Related lending  is often done in  groups, especially business with  pyramid 
ownership structure which is company characteristic in Indonesia.  Related lending 
in addition to  providing benefits also  provide a number  of risks on to  the agency 
problem, as in the acquisition of  rights of minority shareholders through tunneling 
activity.  The  aim  in  this  study  was  to  examine  the  factors  that  influence  the 
tunneling of related lending to public companies in Indonesia. The  study was  conducted  on  companies other  than  banks  and financial institutions  listed   in  the  Indonesia  stock   exchange  for  the   years  2007-2012. 
Tunneling  related  lending are  measured  from  the  difference between  the  other 
related  payables  and  other  related  receivables.  Pyramid ownership  structure  is 
measured from  the difference between the  control rights to  cash flow rights.  The 
data of foreign and  family ultimate controller owner  obtained from the ranking of 
100 business groups in Indonesia from Globe Asia magazine. The proportion of non 
controlling  institutional ownership  measured the  proportion of  shares owned  by 
non-controlling institutions divided by the total shares. Measured by the proportion 
of independent board of commissioners who  are not affiliated with the controlling 
owner of  the total  commissioners. Financial  crisis is  a dummy  variable /  binary 
which  differentiate periods  of  crisis  and not  a  crisis.  Data  analysis by  logistic 
regression analysis. The study  found the  following results.  1) The  ownership structure of  the 
pyramid has a positive influence on tunneling of related lending. 2) Controlling the 
end of the family has a positive influence on tunneling of related lending. 3) Control 
of  foreign end  have  a positive  influence  on tunneling  of  related  lending. 4)  an 
independent  Commissioner no  significant effect  on tunneling  related lending.  5) 
institutional ownership has  a negative effect  on tunneling related  lending. 6)  The 
financial crisis does  not significantly influence  the loan related to tunneling.  This 
study provides empirical evidence that  the loan transactions with related parties  is 
a  means of  tunneling,  although  the regulatory  framework  has undergone  many 
improvements since the Asian financial  crisis of 1997. The ownership structure of 
the pyramid  and family ownership  is not necessarily  bad, but the  findings of this 
study provide evidence that the risk of the type of ownership. 
Keywords: related lending, tunneling, agency problem