

**RESOURCE ANALYSIS TOWARDS JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH TERRORIST
GROUP IN INDONESIA USING RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY**

UNDERGRADUATE THESIS



**UNIVERSITAS
ISLAM
INDONESIA**

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UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INDONESIA

2023

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Proposed to the Department of International Relations
Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences
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As a partial fulfillment of requirement to earn a
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Defended in front of Board of Examiners
in the Department of International Relations
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STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

I hereby declare that this undergraduate thesis is the result of my own independent scientific work, and that all material from the work of others (in books, articles, essays, dissertations, and on the internet) has been stated, and quotations and paraphrases are clearly indicated.

No other materials are used other than those contained. I have read and understood the university's rules and procedures regarding plagiarism.

Making false statements is considered a violation of academic integrity.

20 February 2023,



Azizah Dinda Laksuri

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Charities Aid Foundation's (CAF) 2021 World Giving Index (WGI) shows that Indonesia is the most generous country in the world (Charities Aid Foundation 2021). Indonesia is ranked first with a score of 69, which is up from 59 the last time a yearly index was published in 2018, when it also ranked first. More than 8 in 10 Indonesians donated money in 2021 (Mayestha and Schweppenstedde 2021). This data shows that most Indonesians have a social mentality to share with others, which comes from the culture in Indonesia. The forms of generosity in Indonesian society are very diverse, and consist of not only giving money, but also giving goods and assistance, such as services. Over time, these forms of generosity have become better organized with the existence of charities that manage aid legally.

In Indonesia, charitable institutions that manage aid must be registered with the National Amil Zakat Agency (BAZNAS) so that the purpose of giving alms can be allocated according to its purpose and avoid funds being used internally. Jemaah Islamiyah is one of the social movements that uses the zakat foundation as a vehicle to collect funding to continue carrying out terrorist activities in Indonesia. There are 2 foundations that work for Jemaah Islamiyah in their funding namely Baitul Mal Abdurrahman Bin Auf Amil Zakat Institution (LAM BM ABA) and the Syam Organizer (SO). These two zakat foundations are

foundations that use the collected money as funding for the terrorist activities of the Jemaah Islamiyah group (Aditya 2021). Jemaah Islamiyah is an Islamic militant organization in Southeast Asia that seeks to establish a giant Islamic state in the territory of the countries of Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists infiltrated the existing zakat foundations, giving the terrorists the opportunity to use people's alms funds for their internal fundings. In addition, the zakat foundations that they have set up are used as a disguise so that they can travel freely and can channel funds to various places. The Jemaah Islamiyah movement has the potential to threaten security stability, create problems of social, political, and economic inequality, and contribute to the cultural crisis that is one of the triggers for the proliferation of terrorism networks in Indonesia. The United States government considers this organization a terrorist organization, while Indonesia has declared it a "prohibited corporation" (Forbes and Nicholson 2008). Its existence in Indonesia is still being monitored by the government but growing secretly.

The funding that Jemaah Islamiyah collects using zakat funds provides strong financial support for the activities carried out by them (Aditya 2021). Jemaah Islamiyah collects these funds by asking people for alms in the streets, in mosques, and in other places where it is possible to situate a charity. However, this terrorist plot hid these alms funds by calling it zakat and managing and collecting it through the zakat foundation they created. The money collected is used for several activities, such as sending terrorist operations for military training and terror tactics, and purchasing weapons and explosives.

As a social movement, the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group requires a lot of resources to continue carrying out its activities. Every Social Movement Organization (SMO) must be able to manage the available resources properly. These sources include material resources, such as jobs, income, and savings, as well as non-material sources such as authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, abilities and so on. According to Oberschall, the success and failure of a movement depends on how many people are incorporated into the organization, how to direct them, what their sacrifices are, and how they defend against the opposing party (Locher 2002, 260). This thesis will explain how JI collects and uses all available resources using the resource mobilization theory which explains that there are 5 sources to meet JI's needs as a social movement namely moral resources, cultural resources, social organizational resources, human resources and material dimensions of resources. The resource mobilization approach emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. It examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements.

1.2 Research Question

How does Jemaah Islamiyah get and use its resources to continue carrying out terrorist activities in Indonesia?

1.3 Research Objectives

The objectives of this research are:

1. Identifying the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group as a social movement in Indonesia.
2. Analyzing how JI gets their resources in order to fulfill their needs in conducting the terrorist activities.
3. Analyzing the activities carried out by the JI terrorist group using social movement theory with a focus on resource mobilization theory along with several types of resources in resource mobilization theory.

1.4 Research Scope

The author will limit this research to the activities carried out by JI and the workings of the terrorist movement funding system which will be discussed using social movement theory which is focused on the theory of resource mobilization with 5 types of resources. The author chooses the terrorist group JI because this terrorist group is active in Indonesia and uses the zakat foundation as a cover to obtain and distribute funds. The author will also discuss why the JI terrorist group is considered a social movement organization in Indonesia. This movement needs to be addressed so that all resources originating from the community can be used properly by other actors who need it more and also stop the development of terrorist activities in Indonesia.

1.5 Literature Review

This research is a continuation of previous studies. The author uses previous research as comparison material with the topic of earlier research being that related to the Jemaah Islamiyah group.

First, in a journal written by Rusli Safrudin in 2018 entitled *Countering Terrorism in Indonesia through the Handling and Financing of Terrorism: A Case Study of Jemaah al-Islamiyah*, efforts to combat criminal acts of terrorism through handling aspects of its funding is discussed by reviewing examples of cases of the terrorist organization Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah (JI) during the period 2000 to 2009. In this journal, the author stated that terrorism financing is the provision of financial support for terrorism be it for those who facilitate, plan, or commit terrorism. Rusli argued that funding is obtained through Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) (Rusli Safrudin 2018). However, this research lacks specific details. In the explanation of terrorist financing, the author outlines the ways in which Jemaah Islamiyah misused funds, such as Terrorism Financing through the Banking Sector, Terrorism Financing through Cash Carrying, Terrorism Financing through Non-Profit Organizations/NPOs, and Terrorism Financing through Fund Remittances. Thus, this research is too broad and explains several aspects at once.

