

**INDONESIAN COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY AFTER THE 2018
SURABAYA BOMB ATTACK**



**UNIVERSITAS
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2023

INDONESIAN COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY AFTER THE 2018

SURABAYA BOMB ATTACK

UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

Proposed to the Department of International Relations
Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences

Universitas Islam Indonesia

As a partial fulfillment of requirement to earn

Bachelor Degree in International Relations



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AUTHORIZATION PAGE

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Defended in front of Board of Examiners
in the Department of International Relations
Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences
Universitas Islam Indonesia

As a partial fulfillment of requirement to earn
Bachelor Degree of International Relations



Date

12 October 2023

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No other materials are used other than those contained. I have read and understood the university's rules and procedures regarding plagiarism.

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Indah Kusuma Pertiwi

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ABSTRACT

Ever since the US's World Trade Center was the target of the 9/11 attack, terrorism has gained international attention. That incident spread anxiety and unease among people in the US and around the world. Indonesia has also dealt with numerous cases of terrorism, one of which was the Bali Bombing (Bali Bomb 1) which resulted in 202 deaths, including both Indonesian citizens and foreigners. As terrorism has become a global issue, Indonesia has begun implementing anti-terrorism measures, although bombings have continued. The Surabaya bomb in 2018 was one which caught the interest of many people as children and women were involved as perpetrators in this atrocious act that targeted 3 churches in Surabaya. In this research, the writer will analyse the measures implemented by the Indonesian government after the Surabaya bomb in 2018 using the counterterrorism theory and the variables of repression, physical security, and intelligence gathering.

Keywords: *Counterterrorism, Repression, Physical security, Intelligence gathering.*

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Terrorism has become a global concern ever since the 9th of September attack, often referred to as the 9/11 attack, that targeted the World Trade Center in the US. The attack instilled fear and insecurity in people in the US and all over the world. Ambassador Philip Wilcox Jr. stated at the time that the aftermath of terrorism attacks anywhere in the world affects people all around the world as terrorists commonly attack innocent and unarmed civilians. Their time of attack is unpredictable, meaning that it can happen to anyone at any time. Consequently people, and even states, feel helpless and defenceless when it comes to terror attacks.

The term counter terrorism and the establishment of counter terrorism were derived from the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. The first ever counter terrorism team established was the Special Irish Branch of the Metropolitan Police. The role of counter terrorism is to conduct preventive measures against terrorism, initiating foreign relations and cooperation, and to neutralise the radicalised minds of the terrorists. Counter terrorism is a complex process that implements both hard and soft approaches, involving not only military armed forces, regulations, and sanctions, but also involving educating people and even ex terrorists about radical ways of

thinking. It also encourages acceptance of ex terrorists and the family members of terrorists. Indonesia has made several efforts in counter terrorism such as establishing a deradicalisation program and a constitution for acts of terrorism which is Law No. 15/2003 on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism, and forming the Detachment 88 or *Densus 88* which was formed specifically for dealing with terrorism in Indonesia. Indonesia has actively cooperating with the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force and has been recognised by the UN through its re-election as a member of the United Nations Counter Terrorism Advisory Council in the period of 2015-2018 (Zulian, 2018).

Indonesia has dealt with numerous cases of terrorism with the first ever terrorism case being in 1981 when the Garuda Indonesia flight number 206 that departed from Jakarta was hijacked by 5 terrorists from *Komando Jihad* (Azanella & Nugroho, 2022), an Indonesian Islamic extremist group. Terrorism became more present after the incident of the Bali bombing on the 12th of September 2002 and the following bomb attack that targeted the JW Marriott in Jakarta that occurred on the 5th of August 2003. Noordin M Top, who was a member of *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI), has often been associated with terror attacks that happened in Indonesia after the attacks that happened in the year 2000. *Jemaah Islamiyah* is an Islamic militant organisation in Southeast Asia that seeks to establish a giant Islamic state in the territories of the countries of Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. *Jemaah Islamiyah* is one of the terrorist groups that has conducted a number of attacks in Indonesia, such as the Christmas Eve bombing on the 24th December 2000

that killed 18 people and injured many. This incident was an attack on several churches in Jakarta, Pekanbaru, Medan, Bandung, Batam, Mojokerto, Mataram, and Sukabumi. Jemaah *Islamiyah* is also responsible for the attacks that happened in Bali in 2002 and on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004 (Jeffery, 2004).

Indonesia's war against terrorism is a never-ending issue. One of the main causes of terrorism in Indonesia is the terrorists' own political ideas. For instance, terrorist groups like MIT and JAD have the ideology of "*Takfir*" which views other Muslims as "*Kafir*" or infidels. They have manipulated the term " *Jihad*" to justify the slaughter of others for the cause of Islam. *Jihad* is frequently seen as the primary idea that serves as the foundation for terrorist groups operating under the garb of Islam. The notion of *Jihad* is so powerful that it may drive individual terrorists to commit acts of violence (Gayatri, 2021). The Surabaya bomb in 2018 gained the attention of many people as women and children were known to be involved in conducting the suicide bombing. The involvement of women and children in inhumane activities is concerning and causes people to doubt Indonesia's policies as their involvement may be the result of institutionalised indoctrination. The realisation of how alarming the issue of terrorism is in Indonesia has become one of the reasons why Indonesia's government has made several efforts to combat terrorism within the country, although these haven't been without challenges and flaws.

The Surabaya bomb attack in 2018 caused several casualties. It was found that a family of six, involving girls of the ages 9 and 12 and two boys of the ages of 16 and 18, were the perpetrators of this tragedy. The perpetrators targeted 3 churches -

the Santa Maria Church, Surabaya Pentecostal Church and Diponegoro Indonesian Christian Church - and resulted in the death of 18 people, including the perpetrators, and injury to another 40 people (BBC, 2018). The perpetrators are suspected of being linked to terrorists from the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah Surabaya network. This was also the first ever recorded bomb terror that involved both women and children; therefore, it is important to understand and scrutinise the efforts and strategies of the Indonesian government in the aftermath. Indonesia has implemented several measures in order to combat terrorism for instance, which has included a soft approach through which a deradicalisation program has been established to neutralise the doctrine of radicalism in terrorists and reintegrate ex terrorists back to society. Secondly, the government has strengthened the military power by enhancing the weaponry of security forces. Thirdly, Law No. 15 Year 2003 on the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism was ratified in order to provide legal procedures and sanctions on terrorists. Lastly, the government has engaged in international cooperation, for example with Australia in order to detect cross-border mobilisation of terrorists, investigate international terrorist networks, and implement several measures within the country (Hasanah, 2018).

