MAPPING OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND RADICAL IDEOLOGY FOR HIGHER EDUCATION LECTURERS IN INDONESIA

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Abstract: This research tried to map the religious thought and the level of radicalism of university lecturers in Indonesia. Lecturers' religious thought was mapped to be inclusive, exclusive, and radical, while the radical level was mapped into radical in mind, radical in attitude, and radical in action. The focus of this study was on two things, ie, the level of the religious thought of the lecturers of Higher Education in Indonesia whether it was inclusive, exclusive or radical and the level of radicalism of the lecturers in Higher Education whether it was limited to radical in mind or radical in attitude and even radical in action. This was a field study with phenomenological sociological approach. Data collection methods used questionnaires, interviews, and documentation, involving lecturers from the colleges of religion and universities in big cities of Indonesia. The results of this study were as follows: First, fifty-two percent of lecturers in Indonesia were categorized as inclusive, forty-one percent of lecturers as exclusive and seven percent of lecturers categorized as radical. Second, from seven percent of lecturers who had a radical understanding, six percent was at the level of radical in mind, one percent was at the radical in attitude level, and none was at the level of radical in action.

Keywords: Religious Thought, Radical Ideology, Exclusive, and Exclusive

I. BACKGROUND

The movement of Islamic radicalism is actually the “fruit” of the verbalist-scripturalist understanding of religious texts being forced to legitimize “violence actions” by “calling for jihad to spread terror” in the name of “God”[1]. Scripturalist understanding assumes that truth exists only in the text and there is no truth outside the text. With such an understanding, Islamic radical movements usually place theological conceptions as the basis of action. These theological conceptions are jihad (in the narrow sense), the enforcement of Islamic shari’a, the formalization of Islamic shari’a, amar ma'ruf nahi munkar, and the establishment of an Islamic state (Khilafah/Daulah Islamiyah).[2]

The process of radicalization reaches not only the common people, but also the campus. The campus life is vulnerable infiltrated by radicalism. The vulnerability is seen not only from a psycho-social angle alone, but also in the aspect of the instrument or media that the spread of hatred and violence has been designed with the pattern and lifestyle of the campus. Some of the ways the radicalisms penetrate into the campus life are such as through books, magazines, bulletins, and, the most massive and effective, internet and social media networks. This hatred and violence is the root that creates movements, activities, and acts of terrorism or radicalism in Indonesia.[3]

Referring to a research report by the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ R & D in 1996 on four secular universities in Indonesia, there was an increase in religious activity which tended to be exclusive and radical. This conclusion was reinforced by the research results of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in 2011 which had the conclusion that showed the increasing level of exclusive and radical students. [4] Furthermore, according to LIPI, the tendency of students in this exclusive and radical understanding of religion continues to this day. [5]

Two research results conducted by the Institute for Islamic and Peace Studies (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian/LaKIP) in 2012 and Maarif Institute in December 2015, [6] showed that students became the cadre of radical fundamentalist religious ideals that ultimately lead them into terrorists. In addition, in research conducted by the R & D of Religion in Makassar in 2009 on “Islamic Students’ Religious Understanding in Makassar” also showed an astonishing tendency that the students’ understanding of the nationality significantly indicated the point of shift; around 63.5% students agreed that the form of Khilafah State replaced the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila. [7]

This research intended to map the religious thought and the level of radicalism of university lecturers in Indonesia. Lecturers’ religious thought was mapped to be inclusive, exclusive, and radical, while the radical level was mapped into radical in mind, radical in attitude, and radical in action.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Many studies on religious social movements exist in Indonesia especially about radicalism, but the study of radicalism in the campus has not much been discussed, all of which only discuss about the seeds of radicalism among students. Some research results used as literature review materials in this current research were:

The research of Yusdani, et.al., entitled “Nalar Islam Tenaga Edukatif Universitas Rahmatan Lilalamin” concluded that there were two typologies of UII lecturers, ie, exact and non-exact lecturer. According to this research, the Islamic thought of UII exact sciences and non-exact sciences lecturers was Islam-
Mapping of Religious Thought and Radical Ideology for Higher Education Lecturers in Indonesia

Modernist and Neo-Modernist Islam. Furthermore, this research also mentioned that non-mainstream religious ideology, such as HTI, Ikhwanul Muslimin, and Salafi had entered the campus of UII, especially students.[8]