Another journal has been written by Sylvia Windya Laksmi entitled *Terrorism Financing and the Risk of Internet-based payment services in Indonesia*. This journal explains that there is a risk that internet-based payments in Indonesia could be used as funds for terrorism. This is exacerbated by a lack of government policies focused on mitigating the risks in this sector. As mandated by the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF'S) recommendation, the Indonesian

Government should provide risk mitigation policies for Internet -Based Payment Services. Provision of such policies would guide the government in preventing the use of payment instruments by criminals and terrorists for money laundering and/or terrorism financing crimes (Laksmi 2017). This journal discusses the risk of electronic money being misused by terrorist groups, especially in Indonesia. The conclusion of this journal is that the Government of Indonesia is currently facing three challenges, namely: 1) inadequate regulation of Internet-Based Payment Services, 2) the absence of a strong risk mitigation strategy, and 3) identification of the government's capacity and resources to address the risk of financing terrorism.

Raden Cecep Lukman Yasin. in the *el-Harakah Journal* Vol. 9, discussed the “*Jemaah Islamiyah Jihadist Movement in Indonesia*”. This journal describes the influence of the Darul Islam movement on Jemaah Islamiyah and shows us that contemporary Middle Eastern influences are not needed to create a violent jihadist movement in Indonesia. Such influences may result in the emergence of extremism, but extremism may actually develop without them. Local factors, such as social and economic marginalization and political alienation, also play a strong role. Jemaah Islamiyah is most accurately characterized as a combination of local and international forces. It has been shaped by the deep and bitter historical experience of radical Muslims in Indonesia, overlaid with global jihad tendencies. Yasin, in this journal, explained Jemaah Islamiyah from a historical perspective: how Jemaah Islamiyah was formed and its involvement in the Bali bombing incident in 2002 as a form of evidence of the presence of Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia.

Sukawarsini Djelantik's study entitled "*Jamaah Islamiyah; Profil Organisasi dan Penyelewengan Terhadap Ajaran Islam*" describes deviations of beliefs in Islam that appear in *Jamaah Islamiyah* and other groups who share the same ideology. These teachings oppose Islam; they justify lying, disbelieve a Muslim and practice verses of the Koran textually or piecemeal. In this journal, the author focused on explaining the mistakes made by *Jamaah Islamiyah*, which carries the name of the Islamic religion, in its development.

The results of previous studies show that terrorism funding in Indonesia is now diverse, coming from individual funding, non-profit organizations and e-money. In the 4 journals outlined above that discuss terrorist financing, there is no discussion of the theory used by this author. Therefore, the author will investigate more deeply how the *Jamaah Islamiyah* terrorist group manages resources it obtains from the community using social movement theory, especially the resource mobilization theory.

1.6 Research Framework

In analyzing how the *Jamaah Islamiyah* terrorist group managed the resource it obtained from the community in Indonesia, the author will link the theory of social movements with the theory of resource mobilization. The existence of zakat foundations, one of the social movements that employs the theory of resource mobilization to meet the needs of social movement, is widely abused by terrorists. Resource mobilization is the process of getting resources from the resource provider, using different mechanisms, to implement an organization's predetermined goals (Seltzer 2014). The theory assumes that

individuals are rational, weigh the costs and the benefits of movement participation, and act only if the benefits outweigh the costs. When movement goals take the form of public goods, the free rider dilemma must be taken into consideration.

In defining social movement theory, there are four main trends, namely mass behavior, resource mobilization theory, political opportunity processes and new social movements (NSM) (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Social movements have traditionally been defined as organized efforts to bring about social change. A social movement is a collective effort to build a new order of life. Most of the changes produced by social movements are internal changes within the social movement itself and external changes to society at large brought about by the movement's feedback on its members and the structure itself. This is in accordance with the goals of JI, namely wanting to make Indonesia a Muslim country that adheres to the caliphate system.

In this study, the author will focus on one of the main tendencies of social movement theory to conduct the analysis on how JI get their resources in Indonesia, namely the theory of resource mobilization. In this theory, the types of resources needed by social movements can be grouped into five categories, namely Material Resources, Human Resources, Social-Organizational Resources, Cultural Resources, and Moral Resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977). In accordance with the research questions from this study, the types of resources needed and used by JI to carry out its activities will be discussed one by one.

The culture of giving alms in Indonesia has become a deed that is considered something that must be done. This is in line with Indonesia's

background as the country that has the largest number of Muslims in the world. This is taken advantage of by irresponsible individuals to commit crimes. In Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah is still working underground but its presence can balance ISIS, and we must still be wary of its crimes. When collecting funds using a charity box, Jemaah Islamiyah uses the official name of the charity foundation, including the name and contact of the foundation, the SK number of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the National Amil Zakat Agency, and the Ministry of Religion, and attaches a magazine describing the foundation's programs. Charity boxes are placed in conventional food stalls (Briantika 2021).

1.7 Provisional Argument

The Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network still exists in Indonesia and still uses the zakat charity as a cover to raise funds and also still using the community resource for the terrorist activities. The lack of awareness and knowledge of the general public regarding the existence of terrorists using zakat foundations for a guise to get money for one of their resources is one of the reasons why this group of terrorists would still exist in Indonesia.

1.8 Research Method

1.8.1 Research Type

This type of research is qualitative research, namely research with a descriptive model for identifying how Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group obtain

their resources from the community, especially in Indonesia. Qualitative research is conducted by collecting data that is based on non-numeric data.

1.8.2 Subject and Object of the Research

The subject of this research is the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group as the main actor who is conducting activity to obtain resources for their funding and support to conduct terrorist activity in Indonesia. The object is several types of resources that are mentioned in the resource mobilization theory such as moral resources, cultural resources, social organizational resources, human resources and material dimensions of resources.