Several studies that have been done that concern Indonesia's terrorism and Indonesia's efforts in counter terrorism. A study done by Fahadayna (2021) describes how Indonesia has started to create a relationship with Australia, in efforts to counter terrorism, by making Australia a facilitator for weapons, technology, and funding. Another study conducted by Juwana (2014) showed that Indonesia has tried several

approaches to eradicating terrorism, including the Anti-Terrorism Law which threatens those who conduct terrorist acts with the death penalty. In addition, another study has found that in its approach to eradicating terrorism in Indonesia, the Indonesian government has preferred a more repressive approach in policies and strategies, one of which is the Detachment 88 which has violated human rights several times (Kusuma et al., 2019)

This present research aims to focus on analysing the strategies and policies of Indonesia's government in its efforts towards counterterrorism in the country. This research has the objectives of understanding and analysing the policies and strategies made by the Indonesian government in the context of counterterrorism and, in particular, in the case of the Surabaya bomb attack in 2018.

1.2 Research Question

Given the background outlined above, the research question is how did the Indonesian government respond to the 2018 Surabaya bomb attack?

1.3 Research objectives

The objective of this research is to understand the policies and strategies made by the Indonesian government in the aftermath of the Surabaya bomb attack in 2018.

1.4 Research Scope

In this research, the researcher focuses on analysis that is related to the Surabaya bombings that occurred in 2018 with the reason being that these bombings were the first terrorist case that involved children or a family as perpetrators. Other bombings in Indonesia have mostly involved individual terrorists that are tied to a certain terrorist group. The Surabaya bombings in 2018, however, involved a family of six, the parents and four underaged children. In 2018 alone, there were a total of four bomb attacks in Surabaya. Indonesia has made several efforts to counter terrorism since the early 2000s, for instance with the ratification of the Law No. 15 of 2003 on the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism by Megawati Soekarnoputri on the 4th of April 2003, the efforts made by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's governance during his presidency including but not limited to the establishment of the special force Detachment 88, establishment of international cooperation with Australia and multilateral cooperation through the United Nations (Sumardewi, 2014), and also, the establishment of the deradicalization program by the National Counter Terrorism Agency or BNPT in 2010. Despite the numerous efforts made by the Indonesian government to combat terrorism, there have still been countless bomb terrors caused by terrorists such as the Bali Bomb 2, Australian Embassy bomb, and the JW Marriot bomb. This research will look at the response of the Indonesian government after the Surabaya bomb in 2018 until the end of 2018. Therefore, a thorough analysis is needed of the efforts made by the Indonesian government in trying to counter terrorism as the involvement of children and women in terror attacks in Surabaya in 2018 is an alarming issue.

1.5 Literature review

Plenty of previous studies and research regarding terrorism and counterterrorism have been conducted. The writer of this research conducted a literature review to gain references for the analysis and concept of this research.

An article written by Santhana Dass with the title ‘The Use of Family Networks in Suicide Terrorism: a case study of the 2018 Surabaya attacks’ explains how the use of family networks, specifically, women and children is beneficial and being taken advantage of by terrorist groups. The article then goes on to explain how people are usually easier to lure to an activity that involves religious aspects and involvement rather than those that are related to their nationalism. The writer of the article also provides reasons on the motivations of terrorists for their terror acts such as ideology, personal reasons, and socioeconomic crisis. This article is fruitful for its explanations on the use of family networks in terrorist acts and the advantages of it; however, the writer does not explain the policies and strategies of the Indonesian government in combating terrorism nor the effectiveness of them (Dass, 2021). Thus, this research will provide the efforts and strategies that the Indonesian government has implemented.

Secondly, Meijer, et al. have written an article titled ‘Counter Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia’. In their article, they describe how Indonesia, a country with a Muslim majority, has been said to be successfully tackling Islamic radicalism and terrorism after the fall of Suharto’s new order regime. They argued that although Indonesia has had a rocky journey in combating radicalism

and terrorism, Indonesia's hard and soft approaches can be examples for other countries. This article is useful in providing information on Indonesia's efforts in trying to combat radicalism and terrorism; however, this study did not look at Indonesia's efforts in combating terrorism after the Surabaya Bomb incident in 2018 as the research was conducted quite some time ago (Meijer, et al., 2012). Therefore, the writer of this research will look at the strategies and efforts of the Indonesian government after the Surabaya bombings in 2018.

Thirdly, a journal titled 'The Effectiveness of the Deradicalization Program in Southeast Asia: Does it Work?; The Case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore' written by Yosua Praditya Suratman has looked at the several efforts of Indonesia to tackle radicalism. This journal also assessed the effectiveness of the program and found that some deradicalisation programs actually are not effective as some ex-extremists rejoined their previous groups. This journal is fruitful as it discusses the effectiveness of deradicalisation programs in Indonesia; however, the authors did not assess the deradicalisation programs in Indonesia after the Surabaya bomb in 2018 (Supratman, 2017). On the other hand, this research will include not only the deradicalisation program but also the measures that the Indonesian government took after the Surabaya bombings in 2018.

Lastly, Sylvia Windya Laksmi published a journal titled 'An Analysis of Government Capabilities in Countering Terrorist Financing in Indonesia'. The journal explained that terrorists often adapt to changes in legislation, policy and social trends. This journal also provided some criticism of CFT and how it is falling behind in terms of technology. This journal is useful to the current study as it analyses one of

the counter terrorism efforts in Indonesia; however, it does only focus on one aspect of counter terrorism efforts in Indonesia which is the funding of terrorist groups (Laksmi, 2022). On the contrary, this present research will outline all of the efforts and strategies that the Indonesian government has done since the Surabaya bomb incident in 2018.

The writer of this research has come across several studies on counterterrorism. The existing research is useful and very insightful, giving the writer ideas and knowledge. However, no studies or research were found that discuss Indonesia's policies and strategies on counter terrorism with specific reference to the Surabaya bomb attacks in 2018.

1.6 Research Framework

The research framework that this research will be based on is counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a concept that focuses on the efforts and strategies made to combat terrorism through several approaches, including both hard and soft approaches. According to Lutz & Lutz in their book titled 'Terrorism: The Basics', counterterrorism can be dealt with in various ways, such as treating terrorism like a war, criminal activity, or a disease and therefore, fighting against it with repression. In this approach, a state uses their military forces to counter attack terrorists. Other hard approaches that Lutz & Lutz mentioned are strengthening physical security to intensify security from all aspects of the state, retaliation in which the state retaliates against terrorists with military actions or with covert operations, and using special forces in which a state establishes a special unit force to specifically

fight against terrorism. However, hard approaches are sometimes not enough to combat a problem. Lutz & Lutz also mentioned some soft approaches in their book including intelligence gathering by using intelligence for early warning and early detection, attacking the terrorists' financial sources in order to stop the flow of funds to terrorist groups, cooperating internationally by working with other states to combat terrorism collectively, implementing concessions and reforms in which the state changes their policies to create more difficulties for terrorists in carrying out their actions, negotiating with terrorists, demobilising terrorist group members, , and using counterterrorism civil liberties which is especially important for democratic states because it considers the civil liberties and freedom of citizens in order to increase the security of the state.