Research conducted Maarif Institute in December 2015 showed that the seeds of radicalism among Indonesian adolescents was in the stage of worrying. The survey was conducted on 98 high school students who attended the Maarif Institute Jamboree. The question posed to these students was “Would you be willing to attack people or groups that are considered insulting to Islam?” The result showed that 40.82 respondents answered “willing”, and 8.16 percent of respondents answered “highly willing”. Meanwhile, respondents who answered “not willing” were 12.24 percent and “less willing” were 25.51 percent. [9]

Sartono Kartodirdjo conducted research on religious movements in Java from the 19th century to the 20th century, where the research focused on the trail of Ratu Adil in Java. In his research, he described many millennial religious movements. However, it seems that the research was limited to a preliminary study that described the events due to the large number of religious nuanced movements. [10]

The R & D of the Ministry of Religion of Makasar conducted research on student radicalism in four provinces, ie, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, East Kalimantan, and Maluku and North Maluku. The result was that there were about 63.5% students who agreed that the form of State of caliphate replaced the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila. Furthermore, this research also found that many students had been affected by the thoughts of HTI, Salafi-Wahabi, and the Tarbiyah-Ikhwanul Muslimin group. Religious discussions at these provincial campuses had much discussed about exclusiveness and radicalism. [11]

Muhammad Aliakov in his thesis entitled “The rise of Radicalism in Higher Education in 2012” explained the background of the development of radicalism in Indonesia, the process of radical entry into the college environment, and the solutions to prevent it. Unfortunately, the data submitted were however still too abstract and broad, without being accompanied by recent cases and data. [12]

The result of Zuly Qodir's research entitled “The Islamic Social Movement: The Manifesto of the Believers” described the influence of small-scale religious movements on the larger religious movement. In this study, he explained that many small-scale religious social movements were able to influence the larger religious movements. Zuly emphasized his study on religious movements that were political in which religion was used as a weapon of legitimacy of political movements. [13]

Azyumardi Azra in his book “Islamic Political Upheaval From Fundamentalism, Modernism Up to Post-Modernism” described radical Islamic movements, from the historical aspect, doctrine, ideological roots, jihad both at the level of concept and practice, to the birth of radicalism in politics embodied in terrorist acts in the local, regional and international order.[14]

III. METHODOLOGY

This was a field study with phenomenological sociological approach. Data collection method used questionnaires by involving lecturers from Higher Education of Religion and Higher Education in big cities of Indonesia, such as Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, Malang, Denpasar, and Mataram. The respondents in this study were 50 lecturers, with details 25 people from universities and 25 people from the colleges of religion. Each lecturer was asked to fill out an available questionnaire containing questions that indicated to specific religious and radical levels.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

a. The Development of Radicalism in Indonesia

In the context of Indonesia, the beginning of the Islamic radical movement could be traced from the idea of an Islamic State pioneered by SM. Kartosuwiryo. DI/TII proclaimed on 7 August 1949 in West Java, with the aim of establishing a state based on Islam. On January 20, 1952, DI/TII Kartosuwiryo received support from Kahar Muzakkar and his army based in Sulawesi, and then on September 21, 1953, Daud Beureueh in Aceh also declared part of NII Kartosuwiryo. In 1954, Ibn Hajar and his forces based in South Kalimantan also joined.[15] In the end, the movement was successfully crushed by the pro-government army and never again emerged except through underground movements.[16]

After the revocation of the Rule on Indocrtination of the Pancasila as Single Principle, the turbulence of the radicalism movement was present again despite the different format. Some Islamic movements emerged, such as the FPI (Islamic Defenders Front), MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), Laskar Jihad, FKAWJ (Ahlu Sunnah Wa al-Jama'ah Communication Forum), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), FPIS (Islamic Youth Front of Surakarta), Hizbullah Sunan Bonang, Laskar Jundullah, and so forth.[17]