1.8.3 Method of Data Collection

The data collection technique used in this study was a literature study. Literature study is a review of various reading materials or previous studies related to the themes and issues raised.

1.8.4 Research Process

In the data collection process, secondary data obtained through mass media and official reports from the Indonesian government or International organizations will be analyzed in several stages. First, the results of the data that have been collected are looked at. Second, the data is read and observed closely for greater understanding. During the reading process the writer takes the appropriate points by making comparisons between one data and another to get more accurate data. The data is grouped into several sub-themes to be related to

the research undertaken, and finally, the data that has been analyzed and entered into the study is described.

1.9 Thesis Outline

This research is divided into four chapters, with each chapter consisting of sub-chapters. The chapters are as follows:

A. Chapter I: Introduction

This chapter contains the research background, problem formulation, problem limitations, research objectives, research significance, research scope, literature review, theoretical basis, and research methods.

B. Chapter II: Jemaah Islamiyah's activities in Indonesia

In the second chapter, the relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia and Jemaah Islamiyah globally is discussed, along with how Jemaah Islamiyah collects alms funds under the name zakat from the community and how jemaah islamiyah getting their other resource for their community. This is followed by a discussion why jemaah islamiyah is considered as a social movement organization.

C. Chapter III: Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory as references for Jemaah Islamiyah's income.

In the third chapter, the writer tries to answer the formulated problem using the theoretical basis. This chapter discusses how Jemaah Islamiyah as a

social movement obtain their resources and seeing it from the resource mobilization theory and elaborating how they distribute the funds that they get for their terrorist activity fundings.

D. Chapter IV: Conclusion and Recommendations




CHAPTER II

JEMAAH ISLAMİYAH'S ACTIVITIES

2.1. The relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah Indonesia and the global Jemaah Islamiyah.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is an Islamic extremist organization based in Indonesia (Stanford University 2018). Jemaah Islamiyah is thought to have started in the 1970s when one of the Islamic leaders in Indonesia, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, along with Abdullah Sungkar, founded a religious school or Islamic boarding school for al-mukmin known as Pondok Ngruki in Solo, Central Java Indonesia. Jemaah Islamiyah is a transformation of the Darul Islam movement which once rebelled in around the 1950s with the aim of establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) (Yusoff and Mahmud 2005). With its goal of building Islamic countries, this group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate that extends throughout Southeast Asia, including southern Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the southern Philippines (National Counterterrorism Center 2013).

This terrorist group, JI, has developed quite an extensive network and operates throughout Southeast Asia. The developing countries in this region are seen as having weak central authority, weak law enforcement, many cases of corruption, and open sea barrages in several countries making it easy for JI to operate throughout the region.



Source: (Stanford University 2018)

In the early days of developing JI, the group's founders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir formed an Islamist group in Malaysia and facilitated its members to travel to Afghanistan, allowing Southeast Asian Muslims who wanted to join the war against the Soviets to do so and to train there. Many JI men trained in Afghanistan from the early to mid-1990s, and some of the training camps were affiliated with Al Qaeda (Stanford University 2018). In addition to training, JI reportedly received resources and advice from Al Qaeda during its formation. In several cases of terrorism in Southeast Asia, JI has taken full responsibility for the bombings that occurred. This has led governments in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines to actively pursue JI within their own borders. Based on a report from the Australian National Security, JI also has historical links with other terrorist groups in Indonesia, including Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid and the

Indonesian Mujahidin Council. Members of JI also travel to Syria to cultivate ties with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and other regional militant groups. JI also has ties to the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group (Australian National Security 2022). JI itself is inspired by the anti-Western jihadist ideology of al-Qaeda and supports the use of terrorism to further its political goals. JI seeks to revive a pure form of Islam, governed by Sharia principles.

2.1.1 JI Relations to Extremist Entities

A. Al-Qaeda

The relationship between JI and Al-Qaeda terrorists cannot be proven. This is because only a few individuals who follow JI have links to both terrorist groups. One example is Zulkarnaen. Zulkarnaen was one of the first Indonesian militants to go to Afghanistan in the 1980s for training. He was an instructor at the military academy there for seven years, according to Indonesia's police. Since May 2005, Zulkarnaen has been on the UN Security Council's sanctions list against Al-Qaeda because of his association with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. The UN Security Council has said that Zulkarnaen, who became a master of sabotage, was one of Al-Qaeda's representatives in Southeast Asia and one of the few people in Indonesia who had direct contact with bin Laden's network. Zulkarnaen was appointed head of Camp Saddah, a military academy in the southern Philippines set up for militias from Southeast Asia, according to the Security Council (Lestari 2022). He spent a decade in the camp training other Jemaah Islamiyah members, and in the end became the head of operations for Jemaah Islamiyah (Golbrut 2004). The Anti-terror Special Detachment 88 Team (Densus) arrested Zulkarnaen on Thursday 10 December 2020. The Indonesian

police arrested dozens of members and leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah in Lampung during October-December 2020.

JI is also suspected of having no links because its regional goals do not fully match al-Qaeda's global aspirations. JI does not operate under the auspices of al-Qaeda because decision-making, fundraising and all activities carried out by JI are carried out locally and the group's focus is to establish a caliphate in Southeast Asia and continue to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia (Golbrut 2004). Thus, JI and al-Qaeda are terrorist plots that only benefit each other with mutual assistance. When carrying out acts of terrorism in Southeast Asia, Al-Qaeda gave its plans to JI to carry out the attacks and relied on JI members. This proves that JI's resources are quite large in Southeast Asia if Al Qaeda asked JI for help to carry out massive attacks and provided full funding for them. If JI independently proposes for funding from al-Qaeda and al Qaeda's funds are fit for the purpose, this may happen but this is not considered to be al Qaeda controlling JI.