Indonesia has implemented several of the counterterrorism efforts proposed by Lutz & Lutz, including repression which is an approach conducted by security forces to counteract those who have used violence, for example, by arresting or eliminating them. Physical security has also been implemented which aims to intensify the security of Indonesia across all aspects of the country, including protecting places of worship. Intelligence gathering is also used to help track the mobilisation of terrorists, acquire essential information on terrorists, suspected terrorists, and their plans, and to provide early warning and detection to prevent and fight against terrorism using intelligence and technologies. Several strategies have been implemented by the Indonesian government to counter terrorism after the Surabaya bomb attacks in 2018 specifically, repression, physical security, and intelligence gathering.

The reason as to why the writer of this research chose counterterrorism as the framework of this research is because the main focus of this study is to understand the strategies and policies made by the Indonesian government towards counterterrorism. In line with the concepts of counterterrorism by Lutz & Lutz, the writer of the research will use several concepts, such as repression, physical security, and intelligence gathering, that are the concepts most relevant to the Surabaya bomb attacks in 2018. As counterterrorism is a concept that aims to prevent and eradicate terrorism and potential terrorists, the writer of this research views the concept as well fitted to the study at hand.

1.7 Provisional Argument

According to Lutz & Lutz, there are several aspects of counterterrorism which range from hard approaches to soft approaches. Indonesia has carried out several of these efforts, namely repression, which included the arrests of several terrorists and suspected terrorists mainly in the area of East Java, physical security, which aims to intensify the security of Indonesia through airports and place of worship, specifically churches, and intelligence gathering, which has helped in collecting data of terrorists and suspected terrorists. Indonesia has used repression against terrorists and suspected terrorists, which can be seen specifically in the arrests of terrorists after the Surabaya bombings in 2018. Secondly, ever since this incident, Indonesia has been intensifying the security of several aspects across the whole of Indonesia, notably in airports and churches. Lastly, Indonesia has used their intelligence team to further

investigate terrorists in Indonesia by collecting data of terrorist convicts in East Java and their mobilisation.

1.8 Research methods

1.8.1 Type of the Research

The research method used in this research is a qualitative method by reviewing the strategies and policies of Indonesia on counter terrorism, analysing the cases that happened in Indonesia, and by reading journals and articles regarding the strategies and policies on counter terrorism in Indonesia. A data validity check was done to prove certainty of research using reliability and objectivity tests.

1.8.2 Subject and Object of the Research

The subject of this research is the policy makers which is the government of Indonesia. In this research, the object is Indonesia's policies and strategies on counterterrorism after the Surabaya bomb attack in 2018.

1.8.3 Method of Data Collection

The data collection method used in this research is documents and records by using articles, literatures, and case studies. The writer of this research used literature studies, articles, and past case studies in order to understand and analyse the policies and strategies that have been implemented. The writer also used several interviews found on social media platforms.

1.8.4 Process of the Research

In the research process, the writer accumulated data from reliable and valid sources, such as journals, books, and articles. The writer then wrote systematically about the efforts made by the Indonesian government on counterterrorism and further analysed them. Finally, the writer drew conclusions based on the research findings.

1.9 Thesis Outline

The chapter structure of this research is as follows:

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the writer explains the background of the problem to be discussed, provides a literature review, and presents the research question, research significance, research objectives, and research scope.

CHAPTER II: TERRORISM IN INDONESIA

This chapter consists of the history of the emergence of terrorism in Indonesia and also elaborates on the Surabaya bomb attacks in 2018.

CHAPTER III: ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA'S POLICIES AND STRATEGIES ON COUNTERTERRORISM

In this chapter, the writer analyses the data that was collected based on the objectives and the research question. The effectiveness of Indonesia's policies and strategies on counter terrorism is also analysed based on the efforts made by Indonesia.

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION

This chapter presents the results found by the writer and provides answers to the research question. Here the writer also makes conclusions that encompass the whole research and gives recommendations. In addition, this chapter acts as the closing of the research.

CHAPTER 2

SURABAYA BOMB ATTACKS IN 2018

2.1 Terrorism in Indonesia

Global terrorism has been around for a long time. The infamous term of terrorism became widely known in the 18th century and this phenomenon is no longer novel to society and politics. The brutal decapitation of 40,000 people accused of being part of an anti-government movement in France resulted in the term ‘le terreur’, which means great fear. This then transformed into the widely known term, terrorism. Global terrorism has encountered developments and modernisation since the 19th century.

According to David C. Rapoport, there have been four waves of modern terrorism. Firstly, the anarchist wave that happened between 1880 and the 1920s. During this wave, the anarchists adhered to the statement of “having no ruler”. An anarchist philosopher, Peter Kropotkin, stated that a single attack could make more propaganda than thousands of pamphlets. The second wave arose during the 1920s and continued until the 1960s. The second wave was the anti-colonial wave, and was marked by the incidents of the Irish Republican Army that happened in 1922, the Stern and Irgun Gangs in 1940, and the Greek nationalist group EOKA in 1955. The third wave is the new left wave that happened during the 1960s and was marked by the Marxist movement of Latin America. Lastly, the fourth wave is the religious wave

that arose in 1979 and continues until today. During this fourth wave, extremist groups such as ISIS have emerged.

The world of global terrorism was changed forever on the 9th of September which marks the most destructive attack and was the turning point of global terrorism. Before the 9/11 attack, terrorism was an issue or topic that was taboo or too sensitive for people to talk about. It was also deemed harmful for experts who wanted to examine or showed interest in this field. Therefore, there wasn't a lot of research done on this topic. However, after the 9/11 attack, people started to show interest in terrorism. The incident of 9/11 changed the dynamics of international security. The president of the United States of America at the time, George Bush, made several efforts to regain security. Bush led the invasion of Afghanistan to eradicate Al Qaeda resulting in tightening of aviation security around the world. In addition, after the 9/11 attack, George Bush also created the War on Terror in order to combat acts of global terrorism. A lot of countries followed and adopted the policies of the War on Terror domestically and in international forums such as the US-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Combating Terrorism. The War on Terror also spread to US allies making it appear as though the world was at war with Islamofascism and making people think that Muslims are terrorists and that Islam is an international threat. The incident of 9/11 is one piece of evidence of the fourth wave of modern terrorism: the religious wave. 9/11 has caused several divisions in humanity and has widened hate towards Muslims, also known as Islamophobia. In Indonesia, for instance, most of the terror attacks are led by extremist groups which claim to be a part of Islam and claim to have Islam related motives, which only adds to this.

