# MANAGEMENT OF EARNINGS THROUGH THE MANIPULATION OF REAL ACTIVITIES THAT AFFECT CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS 

## A THESIS

Presented as Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements to Obtain the Bachelor Degree in Accounting Department


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# MANAGEMENT OF EARNINGS THROUGH THE MANIPULATION OF REAL ACTIVITIES THAT AFFECT CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS 

## A BACHELOR DEGREE THESIS

## By

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## TABLE OF CONTENT

## Page

Page of Title ..... i
Approval Page ..... ii
Legalization Page ..... iii
Acknowledgements ..... iv
Table of Contents ..... vi
List of Tables ..... x
List of Appendices ..... xi
Abstract (in English) ..... xii
Abstract (in Indonesia) ..... xiii
Statement of Free Plagiarism ..... xiv
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study ..... 1
1.2 Problem Formulation ..... 3
1.3 Problem Limitation ..... 3
1.4 Research Objectives ..... 3
1.5 Research Contributions ..... 4
1.6 Definition of Terms ..... 4

## CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1 Financial Statement ..... 5
2.2 Earnings ..... 6
2.3 Earnings Management ..... 6
2.3.1 Definitions of Earnings Management ..... 6
2.3.2 Classifications of Earnings Management ..... 9
2.3.3 Targets of Earnings Management ..... 9
2.3.4 Motivations of Earnings Management ..... 9
2.3.5 Patterns of Earnings Management ..... 12
2.4 Statement of Cash Flow ..... 14
2.5 Cash Flows from Operations ..... 16
2.6 Agency Theory ..... 17
2.7 Previous Study ..... 18
2.7.1 Management of Earnings through the Real Activities Manipulation ..... 19
2.8 Hypotheses Formulation ..... 20
2.8.1 Main Hypotheses ..... 20
2.8.1.1 Sales Manipulation ..... 21
2.8.1.2 Reduction of Discretionary Expenses ..... 22
2.8.1.3 Overproduction ..... 22
2.8.2 Hypotheses on cross-sectional variation ..... 24
2.8.2.1 Accrual Manipulation Flexibility. ..... 24
2.8.2.2 Presence of debt ..... 27
2.8.2.3 Short-term Suppliers ..... 27

## CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHOD

3.1 Population and Sample ..... 29
3.2 Research Variables ..... 31
3.3 Formulated Hypothesis ..... 31
3.4 Statistical Tool ..... 33
3.5 Hypothesis Testing ..... 35
CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, AND IMPLICATIONS
4.1 Research Description ..... 41
4.2 Descriptive Statistics ..... 42
4.3 Hypothesis Testing. ..... 45
4.3.1 Suspect firm-years exhibit either unusually low cash flow from operations (CFO) or unusually low discretionary expenses or both ..... 45
4.3.2 Suspect firm-years exhibit unusually high production costs, controlling for the level of sales. ..... 48
4.3.3 Suspect firm-years with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets, that is low accounting flexibility, have abnormally high cost of goods sold (COGS) and abnormally low discretionary expenses, when compared to other suspect firm-years ..... 50
4.3.4 Suspect firm-years with debt outstanding have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years ..... 54
4.3.5 Suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assetshave abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormallylow discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.................. 61
4.4 Classical Assumption Test ..... 67
4.4.1 Multicollinearity Test. ..... 67
4.4.2 Autocorrelation Test ..... 67
4.4.3 Heteroscedasticity Test ..... 68
4.5 Research Implication ..... 68
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS
5.1 Conclusions ..... 70
5.2 Limitations ..... 74
5.3 Recommendations ..... 74
LIST OF REFERENCES ..... 75

## LIST OF TABLES

## Page

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables and
$\qquad$ Dependent Variables 42

Table 4.2-4.5 Result of multiple regression test equation 3.5 .45-46

Table 4.6-4.7 Result of multiple regression test equation 3.6 .48

Table 4.8-4.11 Result of multiple regression test equation 3.7 ...............50-52
Table 4.12-4.17 Result of multiple regression test equation 3.8 .............55-58
Table 4.18-4.23 Result of multiple regression test equation 3.9 .............. 61-65


## LIST OF APPENDICES

Page
Appendix - 1 Manufacture Firms Year 2001 ..... 76
Appendix - 2 Manufacture Firms Year 2002 ..... 88
Appendix - 3 Manufacture Firms Year 2003 ..... 97
Appendix - 4 Manufacture Firms Year 2004 ..... 106
Appendix - 5 Suspect Firm-Years ..... 115
Appendix - 6 Output Regressions of Test Equation 3.5 ..... 119
Appendix - 7 Output Regressions of Test Equation 3.6 ..... 126
Appendix - 8 Output Regressions of Test Equation 3.7 ..... 130
Appendix - 9 Output Regressions of Test Equation 3.8 ..... 136
Appendix - 10 Output Regressions of Test Equation 3.9 ..... 145


#### Abstract

Asrina, Dini Mulya (2006). Management of Earnings Through The Manipulation of Real Activities That Affect Cash Flows From Operation. Yogyakarta. Faculty of Economics. Islamic University of Indonesia.

This study tries to investigate whether there is any evidence of firm managers engaged in management of earning through the manipulation of real activities that affect cash flow from operation in reference to market value. This study concentrates on firm called "suspect firm-years". Suspect firm-years are firm years reporting small annual earnings and small annual earnings changes. Suspect firm-years have net income scaled by market value that is greater than or equal to zero but less than 0.005

This study uses secondary data which is taken from the financial statement of manufacture companies listed on Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) from 2001 until 2004. This study uses 319 samples, including suspect firm years. The amounts of suspect firm years are 15 companies.

This study analyzed data using multiple regressions which was developed by Sugata Roychowdhury (2004), involving four dependent variables and ten independent variables. In this study the writer failed to give empirical evidence whether there is any evidence of firm managers that engaged in management of earning through the manipulation of real activities that affect cash flow from operation in reference to market value. In order to make a different, the writer is replacing total asset at the beginning of year, the denominator for dependent variables, with market value at the beginning of year. But the results do not appear as the writer expected. None of independent variables are related significant to dependent variables. It also explains why the results of regression analysis are not consistent with the previous research done by Roychowdhury (2004). 


Key Words: Earnings. Earnings Management. Cash Flow from Operation.


#### Abstract

ABSTRAK

Asrina, Dini Mulya (2006). Manajemen Laba Melalui Manipulasi Aktivitas Riil yang Mempunyai Dampak Pada Arus Kas Operasi".

Studi ini mencoba untuk menemukan apakah terdapat bukti adanya manajemen laba yang dilakukan oleh manajer perusahaan melalui manipulasi aktivitas riil yang mempunyai dampak pada arus kas operasi yang berkenaan pada harga pasar. Studi ini dipusatkan pada perusahaan yang disebut dengan "suspect firm years". Termasuk dalam kategori suspect firm-years yaitu perusahaan yang pada tahun tersebut melaporkan laba tahunan yang kecil dan perubahan laba tahunan yang kecil. Suspect firm years adalah perusahaan yang melaporkan laba sebelum item luar biasa per total asset awal tahun antara 0 hingga 0,005 .

Data yang digunakan dalam studi ini merupakan data sekunder yang diambil dari laporan keuangan perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Jakarta selama periode 2001-2004. Jumlah sampel perusahaan manufaktur yang digunakan dalam studi ini adalah 319 perusahaan. Jumlah suspect firm year adalah 15 perusahaan.

Selanjutnya data yang diperoleh dianalisis regressi berganda yang telah dikembangkan oleh Sugata Roychowdhury (2004) yang melibatkan empat varibel terikat dan sepuluh variabel bebas. Dalam studi ini penulis tidak berhasil mendapatkan bukti empiris adanya manajemen laba yang dilakukan oleh manajer perusahaan melalui manipulasi aktivitas riil yang mempunyai dampak pada arus kas operasi yang berkenaan pada harga pasar. Untuk membuat perbedaan dengan penelitian sebelumnya, penulis mengganti total asset awal tahun dengan harga pasar awal tahun. Tetapi hasilnya tidak sesuai dengan harapan penulis. Tidak ada satupun variable bebas yang mempunyai hubungan yang signifikan dengan variable terikat. Ini dapat menjelaskan bagaimana hasil dari analisa regresi penulis tidak konsisten dengan penelitian sebelumnya yang dilakukan oleh Sugata Roychowdhury (2004).




Kata Kunci: Laba. Menejemen Laba. Arus Kas Operasi.

## STATEMENT OF FREE PLAGIARISM

Herein I declare the originality of this thesis; there is no other work which has ever presented to obtain any university degree, and in my concern there is neither one else's opinion nor published written work, except acknowledge quotation relevant to the topic of this thesis which have been stated or listed on the thesis bibliography.

If in the future this statement is not proven as it supposed to be, I am willing to accept any sanction complying to the determinated regulation for its consequence.

Yogyakarta, December ,2006

Dini Mulya Asrina


## CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of the Study

Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Concept No. 1 stated that the primary focus of financial reporting is information about an enterprise's performance provided by measure of earnings that provide important information for investment decisions for investors.

Management has direct access to accounting information about the firm and has the ability to use their discretionary power in the financial reporting in an attempt to affect earnings, for his/her own and/or company's benefits. Management, which is monitored by investors, directors, customers, and suppliers-acting in self-interest and at times for shareholders, have strong incentives to manage earnings.

Earnings, synonymous with profit which is also called income, are perhaps the single most studied number in a company's financial statements because they show a company's profitability and also one of the most important measures of a company's performance.

Earnings Management is the choice by a manager of accounting policies so as to achieve some specific objective (Scott, 2000). Managers are engaged in earnings management these activities because they perceive private benefits to meet certain earnings target or reporting goals. Manipulation of real activities during the year is one way to meet certain earnings target. This real activities manipulation, such as price discounts and reduction of discretionary expenses, are possibly optimal action given the
economic circumstances of the firm. This real activity manipulation affects cash flows from operations (CFO).

The information obtained in cash flows is intended to show all of the cash inflows and outflows of the firm during the period. The statement of cash flow is one of the financial reports which show the effect from operating activities, financing activities, and investing activities of the firms towards cash flows within certain period of accounting by reconcile beginning balance and ending balance of cash.

PSAK No. 2 described cash flow from operating activities as amount which are collected from the operating activities that can be used as an indicator to determine whether the company can produce the sufficient cash flow to settle a debt, maintain the company ability in operations, pay dividend and to make a new investment. Cash flow from operation generally comes from other transactions and event, which is influence earning or net loss. Particularly, cash flow from operating activities resulted from the main activity which produces earning in the company. Such as, cash revenue from sales; cash revenue from royalty, fees; cash payment for supplier; salary or wages for the employees; payment for tax; etc.

Based on above explanation, the writer is interested to investigate the management of earning through the manipulation of real activities that affect cash flow from operation. According to the background, the writer entitled this thesis "Management of Earning through the Manipulation of Real Activities That Affect Cash Flow from Operation"

### 1.2 Problem Formulation

To elaborate the focus of this research thoroughly and deeply, the writer wants to formulate the following problem as "Whether there is any evidence of firm managers engaged in management of earning through the manipulation of real activities that affect cash flow from operation in reference to market value"

### 1.3 Problem Limitation

To avoid misunderstanding and misappropriates in this study, the writer will restrict the scope and size of proposed study as follows;

1. This study will obtain the data from the manufacturing companies, which are listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange (ISX) from 2001 until 2004.
2. The writer concentrates on firm called "suspect firm-years". Suspect firm-years are firm-years reporting small annual earnings and small annual earnings changes. Suspect firm-years have net income scaled by market value that is greater than or equal to zero but less than 0.005 .
3. In this study the writer does not investigate whether earnings management is considered as financial fraud or not.
4. In this study the writer does not explain detail about market value beside only wants to make different from the previous research done by Sugata Roychowdhury (2004).

### 1.4 Research Objectives

The objectives of this research is to give empirical evidence whether there is any evidence of firm managers engaged in management of earning through the manipulation of real activities that affect cash flow from operation in reference to market value"

### 1.5 Research Contributions

The benefit or advantage of the research is relevant for the management of the firm and financial statement users to determine whether it is appropriate or not to choose the nature and extent of real activities manipulation as a way of management of earning that could affect cash flow from operation.

### 1.6 Definition of Term

Definition of term given in order to make readers understand what they are going to read as the main term on this thesis:

Earning Management is a purposeful intervention by managers in the external financial reporting process for his/her own and/or company's benefit.

Cash flow is a cash or cash equivalent inflow and outflows.
Statement of Cash flow is a part of financial statement which provides relevant information about the cash receipts and cash payments of an enterprise during a period. Statement of cash flows classify cash receipt and cash payment into three different activities; operating, investing, and financing activities. Operating activities involve the cash effects of transactions that enter into the determination of net income. (Kieso\&Weygandt; 10th Ed.).

## CHAPTER II

## REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This section is about the review of related literature that will give explanations about the relevant theories used in conducting this research and the previous studies. This chapter explains about financial statements, earnings, earnings management, statement of cash flow, cash flow from operations, and agency theory. This chapter also explains more about review of related research which explains about some previous studies, theoretical framework that covers the theoretical assumption used as basis for the research. The hypothesis will also be explained in this chapter.

### 2.1 Financial Statement

SAK year 2002 stated that the objective of financial statement is to provide the information about the financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an enterprise that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions.

The financial statements which most frequently provided are:
(1) The balance sheet; shows the financial condition of the enterprise at the end of a period.
(2) Income statement; which measures the results of operations during the period.
(3) Statement of cash flows; which reports the cash provided and used by operating, investing and financing activities during the period.
(4) The statement of retained earnings; which reconciles the balance of retained earnings account from the beginning to the end of the period. (Kieso \& Weygandt; $10^{\text {th }}$ Ed.).

### 2.2 Earnings

Earnings, synonymous with profit which is also called income, are perhaps the single most studied number in a company's financial statements because they show a company's profitability and also one of the most important measures of a company's performance.

Earning has two major components, cash and accounting adjustments called accruals. Since the determination of the signs and sizes of accruals requires managers' judgment and estimation, accruals are more vulnerable to manipulation. But not all accruals are the result of earnings manipulation ( $\mathrm{Yu}, 2005$ ).

Earnings are important since they are used as a summary measure of firm performance by a wide rage of users. Earnings typically refer to after-tax net income. Ultimately, a business's earnings are the main determinant of its share price, because earnings and the circumstances relating to them can indicate whether the business will be profitable and successful in the long run.

### 2.3 Earnings Management

Earnings management occurs when managers use their discretionary power in the financial reporting process and in structuring transactions. Earnings management is the choice by a manager of accounting policies so as to achieve some specific objective (Scott, 2000)

### 2.3.1 Definitions of Earnings Management

Healy and Wahlen (1999), define earnings management as the alteration of firms' reported economic performance by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes.

Schipper (1989) describes earnings management as "a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intention of obtaining some private gain...a minor extension of this definition would encompass "real" earnings management, accomplished by timing investment or financing decision to alter reported earnings or some subset of it."

According to academic literature the definition of earning management:
Schipper (1989) in Dechow and Skinner (2000): "...purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process) ...."
Healy and Wahlen (1999): "Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers"

Turning to the professional literature, clear definitions of "earnings management" are difficult to discern from pronouncements and/or and statements and speeches by regulators, although an extreme form of earnings management, financial fraud, is welldefined (again in terms of managerial intent) as:
...the deliberate misrepresentation of the financial condition of an enterprise accomplished through the intentional misstatement or omission of amounts or disclosures in the financial statements to deceive financial statement users. (Certified Fraud Examiners, 1993) in Dechow and Skinner (2000).

Leuz et al. (2003), define earnings management as the alteration of firms' reported economic performance by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes. They argue that incentives to misrepresent firm performance through earnings management arise, in part, from a conflict of interest between firms' insiders and outsiders. Insiders, such as controlling owners or managers,
can use their control over the firm to benefit themselves at the expense of other stakeholders. Managers and controlling owners have incentives to manage reported earnings in order to mask true firm performance and to conceal their private control benefits from outsiders. For example, insiders can use their financial reporting discretion to overstate earnings and conceal unfavorable earnings realizations (i.e., losses) that would prompt outsider interference. Insiders can also use their accounting discretion to create reserves for future periods by understating earnings in years of good performance, effectively making reported earnings less variable than the firm's true economic performance. In essence, insiders mask their private control benefits and hence reduce the likelihood of outside intervention by managing the level and variability of reported earnings.

According to Roychowdhury (2004) there is substantial evidence that executives engage in earnings management. One means of managing earnings is by manipulation of accruals with no direct cash flow consequences, hereafter referred to as accrual manipulation. Examples include under-provisioning for bad debt expenses and delaying of asset write-offs. Managers also have incentives to manipulate real activities during the year to meet certain earnings targets. Real activity manipulation affects cash flows and in some cases, accruals as well. Managers engage in these activities either because they perceive private benefits to meeting the reporting goals or because they are acting as agents in value-transfers amongst stakeholders. An example of the latter would be earnings management to avoid debt covenant violation or to avoid governmental intervention.

### 2.3.2 Classification of Earnings Management

Earnings management can be classified into three categories:

1. Fraudulent accounting.

Fraudulent accounting involves accounting choices that violate GAAP.
2. Accruals management.

Accruals management involves within-GAAP choices that try to "obscure" or "mask" true economic performance (Dechow and Skinner, 2000).
3. Real earnings management.

Real earnings management (RM) occurs when managers undertake actions that deviate from the first best practice to increase reported earnings

### 2.3.3 Targets of Earnings Management

Magnan and Cormier (1997) in Gumanti (2000) stated that there are three targets that are reachable by manager related to earnings management practice:

1. Political cost minimization
2. Manager wealth maximization
3. Minimization of financing costs.

### 2.3.4 Motivations of Earnings Management

Manager may engage in earnings management for variety reasons, for example as stated by Scott (2000:352-364):

## 1. Bonus Purpose

Managers have inside information on the firm's net income before earnings management. Since outside parties, including the Board itself, may be unable to learn
what this number is, Healy predicted that managers would opportunistically manage net income so as to maximize their bonuses under their firm's compensation plans.

## 2. Other contractual motivations

There are other contractual motivations for earnings management. An important case arises from long-term lending contrast, which typically contains covenants to protect the lenders against actions by managers that are against the lenders' best interest, such as excessive dividends, additional borrowing, or letting working capital or shareholders' equity fall below specified levels, all of which dilute the security of existing lenders.