Table 1. Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist activities related to al-Qaeda

Year	Place	Activity
1995	Asia	Plot to bomb eleven U.S. commercial airliners
2000	Manila	Bombings that killed twenty-two people
2000	Indonesia	Wave of church bombings that killed eighteen people

2002	Bali	Bombing of a nightclub that killed 202 people, most of whom were foreign tourists from Australia and elsewhere
2003	Jakarta	Car bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel that killed twelve people
2004	Jakarta	Suicide car bombing outside the Australian Embassy that killed three people and left more than 100 wounded
2005	Bali	Suicide bombings that killed twenty people and injured 129

Source: (Ghoshal and Rothaus 2009)

B. Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)

In 2008, JI founder Ba'asyir founded a new group, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). The new JAT group is alleged to have attracted several members from JI (Stanford University 2018). The goal of JAT is to develop an extreme interpretation of Islamic law with the goal of creating an Indonesian caliphate. There may be overlap in membership with JI because JAT's founder, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, was a key JI leader. According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, however, Ba'asyir creation of JAT led him to leave JI (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 2017).

C. ISIS

During Bashir's leadership at JI he announced support for ISIS in 2014 and ordered all of his JAT members to support ISIS. However, after leaving JI, JI took an anti-ISIS stance and did not interfere with what the ISIS terrorist group was doing.

2.2. Jemaah Islamiyah Recent Activities

In recent years, JI has been relatively inactive in carrying out violent activities or bombings and have rather prioritized political activities over violence. The JI is more interested than its earlier incarnation in political influence and political infiltration. Not coincidentally, it is also more interested in very local issues that matter to the community. The biggest such issue for extremist groups in late 2016 and early 2017 was whether or not to take part in demonstrations demanding the arrest and prosecution of the Jakarta governor whom hardliners accused of blasphemy. The younger JI ulama, who five years ago were arguing that the organization needed to focus more on the end goal of building an Islamic state and build a partnership with other Muslim organizations to do so, are now in positions of greater influence. The problem is that their strategy may have been overtaken by events. It is hard to see how JI, even with the most strategic recruitment plan, could compete for influence in the general public with mass organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front (Forum Pembela Islam, FPI) or Forum Umat Islam (FUI) that showed their clout through the numbers they were able to turn out for the 2016 Jakarta demonstrations. If the new young professionals that JI is trying to recruit on campus want political influence, they would be better off with a wholly above-ground organization. They still maintain

to carry out terrorist activities underground through the planning, preparing and supporting acts of terrorism. Their compartmentalized and closed structure makes this terrorist group difficult to detect and allows for violence with limited warning. JI continues to be independently involved in planning attacks. It retains pre military training capabilities and has conducted martial arts and warfare training for its members. Some training programs are likely to remain active. Given the group's continued support for the use of terrorism in achieving its long-term goals, this training is likely intended to prepare members for future terrorist attacks.

JI maintains paramilitary training capabilities, and has conducted martial arts and urban warfare training for its members until at least 2020. Some training programs likely remain active. Given the group's continued support for the use of terrorism in pursuit of its long-term objectives, this training is likely intended to facilitate members engaging in future terrorist attacks. The first people who were going to Syria for humanitarian purposes were linked to Jemaah Islamiyah. So it's important to remember that Jemaah Islamiyah, which was the big bear in the room from up till 2001 and up till the Bali bombs, went on a steady period of decline thereafter. Between 2014 and 2018, JI sent foreign fighters to Syria to acquire combat experience alongside regional militant groups, including listed terrorist organization Jabhat al-Nusra and its successor Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. JI trained 96 foreign fighters across 12 training camps in Java of which more than 60 traveled to Syria and some of which continue to fight in support of terrorist organizations in the region. JI likely plans to send further members to fight in the Syrian conflict, and returning foreign fighters have ongoing potential to increase JI's capability to engage in terrorism. In 2010, JI revived its 'military wing' to

secretly promote and build up its capability to engage in terrorism including through the acquisition of firearms and explosives for use in future attacks. JI maintains the capability to acquire and stockpile weapons and explosives should it choose to return to large-scale attack planning. During its development in Indonesia, the JI group was also not always successful because the Indonesian government also continued to take preventive measures to stop this group. The following are several schemes of cases carried out by the Indonesian government against the JI terrorist group.

- In November 2021, Indonesian law enforcement arrested several suspected JI members in Sulawesi and East Java, and seized firearms and detonators. The group was suspected of storing weapons and participating in pre-military training activities.
- In November 2020 and March 2021, Indonesian law enforcement arrested more than a dozen suspected JI members, including the fugitive bomb maker Upik Lawanga. The group had built a bunker where they collected and stored weapons and bomb-making components.
- In February and March 2021, Indonesian law enforcement arrested 22 suspected JI members in East Java. The group was led by Usman bin Sef, who allegedly trained and stockpiled weapons in preparation for attacks on police.
- From April to August 2020, Indonesian law enforcement arrested 17 suspected JI members in Banten. This group stockpiled firearms

and allegedly planned to attack shops owned by Chinese people in Serang, Tasikmalaya and Surabaya.



CHAPTER III

AN ANALYSIS OF RESOURCES OBTAIN BY THE JEMAAH

ISLAMIYAH TERRORIST GROUP

In answering the problem formulation of this study, the author uses resource mobilization theory which is one of the theoretical tendencies that exists in social movements. One of the things that underlies the formation of social movements is religious fundamentalism which often ends in collective acts of violence in the name of religion. Jemaah Islamiyah has been in Indonesia for a long time and uses public funding to continue carrying out its terrorist activities. This chapter will discuss the analysis of the use of funds by JI according to the theory chosen and the types of funding used.

3.1. Jemaah Islamiyah and Its Funding

JI is fully capable of self-fundraising to fund its operations through member contributions, charitable organizations, legitimate business activities, and criminal activities. JI receives financial, ideological, and logistical support from its Middle Eastern contacts, such as those in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the wider Middle East (Foreign Terrorist Organizations 2013). JI's goal involves a long-term struggle that requires considerable regeneration, organizational development, and organizational operations. This long-term struggle certainly requires long-term funding as well. Long-term funding must be legal, supported by the community, and have a neat and solid organizational structure. To attain this, JI formed several fundraising foundations. However, to continually maintain its funding, JI has also

had to cooperate with criminal actors for the purposes of funding, logistics, and increasing manpower through the Fai' treasure scheme, namely obtaining assets from non-Muslims by forceful robbery.