Indonesia has long had experience with terrorism with it even emerging during the early days of proclamation. Three forms of terrorism are known in Indonesia. The first is the action of secession caused by close relationships with former colonialists, for example, in the case of the South Maluku Uprising (RMS). The South Maluku Uprising or RMS was led by Christian Robert Steven Soumokil and rejected the unitary state of the republic of Indonesia, or NKRI. They wanted to be separate and independent from Indonesia because according to them, Maluku is strong in terms of economy, politics, and geography. The second are acts of terrorism that are based on wanting to establish a state or secede from a particular political ideology, for example, the Indonesian Communist Party which had the motive of changing the ideology and form of the state to communism. The last are acts of terrorism which are caused by a spirit of ethnicity, for instance, the cases of PRRI or Permesta in Sumatra and Sulawesi which were acts derived from the disappointment of the lack of prosperity and justice, of the regional military forces against the central military, especially in the regions of Sumatra and Sulawesi. These three events depict the early pattern of terrorism in Indonesia; however, it all shifted after the 9/11 tragedy. After the 9/11 attack, the motive of terrorist groups shifted to establishing an anti-Western religion based global state. Moreover, religious-based conflicts intensified with what happened in Poso and the bombings in Bali as examples.

From 2010 to 2017, there were about 130 cases of terrorism in Indonesia. In addition, 896 perpetrators were arrested and sentenced. 126 of these were sentenced to death, 674 were imprisoned, and 96 were acquitted (FISIP UI, 2018). Terrorism in Indonesia during and after the 2000s was mostly dominated by terrorist groups such

as JAD and Jamaah Islamiyah. On the 14th of January 2016, a bomb and shootout occurred in Thamrin in front of the Sarinah building. 2 bombs were detonated, the first one in a well-known coffee shop and the second one at a police station not far from the first explosion. After the 2 explosions, a shootout between the 2 perpetrators and the police occurred and ended after the perpetrators died, one from a bomb explosion and the other from police shooting. The mastermind behind this terror act was Aman Abdurrahman, a chairman of ISIS in Indonesia who also founded JAD which is affiliated with ISIS (Kompas.com, 2022).

Jamaah Islamiyah is a terrorist organisation affiliated with Al Qaeda which has successfully created terror in Indonesia through their heinous acts. Their fatal acts were recorded as the Bali Bomb I and Bali Bomb II. The Bali Bomb I happened on the 12th of October 2002 and caused the deaths of 202 foreigners and Indonesian citizens. The perpetrators detonated 3 bombs: the first explosion was at the Sari Club, the second at Paddy's Bar located across from the Sari Club, and the last exploded around 100 metres from the US Consulate. Several perpetrators were caught, namely Amrozi, Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron, and Ali Imron. Just 3 years after the Bali Bomb I, the second Bali Bomb happened on the 1st of October 2005 which caused 23 deaths. Just like the first Bali Bomb, the second Bali Bomb also involved 3 bombs in three different places namely RAJA's Bar and Restaurant, Menega Cafe, and Nyoman Cafe. The perpetrators were found to be a part of Jamaah Islamiyah network, orchestrated by Noordin M. Top (Kompas.com, 2022).

2.1.1 Indonesian Counterterrorism Policies & Strategies

The 9/11 attack caused threats to international security; hence, a lot of countries started to make their own policies regarding the eradication of terrorism, including Indonesia. As the international communities and policy makers started to gain awareness of the alarming issue of terrorism, Indonesia also started to make their own policies and strategies of counter terrorism.

Terrorism has become an alarming issue that states need focus on because it concerns the security of a state. When the security of a state weakens, it can also affect other aspects, such as the economy of the state, and so therefore, states should have policies and strategies to not only combat terrorism but to also prevent terrorism. A study has been done to identify the efforts made by the Indonesian government to counter terrorism. According to the writer Nur Hasanah, under Joko Widodo's governance from 2014 to 2019, Indonesia has made multiple efforts to combat and prevent terrorism (Hasanah, 2018):

1. The Soft Approach as a Way to Counter Terrorism

As a means to combat and prevent terrorism, the government has taken measures in the form of a soft approach to minimise the main causes of terrorism. The government established a deradicalisation program along with the National Counter Terrorism Agency or BNPT in order to neutralise the radical thinking of those who have been exposed to it through re-education, re-socialisation, and cultivating multiculturalism. This deradicalisation program has two parts namely, prevention and rehabilitation. The prevention

aspect is to strengthen the community's protective factor. Meanwhile, rehabilitation is targeted at people who have already been exposed to radicalism, such as the children of terrorists, ex terrorists that have committed some kind of terror attack, and others. The deradicalisation program has begun implementation in the area of Java.

2. The Hard Approach as a Means to Fight Terrorism

Not only did the government use a soft approach as a means to counter terrorism, but it also used a hard approach. Given the fact that terrorism had been increasing in Indonesia, the government did not hesitate to strengthen their military power to carry out counter attacks against terrorists by forming a military force which is specifically aimed at preventing acts of terrorism. During Joko Widodo's era of presidency, the military force of Indonesia or TNI and the police department, specifically Detachment 88, carried out an ambush and chased fleeing terrorists. The government has strengthened military power by improving weaponry equipment, adding and changing personnel, and increasing the budget. Detachment 88 also improved their standard operating procedures.

3. Revision of the Law

Previously, Indonesia issued Law No. 1 Year 2002 on the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism. In 2003, this was replaced with a new law, Law No.

15 Year 2003. The government has been planning to revise several articles in the law which is part of their hope to better prevent terrorism.

4. International Cooperation

Indonesia has not only made efforts to combat terrorism on a national level, but also at the international level through international cooperation aimed at helping to support the fight against global terrorism. This cooperation has taken the form of participating in Counter Terrorism Financing or CTF and the International Meeting on Counter Terrorism or IMCT. In particular, Indonesia has cooperated with Australia on Counter Terrorism Financing, which aims to strengthen international cooperation networks in the overcoming of the threat of cross-border movement of terrorism, including the flow of funds. In addition, Indonesia worked with Australia for the International Meeting on Counter Terrorism. Indonesia's cooperation with Australia in the IMCT was fruitful as Indonesia implemented several strategies in order to counter terrorism.

2.2 The Bomb Attacks in Surabaya in 2018

The Surabaya bomb attacks in the year 2018 left the people of Indonesia both in shock and fear as it was the first terrorist attack that involved a family as well as underaged children. The family members were not merely associated with the attack, but also had their own roles in carrying out the attack. In addition, it was found that the family was connected to a terrorist group known as Jamaah Ansharut Daulat or JAD; therefore, this became not only headline news in Indonesia, but also worldwide as it corresponds to the concerns of global terrorism (BBC Indonesia, 2018).