## 3. Political motivations

Many firms are quite politically visible. Such firms may want to manage earnings to reduce their visibility. This would entail, for example, accounting practices and procedures to minimize reported net income, particularly during periods of high prosperity. Otherwise, public pressure may arise for the government to step in with increased regulation or other means to lower profitability.

## 4. Taxation motivations

Income taxation is perhaps the most obvious motivation for earnings management. However, taxation authorities tend to impose their own accounting rulers for calculation of taxable income, thereby reducing firms' room to maneuver. Consequently, taxation should not play a major role in earnings management decisions in general.

## 5. Changes of CEO

A variety of income management motivations exist around the time of a change of CEO. For example, the bonus plan hypothesis predicts that CEOs approaching retirement would be particularly likely to engage in a strategy of income maximization, to increase their bonuses. Similarly, CEOs of poorly performing firms may income-maximize to prevent, or postpone, being fired. This motivation also applies to new CEOs, especially if large write-offs can be blamed on the previous CEO.

## 6. Initial public offerings

By definition, firms making initial public offerings (IPOs) do not have an established market price. This raises the question of how to value the shares of such firms. Presumably, financial accounting information included in the prospectus is a useful information source.

## 7. To communicate information to investors

The use of earnings management to communicate information to investors may seem questionable in view of efficient securities market theory. Investors will look through firms' accounting policy choices when evaluating and comparing earnings performance. Recall, however, that we define market efficiency relative to publicly available information. If earnings management can reveal inside information, it can actually improve the informative ness of financial reporting.

Earnings management occurs when managers use their discretionary power in the financial reporting process and in structuring transactions. By smoothing earnings over time, managers convey private information to stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company or attempt to influence contractual outcomes that depend on the reported accounting numbers (Agarwal et al., 2003).

Petrovits (2004) reported evidence that manager manipulated earnings by strategically timing paying to their corporate foundations. Prior earnings management studies predict managers will, contingent on their position within bonus boundaries, increase earnings in order to: (a) increase their compensation via formal and informal compensation plans, (b) reduce the likelihood of debt covenant violation and (c) reduce the likelihood of job loss.

### 2.3.5 Patterns of Earnings Management

Scott (2000:365) tried to collect and briefly summarized some earnings management patterns:

## 1. Taking a bath

This can take place during of organizational stress or reorganization, including the hiring of new CEO. If a firm must report a loss, management may feel compelled to report a large one; it has little to lose at this point. Consequently, it will write off assets, provides for excepted future costs, and generally "clear the decks". This will enhance the probability of future reported profits. Healy (1985), also mentions that managers whose net income is below the bogey of the bonus plan may also take a bath, for a similar reason-it will enhance the probability of future bonuses. In effect, the recording of large write offs puts future earnings "in the bank".

## 2. Income minimization

This is similar to taking a bath, but less extreme. Such a pattern may be chosen by politically visible firm during periods of high profitability. Policies that suggest income minimization include rapid write offs of capital assets and intangibles,
expensing of advertising and R\&D expenditures, successful-efforts accounting for oil and gas exploration costs, and so on. Income taxation, such as for LIFO inventory, provides another set of motivations for this pattern, as does enhancement of arguments for relief from foreign competition.

## 3. Income maximization

As seen in Healy's study, managers may engage in pattern of maximization of reported net income for bonus purpose, providing this does not put them above the cap. Firms that are close to debt covenant violations may also maximize income.

## 4. Income smoothing

This is perhaps the most interesting earnings management pattern. Healy suggest that managers have an incentive to smooth income sufficiently that it remains between the bogey and cap. Otherwise, earnings may be temporally or permanently lost for bonus purpose. Furthermore, if managers are risk-averse, they will prefer a less variable bonus stream, and hence may want to smooth net income.

Arya et al. (1998) stated that two of the better known forms of earnings management are "smoothing" and "big bath." For example, in estimating their bad debt allowance, companies might be tempted to provide a generous allowance in good years and skimp in lean years in order to smooth the stream of reported earnings. In contrast, the big bath hypothesis suggests that managers undertake income decreasing discretionary accruals in lean years. Perhaps managers believe that one very poor performance report is not as harmful as several mediocre performance reports. It has been suggested that big baths often occur under the guise of restructuring charges and may coincide with top management transition.

### 2.4 Statement of Cash Flow

Cash flow statement is financial report which shows the effect from operating activities, financing activities; investing activities of the firms towards cash flows within certain period of accounting by reconcile beginning balance and ending balance of cash.

Based on PSAK No. 2 year 2002 statement of cash flows must reported cash flow within certain period and classified based on the operating activities, investment activities, and funding activities.

The main purpose of the statement of cash flows is to provide information about cash receipts and cash payments from one entity in certain period of accounting. Besides explaining information about operating activities, investing, and financing from one entity in certain period of accounting, statement of cash flows can supply some information that may possible for the customer to evaluate changes in firm's net assets, financial structure and the ability to influence the amount and time of cash flows to adapt with the new or different situation and business opportunity.

Statement of cash flows is useful for both internal party (management) and external party (investor and creditor). Management use the statement of cash flows to appraise liquidity, determine the dividend policy, and evaluate the impact of the decision relate to the main policy in investing and financing activities. External parties use the statement of cash flows as the basic to evaluate the firm's ability in producing cash and cash equivalent.

There are eight advantages of cash flows that are set out below:

1. Cash-flow accounting would rely on the price/discounted flow ration as more reliable investment indicator than the present price/earning ratio, because of the
arbitrary allocations which are used to compute the present accrual earnings per share figure and the international differences in the computation of earning per share.
2. In contrast to accrual-based earnings, cash-flow accounting retains money as the unit of measurement, which is familiar and not confusing to people.
3. If the investor's interest is in the survival of the firm, together with their ability to provide a stream of dividend, then cash-flow accounting will prove more useful by providing accounting information about the current and anticipated cash positions of the firm. Liquidity assessment is a critical aspect of performance evaluation in the sense that cash flow and net profit are the end result of a firm's activities.
4. Cash flow does not require price-level adjustments (which can distort reported profit figures if inflation adjustments are not made), because cash transactions reflect prices of the period in which they occur. It is however; appropriate to the note that some general price level adjustment is needed for cash plans occurring in different periods.
5. Cash flow information fits as an important variable in the decision models of various users because of the concerns associated with the firm's ability to pay dividends to investors, interest and capital to lenders and bankers, amount due to suppliers, wages and other benefits to employees, rectification and maintenance services for customers, and taxation to the governments.
6. Cash flow information is argued to be more objective and relevant than the accrual-based information.
7. There is the suspicion that the popularity of the all-embracing measures of performance such as accrual-based profit may well have caused firms to underestimate the importance of performance measures such as market domination, productivity, and quality of products and services.
8. Cash flow accounting is the ideal system to correct the gaps in practice between the way in which an investment is made (generally based on cash flows) and the ways the results are evaluated (generally based on earnings).

### 2.5 Cash Flows from Operations

The reported number of cash flows from operations is an indicator to determine whether from their operating activities company can produce sufficient cash flows to settle a debt, maintain the firm's ability in company operations, pay dividend and make a new investment. The examples of cash flows from operations are:

1. Revenue from sales or services.
2. Revenue from royalty, fees, commissions and other revenue.
3. Cash Payment to the supplier.
4. Cash payment to the employee.
5. Revenue and payment by the insurance company in connecting with insurance premium, claim, annuity and other benefit of insurances.
6. Cash disbursement or cash receipt (restitution) of income tax except if it can be specifically identify as a part of financing activity and investing activity.
7. Cash receive and cash payment from contract which is held for business transaction and trading.

### 2.6. Agency Theory

Agency theory is a theory of the relationship between principals and an agent of the principals. Managers are empowered by the owners of the firm, the shareholders, to make decisions. However managers may have personal goals that compete with shareholders wealth maximization and such potential conflicts of interest are addressed by agency theory.

According to Brigham and Daves (2001) an agency relationship arises whenever one or more individuals, called principals, (1) hires another individual or organization, called an agent, to perform some service and (2) then delegates decision-making authority to that agent. Within the financial management context, the primary agency relationships are those (1) between stockholders and managers, (2) between managers and debt holders, and (3) between managers, stockholders and debt holders in times of financial distress.

The separation of ownership and management has clear advantages. It allows share ownership to change without interfering with the operation of the business. It allows the firm to hire professional managers. But it also brings problems if the managers' and owners' objectives differ. Rather than attending to the wishes of shareholders, managers may seek a more leisurely or luxurious working lifestyle. Such conflicts create principal-agent problems. The shareholders are the principals, the manager are their agents

According to Brealey and Myers (2002) agency costs are incurred when:

- Managers do not attempt to maximize firm value.
- Shareholders incur costs to monitor the managers and influence their actions.


### 2.7 Previous Study

A number of studies have discussed the possibility that managerial intervention in the reporting process can occur not only via accounting estimates and methods, but also operational decisions. Healy and Palepu (1990), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) point to acceleration of sales, alterations in shipment schedules and delaying of $R \& D$ and maintenance expenditures as earnings management methods available to managers.

According to Roychowdhury (2004), certain real activities management methods, such as price discounts and reduction of discretionary expenses, are possibly optimal actions given the economic circumstances of the firm. Roychowdhury (2004) characterized real activities manipulation by two features: (a) departures from normal operational practices - these departures are, by themselves, potentially detrimental to firm value and (b) a desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations.

In consistent with Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal's (2004) survey of 401 financial executives' finds (a) respondents attach a high importance to meeting earnings targets such as zero and previous period's earnings and (b) they are willing to manipulate real activities to meet these targets, even though the manipulation potentially reduces firm value.

A number of papers have used the distribution of frequency of firm-years to argue that firm executives manage earnings to avoid reporting losses. Specifically, on grouping
firm-years into earnings intervals, and plotting the frequency of firm years in each earnings interval, they find that the distribution shifts sharply upwards immediately to the right of zero. This is consistent with Roychowdhury (2004) firms managing earnings up to exceed the zero thresholds. Similar evidence exists with other earnings thresholds, for example, previous year's earnings and analyst forecasts.

The zero earnings threshold is particularly interesting because there is initial evidence that executives manage the cash flow component of earnings to meet the threshold. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) plot the $25^{\text {th }}, 50^{\text {th }}$ and $75^{\text {th }}$ percentiles of unscaled CFO for each earnings interval and find that the distribution of CFO shifts upwards in the first interval to the right of zero. However, this preliminary evidence does not conclusively indicate real activities manipulation. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) do not analyze the underlying activities behind the patterns in CFO and accruals, nor test whether the shifts are statistically significant. There no controls for the level of operations, or for firm performance.

### 2.7.1 Management of Earnings through the Real Activities Manipulation

Most of the evidence on real activities management centers on the opportunistic reduction of R\&D expenses. Bens, Nagar and Wong (2002) and Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong (2002) report that managers repurchase stock to avoid EPS dilution from employee stock option exercises or grants. Managers partially finance these repurchases by reducing R\&D. Dechow and Sloan (1991) find CEOs in their final years reduce spending on R\&D to increase short-term earnings.

Baber,Fairfield\&Hagard(1991)\&Bushee(1998)also find evidence consistent with reduction of R\&D expenses to meet earnings benchmarks. Anecdotal evidence exists on
firms engaging in a whole range of activities in addition to just $R \& D$ expense reduction for example, providing limited time discounts to increase sales towards the end of the year and building up excess inventory to lower reported cost of goods sold (overproduction). Revsine, Collins and Johnson (1998) report that, in 1992-93, Bausch and Lomb shipped finished products out to their dealers and booked sales. The dealers were left with large unsold inventories due to declining demand. In 1995, Duracraft suffered a stock price drop on reporting better-than-expected first quarter earnings, because financial analysts suspected managers of overproducing (Marcial 1995).

Systematic evidence on management of real activities other than R\&D reduction is limited. In Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal's (2004) survey, a larger number of respondents admit to reducing discretionary expenses and/or capital investments than other manipulation methods to meet earnings targets. Barton (2001) and Pincus and Rajagopal (2002) provide evidence that managers smoothing earnings invest in derivatives to smooth the underlying cash flows, instead of relying solely on accrual manipulation. Bartov (1993) shows that firms with negative earnings changes report higher profits from asset sales. Thomas and Zhang (2002) report evidence consistent with overproduction, but are unable to rule out adverse economic conditions as alternative explanations for their results.

### 2.8 Hypotheses Formulation

### 2.8.1 Main Hypotheses

In this study, the writer develops stronger tests of real activities manipulation and applies them to firm-years reporting small annual earnings and small annual earnings changes called the "suspect firm-years".

To detect real activities manipulation, the writer focuses on the following three manipulation methods and their effects on abnormal CFO:

1. Sales manipulation, which is, accelerating the timing of sales and/or generating additional unsustainable sales through increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms.
2. Decreasing discretionary expenses
3. Reporting lower cost of goods sold by increasing production

### 2.8.1.1 Sales Manipulation

Sales manipulation define as managers' attempt to temporarily increase sales during the year by offering price discounts or more lenient credit terms. Managers probably undertake such actions even in the normal course of business. Whether such activities are more extensive than normal among firms trying to meet earnings targets is an empirical question.

One way managers can generate additional sales or accelerate sales from the next fiscal year into the current year is by offering 'limited-time' price discounts. The increased sales volumes generated are likely to disappear when the firm re-establishes the old prices. The cash inflow per sale net of discounts from these additional sales is now lower, though earnings in the current period increase as the sales are booked, assuming positive margins.

A firm may also offer more lenient terms of credit. For example, retailers and automobile manufacturers often offer lower interest rates (zero-percent financing) towards the end of their fiscal years. These are all essentially price discounts and lead to lower cash inflow over the life of the sales, as long as the suppliers do not offer matching
discounts. In general, the writer expects sales management activities to lead to lower current-period CFO than what is normal given the sales level. If the firm generates additional credit sales with its modified terms and a higher amount than normal of these credit sales is outstanding at the end of the year, then the firm should also exhibit an abnormal growth in receivables for a given growth in sales.

### 2.8.1.2 Reduction of Discretionary Expenses

Firms can also increase earnings by reducing discretionary expenses. This research focus on advertising expenses, research and development expenses (R\&D) and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG\&A). The first two are largely discretionary items and managers can temporarily increase earnings by reducing outlays on advertising and $\mathrm{R} \& D$ below what is normal given their sales levels. Some items usually classified as SG\&A, for example, employee training expenses, maintenance and travel, are also likely to be discretionary. If these outlays are generally in the form of cash, the effect on abnormal operational cash flows in the current period is positive, possibly at the risk of lower cash flows in the future as long-term competitiveness and profitability are adversely affected. If some of these expenses are also incurred on account and are usually outstanding at the end of the year, then a decrease in these expenses towards the year-end should lower accounts payable below what is normal and lead to positive abnormal accruals.

### 2.8.1.3 Overproduction

Managers of manufacturing firms can also overproduce (produce more goods than necessary to meet expected demand) to manage earnings upwards. With higher production levels, fixed overhead costs are spread over a larger number of units. As long
as the reduction in fixed costs per unit is not offset by any increase in marginal cost per unit, average unit cost declines. This implies that cost of goods sold (COGS) is lower and the firm reports better operating margins. Nevertheless, the firm incurs costs on the overproduced items that are not recovered in the same period through sales. As a result, cash flows from operations are lower than normal given sales levels.

Overproduction causes higher inventories than normal at the year-end. Presumably, managers indulge in overproduction only if the reduction in reported product costs offsets the inventory holding costs that the firm has to recognize in the current period. The higher inventories at year-end imply that the partial effect of overproduction on accruals is positive.

The partial effect on accruals of each real activities manipulation method is positive. However, positive abnormal accruals are not sufficient evidence of real activities manipulation, because they are also caused by accrual manipulation. Hence, to concentrate on the effects of real activities, this research focuses on abnormal CFO; instead of accruals. A problem with examining abnormal CFO is that managers probably undertake more than one kind of manipulation at the same time. Recall that offering price discounts and overproduction have a negative effect on abnormal CFO, while reduction of discretionary expenses has a positive effect. Consequently, if suspect firm-years engage in the above three kinds of real activities manipulation, they should exhibit at least one of the following: unusually low CFO or unusually low discretionary expenses.

The first hypothesis is formally presented below (in alternate form):
H1: After controlling for sales levels, suspect firm-years exhibit either unusually low cash flow from operations (CFO) or unusually low discretionary expenses or both.

Another way to detect price discounts or overproduction is to examine production costs relative to sales. Production costs are defined as the sum of COGS and change in inventory during the period. Overproduction leads to unusually high production costs for a given level of sales. If the firm gives discounts to increase sales, this also implies unusually high production costs relative to sales, as long as the firm is unable to procure corresponding discounts from its suppliers.

Therefore, the second hypothesis is:
H2: Suspect firm-years exhibit unusually high production costs, controlling for the level of sales.

Analyzing production costs relative to sales, instead of COGS, has an additional benefit. Any accrual manipulation to lower reported COGS, for instance, by postponing write-offs of obsolete inventory, should not affect production costs, because change in inventories is correspondingly higher.

### 2.8.2 Hypotheses on cross-sectional variation

This section develops hypotheses on cross-sectional variation in abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs, abnormal COGS and abnormal discretionary expenses among suspect firm-years. For the sources of cross-sectional variation, the writer focus on (a) flexibility to engage in accrual manipulation, (b) industry membership and (c) incentives to meet zero earnings, including the presence of debt and short-term creditors.

### 2.8.2.1 Accrual manipulation flexibility

Flexibility in accounting allows it to keep pace with busins innovation. Abuses such as earning management occur when people exploit this pliancy. Trickery is employed to obscure actual financial violatility. This in turn, masks the true consequences of management's decisions. (Chairman Levitt, 1998) in Dechow and Skinner (2000).

How managers decide between alternate methods of managing earnings has been an important issue in earnings management. Real activities manipulation is costly. Cash flows in future periods are possibly affected negatively by the actions taken this period to increase earnings. For example, price discounts offered in any period to temporarily increase earnings can lead customers to expect such discounts in future periods as well. Another problem is uncertainty regarding the extent of manipulation required, as all real activities have to be undertaken prior to year-end, before managers observe the shortfall between pre-managed earnings and the earnings target.