3.1.1 Alliancing with Criminal Actors

In its fundraising activities, JI looks for young people who do not have a criminal record but who want to find their identity and prove their courage and commitment to the religion by carrying out robberies using the teaching of Fa'i treasure. Dwi Suwiknyo explained in the book "Ayat-Ayat Ekonomi Islam" that the fa'i assets referred to in this verse came from infidels, such as Bani Quraizhah, Bani Nadhir, residents of Fadak and Khaibar. Then, the property is handed over to Allah and the messenger to be used for public purposes. this teaching is also mention in the Quran surah Al Hasyr verse 7 which reads;

مَا آفَاءَ اللَّهِ عَلَى رَسُولِهِ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْقُرَى فَلِلَّهِ وَلِلرَّسُولِ وَلِذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَالْيَتَامَىٰ وَالْمَسْكِينِ وَابْنِ السَّبِيلِ
كَذَٰلِكَ يُكْوَنُ دَوْلَةٌ بَيْنَ الْأَعْيَاءِ مِنْكُمْ ۖ وَمَا أَنَّكُمْ الرَّسُولَ فَعْدُوهُ وَمَا نَهَاكُمْ عَنْهُ فَانْتَهُوا ۗ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ
شَدِيدُ الْعِقَابِ

Meaning: "The spoils (fa'i) of those that Allah gave to His Messenger (who came from) from residents of several countries, are for Allah, the Messenger, relatives (Rasul), orphans, the poor and for those who are on a journey, so that the wealth does not circulate only among the rich among you. What the Prophet gave you, accept it. Leave what he forbids. And fear Allah. Verily, Allah is severe in punishment."

This uses the teachings of Fai' treasure whose definition has been misinterpreted by the JI group (International Crisis Group 2003). These youths are told to

become "preman" and have the job of helping JI organize border crossings, make documents and fake identities, and transport goods for terrorism activities and people who will become new members of JI. Criminals and gangsters can thus become mujahideen if their goal is to attain Allah's grace. In the end, waging Jihad in defense of Islam is achieved. JI indeed receives a sizable portion of funding from these criminal actors (Golbrut 2004).

3.1.2 Charitable Appeals

1. Syam Organizer (SO)

Syam Organizer is a fundraising foundation or charitable foundation under the Syam Abadi Amal Foundation, belonging to the Jemaah Islamiyah organization, with its head office in Yogyakarta. Syam Organizer, which was founded in 2013, has 21 branch offices in various regions (Alam 2021). The reason for the establishment of Syam Organizer was to raise funds by attracting public sympathy through humanitarian programs. Syam Organizer is a legal entity. Its main missions have been to organize public rallies to collect funds for Syrian refugees and others affected by the war. The funding provided by the Syam Organizer Foundation is obtained in several ways, including through the distribution of money banks and charity boxes. The foundation also obtains funds by holding qurban savings and sermons with several well-known religious teachers. Funds were collected from the congregation who attended the Tabligh Akbar activities. The deposit of these funds was divided into 2, namely for the JI organization (kept in a safe) and for SO operations (kept in the SO account). Between 2013 and 2021, it raised Rp 124 billion

(US\$8.7 million) from both online and offline events through the 21 provincial branches (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 2022). However, the existence of the central office of the SO foundation in Yogyakarta was investigated by Densus 88 in 2021 and the office was disbanded. The Head of the Regional Office of the Yogyakarta City Ministry of Religion, Nur Abadi said, until now the Syam Organizer is not registered with the Amil Zakat Institution (LAZ) (Alam 2021). This indicates that SO is an illegal zakat foundation but it can still move and be active in society freely.

In its activities, the SO foundation employs several ways to integrate into society. The charity employs a mix of professionals and JI members themselves. SO prohibits male employees from having long beards or wearing pants above the ankles, the standard dress code for conservative Muslim men. Women are allowed to work in charitable offices and engage in the practices that are common to legal charities. This is done when there are concerns of increased police oversight. As an additional cover to the activities, JI hires celebrities to appear in SO commercials.

2. The Abdurrahman bin Auf Foundation (ABA)

The most successful charity that JI established was the Abdurrahman bin Auf Foundation (ABA) (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 2022). In collecting funds there are 7 programs used by the ABA foundation, namely:

1. The Da'wah program that focuses on sermons and the deployment of religious teachers to various regions of the archipelago.
2. The Education Program that provides scholarships, educational assistance, and a national foster parent movement.
3. The Health Program in which the ABA provides free medical programs, ambulance services, and health compensation.
4. A Social Assistance program that focuses on compensation for poor families and compensation for widowed families, among others.
5. Islamic world solidarity programs, such as Donations for Palestine, Rohingya, and others.
6. Community Economic Empowerment Programs, such as entrepreneurship training or business assistance.
7. The disaster response program, namely the ABA foundation, which carries out the slaughtering of Qurban animals and provides disaster emergency response and rescue teams in each branch.

The programs of the ABA foundation have been successful in gaining sympathy from the public, resulting in them obtaining large amounts of funds. Based on police information, during the 2014-2019 period alone, the ABA foundation from all branches managed to collect IDR 104 billion (Setyawan 2022). Of this amount, only 1.2 billion flowed into JI's treasury. The rest is being used for the foundation's programs. This means that only a small portion of the funds collected through the foundation have been used for JI's internal interests. But on the other hand, from this program JI

has also gained the sympathy of the people who are the target of the program, which is also JI's long-term program.