ISIS or radicalism has spread throughout states through the internet leading to the emergence of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah or JAD. JAD is an extremist group oriented towards ISIS that was first initiated by Aman Abdurrahman whilst serving his sentence in Nusa Kambangan in 2014. His intention in forming JAD was to establish a Khilafah Islamiyah in Indonesia that would facilitate people who wanted to take part in the war in Syria and to support ISIS. Some of the terror cases linked to JAD include the suicide bombing in Thamrin, the bomb attack in Samarinda, the bomb attack that took place at the West Java Police Headquarters, and the suicide bombing in Kampung Melayu. After the government issued Law No. 5 2018 which stated that JAD is a prohibited organisation, JAD changed their strategies and made smaller groups to carry out attacks with the intention of not being discovered quickly if one of them was caught by authorities (Tifada, 2021).

The heinous act in Surabaya was orchestrated by a family of six who were connected to the extremist group JAD, the Southeast Asian branch of ISIS. The perpetrators targeted three churches in Surabaya which were close in proximity with

approximately four kilometres distance between each of the churches. The incidents happened on Sunday the 13th of May 2018 with the first bomb being detonated at 6:30 am. The perpetrators of this bomb, which were Firman Alim aged 16 and Yusuf Fadhil aged 18, targeted the Santa Maria Catholic Church. The two brothers rode a motorcycle into the courtyard of the church and detonated their bomb. This suicide bomb caused 7 deaths, 2 of which were the perpetrators. Then at 7:15 am on the same day, the second bomb was detonated at Indonesia Christian Church. The second bomb was detonated by the mother of the family, Puji Kuswati, and her two daughters, Famela Rizqita aged 9 and Fadhila Sari aged 12. The mother set off the bomb after being dropped off by her husband, Dita Oeprianto. The second bomb resulted in the deaths of the perpetrators only and no one else. Finally, Dita Oeprianto, the head of the family, detonated the last bomb at the Central Pentecostal Church at 7:53 am. The last bomb was a suicide bomb using a car that was parked in the parking lot of the church, and this bomb resulted in 8 deaths, 1 of which was Dita Oeprianto himself. These atrocious acts of humanity caused the deaths of 18 people, 6 of whom were the perpetrators and 12 were innocent citizens (CNN Indonesia, 2018).

These despicable acts upon innocent lives have left a great impact on Indonesia. Other than leaving people more wary and cautious when praying or going to their place of worship, the country itself may experience an economic tragedy. Some economists stated that Indonesia would possibly experience long-term economic impacts after the incident of the Surabaya bombing in 2018. Several economists have said that the impact of the incident may cause several things, including the weakening of both the Rupiah and Indonesia Composite Index (ICI) and

making investors hesitant to invest in Indonesia because of security problems. However, according to the economist of Bank Central Asia, David Sumual, Indonesia does not need to worry about the rate of ICI and Rupiah because this is not Indonesia's first experience with terrorist attacks. He said that after the Bali bombing in 2002 and the terrorist attacks in Thamrin and Kampung Melayu, the rate of ICI and Rupiah did weaken but recovered. Nonetheless, Indonesia should worry that investors may hesitate or be pessimistic towards investing in Indonesia because security is one of the things that investors consider (Asmara, 2018).

As a result of the Surabaya bombs that happened on the 13th of May 2018, Indonesia also felt impacts in the tourism sector as a result of media framing. According to Erda Nindrasih in her journal written in the year 2022, the media is considered to be a stakeholder in tourism development policy, and tourism has a close correlation to safety and security concerns. In her journal, Erda Nindrasih found that national and international news publications peaked on the day of the event and 10 days after the bombings occurred. The news publications not only covered the chronology of the event, the perpetrators, and the victims, but it also included statements of condemnation from governments, including the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. In addition, the news coverage also focused on the connection of the event with the extremist group ISIS, and also the involvement of women and children which was considered to be rare and new. The media framing of the Surabaya bombings mostly indicated Jihadist groups as the main source of the problem, and journalists also pointed fingers at who should be responsible for the tragedy and what the Indonesian government should do. Media framing can be

destructive especially when it involves a human induced tragedy such as terrorist attacks because the media is powerful enough to illustrate the condition of a country. Potential tourists use media coverage to get an illustration of their destination. And, as tourism is closely related to safety and security matters, tourists can drift away from a country that is considered to be unsafe and full of threats, such as terrorist attacks. Therefore, damage to the tourism and travel industry can be due to the negative words of the media (Kozak et al., 2007).

The Surabaya bomb attack tragedy has gained much attention, both nationally and internationally, because of the involvement of women and children in the attack. After the Surabaya bombings, people started to scrutinise and wonder how women and children could be involved in such an inhumane attack. Indeed, the trend of involving women had started to emerge in Indonesia. Several studies have focused on the participation of children in terror acts, including one conducted by Arianti titled 'Participation of Children in Terrorist Attacks in Indonesia: A Possible Future Trend', which discusses the indoctrination of radicalism to children. The writer of the study mentioned 6 stages of indoctrination of children: 1) seduction, in which children are exposed to a certain ideology; 2) schooling, in which children are taught by teachers who have already been indoctrinated; and 3-6) selection, subjugation, specialisation, and stationing. Alarmingly, the writer of the study also found that there are several boarding schools in Indonesia that have been revealed as being pro ISIS and have also produced several terrorists. One is Miftahul Huda Boarding School which had a place for one of the most well-known terrorists, Noordin M Top. Another example is a boarding school located in Central Sulawesi called Ma'had Darul Anshor, which

was revealed to be pro ISIS and shown to be providing shelter to the children of terrorists that have been caught. Not only do such boarding schools provide shelter for children, but oftentimes the wives of terrorists also seek refuge at them. Alongside the involvement of children, the involvement of women has also caught the interests of both national and international communities. A study by Unaesah Rahmah entitled 'Women in Jihad: An Indonesian Context' focused on the involvement of women in terrorist activities and how it could possibly be a future trend. The year following the tragedy of the Surabaya bombings, family-based suicide bombs started to appear one by one. For instance, a married couple, Asmar Husain or also known as Abu Hamzah and his wife, conducted an attack in North Sumatra in 2019. Going back in time, the trend of the involvement of women in terror attacks first appeared in 2016 with a woman named Dian Yuli Novi. Dian Yuli Novi was the first known potential female suicide bomber and she plotted to detonate a suicide bomb in Jakarta's presidential palace, but she could not successfully complete her terror attack as she was caught. Dian Yuli Novi's husband, Nur Solikhin, who is an ISIS supporter, was instructed to find a bride for a suicide attack prior to their marriage; hence, from this we can see that women and children are being used as a tool for terrorists in order to conduct terror attacks.