Relying on accrual manipulation alone, on the other hand, entails the risk that the realized shortfall at year-end exceeds the amount by which earnings can be managed upwards. If that happens, reported income falls below zero, as real activities cannot be manipulated at year-end. Also, accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditor or regulator scrutiny than real decisions. These problems with accrual manipulation are more severe when the flexibility to manage accruals (henceforth, accounting flexibility) is lower, either because of the inherent asset-liability structure of the firm or because of accrual management in prior years [see Barton and Simko (2002), Choy (2003)]. Interestingly, respondents to Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal's (2004) survey of financial executives indicate a higher willingness to manipulate earnings through real activities than accruals.

Accrual manipulation and real activities manipulation can be used as substitutes, to accomplish a given level of earnings management. It is also possible that they are used as complements. For example, managers offer price discounts during the year to increase earnings and also manage reported earnings more precisely through accruals at the year-
end. It is expected that managers use accrual and real manipulation methods as complements when the firm's stock of current assets is high. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) argue that firms with a high stock of current assets are expected to have high capacity to overstate working capital accruals and hence possess higher accounting flexibility. At the same time, these firms also have higher flexibility to manage earnings through real activities that affect working capital, for example, through overproduction.

Firms with a traditionally low stock of current assets are likely to manipulate specific real activities more aggressively to compensate for their inability to manage working capital accruals. For example, firms that have no credit sales (and hence, no accounts receivable outstanding at the year-end) cannot increase earnings by reducing provisions for bad debts. Similarly, firms that maintain low inventories have less discretion to manipulate inventory upwards, either through inventory-obsolescence writeoffs or through overproduction, without attracting the attention of auditors or investors. If managers in low-current-asset firms manage earnings upwards, they can do so only by offering price discounts to increase sales or reducing discretionary expenses. Thus, it is expected that suspect firm-years with low current assets to be more aggressive at offering price discounts and reducing discretionary expenses.

The ability of low-current-asset firms to lower reported cost of goods sold via overproduction is limited. Thus, while abnormal production costs are not necessarily high for suspect firm-years with low current assets, their COGS relative to sales should be abnormally high.

H3: Suspect firm-years with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets, that is low accounting flexibility, have abnormally high cost of goods sold (COGS)
and abnormally low discretionary expenses, when compared to other suspect firmyears.

### 2.8.2.2 Presence of debt

In a preliminary investigation of why zero earnings are an important threshold, Roychowdury (2004) considered the possibility that debt contracts include covenants that become tighter when firms incur losses. There is no systematic evidence on the prevalence of debt covenants that explicitly mention zero earnings. But debt contracts routinely have minimum tangible net worth requirements that are ratcheted upwards every year when the firm makes profits, but not when it reports losses [see Dichev and Skinner (2002)]. At the very least, losses would make these covenants more binding.

The tests whether suspect firm-years that have debt outstanding engage in real activities management to a greater degree than suspect firm-years who do not. The existence of debt is a proxy for the presence of debt covenants that make zero earnings an important threshold.

H4: Suspect firm-years with debt outstanding have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.

### 2.8.2.3 Short-term suppliers

Discussed by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2004) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), a second possible reason for zero earnings being an important threshold is that there are stakeholders of the firm who use heuristic cut-offs at zero to evaluate the performance of a firm. Among the stakeholders that these studies identify are suppliers,
lenders, employees and customers worried about future services. If the firm's earnings performance falls below a certain threshold like zero, the firm's ability to pay suppliers in time and its potential as a future buyer are in doubt. This leads suppliers to tighten terms of credit and other terms. Managers are more likely to worry about the negative reaction of suppliers if they have more trade credit and other short-term liabilities outstanding. Therefore, the extent of real activities manipulation should vary positively with current liabilities at the beginning of the year.

H5: Suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assets have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.


## CHAPTER III

## RESEARCH METHOD

### 3.1. Population and Sample

Population is a group of comprehensive elements that usually in the form of people, object, transaction or event where we are interest to learn or to become the research object (Kuncoro, 2001). The population used in this research is financial reports of the manufacture company that already go public within period from 2001 until 2004.

Sample is a part collection from unit population. The companies that are chosen as the sample of this research are Manufacture Company that listed at the Jakarta Stock Exchange in the period of 2001-2004. The method used in this research is purposive sampling. Purposive sampling method is a technique to collect the sample based on certain criteria that is in accordance with the purpose of research (Kuncoro; 2003). In this method, the samples are found based on the variables exist in this research.

This chapter will explain about the outlines procedures that are used to gather and analyze the data. The explanation will include the hypothesis formulation. The reason behind is that even though the hypotheses or research problems have been formulated in the form of question, they need to rewritten into statistical hypotheses. This chapter also determines the null and alternative hypotheses that are developed from the theoretical basis.

Companies, in which the financial report is chosen as sample, are companies that can fulfill the following criteria:

1. Manufacturing firms which are listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) from 2001 until 2004.
2. The writer concentrates on firm called "suspect firm-years". Suspect firm-years are that firm-years reporting small annual earnings and small annual earnings changes. Suspect firm-years have net income scaled by market value that is greater than or equal to zero but less than 0.005 .

### 3.2. Research Variables

The variables used in this research are as follows:

## a. Dependent variables:

- Abnormal CFO

Abnormal CFO measured as deviations from the predicted values from the regression:
$\mathrm{CFO}_{\mathrm{t}} / \mathrm{Mvt} \mathrm{t}=\alpha^{*}(1 / \mathrm{Mvt}-1)+\beta_{1}{ }^{*}\left(\mathrm{~S}_{\mathrm{t}} / \mathrm{Mvt} \mathrm{t}\right)+\beta_{2}{ }^{*}\left(\Delta \mathrm{~S}_{\mathrm{t}} / \mathrm{Mvt} \mathrm{t}-1\right)+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{t}}$,
Where:
CFO = Cash flow from operations
Mv t-1 = Market value of Equity year $\mathrm{t}-1$
$=$ stock price x number of outstanding share at balance sheet date
$S_{t} \quad=$ sales during year $t$,
$\Delta \mathrm{St}=$ change in sales during year t .

- Abnormal discretionary expenses

Abnormal discretionary expenses measured as deviations from the predicted values from the regression:

Disexp $_{\mathrm{t}} / \mathrm{Mvt} \mathrm{t}=\alpha^{*}(1 / \mathrm{Mvt} \mathrm{t} 1)+\beta^{*}\left(\mathrm{~S}_{\mathrm{f}} / \mathrm{Mvt} \mathrm{t} 1\right)+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{v}}$,
Where:
Disexp $=$ Discretionary expenses

$$
=\text { R\&D + Advertising }+ \text { Selling, General and Administrative expenses }
$$

$\mathrm{Mvt} \mathrm{t}=$ stock price x number of outstanding share at balance sheet date year $\mathrm{t}-1$
$S_{t} \quad=$ sales during year $t$,

- Abnormal Production Cost

Abnormal Production Cost measured as deviations from the predicted values from the regression:

PRODt $/ \mathrm{Mvt}-1=\alpha^{*}(1 / \mathrm{Mvt}-1)+\beta 1^{*}(\mathrm{St} / \mathrm{Mvt}-1)+\beta 2^{*}(\Delta \mathrm{St} / \mathrm{Mvt}-1)+$ $\beta 3^{*}(\Delta \mathrm{St}-1 / \mathrm{Mvt} \mathrm{t})+\varepsilon \mathrm{t}$

Where:
PROD $=$ Production costs
$=$ Cost of goods sold + Change in inventory
$\mathrm{Mvt} \mathrm{t}=$ stock price x number of outstanding share at balance sheet date year $\mathrm{t}-1$
$\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{t}} \quad=$ sales during year t .
$\Delta S t \quad=$ change in sales during year t .

- Abnormal COGS

Abnormal COGS measured as deviations from the predicted values from the regression:

COGSt $/ \mathrm{Mvt}-1=\alpha^{*}(1 / \mathrm{Mvt}-11)+\beta^{*}(\mathrm{St} / \mathrm{Mvt}-1)+\varepsilon \mathrm{t}$
Where:
COGS $_{t}=$ cost of goods sold in period $t$
$\mathrm{Mvt-1}=$ stock price x number of outstanding share at balance sheet date year $\mathrm{t}-1$
$S_{t} \quad=$ sales during year t .

## b. Independent variable

- SIZE: measured as logarithm of the market value of equity, expressed as deviation from the corresponding industry-year mean.
- Market- to- book - ratio (MTB): The ratio of market value of equity to the book value of equity.
- Net income: income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value.
- SUSPECT_NI: An indicator variable that is set equal to one if change in income before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged market value is between 0 and 0.005 , and is set equal to zero otherwise.
- LoCA: is an indicator variable that is set equal to one if the firm belongs to the lowest quartile of CA/A and is set equal to zero otherwise. LoCA: Firms are divided every year into quartiles based on the level of lagged current assets (CA) as a percentage of market value.
- DEBT: An indicator variable set equal to one if there is long-term or short-term debt outstanding at the beginning of the year or at the end of the year.
- CL, Current liabilities excluding short-term debt, scaled by market value.
- LoCA*SUSPECT_NI
- DEBT*SUSPECT_NI
- CL*SUSPECT_NI


### 3.3. Formulated Hypothesis

In this study, the writer develops stronger tests of real activities manipulation and applies them to firm-years reporting small annual earnings and small annual earnings changes called the "suspect firm-years".

Certain real activities management methods, such as price discounts and reduction of discretionary expenses, are possibly optimal actions given the economic circumstances of the firm. In this study, the writer interested in whether managers engage in these
activities more extensively in the presence of an earnings target, even when compared to firms in similar economic circumstances. It is this behaviour that the writer refers to as real activities manipulation. Thus, real activities manipulation is characterized by two features: (a) departures from normal operational practices - these departures are, by themselves, potentially detrimental to firm value and (b) a desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations.

To detect real activities manipulation, the writer focuses on the following three manipulation methods and their effects on abnormal CFO:

1. Sales manipulation that is, accelerating the timing of sales and/or generating additional unsustainable sales through increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms.
2. Decreasing discretionary expenses
3. Reporting lower cost of goods sold by increasing production

### 3.4. Statistical Tool

Based on the problem statements and the review of the related literature, so that the alternative hypotheses that are proposed in this research are:
$H o_{1}$ : After controlling for sales levels, suspect firm-years do not exhibit either unusually low cash flow from operations (CFO) or unusually low discretionary expenses or both $H a_{1}$ : After controlling for sales levels, suspect firm-years exhibit either unusually low cash flow from operations (CFO) or unusually low discretionary expenses or both $\mathrm{Ho}_{2}$ : Suspect firm-years do not exhibit unusually high production costs, controlling for the level of sales
$H a_{2}$ : Suspect firm-years exhibit unusually high production costs, controlling for the level of sales
$\mathrm{Ho}_{3}$ : Suspect firm-years with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets that is low accounting flexibility, do not have abnormally high cost of goods sold (COGS) and abnormally low discretionary expenses, when compared to other suspect firm-years.
$H a_{3}$ : Suspect firm-years with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets, that is low accounting flexibility, have abnormally high cost of goods sold (COGS) and abnormally low discretionary expenses, when compared to other suspect firm-years. $\mathrm{Ho}_{4}$ : Suspect firm-years with debt outstanding do not have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years
$H a_{4}$ : Suspect firm-years with debt outstanding have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.
$H o_{5}$ : Suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assets do not have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years
$H a_{5}$ : Suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assets have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.

### 3.5. Hypothesis Testing

The first hypothesis (H1) is use to detect whether after controlling for sales levels, suspect firm-years exhibit either unusually low cash flow from operations (CFO) or unusually low discretionary expenses or both.
$H o_{1}$ : After controlling for sales levels, suspect firm-years do not exhibit either unusually low cash flow from operations (CFO) or unusually low discretionary expenses or both $H a_{1}$ : After controlling for sales levels, suspect firm-years exhibit either unusually low cash flow from operations (CFO) or unusually low discretionary expenses or both

To test the first hypothesis (H1) the writer uses multiple regression approach by the following equation:
$\mathrm{Yt}=\alpha+\beta 1^{*}($ SIZE $) \mathrm{t}-1+\beta 2^{*}($ Market-to-book-ratio $) \mathrm{t}-1+\beta 3^{*}($ Net income $)+$
(SUSPECT_NI) $\mathrm{t}+\varepsilon \mathrm{t}$

Dependent variable (Yt) at the first hypothesis (H1) is abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expense, while the independent variable is SIZE, Market-to-book- ratio, Net income and SUSPECT_NI.

From the equation above, the writer estimate significant at the $5 \%$ level. And then determine the criterion of rejected Ho based on the level of significant and regression coefficient.

Ho is rejected when:

- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI ( $\beta 4$ ) is significantly negative, when the dependent variable is abnormal CFO, or
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI ( $\beta 4$ ) is significantly negative, when the dependent variable is abnormal discretionary expense, or
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI ( $\beta 4$ ) is significantly negative when the dependent variables are abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expense.

The second hypothesis (H2) is use to detect whether suspect firm-years exhibit unusually high production costs after controlling for the level of sales
$\mathrm{Ho}_{2}$ : Suspect firm-years do not exhibit unusually high production costs, controlling for the level of sales
$H a_{2}$ : Suspect firm-years exhibit unusually high production costs, controlling for the level of sales

To test the second hypothesis $(\mathrm{H} 2)$ the researcher uses multiple regression approach by the following equation:

$$
\begin{align*}
\mathrm{Yt}= & \underset{ }{\alpha}+\beta 1^{*}(\text { SIZE }) \mathrm{t}-1+\beta 2^{*}(\text { Market-to-book-ratio }) \mathrm{t}-1+\beta 3^{*}(\text { Net income })+ \\
& +3.6 \text { SUSPECT }^{*} \mathrm{t}+\varepsilon \mathrm{t} \tag{3.6}
\end{align*}
$$

Dependent variable (Yt) on second hypothesis (H2) is abnormal production cost, on the other hand, the independent variable is SIZE, Market-to- book- ratio, Net income and SUSPECT_NI.

From the equation above, the writer estimate significant at the $5 \%$ level. And then determine the criterion of rejected Ho based on the level of significant and regression coefficient. Ho is rejected if regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI ( $\beta 4$ ) is significantly positive.

The third hypothesis (H3) is use to detect whether suspect firm-years with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets that is low accounting flexibility,
have abnormally high cost of goods sold (COGS) and abnormally low discretionary expenses, when compared to other suspect firm-years.
$H o_{3}$ : Suspect firm-years with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets that is low accounting flexibility, do not have abnormally high cost of goods sold (COGS) and abnormally low discretionary expenses, when compared to other suspect firm-years.
$H a_{3}$ : Suspect firm-years with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets, that is low accounting flexibility, have abnormally high cost of goods sold (COGS) and abnormally low discretionary expenses, when compared to other suspect firm-years.

To test the third hypothesis $(\mathrm{H} 3)$ the writer uses multiple regression approach by the following equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{Yt}=\alpha+\beta 1^{*}(\text { SIZE }) \mathrm{t}-1+\beta 2^{*} \text { (Market-to-book-ratio)t-1 }+\beta 3^{*}(\text { Net income })+ \\
& \beta 4^{*}(\text { SUSPECT_NI }) t+\beta 5^{*}(\mathrm{LoCA}) \mathrm{t}+\beta 6^{*}(\mathrm{DEBT})+\beta 7^{*}(\mathrm{CL})+ \\
& \beta 8\left(\mathrm{LoCA}^{*} \text { SUSPECT_NI }+\quad \beta 9\left(\mathrm{DEBT}^{*} \text { SUSPECT_NI }^{+}+\right.\right. \\
& \beta 10\left(\mathrm{CL}^{*} \mathrm{SUSPECT}_{-} \mathrm{NI}\right) \mathrm{t}+\varepsilon
\end{aligned}
$$

Dependent variable on the third hypothesis (H3) is abnormal COGS and abnormal discretionary expense, on the other hand, independent variables are Size, Market-to-book-ratio, Net income, SUSPECT_NI, LoCA, DEBT, CL, LoCA*SUSPECT_NI, DEBT*SUSPECT NI, CL*SUSPECT_NI.

From the equation above, the writer estimate significant at the $5 \%$ level. And then determine the criterion of rejected Ho based on the level of significant and regression coefficient. Ho is rejected if regression coefficient LoCA*SUSPECT_NI ( $\beta 8$ ) is significantly positive when the dependent variable is abnormal COGS and significantly negative if the dependent variable is abnormal discretionary expense.

The fourth hypothesis (H4) is use to detect whether suspect firm-years with debt outstanding have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.
$\mathrm{Ho}_{4}$ : Suspect firm-years with debt outstanding do not have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.
$H a_{4}$ : Suspect firm-years with debt outstanding have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years

To test the fourth hypothesis (H4) the researcher uses multiple regression approach by the following equation:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \text { Yt }=\alpha+\beta 1^{*}(\text { SIZE }) \text { t-1 }+\quad \beta 2^{*} \text { (Market-to-book-ratio)t-1 }+\quad \beta 3^{*} \text { (Net income) }+ \\
& \beta 4^{*} \text { (SUSPECT_NI) } \quad t \quad+\quad \beta 5^{*}(\text { LoCA }) t+\quad \beta 6^{*}(\text { DEBT })+\quad \beta 7^{*}(\mathrm{CL})+ \\
& \beta 8\left(\mathrm{LoCA}^{*} \mathrm{SUSPECT} \text { NI) }+\quad \beta 9\left(\mathrm{DEBT}^{2} \text { SUSPECT_NI) }+\right.\right. \\
& \beta 10\left(\text { CL }^{*} \text { SUSPECT_NI }\right) t+\varepsilon  \tag{3.8}\\
& \text { Dependent variable on fourth hypothesis (H4) is abnormal CFO, abnormal }
\end{align*}
$$ production cost and abnormal discretionary, on the other hand, independent variable is Size, Market-to-book-ratio, Net income, SUSPECT_NI, LoCA, DEBT, CL, LoCA*SUSPECT_NI, DEBT*SUSPECT_NI, CL*SUSPECT_NI

From the equation above, the writer estimate significant at the $5 \%$ level. And then determine the criterion of rejected Ho based on the level of significant and regression coefficient. Ho is rejected if regression coefficient DEBT*SUSPECT_NI ( $\beta 9$ ) is significantly negative when the dependent variable is abnormal CFO and significantly
positive if the dependent variable is abnormal production cost and significantly negative if the dependent variable is abnormal discretionary expense.