The method for collecting the most funds has been the collecting alms from the general public who are told the funds are to help Muslims in need even though these funds are used to fund JL operations. In 2017, ABA was registered with the Indonesian National Amil Zakat Agency (BAZNAS) to strengthen its credentials as a legitimate charitable organization (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 2022). ABA has become a legal entity, after previously being registered as a foundation Ministry of Law and Human Rights. By registering ABA as a legal entity and foundation, ABA has been able to abuse this authority. ABA uses BAZNAS affiliates to place charity boxes in public places in Indonesia. Each ABA branch is responsible for determining where the boxes will be placed, collecting the funds, and sending a portion of them each month to the ABA head office, according to a predetermined financial target. The biggest concentration has been in Lampung, with more than 6,000 boxes. This is not the only form of fund-raising that ABA has engaged in, but it was by far the most lucrative. Between 2013 and 2020, ABA raised Rp 104.8 billion (US\$ 8 million) through charity boxes (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 2022).

As a foundation that has been legally registered, ABA needs to send an official report to the Ministry of Religion and BAZNAS detailing the amount collected from donations, the funds going into the foundation's funding, and details of where the funds were sent and used. However, in

the details of the funds for the ABA foundation, records show no money being sent to the JI Group. The way ABA conducts transactions for funds for its religious activities is by giving the money in cash directly to the person concerned. Meanwhile, in an expenditure audit, which is used for JI, funds will be transferred online electronically through the branch office of ABA with a memo stating that the money is for payment of school fees (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 2022). That way ABA can safely make transactions with JI.

3.1.3 Jemaah Islamiyah Human Resources

According to Mc Adam the more organized a group of people, the more likely the success of a social movement will be. As in the Resource Mobilization Theory, McAdam through his Political Process Theory also notes the importance of the presence of an organization to form social movements. The existence of an organization, regardless of its type, will build a structure of solidarity incentives, communication networks, and recognized leaders. Furthermore, McAdam argues that the existence of a social group will enable the emergence of social and interpersonal motivation to take part in group activities with other members. Group members who do not want to join a movement with others will feel guilty and may be punished socially. Meanwhile, if they join, they will benefit socially and will feel increasingly close to other members. (Locher 2002, 265)

The method used by JI in recruiting its members is:

First, delivering da'wah in general in mosques and Islamic boarding schools. Second, people who seem interested in the da'wah earlier are invited to attend halaqah, namely closed recitations in small groups with fewer members. In this

halaqah the members will be guided by an instructor, he will lead the members through four stages:

- Tabligh (delivering da'wah and information),
- Ta'lim (teaching about Islam),
- Tarbiyyah (mental and physical education and training),and
- Tamhis (filtering)

At the tamhis level, participants will be screened and tested for their talents and abilities, then they will be accepted as loyal members of JI followers. This is done in order to foster a mindset where members have the desire and belief that they will get something from their joint actions.

3.2. Social Movement Theory

A social movement is an activity based on the idea of individuals forming networks and focusing on the goals of creating these networks and the means of mobilizing individuals who were not previously involved (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Social movement organizations (SMO) are groups that advocate for social change. SMO are looking for followers - people who support the cause of the movement and people who are involved in actual social support.(McCarthy and Zald 1977). Locher states that social movements can be seen from three aspects (Locher 2002), namely:

A). Organized, a social movement is an organized activity. In social movements, leaders often create and design specific jobs and assignments for movement participants where members of these social movements are given

specific tasks to perform, and they also carefully design a tactic and strategy of action.

B). Deliberate, Social movements also occur because of considerations. This group is intensively deliberately raised and the participants carefully decide whether to join or not to be involved in a movement. The involvement of participants is often driven by promises and membership drives, social movements seek publicity and seek to attract as many people as possible to support the movement..

C). Enduring, Social movements generally last for a long time or have the endurance for several years or even decades to continue to achieve their goals. Based on the 3 aspects mentioned by Locher, Jemaah Islamiyah fulfills these 3 aspects and then adds the understanding that acts of terrorism are based on radical religious views, then terrorism can be interpreted as a social movement, making it easier for this movement to explore the global space of the movement. As we all know, even though several countries in the world have declared war on terrorism, terrorism is still alive and the threat is increasingly frightening. With extensive networks on a cross-country scale, the acts of violence carried out are more orderly and organized. Religion is a very effective vehicle to mobilize masses. This effectiveness does, however, depend on the conditions experienced by the community. Weak socio-political and economic conditions provide space for terrorist actors to recruit new members.

3.2.1 Resource Mobilization Theory

In the formation of social movements, resource mobilization is very important (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Resources of money and labor are very

important to understand the activities of social movements. Resources are needed to engage in social conflict and they must be amassed to achieve the goals of a social movement. The resource mobilization approach emphasizes social support and constraints on social movement phenomena. It examines the range of resources that must be mobilized, the interrelationships of social movements with other groups, the dependence of movements on external support to succeed, and the tactics used by the authorities to control or combine movements. There are 5 types of resources needed by social movements: moral, cultural, social organizational, human and material dimensions (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

1. Moral Resources

Moral resources are those that help organizations to be seen as legitimate. For example, celebrity endorsements can serve as a type of moral resource: when a celebrity speaks for a cause, people may be encouraged to learn more about the organization, view the organization in a more positive light, or even become adherents or constituents of the organization. Moral resources tend to come from outside the social movement or social movement organizations and are generally provided by external sources.

2. Cultural

Cultural resources include the knowledge necessary to carry out organizational activities. For example, knowing how to lobby for elected representatives, draft a policy paper, or organize a rally are all examples of cultural resources. Cultural resources can also include media products, for example, informational books or videos on topics related to the

organization's work. A key difference between cultural resources and moral resources is that cultural resources are more widely available, less exclusive, and accessible for use free of the unfavorable judgment of those outside the social movement or organization.