The president of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, visited the sites of the suicide bombings at GKI Jalan Diponegoro and the Pentecostal church on Jalan Arjuno, and visited victims at Bhayangkara Hospital, Surabaya. The president said that "the act of terrorism this time was truly barbaric and beyond the limits of humanity". The president also said to reporters that he had commanded the police chief to thoroughly

investigate the perpetrators' networks to their roots (BBC Indonesia, 2018). After the bombings of three churches perpetrated by a family of six, the government decided to take strict preventive measures prior to Christmas Day in 2018. The first step was the sterilisation of 25 churches that had congregations of more than 1000 with the help of the Detachment 88. Secondly, the government reduced and restricted vehicle access to the churches by coordinating with the churches. Thirdly, all churches in Surabaya were guarded by police. Lastly, large numbers of troops from various elements, for example the military, the city government of Surabaya, and Muhammadiyah, were deployed to secure Christmas Day (CNN Indonesia, 2018). Indonesia has experienced a long and hard journey with terrorism especially after the Bali Bomb in 2002. Fed up with the constant fear of the people caused by terrorists, Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights spoke out on the Surabaya bomb attacks in 2018 firmly stating the government needed to take firm actions against the perpetrators while still respecting human rights, especially those of the victims. The commission also stated that the community should maintain unity and not be provoked and that the government convey accurate information so that no one is provoked and no miscommunication or misinformation occurs. The government was also urged to take precautions so that this did not recur and to use the Witness and Victim Protection Agency to help victims and provide protection and recovery.

CHAPTER 3

INDONESIA'S COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES AFTER SURABAYA

BOMB 2018

3.1 Approaches Implemented After the Surabaya Bomb in 2018

The unpredictable acts that were conducted by Dita Oeprianto and his family happened almost at the same time with just roughly 40 minutes between one explosion and the next. The first bomb was detonated at 6:30 am, the second one at 7:15 am, and the last one at 7:53 am. Thus, the police department had no time to investigate the incident before the next one and did not expect there would be follow-up bombs. The police also did not expect that a whole family would be involved as this was the first case involving a family, woman, and children. In addition, the suicide bombs detonated by the perpetrators resulted in the deaths of all 6 perpetrators therefore, no perpetrators were arrested.

In the aftermath of the Surabaya bombings, one of the actors with a large involvement was Detachment 88. Detachment 88 has used several strategies to deal with the aftereffects of these bombs including arresting several terrorists in East Java, using their intelligence team to further investigations, and intensifying security measures all over Indonesia across all aspects of the country. Other than Detachment 88, the other actor involved in dealing with the aftermath of the Surabaya bomb attacks in 2018 was Kodam V Brawijaya which is the Regional Defense Command that covers the province of East Java.

3.1.1 Repression

Repression is used as a hard approach in countering terrorism. Repression against terrorism has been implemented by the Indonesian government to counter terrorism using military forces and the police department, or Detachment 88, mainly to secure the national security of Indonesia. Detachment 88 has been specifically tasked to counter attack terrorists and during their duty they have killed 120 terrorist suspects during arrest and 40 of these were wrongfully arrested (Kusuma et al., 2019). Another case of repression was when Detachment 88 successfully caught terrorists that had attempted to escape in Poso. Repression used against terrorists is controversial because Detachment 88 has committed violations of human rights. However, Indonesia has mainly used hard power as a weapon against terrorism, including in the case of the Surabaya bombings.

Detachment 88 made several arrests of terrorists and suspected terrorists after the Surabaya bomb attacks in 2018. Their efforts are evident in their successful arrests of 13 terrorists that were part of the JAD network. Two of these 13 terrorists were shot dead because they resisted arrest (Sohuturon, 2018). Suspected terrorists in East Java continue to be arrested by the police force. 23 suspected terrorists have been arrested in the area of East Java, which is an area that not only covers Surabaya but also other cities in East Java such as Sidoarjo, Malang, Pasuruan, and Probolinggo. Again, 4 of these 23 suspects were shot dead by the police (Kompas.com, 2018).

The use of repression to counterattack terrorists after the Surabaya bomb attack can improve the image of the military and police force which then makes terrorist convicts to be afraid of them. The arrests of members of JAD and terrorist convicts in East Java may be effective and may be an effective way of countering terrorism as it may result in the failure of those terrorists in carrying out their next possible attacks.

As terrorists are people who are brainwashed with radicalism, they have no fear. Therefore, the Indonesian government and the military forces have to counter attack. This approach that the Indonesian government has chosen may be fruitful as it shows that Indonesia's military forces also have no fear in counter attacking and fighting back against terrorists.

According to Kodam V Brawijaya, the regional police and security forces have 3 capacities that they usually use to deal with terrorist activities, namely their intelligence team, operational activities, and territorial security. However, after the Surabaya bombings, they only used 2 of these capacities – the intelligence team and territorial – which were used to protect and guard the area of the incident.

3.1.2 Physical Security

As a result of ongoing terrorist attacks, intensified security is needed across all aspects of the state, for example in airports, as a preventative measure. Metal detectors in airports are mandatory in order to prevent any illegal weapons or substances from entering the country. In addition, purchase of armed weapons by citizens needs to be restricted, and as a consequence, Indonesia has issued Law No. 8

Year 1948 on the possession of armed weaponry. According to Law No. 8 of 1948, a firearm in the hands of a person who is not a member of the Army or Police must be registered by the Head of the Residency Police or the Head of the Special Region of Police, hereinafter referred to as the Head of the Residential Police or a person designated by him. This has made it harder for regular citizens to purchase armed weaponry.

Another regulation has also been issued to further specify who among civil society can possess armed weaponry. This is Chief of Police Regulation Number 82 Year 2004. According to the regulation there are several groups of civilians who are allowed to own guns which was decided by urgency. Only certain groups of civil society are allowed to own firearms, such as chief directors, ministers, government officials, main employers, commissioners, lawyers and doctors. The possession of armed weapons is criminal law; therefore, individuals who own armed weapons but are not a part of one of the specified groups that are allowed to possess armed weaponry by law can be sentenced to death penalty, life imprisonment, or 20 years of imprisonment.

The physical security of a state often intensifies when the state is exposed to threats such as terrorist attacks. The bombing of the 3 churches in Surabaya in 2018 inevitably caused the government to intensify security all around Indonesia. Indonesia's Ministry of Transportation demanded the tightening of security of all airports in Indonesia. The Director General of Air Transportation, Agus Santoso has explained that it is important to protect and tighten the security of airports because airports are a national vital object. In order to do so, he demanded security personnel

to maintain airport facilities in order for them to function properly. The facilities mentioned were radars, tower controls, CCTV, and X rays. The Director General of Air Transportation, Agus Sutanto, also demanded that all suspicious people and objects be escorted out of the airport immediately (Syahla, 2018).

The special force Detachment 88 played a vital role in the Surabaya bombings of 2018 as they specialise and focus on cases involving terrorists. After the incident, they searched the homes of the families of the perpetrators of the series of suicide bombings in Surabaya and found out that they were members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, an extremist group that supports ISIS (Kompas.com, 2018). In addition, Detachment 88 also helped in tightening the security of churches in Surabaya. Prior to Christmas in 2018 and New Year's Eve 2019, they carried out sterilisation of 25 churches that have congregations of 1000 to 5000 people. Secondly, they reduced vehicle access to the churches and traffic flow around the churches to prevent vehicles from entering the churchyard having learned from the bombings as one of the perpetrators trespassed into the churchyard and detonated the bomb there. Thirdly, they guarded all churches in Surabaya. Lastly, troops were deployed from various elements to secure Christmas 2018. The National Police also provided 2,000 officers to intensify security around churches in Surabaya (CNN Indonesia, 2018) Detachment 88 was not the only actor that took part in amplifying the security of the churches in Surabaya, but Kodam V Brawijaya also used one of their functions namely, territorial, to increase the security of the churches in Surabaya by securing the area of the tragedy with security forces.

