monjur, He Jian, Md. Wahidul Alam, and K M Azam Chowdhury. 2019. “Protracted Maritime Boundary Disputes and Maritime Laws.” *Journal of International Maritime Safety, Environmental Affairs, and Shipping* 2 (2): 89–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/25725084.2018.1564184>.

Laksmiana, Evan A. 2018. “Maritime Security and Indonesia: Cooperation, Interests, and Strategies; Unresolved Border, Land and Maritime Disputes in Southeast Asia: Bi-and Multinational Conflict Resolution Approaches and ASEAN’s Centrality.” *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 54 (2): 270–74. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2018.1522704>.

Madjid, M. Adnan, Widodo Widodo, and Eko G. Samudro. 2019. “The Implementation of Sinking Illegal Fishing Vessels Policy Towards the Bilateral Relations between Indonesia and Malaysia.” *Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review* 4 (2): 191–207. <https://doi.org/10.15294/ipsr.v4i2.18767>.

Mahyudin, Emil, Gilang Nur Alam, Rmt Nurhasan Affandi, Windy Dermawan, and Fuad Azmi. 2022. “Challenges and Implications of Indonesia’s Strategic Position in Maritime Security.” *Journal of Governance* 7 (2). <https://doi.org/10.31506/jog.v7i2.15169>.

- Maswandi, Maswandi. 2022. "The Management Of The Border Region In Perspective International Law (Indonesia-Malaysia)." *International Asia Of Law and Money Laundering (IAML)* 1 (1): 13–22. <https://doi.org/10.59712/iaml.v1i1.4>.
- Pratomo, Eddy, and Jonathan Kwik. 2020. "Good Agreements Make Good Neighbours: Settlements on Maritime Boundary Disputes in South East Asia." *Marine Policy* 117 (July):103943. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103943>.
- Pratomo, Eddy. 2016. "Indonesia–Malaysia Maritime Boundaries Delimitation: A Retrospective." *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs* 8 (1): 73–84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/18366503.2016.1174362>.
- Rantau Itasari, Endah. 2020. "BORDER MANAGEMENT BETWEEN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA IN INCREASING THE ECONOMY IN BOTH BORDER AREAS." *Jurnal Komunikasi Hukum (JKH)* 6 (1): 219. <https://doi.org/10.23887/jkh.v6i1.23473>.
- Ruhana, Siti, and Tun Abdul Karim. 2024. "Indonesia vs. Malaysia: The Battle for Border Territory Resolved." *International Law Discourse in Southeast Asia* 3 (1). <https://doi.org/10.15294/ildisea.v3i1.78889>.
- Schofield, Clive. 2021. "Options for Overcoming Overlapping Maritime Claims." *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 8 (2): 21–41.
- Sebenius, James K. 2013. "Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its 'Behind-the-Table' Challenges." *Negotiation Journal* 29 (1): 7–21. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nej.12002>.
- Storey, Ian. 2009. "MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Two Cheers for Regional Cooperation." *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 36–58.
- Yusof, Salma, and Mazura Md Saman. 2023. "The Demarcation of Malaysia-Indonesia Maritime Boundaries: A Review." *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences* 13 (4): Pages 624-636. <https://doi.org/10.6007/IJARBS/v13-i4/16667>.

### **Legal Document**

- United Nations, United. 1945. "Charter of the United Nations." Statute. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>.

### **Website Article**

- "Direktorat Jenderal Strategi Pertahanan Kemhan RI." 2023a. Pertemuan Teknis Ke-40 Penetapan Batas Maritim RI-Malaysia. July 23, 2023. <https://www.kemhan.go.id/strahan/2023/07/23/pertemuan-teknis-ke-40-penetapan-batas-maritim-ri-malaysia.html>.
- "Kemlu Malaysia Jelaskan Traktat Batas Laut Terbaru Indonesia-Malaysia - ANTARA News." n.d. Accessed March 8, 2025. <https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/3598860/kemlu-malaysia-jelaskan-traktat-batas-laut-terbaru-indonesia-malaysia>.
- Laksmiana, Evan A. 2024. "Indonesia's Reference-Point Diplomacy Decade under Jokowi." *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, October. <https://www.iiss.org/sv/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/10/indonesias-reference-point-diplomacy-decade-under-jokowi/>.

- Post, The Jakarta. n.d. "Malaysia-Indonesia Maritime Treaty: One Step Forward, Never a Step Back - Academia." The Jakarta Post. Accessed May 22, 2024. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2023/07/04/malaysia-indonesia-maritime-treaty-one-step-forward-never-a-step-back.html>.
- Suryadi, Suryadi, Sulistyowati Sulistyowati, Dewi Nadya Maharani, and Gusti Bintang Maharaja. 2024. "Maritime Boundary Arrangements with Other Countries and The Economic Impact on Indonesian Fishermen." Edited by G. Jameson, I. Gibson, P. Doumenq, T. Yamamoto, T. Mare, and H. Pardi. *BIO Web of Conferences* 134:07001. <https://doi.org/10.1051/bioconf/202413407001>.
- The Jakarta Post, Editorial. 2024. "Wanted: An Opposition." May 27, 2024. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2024/05/27/wanted-an-opposition.html>. Website Article.