Referring to a research report by the Ministry of Religious Affairs' R & D in 1996 on four secular universities in Indonesia, there was an increase in religious activity which tended to be exclusive and radical. This conclusion was reinforced by the research results of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in 2011 which concluded that the level of exclusive and radical students was increasing.[18] Furthermore, according to LIPI, the tendency of students in this exclusive and radical understanding of religion continues to this day.[19]
Research conducted by the Institute for Islamic and Peace Studies (LaKIP) in 2012 and Maarif Institute in December 2015, [20] showed that students became the cadre of radical fundamentalist religious ideals that ultimately lead them into terrorists. In addition, in research conducted by the R & D of Religion in Makassar in 2009 on “Islamic Students’ Religious Understanding in Makassar” also showed an astonishing tendency that the students’ understanding of the nationality significantly indicated the point of shift; around 63.5% students agreed that the form of Caliphate State replaced the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.[21] The research by the R & D of Makasar also showed that in some universities, especially general universities, new Islamic groups such as HTI, Salafi-Wahabi, and Tarbiyah-Ikhwani Muslimin group, gripped strongly the students’ understanding of Islam. These groups dominated the religious discourses of campus through various seminars, regular discussions, the publication of various writings in the form of bulletins, magazines, and newspapers, and the recruitment of highly intensive cadres. These new groups had also infiltrated quite brilliantly to intracampus institutions, especially LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus/Campus Dakwah Institute) and some student bodies and study program student unions. These groups were also quite good at pouring student militancy and ideology with the issue of resistance to the West and the United States with all their modernization and capitalism projects.[22]

2. The Root of Radicalism in Indonesia

The roots of radicalism that emerged in Indonesia and globally could be seen from several causes, among others, firstly, international politics or development at a global level in which radical groups made the situation in the Middle East an inspiration to take up arms and acts of terror. What happened in Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and so on was seen as the interference of America, Israel, and their allies. Their terror acts were regarded as retaliation for the intervention of America and its allies, including in Indonesia. The second cause was interpretative error or the mistake in understanding religious texts. This interpretative error could be seen in Wahhabism that glorified the conservative Arab-style Islamic culture. In terms of radicalism, Wahhabism was considered not just a stream, a thought, or an ideology, but a mentality. Mental characteristics included liking to make the narrow group boundary of the Muslims and easily claiming that those outside their group were kafir or enemy that had to be fought. This happened because of mistakes in understanding the meaning of religious texts. The third cause was the factor of poverty. The main thing that might make the link between poverty and radicalism was the feeling of being marginalized. Such a situation became a fertile breeding ground for radicalism and terrorism. Moreover, radical groups offered substantial material pay and "paradise" for acts of terrorism, so that many people were affected to do so.[23]

The fourth cause was the political pressure of the authorities against a particular society or group. The authoritarianism of this ruler triggered the emergence of a radical attitude of resistance. The fifth cause was the factor of religious emotion and the factors triggered by SARA, especially religion.[24] The sixth cause was different cultural factors. This was natural because culturally in society it was always found the effort to escape from the bondage of certain cultural webs considered not appropriate, such as Western culture that was considered as an enemy that had to be removed from the earth. Westernization was a thought considered dangerous to Muslims in applying Islamic Shari'a, so that the symbols of the West should be destroyed for the enforcement of Islamic Shari'a.[25]

3. Religious Thought Map of the Lecturers in Indonesia

Based on the data that the author obtained from about 50 lecturers who filled in the questionnaire, 52%, 41%, and 7% of the lecturers in Indonesia were categorized as inclusive, exclusive, and radical, respectively. The inclusiveness referred to in this study was to have an open understanding of differences of opinion and to accept dissent as something natural, sunnatullah, and equally having truth value. The exclusiveness was the understanding of an opinion that the truth was only one, but not imposing this opinion to others, because they still thought that differences were sunnatullah. The radicalism was the assumption that the most correct opinion was one’s own opinion, while the opinion of others was wrong and had to be straightened to fit his opinion. Furthermore, based on the radical category that the author defined, there were about 7% of lecturers having radical understanding. The radical understanding in question means that the lecturers only considered the truth of their own and their group, while others were wrong and had to be straightened out. Of the seven percent, there were six percent at the level of radical in mind, one percent at the radical in attitude level, and none the level of radical in action.

CONCLUSION

The conglutination of this study were as follows: First, fifty-two percent of lecturers in Indonesia were categorized as inclusive, forty-one percent of lecturers as exclusive and seven percent of lecturers categorized as radical. Second, from seven percent of lecturers who had a radical understanding, six percent was at the level of radical in mind, one percent was at
the radical in attitude level, and none was at the level of radical in action.

REFERENCES


[3] The phenomenon of shifting and strengthening of the religious movement at campuses is obviously very interesting to study at least for several reasons as: first, the religious phenomenon at campuses of Yogyakarta is quite obvious as many students use the attribute of Islam (Arab). Second, the rise of Islam among students starting from the campuses is not only secular campus like UGM and UNY but also Islamic campus itself like UIN, UI and UMY. Thirdly, the Islamic activities are not temporary but are included in the activities included in the student affairs program including the administration of Aqidah and Islamic lectures on campus. All four of their activities have spawned new ideas that they have been practicing in applying Islamic concepts on certain unspoken issues such as the idea of a kitulah. See. Ibid.