The fifth hypothesis (H5) is use to detect whether suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assets have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.
$\mathrm{Ho}_{5}$ : Suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assets do not have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years
$H a_{5}$ : Suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assets have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.

To test the fifth hypothesis (H5) the writer uses multiple regression approach by the following equation:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \mathrm{Yt}=\alpha+\quad \beta 1^{*}(\text { SIZE }) \mathrm{t}-1+\quad \beta 2^{*} \text { (Market-to-book-ratio)t-1+ } \quad \beta 3^{*} \text { (Net } \quad \text { income) }+ \\
& \beta 4^{*} \text { (SUSPECT_NI) } \mathrm{t} \quad+\quad \beta 5^{*}(\mathrm{LoCA}) \mathrm{t}+\quad \beta 6^{*}(\mathrm{DEBT})+\quad \beta 7^{*}(\mathrm{CL})+ \\
& \beta 8\left(\text { LoCA }^{*} \text { SUSPECCT_NI) }+\right. \\
& \beta 10(\text { CL*SUSPECT_NI }) t+\varepsilon  \tag{3.9}\\
& \beta 9\left(\mathrm{DEBT}^{*} \text { SUSPECT_NI }^{+}+\right.
\end{align*}
$$

The dependent variable on fifth hypothesis (H5) is abnormal CFO, abnormal production cost and abnormal discretionary, on the other hand independent variable is Size, Market-to-book-ratio, Net income, SUSPECT_NI, LoCADEBT, CL, LoCA*SUSPECT_NI, DEBT*SUSPECT_NI, CL*SUSPECT_NI.

From the equation above, the writer estimate significant at the $5 \%$ level. And then determine the criterion of rejected Ho based on the level of significant and
regression coefficient. Ho is rejected if regression coefficient CL*SUSPECT_NI ( $\beta 10$ ) is significantly negative when the dependent variable is abnormal CFO and significantly positive if the dependent variable is abnormal production cost and significantly negative if the dependent variable is abnormal discretionary expense.


## CHAPTER IV

## REASEARCH FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, AND IMPLICATIONS

### 4.1 Research Description

The sample selection in this research is based on company consistency in publishing the annual financial statement and data completion by manufacturing companies listed on Jakarta Stock Exchange during 2001-2004. The data used are secondary data taken from the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) corner in the Economic Faculty of Islamic University of Indonesia, libraries and internet.

Samples are collected from secondary data and further analysis by using multiple regressions which was developed by Sugata Roychowdhury (2004). As explained before, this research involved four dependent variables and ten independent variables. The dependent variables are abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs, abnormal COGS and abnormal discretionary expenses. While the independent variables are SIZE, Market- tobook - ratio (MTB), Net income, SUSPECT_NI, LoCA, DEBT, CL, CL*SUSPECT_NI, DEBT*SUSPECT_NI, LoCA*SUSPECT_NI.

Based on the criteria explained in the previous chapter, the observation and the selection to the manufacture companies listed on Jakarta Stock Exchange during 20012004 are 319 samples, including suspect firm years, namely firm-years reporting small annual earnings and small annual earnings changes. Suspect firm-years have net income scaled by market value that is greater than or equal to zero but less than 0.005 . The amounts of suspect firm years are 15 companies.

The hypothesis testing is done by statistical testing method, for the measurement of variable. Microsoft Excel is used and the data are processed by using SPSS 13.0 for the statistical calculation.

### 4.2 Descriptive Statistics

The objective of the descriptive statistics is to observe the sample characteristics used in this research. In detail, the characteristics of sample are shown in table 4.1. From the table we find the amount of sample, minimum and maximum value, mean and the standard deviation of each variable that are used.

As we can see from table 4.1, the amount of sample, which is used in this research, is 319.

Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables and Dependent Variables
Descriptive Statistics

|  | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Abcfo | 319 | -1.39399 | .03016 | .0000003 | .07834183 |
| Abdisexp | 319 | -.02651 | .00846 | .0000001 | .00206400 |
| Abprod | 319 | -.02139 | .02362 | -.0000003 | .00282395 |
| Abcogs | 319 | -.01002 | .04004 | .0000000 | .00320230 |
| size | 319 | 7.37034 | 11.71875 | 8.7182568 | .67311895 |
| mtb | 319 | .00094 | 193.30558 | 2.8226499 | 11.60521227 |
| ni | 319 | -.77238 | .72990 | .0556797 | .12752350 |
| cl | 319 | .00000 | .05806 | .0027156 | .00690843 |
| locasus | 319 | .00000 | 1.00000 | .0282132 | .16584149 |
| debtsus | 319 | .00000 | 1.00000 | .0282132 | .16584149 |
| clsus | 319 | .00000 | .04067 | .0002364 | .00248612 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 319 |  |  |  |  |

Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for the independent variables. $\mathrm{N}=319$, this number represents the amount of valid data to be process is 319 samples.

- The minimum value of Abnormal CFO is -1.39399 , while the maximum is 0.03016. The mean level or the average of Abnormal CFO is 0.0000003 . The standard deviation of Abnormal CFO is 0.07834183 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average.
- The minimum value of abnormal discretionary expense is -0.02651 , while the maximum is 0.00846 . The mean level or the average is 0.0000001 . The standard deviation is 0.00206400 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average.
- The minimum value of abnormal production costs is -0.02139 , while the maximum is 0.02362 . The mean level or the average is -0.0000003 . The standard deviation is 0.00282395 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average.
- The minimum value of Abnormal COGS is -0.01002 , while the maximum is 0.04004 . The mean level or the average is 0.0000000 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average. The standard deviation is 0.00320230 .
- The minimum value of SIZE is 7.37034 , while the maximum is 11.71875 . The mean level or the average is 8.7182568 . The standard deviation is 0.67311895 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average.
- The minimum value of Market- to- book - ratio ( mtb ) is 0.00094 , while the maximum is 193.30558 . The mean level or the average is 2.8226499 .

The standard deviation is 11.60521227 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average.

- The minimum value of net income (ni) is -0.77238 , while the maximum is -0.72990 . The mean level or the average is 0.0556797 . The standard deviation is 0.12752350 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average.
- The minimum value of current liability (cl) is -0.00000 , while the maximum is 0.05806 . The mean level or the average is 0.0027156 . The standard deviation is 0.00690843 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average.
- The minimum value of LoCA*SUSPECT_NI (locasus) is -0.00000 , while the maximum is 1.00000 . The mean level or the average is 0.0282132 . The standard deviation is 0.16584149 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average.
- The minimum value of DEBT*SUSPECT_NI (debtsus) is -0.00000 , while the maximum is 1.00000 . The mean level or the average is 0.0282132 . The standard deviation is 0.16584149 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average.
- The minimum value of CL*SUSPECT_NI (clsus) is -0.00000 , while the maximum is 0.04067 . The mean level or the average is 0.0002364 . The standard deviation is 0.00248612 . The standard deviation is used to estimate the dispersion of sample's average.


### 4.3 Hypothesis Testing

### 4.3.1 Suspect firm-years exhibit either unusually low cash flow from operations <br> (CFO) or unusually low discretionary expenses or both.

The first hypothesis is uses multiple regressions as in equation 3.5. In this case $\alpha$ is the constant, meanwhile $\beta$ is coefficient regression. Dependent variables (Yt) in the first hypothesis (HI) are abnormal CFO (table 4.2 and table 4.3) and abnormal discretionary expense (table 4.4 and table 4.5), meanwhile the independent variables are SIZE, Market-to-book-ratio, Net income, SUSPECT_NI and the rest, $\varepsilon$ t is error. From data analyses by using spss 13.0 by multiple regressions, the findings are:

Table 4.2 result of multiple regression test equation 3.5

a. Dependent Variable: abcfo

Table 4.3 result of multiple regression test equation 3.5

| Model Summary $^{\text {b }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Model | $R$ | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |  |
| 1 | , $087^{a}$ | , 008 | ,- 005 | , 07853686 | 2,007 |  |

a. Predictors: (Constant), sus, mtb, size, ni
b. Dependent Variable: abcfo

Based on the table 4.2, with abnormal CFO as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is 0.009 , with standard error 0.007 and sig 0.200 .
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is $3.79 \mathrm{E}-0.005$, with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.921$.
- Regression coefficient Net income is 0.022 with standard error 0.035 and sig 0.532 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI is 0.005 , with standard error 0.021 and sig 0.802 .

Table 4.4 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.5

Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Model |  | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients Beta | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | (Constant) | , 001 | , 002 |  | . 546 | ,585 |  |  |
|  | size | , 000 | ,000 | -,034 | -,588 | , 557 | ,974 | 1,027 |
|  | mtb | -8.7E-007 | ,000 | -,005 | -,087 | ,931 | ,996 | 1,004 |
|  | ni | ,001 | ,001 | , 064 | 1,122 | ,263 | ,968 | 1,033 |
|  | sus | ,000 | . 001 | , 024 | ,429 | ,668 | , 987 | 1,013 |

a. Dependent Variable: abdiexp

Table 4.5 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.5

Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | $R$ | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | , $070^{2}$ | , 005 | ,- 008 | , 00207203 | 1,967 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), sus, mtb, size, ni
b. Dependent Variable: abdiexp

Based on the table 4.4 and table 4.5 above, with abnormal discretionary expense as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.557$.
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is $-8.7 \mathrm{E}-007$, with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.931 .
- Regression coefficient Net income is 0.001 with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.263 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.668 .

The result of the regression indicates that suspect firm-years do not exhibit as the writer expected. Suspect firm-years do not exhibit neither unusually low cash flow from operations (CFO) or unusually low discretionary expenses or both. Based on the table 4.2, when the dependent variable is abnormal CFO, the coefficient on SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is positive ( 0.005 ) is not significant at the $5 \%$ level (see Sig $0.802>$ 0.05 ). The indicator variable did not indicate negative as the writer expected. The coefficient indicates positive correlation between dependent variable abnormal CFO and independent variable SUSPECT_NI, this means that an increase of SUSPECT_NI followed by an increase of abnormal CFO, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same.

When the dependent variable is abnormal discretionary expenses the coefficient on SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is positive ( 0.000 ) and not significant at the $5 \%$ level (see Sig $0.668>0.05$ ). The indicator variable did not indicate negative as the writer expected. The coefficient indicates positive correlation between dependent variable abnormal discretionary expenses and independent variable SUSPECT_NI, this means that an increase of SUSPECT_NI followed by an increase of abnormal discretionary expenses, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same.

From the regression analysis above indicates that H 0 is failed to reject, and does not proved the first hypothesis. This is not consistent with the previous research done by

Roychowdhury (2004) indicated that suspect firm-years who engage in real activities manipulation would lead to lower current-period CFO than what is normal given the sales level to meet zero earnings and Firms can also increase earnings by reducing discretionary expenses.

### 4.3.2 Suspect firm-years exhibit unusually high production costs, controlling for the

level of sales.
The second hypothesis is uses multiple regressions as in equation 3.6. In this case $\alpha$ is the constant, meanwhile $\beta$ is coefficient regression. Dependent variable (Yt) in the first hypothesis (HI) is abnormal production cost (table 4.6 and table 4.7), meanwhile the independent variables are SIZE, Market-to-book-ratio, Net income, SUSPECT_NI and the rest, $\varepsilon$ et is error. From data analyses by using spss 13.0 by multiple regressions, the findings are:

Table 4.6 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.6

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | B | Std. Error | Beta |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 (Constant) | -,003 | ,002 |  | -1,546 | ,123 |  |  |
| size | ,000 | ,000 | ,093 | 1,651 | ,100 | ,974 | 1,027 |
| mtb | 8,56E-006 | ,000 | ,035 | ,635 | . 526 | ,996 | 1,004 |
| ni | -,004 | . 001 | -, 189 | -3,360 | ,001 | ,968 | 1,033 |
| sus | ,000 | ,001 | -, 025 | $-.448$ | ,654 | . 987 | 1,013 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Table 4.7 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.6
Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | , $200^{\mathrm{a}}$ | , 040 | , 028 | , 00278463 | 1,957 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), sus, mtb, size, ni
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Based on the table 4.6, with abnormal production cost as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.100 .
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is $8.56 \mathrm{E}-0.006$, with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.526 .
- Regression coefficient Net income is -0.004 with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.001 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.654 .

The result of the regression indicates that suspect firm-years do not exhibit as what the writer expected. Suspect firm-years do not exhibit unusually high production costs as percentage of sales level. When the dependent variable is abnormal production cost (table 4.6), the coefficient on SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is positive ( 0.000 ). The indicator variable indeed indicate positive, but it is not significant at the $5 \%$ level (see Sig $0.654>0.05$ ). The coefficient indicates positive correlation between dependent variable abnormal production cost and independent variable SUSPECT_NI, this means that an increase of SUSPECT NI followed by an increase of abnormal production cost, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same. Based on table 4.7, the coefficient determination (Adjusted $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ ) is 0.028 which means that around $2.8 \%$ of the variation on abnormal production variable can be explained by 4 independent variables in the model, where as the residual of $97.2 \%$ is explained by other factors outside the model.

From the regression analysis above indicates that H 0 is failed to reject, and it does not prove the first hypothesis. This is consistent with the previous research done by

Roychowdhury (2004) indicated that suspect firm-years who engage in real activities manipulation pass through overproduction leads to unusually high production costs for a given level of sales.

### 4.3.3 Suspect firm-years with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total

 assets, that is low accounting flexibility, have abnormally high cost of goods sold (COGS) and abnormally low discretionary expenses, when compared to other
## suspect firm-years

The third hypothesis is uses multiple regressions as in equation 3.7 In this case $\alpha$ is the constant, meanwhile $\beta$ is coefficient regression. Dependent variables (Yt) in the first hypothesis (HI) are abnormal COGS (table 4.8 and table 4.9) and abnormal discretionary expense (table 4.10 and table 4.11), meanwhile the independent variables are SIZE, Market-to-book-ratio, Net income, SUSPECT_NI, LoCA, DEBT, CL, LoCA*SUSPECT_NI, DEBT*SUSPECT_NI, CL*SUSPECT_NI and the rest, $\varepsilon$ et is error. From data analyses by using spss 13.0 by multiple regressions, the findings are:

Table 4.8 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.7

| Model |  | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized <br> Coefficients <br> Beta | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | (Constant) | -. 002 | . 002 |  | - - -698 | . 486 |  |  |
|  | size | . 000 | . 000 | . 029 | . 519 | . 604 | 859 | 1.164 |
|  | mtb | $1.55 \mathrm{E}-005$ | . 000 | . 056 | 1.082 | . 280 | . 989 | 1.011 |
|  | ni | -. 003 | . 001 | -. 120 | -2.115 | . 035 | . 830 | 1.205 |
|  | Sus | -. 001 | . 002 | -. 034 | -. 321 | . 749 | . 235 | 4.247 |
|  | loca | . 000 | . 000 | -. 062 | -1.051 | . 294 | . 776 | 1.289 |
|  | Debt | . 000 | . 000 | . 048 | . 853 | . 394 | . 845 | 1.184 |
|  | cl | . 190 | . 026 | . 410 | 7.393 | . 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
|  | locasus | . 001 | . 002 | . 035 | . 359 | . 719 | . 276 | 3.625 |
|  | debtsus | -. 001 | . 002 | -. 028 | -. 306 | . 760 | . 331 | 3.018 |
|  | clsus | -. 089 | . 093 | -. 069 | -. 960 | . 338 | . 514 | 1.945 |

[^0]Table 4.9 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.7

Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.419^{a}$ | .175 | .148 | .00295505 | 1.995 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abcogs

Based on the table 4.8, with abnormal COGS as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.604$.
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is $1.55 \mathrm{E}-005$, with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.280$.
- Regression coefficient Net income is -0.003 with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.035 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI is -0.001 , with standard error 0.002 and sig 0.749 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.294 .
- Regression coefficient DEBT is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.394 .
- Regression coefficient CL is 0.190 with standard error 0.026 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.000$.
- Regression coefficient LoCA*SUSPECT_NI is 0.001 , with standard error 0.002 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.719$.
- Regression coefficient DEBT*SUSPECT_NI is -0.001, with standard error 0.002 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.760$.
- Regression coefficient CL*SUSPECT_NI is -0.089 , with standard error 0.093 and sig 0.338 .

Table 4.10 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.7

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients Beta | 1 | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 (Constant) | . 001 | . 002 |  | . 640 | . 523 |  |  |
| size | -7.6E-005 | . 000 | -. 025 | -. 428 | . 669 | . 859 | 1.164 |
| mtb | -3.3E-006 | . 000 | -. 018 | -. 340 | . 734 | . 989 | 1.011 |
| ni | . 001 | . 001 | . 043 | . 735 | . 463 | 830 | 1.205 |
| Sus | . 000 | . 001 | . 012 | . 108 | . 914 | . 235 | 4.247 |
| loca | . 000 | . 000 | . 055 | . 894 | . 372 | 776 | 1.289 |
| Debt | . 000 | . 000 | -. 074 | -1.264 | . 207 | . 845 | 1.184 |
| cl | -. 102 | . 017 | -. 342 | -5.948 | . 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
| locasus | . 000 | . 001 | -. 028 | -. 274 | . 784 | . 276 | 3.625 |
| debtsus | . 000 | . 001 | . 027 | . 287 | . 774 | . 331 | 3.018 |
| clsus | . 062 | . 062 | . 075 | . 998 | . 319 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Table 4.11 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.7

Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.335^{2}$ | .112 | .084 | .00197590 | 2.034 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Based on the table 4.10, with abnormal discretionary expense as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is $-7.6 \mathrm{E}-005$, with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.669 .
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is -3.3E-006, with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.734$.
- Regression coefficient Net income is 0.001 with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.463 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.914 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.372 .
- Regression coefficient DEBT is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.207$.
- Regression coefficient CL is -0.102 with standard error 0.017 and sig 0.000 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA*SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.784$.
- Regression coefficient DEBT*SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.774.
- Regression coefficient CL*SUSPECT_NI is 0.062 , with standard error 0.062 and sig 0.319.