The intensified security was not only carried out in the place of the tragedy, Surabaya, but also in Jakarta. The impacts of the bomb led the Regional Police Chief of Metro Jaya, Inspector General Idham Aziz, to demand increased security at churches and vital objects in Jakarta and its surroundings. In addition, the alert status of all levels of Regional Police of Metro Jaya was shifted to Alert 1 in order to remain alert for other terrorist attacks that might happen (Kompas.com, 2018).

On top of that, security was intensified in the tourist attraction sector, such as at Borobudur temple and Tanah Lot temple. According to the General Manager of the Borobudur Temple Tourism Park, I Gusti Putu Ngurah Sedana, security was tightened at every Borobudur entry post. Internal security officers and the Indonesian National Police increased the security and supervision of tourists and vehicles by checking every vehicle that entered the temple area (Antara News, 2018). Similar efforts began to be made at tourist attractions in Tabanan by tightening guard supervision at the entrances and by checking all vehicles with bomb detectors (Kilas Bali, 2018).

After the Surabaya bombings in 2018, Indonesia's Ministry of Transportation demanded all airports in Indonesia increase their security by making sure all facilities, such as X rays, CCTV, radars, and other security equipment, as well as security personnel, be maintained well in order to improve security in airports. The attempt to increase security in airports all around Indonesia can be an effective way to counter terrorism because it limits the mobilisation of terrorists, hindering their ability to carry out an attack. Although the Indonesian government made an effort to limit the mobility of terrorists through intensifying security in airports, it should also have intensified the security in all public spaces including places of worship and in

transportation other than airports, such as train stations, malls, and bus stations. All aspects of public spaces should be tightly secured as terrorists usually attack and carry out their bombings in public spaces with the goal of creating fear amongst people. In addition, the Indonesian government should also restrict the possession of bombs and firearms, as perpetrators own or make numerous bombs to carry out their attacks. This raises concern over the policies on the possession of not only firearms but also bombs and chemical weapons as how the perpetrators obtained their bombs is questionable as they are regular citizens. After the Surabaya bombs in 2018, another bomb was detonated in Sidoarjo on the same day and the police found that the perpetrators had self-assembled their bombs.

After the Surabaya bombings in 2018, Kodam V Brawijaya also conducted protection in the territories of the tragedy. The Surabaya regional police dispatched 2,000 members to intensify security in the area. In addition, prior to Christmas Eve of 2018 and New Year's Eve 2019, the Surabaya regional police sterilised 25 churches that had congregations of large numbers. They also restricted the number of vehicles entering the area of the churches and controlled the flow of traffic around the 25 churches in Surabaya. This may be an effective way to prevent other terror attacks from happening as the mobility of potential terrorists wanting to bomb churches is limited.

Kodam V Brawijaya is evidently not using their third capacity which is operational activities. Operational activities include providing guidance to the community through social communication. This aims at future prevention and also provides an understanding of internal national insight to community groups. It is

unfortunate that the Surabaya regional police did not carry out these operational activities at the time because these activities and guidance for society can become a form of prevention and encourage people not to create provocation.

3.1.3 Intelligence Gathering

Intelligence gathering has been another effort made by the Indonesian government to counter terrorism. Intelligence gathering is a strategic effort utilising the human resources of Indonesia. Intelligence agents were trained to be able to give early warning and early detection of acts of terrorism. Furthermore, agents can now get various information from other countries' intelligence; hence, they know a greater amount about terrorist movements including those on the wanted list. A further example of efforts made by the Indonesian government is the attacking of financial sources. This is one of the effective methods to counter terrorism as it limits the ability for terrorists to carry out their missions because without their funds, they cannot purchase the firearms and substances needed, nor can they easily mobilise from one place to another.

According to Kodam V Brawijaya, the Defense Regional Command covering the province of East Java, the Indonesia military force and the national police have used several strategies to combat terrorists after the Surabaya bombings in 2018. The Kodam V Brawijaya has 3 capacities that are used for tackling an event namely: their intelligence team, operational activities, and territorial. In the case of the attacks that happened on the 13th of May 2018 in Surabaya, Kodam V Briwijaya used their intelligence team. The intelligence team collected data on terrorist convicts in East

Java in order to investigate further connections with other terrorists and their whereabouts to be on alert for possible bombs that might happen as a result of provocation after the Surabaya bomb (Dilianto, 2021).

Although the intelligence team is not the only strategy that the Indonesian government relies on, the intelligence team is the strategy that people expect and depend on for preventing acts of terrorism and giving early warning. People had high expectations of the intelligence team, but when the team did not manage to detect the bombings of the 3 churches in Surabaya, people started to criticise and doubt the capability of the intelligence team. Intelligence is a complex unit and their capacity and capability depends on several factors, such as the cognitive abilities of intelligence personnel, difficulties in identifying and focusing on targets, internal bureaucratic obstacles, and failure to share information obtained. However, terrorist groups such as JAD are no less complex or advanced because they are skilled at outwitting intelligence activities and personnel. For example, JAD members know how to avoid communication being tracked by intelligence services and ward off interrogation and surveillance. As another example, Dita Oeprianto, the perpetrator of the Surabaya bombs in 2018, used bombs that were formulated from kitchen ingredients, so they were legal to buy and easily found in supermarkets. The Indonesian police also acknowledged that there was negligence in supervising Dita Oeprianto. It came to light that Dita Oeprianto was already under surveillance before he carried out the bombs in 3 churches; however, Detachment 88 saw Dita Oeprianto's ability to socialise well and thus did not suspect him. Thus, we can't be sure whether the intelligence or Detachment 88 failed, but there was a contribution

from their negligence in the failure of early prevention of the Surabaya bombs in 2018 (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, 2018).

After the Surabaya bombs, French Ambassador Jean Charles Berthonnet became interested in working with Surabaya in the security sector, specifically in terrorism. The French Ambassador offered cooperation between Surabaya and France to carry out post-bomb recovery for children who have experienced post-bomb trauma. The offer by the French Ambassador is still in discussion and has not been confirmed and agreed upon by the Surabaya City Government (CNN Indonesia, 2018). The cooperation between Surabaya and France could be a stepping stone for Surabaya's success in countering terrorism as terrorism is a global issue and states should work together beyond borders. Moreover, the cooperation between France and Surabaya could also enhance security facilities, personnel and the resources needed in order to counter terrorism. The offer made by the French Ambassador may become a possible cooperation with France in the future in results of the Surabaya bomb attack however, apart from international media coverage on Surabaya bomb in 2018, the international community or organisation, such as The International Criminal Police Organisation, have not contributed on the counterterrorism policies after Surabaya bomb in 2018 because the Surabaya bomb in 2018 was a domestic tragedy.