3. Social Organizational Resources

Socio-organizational resources are the resources that Social Movement Organizations (SMO) use to build their social networks. For example, an organization might develop an email list of people who support their cause; this is considered a social organizational resource that the organization can use itself or share with other SMOs who share the same goals. There are three forms of social organizational resources, namely: infrastructure, social networks, and organizations. Infrastructure is a social organization equivalent to public goods such as postal services, sanitation or civil infrastructure such as roads, sidewalks and traffic lights, which facilitate the smooth functioning of everyday life. Infrastructure does not belong to social resources. Conversely, access to social networks and special formal groups and organizations, the resources within them can be controlled.

4. Human Resources

Human resources refer to the labor required, either voluntarily or paid, to carry out organizational activities. Depending on the goals of the organization, certain types of skills may be invaluable forms of human resources. Human resources in this case are more individual than social or cultural organizational structures. Individuals usually have the right to

control the use of human resources and labor, except in extreme cases such as forced labor and extortion.

5. Material Resources

Material resources are tangible resources such as money, locations for the organization to meet, and physical supplies needed to run the organization. Material resources can include anything. Money is the main resource that is needed. It doesn't matter how many resources there are in mobilizing the movement, they will come at a cost and someone will have to pay for them. Material resources are often the subject of analysis because they are generally more tangible, more exclusive, and in some cases more functional than other types of resources.

Table 2. Resource Mobilization and Jemaah Islamiyah

Resource type	Moral	Cultural	Social Organizational	Human	Material
1.	Members of JI have joined political-religious organizations in Indonesia such as the People's Da'wah Party and the Indonesian	Using Internet technology to connect with other terrorist organizations.	Using zakat foundations as a front for collecting funds used for acts of terrorism.	“Preman” are obtained through young people who don't have an established mindset yet.	Internal funding comes from public alms money collected through foundations and also personal money from JI members which

	Ulema Council (MUI).				must be paid continuously.
2.	Using well-known religious teachers to carry out their “tabligh akbar” with the aim of raising funds	Creating, defining, teaching and indoctrinating the meaning of jihad in accordance with their goals.	Building a new terrorist group whose members come from JI.	Using civilians to work in foundations that are used as a place to collect funds in order to reduce the suspicions of residents.	Provisions of financial assistance and weapons from terrorist groups with links to JI.
3.	Hiring celebrities to appear in SO commercials.	Having a guide book that discusses all matters of JI.	Cooperating with other terrorist groups to commit acts of terrorism and build mutualistic relations.	Sending members of JI to Syria for training.	Using houses and shophouses to continue carrying out terrorist activities without arousing the suspicions of residents.

Source: (McCarthy and Zald 1977)

According to Edwards and McCarthy there are four mechanisms that can be used by social movement actors and social movement organizations to gain access to their resources (Sukmana 2016, 188), namely:

1. Aggregation, where the resources that exist and are still spread to each individual are then combined into collective resources by movement actors. Aggregate social movement resources can be sourced and owned by the private sector or can come from donations from individual conscience to achieve SMO goals. One example is that cultural resources can be pooled by organizing conferences where activists from various groups meet to share information, brainstorm strategies, and conduct training.
2. Self-production, where movement leaders create resources or add value to the resources that have been collected. The movement produces its own human resources through leadership training and socialization of the movement's practices and values. Movements establish social movement organizations, build networks, and form coalitions. The movement produces its own human resources through leadership training and socialization of movement practices and values. Movement leaders also make various items for sale such as literature and important symbols of the movement such as t-shirts, glasses, posters, and so on.
3. Co-optation/Appropriation, Co-optation refers to the use of resources that have been collected by the group in a transparent manner and with the permission of the group. Meanwhile, appropriation refers to the tacit exploitation of resources previously collected from various other groups.

Co-optation is accompanied by the transfer of some amount of ownership control over the co-opted resource.

4. Patronage, what is meant in Patronage is the provision of resources to social movement organizations by individuals or organizations. Patronage mechanisms in social movements are also possible in the form of the provision of human resources, including, in particular, the loan of personnel for a certain period of time. Patronage in moral resources occurs when an individual or an organization provides appreciation or recognition for the positive achievements of a social movement organization.

The existence of an organization, regardless of its type, will build a structure of solidarity incentives, communication networks, and recognized leaders. This has led to the existence of many terrorist fund-raising foundations in Indonesia because the existence of a social group enables the social motivation of an individual to take part in group activities with other members. It can be seen from the table of the types of resources used by JI in carrying out its activities that this terrorist group carries out all its activities in a very structured and optimal manner. However, the Indonesian government is also aware of the presence of JI in Indonesia, evidenced by the many arrests of suspected terrorists and also other actors who have links with JI. The foundation which was also used by JI to collect its funding has also been disbanded by the Detachment 88 team based in Yogyakarta. This does not, however, mean that JI is no longer operating in Indonesia. There are still many networks that continue to carry out terrorist activities unnoticed or underground.

According to John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, the greater the revenue stream to the SMO, the more likely it is that the staff will be professional and the larger the group will be. This happens because funds flow directly from the economic support model. It is clear that the more money available to an organization, the more full-time personnel it can employ (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The ability to draw on external funding sources depends on the network of relationships within the local community, which is able to place other external organizations into the local community. This perspective emphasizes a shift from a more general approach to community institutions to more specific community organizations.

Funding from foundations that is of highest risk is that from domestic donations from the wider community through cash transactions. Cash transactions have weak oversight from the donors who may be unclear on what the funds are being used for. In Indonesia, the regulation of criminal acts of terrorism within the country was first carried out with the establishment of a Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. Criminal acts of terrorism are regulated in Article 6 to Article 16. Initially, the crime of financing terrorism in Indonesia was an integral part of the crime of terrorism itself. This is because the crime of financing terrorism was regulated simultaneously with the crime of terrorism in the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, which was amended to become Law no. 15 of 2003 (Tim National Risk Assessment Indonesia 2015). However, this is no longer relevant today. There is a new law that has replaced this which specifically

focuses on terrorism funding, namely Law no. 9 of 2013. In this article it is stated that funds are all movable or immovable assets or objects, both tangible and intangible, can be obtained in any way or form, including in digital or electronic format, and show evidence of ownership or connection with all such assets or objects, including but not limited to bank credit, traveler's checks, checks issued by banks, remittance orders, stocks, securities, bonds, bank drafts, and promissory notes (Tim National Risk Assessment Indonesia 2015).