The result of the regression indicates that suspect firm-years do not exhibit as what the writer expected. The result of regressions do not indicate that suspect firm-years with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets, that is low accounting flexibility, have abnormally high cost of goods sold (COGS) abnormally low discretionary expenses. Based on the table 4.8 , when the dependent variable is abnormal COGS, the coefficient on LoCA*SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is positive (0.001). The indicator variable indeed indicate positive, but it is not significant at the $5 \%$ level (see $\operatorname{Sig} 0.719>0.05$ ). The coefficient indicates positive correlation between dependent variable abnormal COGS and independent variable LoCA*SUSPECT_NI, this means that an increase of LOCA*SUSPECT NI followed by an increase of abnormal COGS, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same. Based on table 4.10, the coefficient determination (Adjusted $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ ) is 0.148 which means that around $14.8 \%$ of the variation on abnormal COGS variable can be explained by 10 independent variables in the model, where as the residual of $85.2 \%$ is explained by other factors outside the model.

When the dependent variable is abnormal discretionary expenses (see table 4.11) the coefficient on LoCA*SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is positive ( 0.000 ) and not significant at the $5 \%$ level (see $\operatorname{Sig} 0.784>0.05$ ). The indicator variable did not indicate negative as the writer expected. The coefficient indicates positive correlation between dependent variable abnormal discretionary expenses and independent variable LoCA*SUSPECT_NI, this means that an increase of LoCA*SUSPECT_NI followed by an increase of abnormal discretionary expenses, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same. Table 4.12 shows the coefficient determination (Adjusted $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ ) is 0.084 which means that around $8.4 \%$ of the variation on abnormal discretionary expense variable can be explained by 10 independent variables in the model, where as the residual of $91.6 \%$ is explained by other factors outside the model.

From the regression analysis above indicates that H0 failed to reject, and does not proved the first hypothesis. This is not consistent with the previous research done by Roychowdhury (2004) indicated how managers choose between manipulation methods and how suspect-firms years with low levels of current assets, or low accounting flexibility are most likely to offer price discounts and reduce discretionary expenses.

### 4.3.4 Suspect firm-years with debt outstanding have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.

The fourth hypothesis is uses multiple regressions as in equation 3.8 In this case $\alpha$ is the constant, meanwhile $\beta$ is coefficient regression. Dependent variables on first hypothesis (HI) are abnormal CFO (table 4.12 and table 4.13), abnormal production cost (table 4.14 and table 4.15) and abnormal discretionary expenses (table 4.16 and table
4.17), on the other hand, independent variables are Size, Market-to-book-ratio, Net income, SUSPECT_NI, LoCA, DEBT, CL, LoCA*SUSPECT_NI, DEBT*SUSPECT_NI, CL*SUSPECT_NI, and the rest, $\varepsilon$ t is error. From data analyses by using spss 13.0 by multiple regressions, the findings are:

Table 4.12 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.8

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients Beta | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 (Constant) | -. 004 | . 002 |  | -2.047 | . 042 |  |  |
| size | . 000 | . 000 | . 117 | 2.034 | . 043 | . 859 | 1.164 |
| mtb | 1.25E-005 | . 000 | . 051 | . 964 | . 336 | . 989 | 1.011 |
| ni | . 004 | . 001 | -. 187 | -3.211 | . 001 | . 830 | 1.205 |
| Sus | -. 001 | . 001 | -. 048 | -. 443 | . 658 | . 235 | 4.247 |
| loca | . 000 | . 000 | -. 077 | -1.283 | . 200 | . 776 | 1.289 |
| Debt | . 000 | . 000 | -. 020 | -. 348 | . 728 | . 845 | 1.184 |
| cl | . 117 | . 023 | . 287 | 5.051 | . 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
| locasus | . 000 | . 002 | . 020 | . 194 | . 846 | . 276 | 3.625 |
| debtsus | . 000 | . 002 | -. 015 | -. 162 | . 871 | . 331 | 3.018 |
| cisus | . 029 | . 084 | . 025 | . 340 | . 734 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Table 4.13 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.8

> Model Summaryb

| Model | $R$ | $R$ Rquare | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.362^{\mathrm{a}}$ | .131 | .103 | .00267474 | 1.949 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Based on the table 4.12, with abnormal production as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.043 .
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is $1.25 \mathrm{E}-005$, with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.336$.
- Regression coefficient Net income is -0.004 with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.001 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI is -0.001 , with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.658 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.200$.
- Regression coefficient DEBT is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.728$.
- Regression coefficient CL is 0.117 with standard error 0.023 and sig 0.000 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA*SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.002 and sig 0.846
- Regression coefficient DEBT*SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.002 and sig 0.871 .
- Regression coefficient CL*SUSPECT_NI is 0.029 , with standard error 0.084 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.734$.

Table 4.14 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.8

| Model |  | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | B | Std. Error | Beta |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | (Constant) | - - 065 | . 060 |  | -1.071 | . 285 |  |  |
|  | size | . 007 | . 007 | 057 | . 933 | . 351 | 859 | 1.164 |
|  | mtb | 1.33E-005 | . 000 | . 002 | . 035 | . 972 | . 989 | 1.011 |
|  | ni | . 033 | 038 | . 054 | . 864 | . 388 | . 830 | 1.205 |
|  | Sus | C $\quad .014$ | - / 1.043 | $-.037$ | + 1.317 | . 751 | . 235 | 4.247 |
|  | loca | 2. 008 | . 011 | -. 046 | . 709 | . 479 | . 776 | 1.289 |
|  | Debt | . 005 | . 010 | . 030 | . 490 | . 625 | . 845 | 1.184 |
|  | cl | . 028 | . 688 | . 002 | . 041 | . 968 | . 872 | 1.146 |
|  | locasus | -. 013 | . 051 | -. 027 | -. 250 | . 803 | . 276 | 3.625 |
|  | debtsus | -. 004 | . 047 | -. 008 | -. 085 | . 933 | . 331 | 3.018 |
|  | clsus | -. 159 | 2.491 | -. 005 | -. 064 | . 949 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

Table 4.15 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.8

Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | $R$ | $R$ Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.102^{\text {a }}$ | .010 | -.022 | .07918824 | 2.002 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

Based on the table 4.14, with abnormal CFO as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is 0.007 with standard error 0.007 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.351$.
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is $1.33 \mathrm{E}-005$, with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.972$.
- Regression coefficient Net income is 0.033 with standard error 0.038 and sig 0.388 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI is 0.014 , with standard error 0.043 and sig 0.751 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA is 0.008 , with standard error 0.011 and sig 0.479.
- Regression coefficient DEBT is 0.005 , with standard error 0.010 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.625$.
- Regression coefficient CL is 0.028 with standard error 0.688 and sig 0.968 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA*SUSPECT_NI is -0.013 , with standard error 0.051 and sig 0.803
- Regression coefficient DEBT*SUSPECT_NI is -0.004 , with standard error 0.047 and sig 0.933.
- Regression coefficient CL*SUSPECT_NI is -0.159 , with standard error 2.491 and sig 0.949.

Table 4.16 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.8

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients Beta | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 (Constant) | . 001 | . 002 |  | . 640 | . 523 |  |  |
| size | -7.6E-005 | . 000 | -. 025 | -. 428 | . 669 | . 859 | 1.164 |
| mtb | -3.3E-006 | . 000 | -. 018 | -. 340 | . 734 | . 989 | 1.011 |
| ni | . 001 | . 001 | . 043 | . 735 | . 463 | . 830 | 1.205 |
| Sus | . 000 | . 001 | . 012 | . 108 | . 914 | . 235 | 4.247 |
| loca | . 000 | . 000 | . 055 | . 894 | . 372 | . 776 | 1.289 |
| Debt | . 000 | . 000 | -. 074 | -1.264 | . 207 | . 845 | 1.184 |
| cl | -. 102 | . 017 | -. 342 | -5.948 | . 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
| locasus | . 000 | . 001 | -. 028 | -. 274 | . 784 | . 276 | 3.625 |
| debtsus | . 000 | . 001 | . 027 | . 287 | . 774 | . 331 | 3.018 |
| clsus | . 062 | . 062 | . 075 | . 998 | . 319 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Table 4.17 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.8

Model Summaryb

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.335^{2}$ | .112 | .084 | .00197590 | 2.034 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Based on the table 4.16, with abnormal discretionary expense as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is $-7.6 \mathrm{E}-005$, with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.669 .
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is $-3.3 \mathrm{E}-006$, with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.734$.
- Regression coefficient Net income is 0.001 with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.463 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.914 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.372 .
- Regression coefficient DEBT is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.207$.
- Regression coefficient CL is -0.102 with standard error 0.017 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.000$.
- Regression coefficient LoCA*SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.784
- Regression coefficient DEBT*SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.784$.
- Regression coefficient CL*SUSPECT_NI is 0.062 , with standard error 0.062 and sig 0.319

The result of the regression indicates that suspect firm-years do not exhibit as what the writer expected. The result of regressions do not indicate that suspect firm-years with debt outstanding have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years. Based on the table 4.13, when the dependent variable is abnormal production, the coefficient on DEBT*SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is positive ( 0.000 ). The indicator variable indeed indicate positive, but it is not significant at the $5 \%$ level (see $\operatorname{Sig} 0.871>0.05$ ). The coefficient indicates positive correlation between dependent variable abnormal production and independent variable DEBT*SUSPECT NI, this means that an increase of DEBT*SUSPECT_NI followed by an increase of abnormal production, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same. Table 4.14 shows the coefficient determination (Adjusted $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ ) is 0.103 which means that around $10.3 \%$ of the variation on abnormal production variable can be explained by 10 independent variables in the model, where as the residual of $89.7 \%$ is explained by other factors outside the model.

When the dependent variable is abnormal CFO (see table 4.15), the coefficient on DEBT*SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is negative ( -0.004 ). As the writer expected, the indicator variable indeed indicate negative, but it is not significant at the $5 \%$ level (see Sig $0.933>0.05$ ). The coefficient indicates negative correlation between dependent variable abnormal CFO and independent variable DEBT*SUSPECT_NI, this means that an increase of DEBT*SUSPECT_NI followed by a decrease of abnormal CFO, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same.

When the dependent variable is abnormal discretionary expenses (see table 4.17) the coefficient on DEBT*SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is positive ( 0.000 ) and not significant at the $5 \%$ level (see $\operatorname{sig} 0.774>0.05$ ). The indicator variable did not indicate negative as the writer expected. The coefficient indicates positive correlation between dependent variable abnormal discretionary expenses and independent variable DEBT*SUSPECT_NI, this means that an increase of DEBT*SUSPECT_NI followed by an increase of abnormal discretionary expenses, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same. Table 4.18 shows the coefficient determination (Adjusted $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ ) is 0.084 which means that around $8.4 \%$ of the variation on abnormal discretionary expense variable can be explained by 10 independent variables in the model, where as the residual of $91.6 \%$ is explained by other factors outside the model.

From the regression analysis above indicates that H 0 failed to reject and does not prove the first hypothesis. This is consistent with the previous research done by Roychowdhury (2004) indicated suspect firm-years with debt outstanding have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.

### 4.3.5 Suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assets

 have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.The fifth hypothesis is uses multiple regressions as in equation 3.9 In this case $\alpha$ is the constant, meanwhile $\beta$ is coefficient regression. The dependent variables on first hypothesis (HI) are abnormal CFO (table 4.18 and table 4.19), abnormal production cost (table 4.20 and table 4.21) and abnormal discretionary expenses (table 4.22 and table 4.23), while the independent variables are Size, Market-to-book-ratio, Net income, SUSPECT_NI, LoCADEBT, CL, LoCA*SUSPECT_NI, DEBT*SUSPECT_NI, CL*SUSPECT_NI, and the rest, $\varepsilon$ t is error. From data analyses by using spss 13.0 by multiple regressions, the findings are:

Table 4.18 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.9

| Model |  | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients Beta | t | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | (Constant) | -. 065 | . 060 |  | -1.071 | 285 |  |  |
|  | size | . 007 | . 007 | 057 | . 933 | 351 | . 859 | 1.164 |
|  | mtb | 1.33E-005 | . 000 | . 002 | . 035 | . 972 | 989 | 1.011 |
|  | ni | . 033 | . 038 | 054 | . 864 | . 388 | . 830 | 1.205 |
|  | Sus | . 014 | . 043 | . 037 | . 317 | . 751 | . 235 | 4.247 |
|  | loca | . 008 | . 011 | . 046 | $\pm \quad .709$ | . 479 | . 776 | 1.289 |
|  | Debt | 005 | . 010 | . 030 | . 490 | . 625 | . 845 | 1.184 |
|  | cl | . 028 | . 688 | . 002 | . 041 | . 968 | 872 | 1.146 |
|  | locasus | -. 013 | . 051 | -. 027 | -. 250 | . 803 | 276 | 3.625 |
|  | debtsus | -. 004 | . 047 | -. 008 | -. 085 | . 933 | 331 | 3.018 |
|  | cisus | -. 159 | 2.491 | -. 005 | -. 064 | . 949 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

Table 4.19 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.9

Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.102^{\text {a }}$ | .010 | -.022 | .07918824 | 2.002 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

Based on the table 4.18, with abnormal CFO as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is 0.007 with standard error 0.007 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.351$.
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is $1.33 \mathrm{E}-005$, with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.972$.
- Regression coefficient Net income is 0.033 with standard error 0.038 and sig 0.388 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI is 0.014 , with standard error 0.043 and sig 0.751 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA is 0.008 , with standard error 0.011 and sig 0.479.
- Regression coefficient DEBT is 0.005 , with standard error 0.010 and sig 0.625 .
- Regression coefficient CL is 0.028 with standard error 0.688 and sig 0.968 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA*SUSPECT_NI is -0.013, with standard error 0.051 and sig 0.803
- Regression coefficient DEBT*SUSPECT_NI is -0.004 , with standard error 0.047 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.933$.
- Regression coefficient CL*SUSPECT_NI is -0.159 , with standard error 2.491 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.949$.

Table 4.20 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.9

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients Beta | 1 | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 (Constant) | -. 004 | . 002 |  | -2.047 | . 042 |  |  |
| size | . 000 | . 000 | . 117 | 2.034 | . 043 | . 859 | 1.164 |
| mtb | 1.25E-005 | . 000 | . 051 | . 964 | . 336 | . 989 | 1.011 |
| ni | -. 004 | . 001 | -. 187 | -3.211 | . 001 | . 830 | 1.205 |
| Sus | -. 001 | . 001 | . 048 | -. 443 | . 658 | . 235 | 4.247 |
| loca | . 000 | . 000 | -. 077 | -1.283 | . 200 | . 776 | 1.289 |
| Debt | . 000 | . 000 | -. 020 | -. 348 | . 728 | . 845 | 1.184 |
| cl | . 117 | . 023 | . 287 | 5.051 | . 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
| locasus | . 000 | . 002 | . 020 | . 194 | . 846 | . 276 | 3.625 |
| debtsus | . 000 | . 002 | -. 015 | -. 162 | . 871 | . 331 | 3.018 |
| clsus | . 029 | . 084 | . 025 | . 340 | . 734 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Table 4.21 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.9

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate | DurbinWatson |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | $362^{\text {a }}$ | . 131 | 103 | . 00267474 | 1.949 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), cisus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Based on the table 4.20, with abnormal production as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.043$.
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is $1.25 \mathrm{E}-005$, with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.336$.
- Regression coefficient Net income is -0.004 with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.001 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT_NI is -0.001 , with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.658 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.200 .
- Regression coefficient DEBT is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.728 .
- Regression coefficient CL is 0.117 with standard error 0.023 and sig 0.000 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA*SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.002 and sig 0.846
- Regression coefficient DEBT*SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.002 and sig 0.871 .
- Regression coefficient CL*SUSPECT_NI is 0.029 , with standard error 0.084 and sig 0.734 .

Table 4.22 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.9

Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Model |  | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients Beta | t | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | (Constant) | . 001 | . 002 |  | . 640 | 523 |  |  |
|  | size | -7.6E-005 | . 000 | -. 025 | -. 428 | 669 | . 859 | 1.164 |
|  | mtb | -3.3E-006 | . 000 | -. 018 | -. 340 | . 734 | . 989 | 1.011 |
|  | ni | . 001 | . 001 | . 043 | . 735 | . 463 | . 830 | 1.205 |
|  | Sus | . 000 | . 001 | . 012 | . 108 | . 914 | . 235 | 4.247 |
|  | loca | . 000 | . 000 | . 055 | . 894 | . 372 | . 776 | 1.289 |
|  | Debt | . 000 | 000 | -. 074 | -1.264 | . 207 | 845 | 1.184 |
|  | cl | - 102 | . 017 | -. 342 | -5.948 | . 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
|  | locasus | . 000 | . 001 | -. 028 | -. 274 | . 784 | . 276 | 3.625 |
|  | debtsus | . 000 | . 001 | . 027 | . 287 | . 774 | . 331 | 3.018 |
|  | clsus | . 062 | . 062 | . 075 | . 998 | . 319 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Table 4.23 result of the multiple regression test equation 3.9
Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.335^{\mathrm{a}}$ | .112 | .084 | .00197590 | 2.034 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Based on the table 4.22, with abnormal discretionary expense as the dependent variable:

- Regression coefficient SIZE is $-7.6 \mathrm{E}-005$, with standard error 0.000 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.669$.
- Regression coefficient Market-to-book-ratio is $-3.3 \mathrm{E}-006$, with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.734 .
- Regression coefficient Net income is 0.001 with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.463 .
- Regression coefficient SUSPECT NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and sig 0.914.
- Regression coefficient LoCA is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.372 .
- Regression coefficient DEBT is 0.000 , with standard error 0.000 and sig 0.207.
- Regression coefficient CL is -0.102 with standard error 0.017 and sig 0.000 .
- Regression coefficient LoCA*SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.784$
- Regression coefficient DEBT*SUSPECT_NI is 0.000 , with standard error 0.001 and $\operatorname{sig} 0.784$.
- Regression coefficient CL*SUSPECT_NI is 0.062 , with standard error 0.062 and sig 0.319

The result of the regression indicates that suspect firm-years do not exhibit as what the writer expected. The result of regressions do not indicate that suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assets have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years. Based on the table 4.18, when the dependent variable is abnormal CFO, the coefficient on CL*SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is negative
(-0.159). The indicator variable indeed indicate negative, but it is not significant at the $5 \%$ level (see $\operatorname{Sig} 0.949>0.05$ ). The coefficient indicates negative correlation between dependent variable abnormal CFO and independent variable CL*SUSPECT_NI, this means that an increase of CL*SUSPECT_NI followed by a decrease of abnormal CFO, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same.