3.1.4 Soft Approaches

The Surabaya bomb in 2018 has made the Indonesian government to be aware of the speed and how fast information is being transferred especially in this era of technology. In addition, terrorist groups are not inferior to advanced and sophisticated

technologies and they, too, grow advanced by following trends (Hakim & Kuwado, 2019). After the 2018 Surabaya bomb attack, the Ministry of Communication and Information of the Republic of Indonesia or Kominfo have asked the people of Indonesia to report radical content (Kominfo, 2018). In addition, the Kominfo eradicated thousands of accounts after the Surabaya Bomb Attack. There were 280 accounts that have been frozen on Telegram, 300 accounts on Facebook, more than 250 on YouTube, and around 70 accounts on Twitter (Agung, 2018). This may be an effective approach to countering terrorism in Indonesia as the efforts made by the government to eradicate radical contents and accounts on all social media efforts may reduce the amount of people being exposed by radicalism.

The use of soft approach is as equally important as hard approach in countering terrorism hence, by blocking radical contents on the internet and blocking accounts that have been detected to post radicalism may be an effective policy as it is an effort to prevent the public from being exposed to the understandings of radicalism.

In addition to the fact that the inhumane attack in Surabaya was perpetrated by a family of 6, the involvement of women and children also became headline news. People became concerned about the indoctrination of radicalism to children. In a study by Arianti, it was also found that there are several Islamic boarding schools that provide refuge for terrorists and are found to be pro ISIS; hence, there is concern about the educational system in those Islamic boarding schools. It was also found that even though those Islamic boarding schools were revealed to be pro ISIS, there was no response from the government which caused separation and provocation with the

residents living around the area of those Islamic boarding schools and also caused the local community to become aggressive.

In order to prevent the general public from being exposed to radical ideas, the Indonesian government's effort on blocking radical content on the internet and blocking accounts that have been found to post radical ideas may be an effective way of countering terrorism. The use of a soft approach is just as important in combating terrorism as the use of a hard approach.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

4.1 Conclusion

Since the attack on September 9th 2001, which was one of the worst terrorist attacks ever, terrorism has gained international attention. After this, the world's communities and decision-makers began to recognize the grave threat posed by terrorism, including decision-makers in Indonesia who began to develop their own counterterrorism policies and methods.

A family of six connected to the extremist organisation JAD, the Southeast Asian affiliate of ISIS, masterminded a horrible crime in Surabaya in 2018. Three churches in Surabaya were the targets of the offenders. The first bomb went off at 6:30 am on Sunday, May 13, 2018. The perpetrators, who were Firman Alim aged 16 and Yusuf Fadhil aged 18, targeted the Santa Maria Catholic Church. The two brothers rode a motorcycle, entered the courtyard of the church, and detonated their bomb. This was a suicide bomb that caused 7 deaths, 2 of which were the perpetrators. Then, at 7:15 am on the same day, a second bomb was detonated at Indonesia Christian Church. The second bomb was detonated by the mother of the family, Puji Kuswati, and her two daughters, Famela Rizqita aged 9 and Fadhila Sari aged 12. Puji detonated the bomb after being dropped off by her husband, Dita Oeprianto. The second bomb resulted in the deaths of the perpetrators and no one

else. Finally, Dita Oeprianto, the head of the family, detonated the last bomb at Central Pentecostal Church at 7:53 am. The last bomb was a suicide bomb using a car that was parked in the parking lot of the church. This final bomb resulted in 8 deaths, 1 of which was Dita Oeprianto himself. These atrocious acts against humanity caused the deaths of 18 people, 6 of which were the perpetrators and 12 of which were innocent citizens (CNN Indonesia, 2018).

As a response to the terror attacks on churches in Surabaya, the Indonesian government began implementing counterterrorism efforts and strategies that are in line with the counterterrorism variables proposed by Lutz & Lutz. Firstly, the Indonesian government has taken the approach of repression in which security forces conduct counter attacks against those who have used violence by arresting or eliminating them. This is evident in the successful arrest of 13 terrorists that were part of the JAD network after the Surabaya bombings. In addition, 23 suspected terrorists were arrested in the area of East Java, 4 of which were shot dead by the police (Kompas.com, 2018). Secondly, the Indonesian government has increased the physical security of all aspects of the country, for example, by protecting and tightening the security of airports (Syahla, 2018), sterilising and guarding several churches in Surabaya by deploying 2,000 officers to improve security around churches in Surabaya (CNN Indonesia, 2018), and intensifying the security in tourist attractions, for instance Borobudur temple, by increasing the security and supervision of tourists and vehicles by checking every vehicle that enters the tourist attraction areas (Antara News, 2018). Lastly, the Indonesian government has been using intelligence to acquire essential data of terrorists. The intelligence function was used

after the Surabaya bombings to collect data on terrorist convicts in East Java. This was conducted by Kodam V Brawijaya (Dilianto, 2021).

The approach of using intelligence gathering to counter terrorism after the Surabaya bomb attacks in 2018 was an adequate addition to the strategies of hard powers used; however, the efficiency and the quality of the performance of the intelligence team has been scrutinised as they did not manage to provide early warning and detection of the Surabaya bombings in 2018. The fact that Dita Oeprianto was already being watched before he carried out the bombings in the three churches in 2018 led the Indonesian police to acknowledge that their surveillance of Dita Oeprianto was lax. Detachment 88 stated that they did not suspect Dita Oeprianto because he was observed to be socialising well. On account of that, we cannot be certain whether Detachment 88 or the intelligence failed; however, due to their negligence, there was a failure of early prevention in the Surabaya bombings in 2018 (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, 2018).

The Indonesian government has made efforts to combat terrorism through a variety of techniques, although it mostly employed hard powers in the aftermath of the incident in Surabaya. In Indonesia's efforts to combat terrorism, the deployment of simple physical power may not be as optimal as the government hopes and may also not work or be fruitful in the long run.

4.2 Recommendations

This research discusses the response of the Indonesian government after the Surabaya bomb attacks and the efforts and strategies implemented by the Indonesian

government in accordance with the atrocious act by using secondary data. The writer of this research recommends the next researcher to conduct interviews with several actors, such as but not limited to the Police Chief of Surabaya, in order to get an in-depth understanding of the measures taken behind closed doors. In addition, the writer of this research hopes the next researcher will expand on this topic by providing an analysis of the effectiveness of the efforts and strategies that have been implemented by the Indonesian government and whether those efforts and strategies have been successful in combating against terrorism.

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