In JI's case, this terrorist group obtained domestic funding through donations to foundations and through the foundation funds using the cash instruments used to manage terrorist networks. The mode of financing terrorism through foundations is dominant and has a high risk potential because the origin of the funds generally comes from legal activities, for example, donations or community contributions from work. In addition, there are also other ways to raise funds, namely public donations through charity boxes, donations via the internet and membership fees (Tim National Risk Assessment Indonesia 2015).

3.3. Distribution of funding for Jemaah Islamiyah

1. Terrorism Funding through the banking sector


The banking sector is a financial services sector that is vulnerable to being used to finance terrorism by terrorist groups such as JI to fund their actions. The ease and convenience offered by banking services such as fast storage, transfer or transfer of funds across countries, and withdrawals that can be made at ATMs that are scattered everywhere make

the banking sector an attractive tool for use by terrorist organizations. The typology of terrorism financing through the banking channel is simple, in which the funds that enter the account are generally withdrawn directly by the recipient of the funds. In other words, terrorist actors do not try to disguise their transaction flow or layering as is usually done by money laundering offenders. Meanwhile, for the Jemaah Islamiyah case, JI tends to avoid sending funds through banking mechanisms. However, if you still have to send funds through banking services, usually the funds sent are in small amounts. This is supported by the conveniences offered, such as priority customer service with confidentiality for its customers, easy cross-border transfers, and money withdrawals that can be made through ATMs anywhere, which can attract terrorist organizations to use bank services to store and transfer funds for acts of terror.

2. Funding of Terrorism Through the Carrying of Cash

Carrying cash or other payment instruments is also known as cross border cash carrying (CBCC). The cash carrying mechanism was used by JI when raising funds for the 2002 Bali Bombing and the 2003 J.W.Marriot Hotel Bombings (Safrudin 2013, 124). Carrying cash is seen as JI's most effective method of disbursing funding. Individual couriers, often not JI members. According to the researchers' findings, instead of using the official customs route, JI prefers to take the unofficial route through the underground when crossing the border area to enter Indonesian territory (Safrudin 2013, 125). In addition, the length of the border line between Indonesia and neighboring countries makes the border

area vulnerable to being used as a route for smuggling goods and money to support acts of terror in Indonesia. Because JI organizations exist in several countries in the Southeast Asian region such as Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines to Australia, the activity of carrying money by courier is a mechanism that is very likely to be used by JI to move funds that will be used to support operational costs and terrorist acts. Indonesia as an archipelagic country has so many entrances that can be passed by land and sea. It is the duty of the government to prevent carrying cash or other payment instruments intended to finance acts of terrorism.



CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

4.1 Conclusion

The development of terrorist networks within a country is becoming increasingly difficult to contain. This is due to the rapid development of information and communication technology which has impacted on changes in the patterns of recruiting new terrorist members. In recruiting members to a group of excessive fanaticism of a religion, wrong doctrinalization of messages contained in religious aqeedah and low education play key roles in getting someone to be involved in various acts of terrorism. The existence of social groups will be more likely to bring about a social movement if the social group is segmented. Because segmented social groups will attract membership from special classes in a society. The more segmented the association group in a society, the more likely it is to be mobilized into a Social Movement Organization (SMO). The similarity of membership in a group tends to have similarity also in terms of shared desires.

Donations are the easiest way to collect funds and their origin is difficult to trace because the donations received come from numerous parties, from individuals in the general public or abroad and institutions within the country or abroad. Terrorist groups can easily carry out activities in Indonesia because they are supported by a generous community in which the majority have a background in Islam. Furthermore, donating to charity is one of the good deeds that will always be carried out by Muslims. With these supporting factors, JI can continue to develop through underground activities. At present, JI members also easily

blend into society; thus, it is important for the government and society as individuals to be more sensitive to their surroundings.

4.2 Recommendations

Terrorists have now blended into society, so it is not easy to distinguish them from other members of society. Furthermore, if the government uses a war strategy against terrorists, it will be met with resistance. So far, the government has emphasized repressive measures in dealing with terrorists, and has even tended to ignore basic human values (HAM). As a result, the terrorist movements have become more extensive and open. The groups are becoming increasingly violent and even daring to attack law enforcement officers. Even if the government succeeds in eliminating all terrorists in this decade, there is no guarantee that in the next 10 to 15 years Indonesia will be completely free from terrorism. The reason for this is quite simple: the descendants of terrorists who were killed or captured grow up, and the spirit of jihad is passed on within them. This will also likely result in crimes of terrorism that are crueler. It won't only be jihad that underlies their actions, but also revenge. Because terrorist movements are based on radical religious views, deradicalization is the answer. Deradicalization is all efforts to neutralize radical understandings through an interdisciplinary approach, such as law, psychology, religion and socio-culture for those who are influenced by radical and/or pro-violence views. The deradicalization process prioritizes dialogue rather than physical action so that it is more effective and safe from human rights violations.

In the opinion of the author, the foundations used by terrorists as a forum to collect funding for their activities is negligence on the part of the government. These foundations can obtain legal permission from the Ministry of Religion which means there is a gap in the government in regards to monitoring the numerous and widespread foundations like this that exist in Indonesia today. To overcome this, the government needs to tighten the terms and conditions of formation of a foundation related to zakat and alms funds. In addition, periodic checks regarding the growth of new foundations which may not be legally registered are needed. It is also necessary for the government to provide education and information to the public so that they are more aware of which zakat foundations are used by terrorists to collect funds for their activities. The general public must also be more careful in choosing the institution in which their social funds are channeled, to ensure that they are not providing a source of funding for terrorism activities. The state, in this case, cannot back down or lose to terrorist groups. It is the duty of the State to ensure the security of the people, including from the threat of terrorism.

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