When the dependent variable is abnormal production (see table 4.20), the coefficient on CL*SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is positive (0.029). The indicator variable indeed indicate positive, but it is not significant at the 5\% level (see Sig $0.734>0.05$ ). The coefficient indicates positive correlation between dependent variable abnormal production and independent variable CL*SUSPECT_NI, this means that an increase of CL*SUSPECT NI followed by an increase of abnormal production, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same. Based on table 4.21 the coefficient determination (Adjusted $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ ) is 0.103 which means that around $10.3 \%$ of the variation on abnormal production variable can be explained by 10 independent variables in the model, where as the residual of $89.7 \%$ is explained by other factors outside the model.

When the dependent variable is abnormal discretionary expenses (see table 4.22) the coefficient on CL*SUSPECT_NI as an indicator variable is positive (0.062) and not significant at the $5 \%$ level (see Sig $0.319>0.05$ ). The indicator variable did not indicate negative as the writer expected. The coefficient indicates positive correlation between dependent variable abnormal discretionary expenses and independent variable CL*SUSPECT_NI, this means that an increase of CL*SUSPECT_NI followed by an increase of abnormal discretionary expenses, while the rest of the independent variables remain the same. Table 4.23 shows the coefficient determination (Adjusted $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ ) is 0.084
which means that around $8.4 \%$ of the variation on abnormal discretionary expense variable can be explained by 10 independent variables in the model, where as the residual of $91.6 \%$ is explained by other factors outside the model.

From the regression analysis above indicates that H 0 failed to reject and it does not prove the first hypothesis. This is not consistent with the previous research done by Roychowdhury (2004) indicated suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assets have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years.

### 4.4 Classical Assumption Tests

### 4.4.1 Multicollinearity Test

The term multicollinearity means the existence of a "perfect" or exact, linear relationship among some or all explanatory variables of a regression model. The existence of multicollinearity causes in appropriate estimation result (Gujarati, 1995). According to Gujarati (1995), as a rule of thumb, if the VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) of variable exceeds 10 and value of tolerance is closed to 0 , variable is said to be highly collinear.

Multicollinearity happens when variance inflation factor (VIF) is more than 10 or tolerance less than 0.1 . From the table 4.3 until table 4.23 shows that there is no multicollinearity among independent variables in this research. Because VIF is less than 10 and tolerance value of each variable is more than 0.1 .

### 4.4.2 Autocorrelation Test

To test whether there is autocorrelation, the Durbin Watson (D-W) table statistics is used. In the table of Durbin Watson the number must be closed to 2 or approximately
around 2 at the level of significance $5 \%$. From the table 4.3 until table 4.23 the numbers in the table of Durbin Watson are closed to 2 or approximately around 2, it shows that there is no autocorrelation among independent variables in this research.

### 4.4.3 Heteroscedasticity Test

The heteroscedasticity symptom will appear when the residual has the difference variance from one observation to another. The existence of heteroscedasticity causes the regression coefficient estimation becomes inefficient.

The detection of the presence of heteroscedasticity in this research is conducted by analyzing Scatterplot graphic from the regression analysis. As it can be seen in Scatter plot graphic on each regression result per hyphoteses, dots spread randomly and do not form any clear patterns. It can be concluded that the result of this test shows that heterocedasticity does not exist. This result proves that the data was valid and it will give a reliable estimated model parameter.

### 4.5 Research Implications

In this study, formely, the writer wants to give empirical evidence whether there is any evidence of firm managers that engaged in management of earning through the manipulation of real activities that affect cash flow from operation. In order to make a different, the writer is replacing total asset at the beginning of year, the denominator for dependent variables, with market value at the beginning of year. But the results do not appear as the writer expected. None of independent variables are related significant to dependent variables. This is also explaining why the results of regression analysis are not consistent with the previous rescarch done by Roychowdhury (2004).

Although the results do not appear as what the writer expected, still the writer suggest the management of the firm to be wise in determining whether it is appropriate or not to choose the nature and extent of real activities manipulation as a way of management of earning that could affect cash flow from operation. For the financial statement users, they should look for more details about the company, and not just judge a book (a company) by its cover (the number of reported earnings).


## CHAPTER V

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 Conclusions

In this study the writer failed to give empirical evidence whether there is any evidence of firm managers that engaged in management of earning through the manipulation of real activities that affect cash flow from operation in reference to market value. In order to make a different, the writer is replacing total asset at the beginning of year, the denominator for dependent variables, with market value at the beginning of year. But the results do not appear as the writer expected. None of independent variables are related significant to dependent variables. It also explains why the results of regression analysis are not consistent with the previous research done by Roychowdhury (2004).

The other reasons why the results of regression analysis are not consistent with the previous research done by Roychowdhury (2004) possibly caused by the period of sample which are only four years (2001-2004), and the type of industry that is only restricted to manufacturing firms.

It is concluded that Suspect firm-years is not proved engage in management of earning through the manipulation of real activities that affect cash flow from operation. Suspect firm-years are firm-years reporting small annual earnings and small annual earnings changes. Suspect firm-years have net income scaled by market value that is greater than or equal to zero but less than 0.005 .

Based on the results of regression analysis in chapter IV, it can be conclude as follow:

1. Suspect firm-years do not significantly exhibit either unusually low cash flow from operations (CFO) or unusually low discretionary expenses or both. The first hypotheses analysis indicates that suspect firm-years do not proved engage in real activities manipulation that would lead to lower current-period CFO than what is normal given the sales level to meet zero earnings. This is possibly because firms do not engage either in sales manipulation or in decreasing discretionary expenses that would lead to decreasing of cash flow. For example if a firm engage in sales manipulation by offering price discount, this would lead to decreasing of cash flow yet increasing the earnings in appropriate with sales order. Decreasing discretionary expenses also lead to decreasing of cash flow yet increasing earnings.
2. Suspect firm-years do not significantly exhibit unusually high production costs, controlling for the level of sales. The first hypotheses analysis indicates that suspect firm-years do not proved engage in real activities manipulation pass through overproduction leads to unusually high production costs for a given level of sales. This is possibly because firms do not engage in overproduction Overproduction would lead to unusually high production cost for the level of sales. Overproduce (produce more goods than necessary to meet expected demand) to manage earnings upwards. With higher production levels, fixed overhead costs are spread over a larger number of units. As long as the reduction in fixed costs per unit is not offset by any increase in marginal cost per unit, average unit cost declines. This implies that cost of goods sold (COGS) is lower
and the firm reports better operating margins. Nevertheless, the firm incurs costs on the over-produced items that are not recovered in the same period through sales. As a result, cash flows from operations are lower than normal given sales levels.
3. Suspect firm-years with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets, that is low accounting flexibility, do not significantly have abnormally high cost of goods sold (COGS) and abnormally low discretionary expenses, when compared to other suspect firm-years. The first hypotheses analysis do not proved suspect firm-years with low levels of current assets manage earnings upwards, they can do so only by offering price discounts to increase sales or reducing discretionary expenses. Offering price discount would lead to would lead to unusually high production cost for the level of sales. With higher sales levels, cash flow from operation would manage upwards. Increasing earnings also can be done by decreasing discretionary expenses that would decline the cash flow from operation.
4. Suspect firm-years with debt outstanding do not significantly have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years. The first hypotheses analysis do not proved suspect firm-years with debt outstanding engage in earnings management through real activities manipulation, such as sales manipulation, overproduction, decreasing discretionary expenses that affect cash flow from operation. Sales manipulation attempt to increase sales in order to increase earnings. Overproduction would lead to unusually high production cost for the
level of sales. Overproduce (produce more goods than necessary to meet expected demand) to manage earnings upwards. Decreasing discretionary expenses would lead to low discretionary expenses to manage earnings upward.
5. Suspect firm-years with high current liabilities as a percentage of total assets do not significantly have abnormally low CFO, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses compared to other suspect firm-years. This is possibly because suspect firm-years with high current liabilities do not engage in activities that would lead to high production costs and low discretionary expenses. Manager my concern about the high current liabilities would lead the firm to lose its ability to do overproduction that has effect on high production cost which managers are more likely to worry about the firm's ability to pay the outstanding debt or probably it would lead to a greater number of outstanding debts.

In this study the writer failed to give empirical evidence whether there is any evidence of firm managers that engaged in management of earning through the manipulation of real activities that affect cash flow from operation in refers to market value. In order to make a different, the writer is replacing total asset at the beginning of year, the denominator for dependent variables, with market value at the beginning of year. But the results do not appear as the writer expected. None of independent variables are related significant to dependent variables. This is also explaining why the results of regression analysis are not consistent with the previous research done by Roychowdhury (2004).

The other reasons why the results of regression analysis are not consistent with the previous research done by Roychowdhury (2004) possibly caused by the period of sample which are only four years (2001-2004), and the type of industry that is only restricted to manufacturing firms.

### 5.2 Limitations

The limitations that may influence this study are:

1. The samples are only restricted to manufacturing firms.
2. The period of study is only four years (2001-2004).
3. In this study the writer only focus management of earnings through real activities.

### 5.3 Recommendations

From the limitation that may influence this research, the researcher suggests:
4. Hopefully the companies used as samples for future study can be added by other types of industry, not only restricted to manufacturing firms. So the result may be significant.
5. The period of study consideration for the same study hopefully can be conducted over a longer period, in this study it is only four years (2001-2004). The longer period hopefully may lead to significant result.
6. For further study may analyze the different between management of earnings through real activities and accrual manipulation. This is because, in this study the writer only focus management of earnings through real activities.

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| 0 | てヤヤらち8ヤ0．0 | $66 \vdash 00^{\circ}$ | SてZ98＇L | 99608L000＇0 |  | S0－3L999 ${ }^{\text {Sos }}$ | Yqı opulqn $\perp$ en！$\bigcirc \perp 1$ dd |
| 0 | 万ZLLLEEOO | 18ヤ000 | 91999b＇0 | LZZLOL900＇0 | 1Sレヤで90000 |  | Yqı le66unuew eke！uozeg Id |
| 0 | 6ヤ801てヤ0＊0 | $68 \triangleright 000$ | 9とZ090． | 8ち8606000＇0 | とャ69 280000 | จ乞と19ヤ0000 |  |
| 0 | SZ6LヵS000－ | 6ヶ00＇0 | カで96でて | 9ع\＆と99000＇0 | Lてヤ965000＇0 | 662801000＇0 |  |
| 0 | とちらもSを810 | 〉Z900 0 | と9899＇1 | ヤレ06ヶ\＆と00＇0 |  | L19ヶ8200000 |  |
| 0 | 29992をャ00 | 98ヤ00＇0 | SL6Lts＇ | 6606Z1E00＇0 | Lt9LZ98000 | 91LSLE0000 | Yqı Esozues sellı $\perp$ dd |
| 0 | ع09E1880 0 | LLDOO＇0 | 6レてLEs0 | 88ャらヶL000＇0 | L6ELヤL00000 | かヤて801000 |  |
| 0 | 6ヤLL8E10＇0－ | 98ヤ00＇0 | 9ヶ6L6L＇Z | 8ع81800＇0 | ScZELZE00＇0 | ع1096ヤ0000 |  |
| 0 | 9sıZしseo | LSヤ000 |  | 6L9S26200＇0 | ヤヤEL86て00＇0 | S66012000＇0 |  |
| 0 | L9LZとZ80＇0 | $16 \bigcirc 000$ | 9ZLSZ9＊0 | とLもZ68100＇0 | 七\＆868100\％0 | くヵてSEZ000＇0 |  |
| 7 Sns | 7 Əmoうuljon | O¢0． | L－7 81W | 7 POJd | ＋ 5 OOOV | － 7 dxololo | Y $1+1$ SeldeuKo 1 d |




| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8L891で8 | †6000 ${ }^{-}$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | L91をちを＇8 | S2000＇0－ | $\frac{981000}{12000}$ | 900000 | Y9 1 pl7 $0 \bigcirc$ eu！$\mu$ ag $\perp$ d |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | LL9LZで 6 | ¢8000＊${ }^{-}$ | S12000－ | 200000 | Yqı soulisnpul isejdels $\forall 1$ Id |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 26ヤ81を8 | 901000－ | S8000＇0－ | L5000 ${ }^{-1}$ | Yqı pl7 0j ssejo peid seumyes $\forall 1 / d$ |
| 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 8عLLLE．8 | 621000－ | 18100＇0－ | 850000 | Yad Inwxew opuliful ekns 1 d |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Sちくカヤで8 | 9 $10000^{-}$ | S9100＇0－ | $88000{ }^{\circ}$ | yqı eleg niedas $1 d$ |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 600699 | －2100 ${ }^{-}$ | －17000－ | 890000 | Yqı eyedinn esenes 1 d |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 860¢5＇8 | 69000\％ | 26000\％ | 8900000－ | Yqı euesnq！p $\forall$ oueky 1 d |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6t9890 8 | 91000 ${ }^{\circ}$ | SS000＇0－ | 90000\％ |  |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2LL098．8 | ＋0000 ${ }^{-}$ | L1000\％ | $11000{ }^{\circ}$ |  |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | SLSL9L＇8 | L $\angle 1000$ | ELto00－ | LEL00＇0－ |  |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | S60ZL8．8 | LSLOO＇0 | 851000 | $\frac{2610000}{}$ | Yqı sonepuks emenopuld |
| 0 | 0 | b | $\downarrow$ | しヤ6とてで6 | 2t000＇0－ | $\square \rightarrow 0000^{-}$ | t9000 0 |  |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | カヤ986E＇8 | 95000 ${ }^{-}$ | $\angle \square 0000^{-}$ | 820000 |  |
| 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 899ヤ06．8 | 80100＇0－ | $820000^{-}$ | S000＇0 | Yq，elsauopul elew ounyof 1 d |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 989086.6 | 80100＇0－ | $\frac{82000}{8100} 0^{-}$ | \＄5000 ${ }^{\circ}$ |  |
| 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 91980．01 | 80100＇0－ | 821000－ | 9 500000 | Yq．emaodurs ejepuew eke！ueh $\perp$ d |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 908606.8 | 6ع100＇0－ | $66000^{-}$ |  | Yqı wejeg 6uepno id |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2100＇0 | $18000{ }^{-}$ | $\frac{2000}{} 915000^{-}$ | Yq1 Kuedmos 6upen pue knsnpu eisouopul $1 \forall 8 \perp 1$ |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9280 26.8 | 26000＇0－ | 21000\％${ }^{-}$ | 9＋000\％ | Yqı Kuedmos бu！pen $\perp$ pue Kısnpul yiln eker eıfn 1 dd |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | LSLLLL＇8 | $\rightarrow 0100{ }^{\circ}$ | 91100\％${ }^{-}$ | ¢ 10000 | Yq $\perp$ bundwe 7 njeg seun $\perp \perp d$ |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | －LてE69＇6 | Zヶ000 ${ }^{-}$ | 220000 | 21000．0 |  |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | L866くヤ・8 | ¢8000 ${ }^{-}$ | $86000{ }^{\circ}$ | عヤ000\％ |  |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Sてらったぐ8 | 21000 ${ }^{-}$ | LZ1000－ | 8¢000＇0 | Yq $\perp$ dO $\perp$ dejue！$S$ Id |
| $\downarrow$ | 1 | 1 | $\downarrow$ | 960LE9＇8 | 92100＇0－ | 681000－ | 180000 | yqı epesnh ！les 1 ¢ |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | くち6LLL＇6 | 15000＇0－ | $6 \angle 0000^{-}$ | ャ1000＇0 |  |
| 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | $8860{ }^{\circ} \mathrm{OL}$ | 82000＇0－ | $92000^{\circ} 0^{-}$ | 2ع000＇0 | Yal yqı yepul ejokew 1 dd |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 91ELLZ＇8 | 681000－ | ¢S100\％${ }^{-}$ | SOL00＇0 | Yq． m myew sesyns poojopul 1 dd |
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| ع0S198100\％ | ESLLOOO | †98L690000 | LャレレOO | 000＇000＇0ヶ8＇Zレレ | S12LLLOOO | Yqı pl7 0う sselo te｜J semulues $\forall 1 \mathrm{ld}$ |
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| 9899EOLE10 | 6LE9ヤ0 0 | 80\＆て6ちヤ000 | ヤでヤ98が0 | 000＇000＇568 | L98299090＇0 | 191 eleg nıedes 1 d |
| － 28 Z91000＇0 | 60 21000 | Sヤ8ZLZ00000－ | 8\＆ャ1000 | 000＇000＇000＇ 281 | Eblol0000 | Yqı eyejonn eseres id |
| ¢0－32 | 50－389＇$\varepsilon$ | 90－39ちら㫙9－ | 901000＇0 | 000＇000＇000＇98\＆ | 90－ヨしをけをち9 |  |
| 2000 $2000 \cdot 0$ | 50－3L6＇6 | ZL900800000－ | 86Lb00＇0 | 000＇000＇096＇8t | 96SEZZ000＇0 |  |
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| 9ELLOZ000＇0 | $182000{ }^{\circ}$ | ャ0001E100＇0－ | 20EzO0＇0 | 000＇080＇198＇ஏ¢て | S0－ヨLEtS＇${ }^{-1}$ |  |
|  | 8861600 | Z885ヶ2100＇0－ | －610100 |  | 90－قS | Yqı sonjpuks emesopu 1 d |
| 90－3¢ ${ }^{\text {¢ }}$ | 90－382＇6－ | ¢SELL000＇0－ | 98ャ100 0 | 000＇000＇000＇8ちて | S0－ヨL9E29＇Z | Y91 E！sauopul |
| ヵてELL1000＇0 | Lع000＇0 | E9LLLて000＊0－ | $198000{ }^{\circ}$ | 00＇ $180^{\prime} 99 \varepsilon^{\prime \prime} \downarrow 8$ | 90－3g92LL6 | Yq $\perp 1$ |
| 8816210000 | L960000 | S0－3E09LE＇L | LSOLOO | 000＇000＇000＇00ャ＇tl | Gヶ89210000 | Yq＾e！sauopul plyjo nKorg 1d |
| S0－378L9で8 | 620100 0 | L988L1000＇0 | 8921000 | 000＇00て＇${ }^{\prime} 9 \varepsilon^{\prime}$＇$\downarrow 9^{\prime} 91$ | 8عLEE10000 | yal ureseg buepno 1 dd |
| 1806950000 | S8800000－ | S0－3988LL | 682100＇0 | 000＇000＇008＇S ${ }^{\text {¢ }}$ | †をャZOLOOO＇0－ |  |
| てLEヤEヤ1000 | ZSEE00＇0 | 88990S $100{ }^{\circ}$ | 878800 0 | 000＇000＇00て＇9b | 962989000＇0 | Y $1+$ Kuedmog 6u！ped $\perp$ pue Kısnpul Yiliw eker entin 1 d |
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| 6L0999000\％ | 1690000 | LS980ャ000＊＊－ | 8ع 21000 | 000＇000＇008＇เ9 | $18 \angle 8980000$ | Yqı 4epul eqns $\perp$ d |
| 96てL9Z000＇0 | LL9000＇0 | S0－ヨع6＜96＇ | SOEE00＇0 | S99＇6LS＇280＇868 | 50－3899ャて | Yal emnpodd perels 1 d |
| とてヤ 201000 | LLOZOO | SZStS100＇0 | － $28800{ }^{\circ}$ | 000＇000＇0ヤL＇0L | LてZレレE000＊ | Ya 1 dO 1 delue！ S 1 d |
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| 9898ELてO0＇0 | 92t000＊ | 8860L1000＇0 | 6ヶ0ヶ00＇0 | 000＇0ヤヤ＇SbL＇6E | 106ヶ0ヶ5000 |  |
| 8ع6ヶ¢08000＇0 | $68+000{ }^{\circ}$ | S0－ヨトてしてZ＇9－ | 92Z1000 | 000＇000＇02ヤ＇でヤ | 190ヤをZ000＊0 | Yad e！seuopu｜6uełulg ！inn 1 Id |
| 96S86ヶ000＇0 | L－19000＇0 | S160L90000 | －LOt00\％ | 000＇088＇90と＇Sヶて | 9962Lヤ000＊0 | Ya $\perp$ पepul ejokew 1 d |
| 8ヤてZ8E00000 | 6 6£000＇0 | 8عE8LE000＇0 | LL8200＇0 | 000＇000＇009＇てZL＇S | 50－36668＇ャ－ |  |
| 1L2Z60100＇0 | S6ヶ000＇0 | て180sع00000 | 8902000 | 000＇09L＇Eヤ8＇SヤE | ヶ9ZZZ000＇0 |  |
|  | $8560000^{-}$ | 999EE20000－ | 1827000 | 009＇S ${ }^{\text {a }}$＇00L＇してL | عLE6ちをZ00＇0 | Yaı eyexe！a etpa 1 d |
| S0－ヨ $26800^{\circ} \mathrm{L}$ | 829000＇0 | 6809EOL00＇0 | ع12900＇0 | 0¢でレヤ8＇6切68 | Z8999L100＇0 | Yqı ！peqv semoneg $\perp$ d |
| 9ヶ080Z000．0 | Sعヤ000＇0－ | 192LOg0000 | †¢98000 | $00{ }^{\prime} 000{ }^{\prime} 009^{\prime} \angle b$ | S8ZZ18000＇0 | Yqı Jeqley ekeye） 1 d |
| S0－3ZLSLS 8 | LOSLOOO | SヤS6ヤ000\％ | 81てZ000 | 000＇¢Sc＇989＇09t | tヶ9らヶL000＊ | Yqı ！dd！ss！ss！W Uәplo |
| $\frac{\text { 20L2L } 20000}{\text { dxa！0］}}$ | 991000＇0 | てZES620000 | 9ELLOO＇0 | 000＇000＇009＇s8 | ع86¢98000＇0 |  |
| $7 \mathrm{dxa!} \mathrm{P}$ | L－158 | 4SV | 15 | L－7 ${ }^{\text {N }}$ | 10.5 |  |