[4] In another study conducted from October 2010 to January 2011, the Institute for Islamic and Peace Studies (LaKIP) found that among 1,000 student respondents in 100 public and private junior and senior high schools in Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi, 48.9% of students said they supported violence in the name of religion. See Ibid.

[5] The results of the 2011 study conducted at five prestigious universities in Indonesia, ie, UGM, UI, IPB, Unair and Undip, showed an increase in understanding of religious fundamentalism among students in the general campus, even lasting until today.


[12] In fact, the Islamic radical movement has no strong roots in Indonesia. These movements are not original products of the Indonesian nation but are imported from outside, especially from the Middle East. Noorhaidi states that the Islamic radical movement has a network close to the Middle East. He proved this with the results of his research on FKAWJ in the case of the Maluku conflict. The organization called for the justification of jihad from some salafi scholars in the Middle East. Noorhaidi even said it is likely that the organization is also seeking funding from the Middle East. See. Noorhaidi Hasan, Transnational Islam Within the Boundary of National Politics: Middle Eastern Fatwas on Jihad in the Moluccas ; Paper presented at” The Conference of Fatwas and Dissemination of Religious Authority in Indonesia “conducted by the International Institute for Asia Studies (IIAS) Leiden, October 31, 2002.


[15] The movement was not appear after the reforms occurred, but there was a long and tedious process to go. In 1980, a new generation of Darul Islam emerged with various factions scattered in various areas, ie, 1) Atjeng Kurnia faction that included Bogor, Serang, Purwokarto, and Subang, 2) Ajengan Masduki faction that included Cianjur, Purwokerto, Subang, Jakarta, and Lampung 3) Abdul Fatah Wiranagapati faction that included Garut, Bandung, Surabaya, and Kalimantan 4) Gaos Taufik faction that included all of Sumatra 5) Abdullah Sungkar faction that included Central Java and Yogyakarta 6) Ali Hate faction that included South Sulawesi, and 7) Komandemen Area IX faction led by Abu Toto Syekh Panji Gumilang. See. Ibid, 27; Zuly Qadir, Radikalisme Agama di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2014), 144.

[16] In another study conducted from October 2010 to January 2011, the Institute for Islamic and Peace Studies (LaKIP) found that among 1,000 student respondents in 100 public and private junior and senior high schools in Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi, 48.9% of students said they supported violence in the name of religion. See. Ibid.

[17] The results of the 2011 study conducted at five prestigious universities in Indonesia, ie, UGM, UI, IPB, Unair, and Undip showed an increase in understanding of religious fundamentalism among the students on the public campus, even lasting until today.

[18] In the case of the New Order, the state always churned out political movements. see. Noorhaidi Hasan, Transnational Islam Within the Boundary of National Politics: Middle Eastern Fatwas on Jihad in the Moluccas .

[19] at least if we refer to the pattern of movement, which is similar to the picture of E. Marty; Literal-closed, exclusive, intolerant, anti all that smells of modernism and some of its political movements. see. http://www.kompasiana.com/jihail/awas-radikalisme-agama-mewabah-di- kalangan-mahasiswa-islam._5698bfee6023bd6d06585193. Retrived 20 May 2016.

[20] In the case of the New Order, the state always churned out what was identified as a radical movement. For it, radicalism was the number one enemy and made as common enemy through various media transformation. Left and right radicalism was the same. Left radicalism was like the New Left Movement, which once flourished in Indonesia around 1980s and Radical Right was like Komando Jihad.Azyumardi Azra. (1996). Pergolakan Politik Islam, dari Fundamentalis, Modernisme hingga Post-Modernisme. Jakarta: Paramadina, 18.

[21] The involvement of the religious emotional factor was manifestly demonstrated by the mass riots at the beginning of the reforms, hundreds of Chinese churches and businesses being burned, destroyed, and looted. In May 1998 SARA nuanced riot killed more than 1000 people. The riots such as in East Timor, Poso, Ambon, Sambas, and others are part of a long list of riots that are based on religious and ethnic conflicts. The recent violence, such as FPI violence with Ahmadiyya in Cikusesi, riots in Temanggung, Lombok, and Shi‘a and NU riots in religious