| SLLLLE0000 | ZSEE00＇0 | SZZLLE000＊0－ | 8982100 |  | ZS6E6E1000 |  |
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| ヶ08918000＇0 | 9160000 | ع68662000＇0 | 68LLOO＇0 | 000＇000＇¢ $28^{\prime}$ ¢1を | 6ヶ8とてS0000－ |  |
| عくったてL000＇0 | عと1000\％ | S0－399ャ81＇8 | 162100＇0 | 000＇891＇02S＇ $29 \downarrow$ | 296L9Z00000 | $\frac{\text { Yq } \perp \text { ueap！}}{\text { y }}$ seun $\perp \perp \mathrm{dd}$ |
| てOtを19000＇0 | 9ع20000 | ESZS19000＇0 | $88600{ }^{\circ}$ | 000＇000＇02s＇0z | L9ZをE00000 | Yqı eundmas jewejas 1 d |
| £ย์ $186000^{\circ}$ | LZ1000 | 98てヤヤして000 | จてLLIOO | 000＇000＇009＇01 | 9ZSLESZ00＇0 |  |
| 9L6を68000＇0 | 21000＇0 | 1E09120000－ | 8LLてOOO | 000＇009＇ $286^{\prime} \mathrm{S}$ b | $66 \angle \varepsilon \angle \vdash 000{ }^{\circ}$ |  |
| 89¢ヤを¢ヤて000 | －ヵてS000 | ¢S6E80100＊－ | て8ャレレ00 | 000＇000 ${ }^{\circ} 005^{\prime}$ ¢ $\downarrow$ | 90－ヨャレヤヤ9 ${ }^{\text {－}}$ |  |
| LOLEとて100＇0 | 96Z\＆00＇0 | 8906ES $100^{\circ} 0$ | 681510＇0 | 000＇00s＇290＇ャl | 8ELEL000＇0－ | Yqı Du！ 1 dsopul 1 d |
| ¢G8981000＇0 | S8E000＇0 | 8288ャ10000－ | LE9800 0 | 000＇000＇008＇8G | S0－39LE88＇て－ |  |
| G9918L000＇0 | 909000 | 891621000＊－ | LZS900\％ | 000000006002 | L90L61000＇0 |  |
| と0ヶSカ200000 | 90－390 ${ }^{\text {－}}$ | S0－38 $1969{ }^{\circ} \mathrm{E}$ | 9力てZ00＊0 | 000＇ $865^{\prime} \downarrow 99^{\prime} 816$ |  | Yqı e！nw equerg id |
| 1800LL000＇0 | LヵEOOO＇0 | 915EL10000 | $961900{ }^{\circ}$ |  | Lع9E80000 | Yqı suedolo ents $\forall 1 d$ |
| 90－ヨZLE66．9 | S0－3EL＇Z | S0－39606L | S0－3E1＇6 | 000＇sLで6レ1＇90ヤ＇し |  | Yqı feuoljeujełul ens $\forall \perp$ dd |
| 8Lヤしゃく0000 | 2000 | 981899000 ${ }^{-}$ | 1980000 | 000＇000＇008＇001 | 90－ヨ9E990＇ |  |
| LZZESS000＇0 | 8ヵ20000 | 七てLSE9000\％0 | LL9ZOO＇0 | 000＇009＇602＇LE | 90101ヤ000＊0 |  |
| 88080ヤ000＇0 | 8060000 | とて9L88000＇0 | 2ヶ02000 | 000＇000＇091＇8 | 90－398010\％ |  |
| 9266860000 | 8982000－ | S18カレL110＇0 | と■ 28100 | $000{ }^{\circ} 000^{\circ} 009^{\prime} \mathrm{E}$ L | LLTLOLOOO | Yq1 eulld 4 sew uoli 1 d |
| S0－3GLtャ9＇L | 6090000 | S0－ヨ661 ${ }^{\text {cos }}$ | 969000 0 | 000＇000＇000＇2¢9 | 90－396919＇9 | Yqı leats ！led eker 1 d |
| S0－3L916でL | S0－362＇8 | S0－ヨLES66．6 | 976000＇0 | 000＇000＇009＇レZ | 9658ャを000 $0^{-}$ |  |
| LLL295000\％ | ZS10000 | 60ヤレてZ1000－ | $618900{ }^{\circ}$ | 000＇000＇09ヤ＇ZS1 | とદてしをย0000 |  |
| L600L20000 | $9 \mathrm{CEO00} 0$ | 9888S1000＇0 | L8S100\％ | 000＇000＇98 ${ }^{\prime}$＇292＇$\varepsilon$ | 808G9Z000＇0 |  |
| 6ZLZLZ1000 | 8981000 | عモSEャOL00\％ | ャャ8L100 | 000＇000＇060＇ 291 | 88LLL8000＇0 |  |
| SLSEか1000＇0 | 680000 | St0 $661000{ }^{\circ}$ | ZESL000 |  | ヤ86L8ヤ000＇0 |  |
| L8\＆ヤOLOOO＇O | 1690000 | S0－ヨャレャレでで | 8LZ100\％ | 000＇00ヤ＇066＇6ャレ | いとくヤ1000＊ | Yqı esexjad eरer eueye $M$ Id |
| 9ヶ8てZ\＆000：0 | SIZ1000 | 8\＆ヤ801000\％ | 928ヤ00＇0 | 000＇000＇000＇ 291 | LLZとEと1000 | Yqı esolues sell 11 d |
| S0－3Et8GL＇S | てZLOOOO－ | LLLもS10000－ | 6120000 | 000＇000＇SLL＇LLL | S0－ヨZ098E＇L |  |
| LS66880000 | 682000＇0 | Z9LELE000＇0 | 959000 |  | しってZてZ000＊0 |  |
| Lヤ8LLE000＇0 | ャてヤ000＇0 | 99と 2 ¢9000＇0 | عとLヤO00 | 000＇000＇009＇ャ6 |  |  |
| S0－32909L＇Z | S0－ヨャ¢ | S0－388580＇1 | とヤ000\％ | 000＇000＇S6t＇ZOS | S0－381081．6 |  |
| 8660LE000＇0 | 9150000 | てL09Zヤ6000 | 8ع08000 | 009＇¢Z¢＇Z98＇9ャレ | SSE8990000 | Yq $1+5 \mathrm{sej}$ deuko 1 d |
| － 1 dxa！${ }^{\text {d }}$ | S18000 0 | と891して00000 | $898 \varepsilon 000$ | 000＇000＇sLZ＇29 | †869890000 |  |
|  | －is | ＋SV | 15 | L－INW | $10 \pm 3$ | swund ¢ulumpe！nuew |






| 0 | L806900＇0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | カレSOL8＇6 | Yqı SJOtoed $\perp$ pet！un 1 d |
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| 0 | ZZ68ZOO＇0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | しぃ8レて8＇L |  |
| 0 | 98995000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ヤてヤを¢8＊8 | Yqı equed osenul 1 d |
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| 0 | 9661500＇0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6LヤSSL｀8 |  |
| 0 | 8LEt000\％ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | くヤレ169 8 | Yq $\perp$ e！sauopul deakpoos 1 d |
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| 0 | L99ち000＇0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | Sヤくヤで6 | Yqı Spedolo ens $\forall$ คd |
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| 0 | ع600000\％ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | とわてLE1「8 |  |
| 0 | $6088000^{\circ}$ | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 829L28．L |  |
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| 0 | £9LZ000＇0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | $\downarrow$ | 9LSELE8 | Yqı enuaqupul fseldy |
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| $\angle 81000$ | 30000 | LLL00＇0－ | 0 | t0：${ }^{\text {S } 89000}$ | 967000 | カでSガて | 8610000 | ZSIZOOO | Y9 1 E！sauopul｜lemuey Id |
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| EOLOSL0000 | 9180Z100000－ | 19ZZ000 | 000＇000＇SL8＇ャ6 | LEOOS0000 |  |
| 1عZLь90000 | LLZZLZOOO＇0－ | Z0ZS000 | 000＇000＇009＇乙と | L0－ヨ9ャ8を6．1 | Yal sounsnpuliseldels $\forall 10$ |
| 1－158 | ISV | 15 | L－7／N | $10 \pm 0$ | sumf buuntoe！nuew |


| S0－3696レでL | S0－ヨレレて86 | S89000＇0 | 000＇000＇009＇988＇${ }^{\prime}$ | S0－396L0 6 | Yqı e！səuopul dəлə｜！uก 1 d |
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| 6ヶ¢で9000＊0 | と\＆Zて09000＇0－ | 996500＇0 | 000＇000＇02s＇88 | £S6ャ68000＇0 | Yqı miey exn！snw Id |
| ๑ESSEZ000＊0 | عเSZEZ000＇0 | EZLZOO＇0 | 000＇000＇000＇ャع | St09820000 | Yqı E！szuopul mopuew 1 d |
| S0－ヨ8Lも8E\％ | S0－ヨ8レヤく8．8 | カヤレレ00＇0 | 000＇000＇09Z＇998＇1 | 90－3cssel＇t |  |
| 12S0620000 | ¢9L0920000 | 8LOち00＇0 | 000＇000＇008＇8Z | SL8ZOE000＊ | Yqı E！sauopul प6nold 6uloups 1 d |
| S0－ヨ68ャレでと－ | S0－ヨ8 29 E8 | 1610000 |  | 80－ヨら966でて |  |
| S0－ヨE680t ${ }^{\text {－}}$ | 91998E0000 | £てE1000 |  | ヤヤ8L8て000＊0 | Yaı YכJew Id |
| 90－399120 ¢－ | くヶ981E00000 | 8921000 | 000＇000＇067＇ $220^{\prime} 1$ | LZ90E000＇0 |  |
| を什し9ヶ00000 | てヤ669100000－ | L89200＇0 | 000＇000＇02L＇91L＇ | 6SLちSt000\％ | Yqı emsed 2 qiey 1 dd |
| LZLEか10000 | L6S19000＇0－ | SLSLOOO | 000＇000＇009＇ LGZ | Z69E920000 |  |
| 9く8ちヤ800000 | LIEZSE0000 | SعEE00＇0 | 000＇000＇01て＇$\angle 9 \varepsilon$ | 81L6Sち0000 | yqı selujejeqe7 soxued Id |
| 68988620000 | 65962000＇0－ | LSE6100 | 000＇000＇902＇01 | ELZ910200＊0 |  |
| S0－ヨレStLで1 | S0－ヨZ9LLE6 | S18000 | 009 ${ }^{\text {¢ }}$ ¢ $20{ }^{\prime} \downarrow 69^{\prime} 0$ L | 90－ヨ | Yaı eyesnd unbueg euepıad Id |
| Z68815000＊0－ | S18S0S1000－ | 1899100 |  | L0－3E81EL゙し－ | Yq．Kuedwoう wilf 아으d wepow Id |
| 6てもヤく8000＊－ | S0－ヨE6SZ6－－ | 6LSか100 | 000＇000＇80か＇$\angle \downarrow$ | て£Sち91000 | Yqı SAOpe」 $\perp$ peltun 1 d |
| 8SL9EZ00000 |  | Z62900 0 |  | S9SELヤ000＊＊－ | Yqı ueaply seun $\perp 1 d$ |
| S0－3SE0tril | S0－396828 | 8890000 | 000＇000＇000＇ャレ | S0－ЭャZSOS＇1 |  |
| ع09101000\％ | S0－3ャ6680 6 | E69100＇0 | 000＇ZS6＇EL9＇9LE | 9ヶL $\dagger$ S1000＊ | Yqı ewndwas lewejes $\perp$ d |
| L8890L000＇0 | 600ヤレLL00 | L161200 | 000＇000＇098＇ LL | SESOSIL000 | Yq，ləəıS Kollv emild $\perp$ d |
| 881 20$\rangle 1000$ | S0－ヨGL898 ${ }^{\text {－}}$ | 9192000 | 000＇000＇000＇91 | 9088LEL00\％ | Yqı ssajd！ N Id |
| 6800LZ000＇0－ | 8118St00000－ | か9ZZ000 | 000＇000＇0SL＇Zし | L0－3989 ${ }^{\text {c }}$－ | Yqı ejelelos eulld ！inW 1 d |
| 61．6て1．000－ | 950990000－ | 662ILOO | 000＇000＇09ぐしゅ | S0－ヨらとなって |  |
| 816L88000\％ | 9501000＇0 | 6988000 | 000＇000＇S L $^{\prime} \downarrow \downarrow$ | Z8S8EZ0000 |  |
| L－15V | 158 | 15 | L－\AN | $10 \pm 3$ |  |


| 2 70000 | 0 | ZLLEZLLLI＇0 | L8500\％ | 92680ヶ＇ | 109100\％ | ELS 1000 | Z0ZELE000＇0 |  |
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| ع900000 | 0 | －L8688tS「＇0－ | $16+000$ | t019s8＇ | ع0ZOOO 0 | 992000 0 | ヤSちS100000 | נnuxew opunul ekins Id |
| ๑L000\％ | 0 | 9してをEOLく100 | 165000 | 9S68てZ＇1 | 9621000 | 9 21500 | ع\＆L6L9000＇0 | d |
| 50000 | 0 | 8LLでら9ャで0－ | 167000 | 1E1レく9＇Z | 9ZOZOO 0 | 982Z00\％ | ャてt91E00000 | Yqı eyej6mn esenes id |
| 89100＇0 | 0 | Z8t98099で0－ | 9 28000 | S8ZOZで0 | ELOち00＇0 | 97¢8000 |  |  |
| จ11000－ | 0 | 66巾LS8EL000 | $t+6000$ | い6してでて | SE6ャ100 | ELOSLOO | 6L6196Z00＇0 | Yqı opu！teqolv espnd Kxply Id |
| て 70000 | 0 | カレS9EとLヤ000 | $88500 \%$ | 91て666＊ | 99ヤ1000 | 89ヵ1000 | 88£ヶ0Z000＊0 | Yqı $\times 21$ sjarposg ued Id |
| 820000 | 0 | てとってL065000－ | ¢St000 | 61て69ャ＇ | EOZZOO－0 | Zと£Z000 | 9158LZ0000 |  |
| 21000－ | 0 | 6L16ヤち8000 | 七\＆ 2000 | t920く10 | 812600＇0 | \＆ャ06000 | †660ع8000＇0 | Yqı sэṇəuks emejopul $1 d$ |
| － $900000^{\circ}$ | 0 | 810ZEZLZO＊ | 185000 | ヤレ9ヤてで0 | 8601000 | L20100＇0 | S0－36しったL゙6 | Yq\＆emein ！ 1 snpul uosueh 1 d |
| 9000\％ | 0 | G16LSt10＊0 | $6 t+000$ | Z60ZLE＇0 | 切1000 | LSt1000 | 6281990000 |  |
| Z C 900000 | 0 | L16LZEL910－ | 88t000 | く18してぐ0 | 8ヤレレ000 | L61L000 | S0－ヨع1800＇Z |  |
| G9000＇0 | 0 | LS6Lヤ9tヤ00－ | Z6t000 | Lャ6 ${ }^{\text {cto }}$ | \＆ャ9000\％ | Lt9000 0 | S0－39E191＊ |  |
| －1900\％${ }^{-}$ | 0 | LOLELてもた0＇0－ | $\pm 60000$ | と91しで0 | 6ヤOEO＇0 | LLLOEOO | と6008200＇0 |  |
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| $680000^{\circ} 0$ | 0 | カャレL8681．0 | ع8t000 | と66ヶ69＇Z | SLLLOOO | 991．000 | ¢0－360¢96．6 | Yal mejeg 6uepno Id |
| 6 2900000 | 0 | 8909980L0 0 | 81500\％ | LLSLてE＇ | 9bt0000 | 1670000 | 6LL18E000＇0 | Yqı E！souopul $1 \forall 8 \perp$ dd |
| E9000＇0 | 0 | SZLZSELOO＇0 | 98t000 | S69 $261{ }^{\text {c }}$ | てZと000\％ | L82000 0 | S0－ヨ96ZLE．9 |  |
| 乙ヶ000 ${ }^{\text {90－}}$ | 0 | L008EStS10－ | L9500＇0 | 6ZL8Z10 | 6089000 | Z8E9000 | ELZ61L0000 | Ya 1 yepul eqns 1 d |
| 90000－ | 0 | －1L0861600－ | ヤでャ00．0 | カてLSE6． | S8900＇0 | E82L000 | 6t9 2810000 | Yqı $20 n \mathrm{nodd}$ pejels 1 dd |
| $98000 \cdot 0$ | 0 | 8ع60829900 | 195000 | 189ャ9で | 9891000 | 9891000 | 89692Z000＇0 |  |
| 290000 | 0 | 898ZZ8SEZ＇0 | Z05000 | 888ヤでて | 6820000 | G08000\％ | －29001000 0 | Yqı epesnh ！les $1 d$ |
| 1－1L000 | 0 | 9098199000－ | ع65000 | しもをしヤじカ | LLS000＇0 | 8150000 | 288908000＇0 |  |
| L 20000 | 0 | 6Sts $6681^{\circ} 0$ | 666000 | S98Lヤ0＇Z | E0S000＇0 | LOS000\％ | £98L82000\％ | Yqı E！sauopul 6uejulg ！min Id |
| 810000 | 0 | L6E80SE90＇0 | ヤLS000 | L96168\％ | Z882000 | ع9LZ000 | 16LILS00000 | Ya 1 पepul eıokew 1 d |
| LZOOOO | 0 | L6S899680＇0 | $\angle \pm 000$ | SLELES＇ | L8ZZ00＇0 | 18\＆Z000 | 98ع9をャ000\％ | Yqı נnuyew sesyns poojopul 1 d |
| とZLOO＇0 | 0 | とLL9St8t100 | $6 \angle 5000$ | 80ZLE6 C | 86L0000 | 96L0000 | ع09080100\％ | E！seuopul $\mathrm{pOO}_{-1} 1 \mathrm{Se}_{\mathrm{J}}$ Id |
| ¢6 $2000^{\circ} 0$ | 0 | 8ヶ966とZOL＇0 | 208100－ | 9809000 | L6SLILO | 6001レ0 | LE8t162900 | Yqı eprexta elpa 1 d |
| 82100＊ | 0 | S091L291．0 | LEヤ000 | 88とてで0 | Z169000 | 9199000 | S0－ヨE08しゃ | Yqı ！peq $\forall$ semoneg 1 d |
| S10000 | 0 | E9LL9S0100 | 6Lt00＇0 | 896 $0 \chi^{\circ} 0$ | E8SZ00\％ | $\downarrow$－${ }^{\text {coo }} 0$ | 696LS1000\％ |  |
| SL000＇0 | 0 | LLZEZ8LLIO | Z $2700{ }^{\circ}$ |  | 9961000 | S96100\％ | S0－ヨE6ヤ8LS | Yq＋！dd！ss！ss！ N uәplos enbb 1d |
| SEL00\％ | 0 | 618900 $10^{\circ} 0$ | LSt00 0 | 6してヤと9＊0 | †S6100\％ | $\pm 61000$ | SL888ヤ100 0 |  |
| dxas！pq ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | 7SnS | 7 2mosul lon | Ofoq＊ | 1－7 81W | $7{ }^{\text {POJd }}$ dV | 7 \＄900］ | 7 dx ！ 0 － | sunty 6ulnłoennuew |


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| $87000{ }^{-}$ | 0 | 6LStS9990\％ | t9b00＇0 | してとヤく80 | 669 2000 | 92＜1000 | C2F090000 | Yq $\perp$ leuonewełul sesyns liqomopul 1 d |
| 200000 | 0 | LOLSOLZ 50 | 29b00 0 | てZ6Z ${ }^{\text {LCO }} 0$ | 66926000 | 9C2L000 | 8ع268ヤ1000 |  |
| 25000＇0－ | 0 | 9LLE000 200 | SSt00＇0 | t99E9E6 | 812900＊0 | 2999000 | CヶGlて 680000 | Yqı E！sauopul jeakpoos 1d |
| S1000＇0－ | 0 | 6189095000 | ع8เ00＇0 | ヤ626ヶt90 | LL6ち00\％ | L999000 | 9876880000 | Yqı 1e66un $\perp$ पere⿹ 1 d |
| 880000 | 0 | 2982692LI0 | Z2t00＇0 | 乙ع£S00＇1 | 9 g 91000 | 12891000 | Z699ヶ200000 | Yqı E！nnw equesg Id |
| 810000 | 0 | ヤ8tS¢8891＊0 | 99t00\％ | Lع6L9Z＇Z | 82000 | 1062000 | 86997CO000 | Yqı spuedolo ełs $\forall \perp 1 \mathrm{~d}$ |
| $9000{ }^{\circ}$ | 0 | 128L91LOLO | 26ヶ00\％ | カャ9ででと | $8 \varepsilon$ 8000＇0 | LZE000＇0 | 89－380190 $\varepsilon$ |  |
| $18000{ }^{\circ} 0$ | $\downarrow$ | 98E998000 | 10900\％ | Z886010 | と8เレ00\％ | LSLLOOO | 6890－3801900 \＆ |  |
| 9t900 ${ }^{-}$ | 0 | 96L286EL0 0 | 96100\％${ }^{-}$ | てtG1くEO | 6LE820 0 | 81－2620 0 | とヤS8てヤ010000 | Yqı |
| 90000 | 0 |  | $68+00{ }^{\circ}$ | 9ちてら6t＊ | GLLLOOO | ¢821000 | とく1ヶて5000\％ | Yqı ueuemes e！nW e6equel 1 d |
| LャE00＇0－ | 0 | LOLZてZ9ャ0．0 | 992000 | Lレセ69が0 | 109 100 | 289 2100 | L2998600000 | Yqı syom letaw uoil 1 d |
| 80200＇0－ | 0 | と6Lヤ9をち600 | 88ع00\％ | てz9L80 | SLILIOO | ع86010\％ | ¢09986000 | Y9 1 emul |
| 9100＇0－ | 0 | L699S0ZE10－ | 827000 | しゅ6てとで0 | S6LZ100 | SZZと100 | と2008ヤ1000 | YqL leols yed eker id |
| LS0000 | 0 | 80160s120 0 | L 2000 | 6LZ681＇ | 9880000 | 6S8000\％ | ¢20－39s9cto 6 |  |
| SS000＇0 | 1 | L186902000 | $\angle 85000$ | Et 2699 － | 8090000 | 6ع9000\％ | S0－3c815t | Yq\＆opulqn $\perp$ en！$\bigcirc \perp d$ |
| $\angle 68000^{-}$ | 0 | 88\＆8LZLE0＇0－ | $\angle 15000$ | L9LZ810 | 2960ZO 0 | ¢ع60Z0＇0 | 90969Z10000 | Yqı |
| 890000 | 0 | ZSOャOZャSOO | 5000 | てらち0カャワ | 80L000＇0 | ç2000 0 | ¢S0200000 |  |
| S8000\％ | 0 | LIZLSCZO 0 | 28500＇0 | 98LLEZ | 9z81000 | －18100\％ |  | Y91（osasiad）y！sang uamas id |
| 9ヶ000\％ | 0 | てLもカ098900 | t25000 | 9ヵ0ヶ¢0\％ | ¢ヤOL00\％ | LLLL000 | 6EOtEZ00000 |  |
| 92000\％ | 0 | LLOS991LIO | S00\％ | 6298060 | 8LLL000 | ヤ891000 | S989SL000－0 |  |
| $8 \vdash 0000$ | 0 | 928826800＇0 | S $\angle 7000$ | LZSLZ゙ | 868000\％ | 6L8000\％ | 90－3ヶ8961．9 | Yq\＆esozues seup Id |
| 10000 | 0 | 60LZ969980－ | 615000 | 8ヤL68で0 | SSOE00＇0 | 6862000 | てع90ヶ000＊0 |  |
| $80000^{\circ} 0^{-}$ | 0 |  | EtS00\％ | L09892\％ | L66200＇0 | †6£ 000 | を£๕て61000＊0 | Yqı Jnuyew ！uem！S Id |
| 890000 | 0 | LTS691LOO | 8ャ00．0 | SゅE80ャワ | 18ヤ0000 | ヤعヤ000\％ | ¢0－ヨ゙らてかて8て | d）$\times 9 \downarrow 1$ ejodjoj e！s $\forall$ uled Id |
| ع100＇0－ | 0 | ع986196 ${ }^{\circ} 0^{-}$ | 298000 | 686しが0 | Z6E\＆100 | G9EEL00 | 616LLIZ0000 |  |
| $600000^{-}$ | 0 | L9696LL90＇0 | $\checkmark 66000$ | t9t910． | 826Z000 | ヤOZと000 | と0LL1E000\％ | Y $\perp \perp \mathrm{pl}_{7} 7 \mathrm{~K}$ |
| 990000 | 0 | 8016S 28100 | 96500\％ | ¢68990 | S0－3t6．9 | ¢0－ $3699^{\circ} \mathrm{L}$ | 90－Э6Z6を8 $\frac{1}{}$ |  |
| $85000{ }^{\circ}$ | 0 | St6てらSャレ00－ | 60500\％ | 9¢カワワくで0 | ZOLL000 | ¢60100\％ | 90Z61L00000 | Yq＿opulseld ekiey uepul |
| عと0000 | 0 | とLヵSL6EOLO | 8 2 －00 0 | 19909で1 | $\angle \square \angle L 0000$ | L 291000 | St899Z00000 | Yqı ！insnpul esnn opu！lodene $\rfloor$ Id |
| $18000{ }^{\circ}$ | 0 | L6L96LIEOO | 91500\％ | LScE890 | Lt9100\％ | 七891000 | 12868200000 | Y $1+1$ seldeuko 1 d |
| 9ヶ000＇0－ | 1 | ャ880260000 | \＆ャ000 | $98660{ }^{\circ} 0$ | 989ャ000 | LStt00\％ | 6915ちZ0000 |  |
| dxəs！pq ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | ＋SnS | 7 OMOSUI 7 ON | O¢フロ | l－7 81w | $7{ }^{\text {POJdV }}$ | 7 SЭOご | 6915てZ0000 | Yq $\perp$ selnsnpul $\ddagger$ se｜de！s $\forall \perp d$ |


| $\angle 000 \cdot 0$ | 0 | 12096と6しが0 | E6ヶ000 | L8199＇EL | 1620000 | 1820000 | ZZLLLL0000 |  |
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| 82L00＇0 | 0 | て8tヤレEくE000 | $69+000$ | LOZSLLO | S6を2000 | 999200\％ | 66Ez892000 |  |
| ع9000＇0 | 0 | 9960ちLELLO | $8 \angle 5000$ | とて080で | 979100＇0 | LS91000 | L10189000＊ | Yal mey explisnw Id |
| $69000{ }^{\circ}$ | 0 |  | 9 $2+000$ | SLEELL＇ | ع9000\％ | £290000 | 1609180000 | Yqı e！sauopul mopuew 1 dd |
| 980000 | 0 | 9とZ6ャ068000 | 9700\％ | 90S109 6 | ヤ9¢200＊0 | LZSZ000 | 8988921000 |  |
| عLOOO＇0 | 0 | Sでャ28800 0 | $16 \pm 000$ | 9E\＆Zしく0 | S0－38E＇L | 50－381\％ | 598901000\％ |  |
| ع8000＇0 | 0 | 9で96ちを6で0 | ヶ6ヶ00＇0 | ヤ0ヤレOガて | 6Z5000\％ | LLS0000 | tSSLOS000＇0 | Yq $\perp$ Y |
| 990000 | 0 |  | 67000 | LSOZZLI | 912L000 | 七てL000 | て88Lちヤ0000 |  |
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| 860000 | 0 | ع96L990SLO | 8LS00\％ |  | ZZ5000\％ | 66ヶ0000 | L801－2000＇0 |  |
| $6000{ }^{\circ} \mathrm{O} 100^{\circ} 0$ | 0 | ع096t66810 | ع8t000 | 9LELS8＇ | t091000 | ヵ191000 | ع08901L00＇0 | Yq．soluoteroqe 7 soxuea 1 d |
| 6ヤ10000 | 0 | 686Lくレレで0 | St00 0 | L82L860 | LEELO0＇0 | £Ъ¢800\％ | LOヤレヤ6900\％ | Yqı E！souopul qqunbs sfokw－lolsug Id |
| ع90000 ${ }^{\text {800 }}$ | 0 | 90860ZS100 | $\angle \angle 5000$ | Eャレ69L0 | ع0L000＇0 | † 290000 | 10ヤLL1000\％ | yqı eyesnd un6ueg euepıad 1 d |
| 8000＇0－ | 1 | LS9L9LE00＇0 | LZと000 | SZLLSLO | 90L2100 | こZLZLOO | 8LLヤ892000 |  |
| ZZZOO ${ }^{\text {S }}$ | 0 | 9L68L9LS0＇0 | 955000 | Lt9 ${ }^{\text {cha }}$ | 61．100 | 8ヵてZ100 | としてヤL600000 | Yq $\perp$ SIOpoe」 $\perp$ pepuu 1 d |
| S8000＇0－ | 0 | ZS066862LO | $68 \varepsilon 00{ }^{\circ}$ | してヤヤ660 | LEL900＇0 | てZ90000 | 9とZLLZ00000 | Yq $\perp$ ueaply seun $\perp 1$ dd |
| LS000＇0 | 0 | 869ESEZZ000 | 285000 | ヤOLZS＇$¢$ | ISS000＇0 | ELS0000 | S0－398\＆6Z＇s |  |
| $\frac{\square 000 \%}{}+$ | 0 | しゃS69028000 | ع8t500 | S96Lヤ80 | Z6E1000 | †821000 | LLLOLL0000 | Yqı eundmes łewepes Id |
| S0t00＇0－ | 0 | と8t6 2 ¢680＇0 | 98000 ${ }^{-}$ | LL920LO | ع916100 | Z816100 | عOZE801000 | Yq．loals Kolly emild 1 d |
| $\frac{29000}{}{ }^{-1}$ | 0 | S929692Z00 | Z 25000 | 9028090 | ES09000 | $1+9000$ | S289L90000 | Yq $\perp$ ssadil $\mathrm{N} \perp \mathrm{d}$ |
| EL000 ${ }^{-}$ | 0 | L6セち8Lt000－ | LLヤ00＇0 | S6ャ9 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 1891000 | 8981000 | 8091 290000 |  |
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| dxes！pq＊ | 7 SOS |  | Oj09 | L－l 8ıW | 7 | G8L2000 | 9929760000 | Yqı $\perp$ 6updsopu $\perp$ dd |



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| 0 | LE6E1J0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | LZマZS1Z 6 | 201000 | 91000 |  |
| 0 | 659ヶC000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6082926 | C2L00000 | L1L000 | Yqı ElnW ejuerg 1 d |
| 0 | 11ヶ600000 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | $\downarrow$ | 9081ヶ01 | 2200000－ | 25000 ${ }^{-}$ | Y9 1 suedolo ens $\forall 1 d$ |
| 0 | عs $\dagger 00000$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | ELL00－0－ | ع000 ${ }^{-}$ |  |
| $67000 \cdot 0$ | L68かCOO 0 | $\downarrow$ | 1 | 1 | 1 | Z99988 | 2100＇0－ | － $660000^{-}$ |  |
| 0 | 1．62E100 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 61ESGL＇8 | 21100 | S6100 ${ }^{-}$ |  |
| 0 | LLちEOOCO | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 8tヤを0＇8 | L2100 ${ }^{-}$ | 21L100 |  |
| 0 | S0t88000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ヤてZちら＇L | 6S9000 | S2L00＇0－ |  |
| 0 | 8957i00 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | L | SLZSO1－8 | ع9200 | ELtoo 0 |  |
| 0 | 610ヤ6E0\％ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | － $26 \angle L$－8 | 90ヤ00＇0 | －8100 | Yal leals ued eker 1 d |
| 0 | 950Z000＇0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 9E19288 | $160000^{-}$ | Csp00 0 | Yqı Kıs |
| S0－ヨャ8 t | \＄8t0000＇0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | LLOOOT－L | 86000 ${ }^{-}$ | $1000^{-}$ | Yqı opulan $\perp$ en！$\bigcirc \perp d$ |
| 0 | 1Sを¢800\％ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ELS686．8 | $2 \angle 000$ | 988000 ${ }^{-1}$ | Yq $\perp$ leb6unuew EReluoleg 1 d |
| 0 | 0888000＇0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | l | S01LE86 | －1．000－ | $98800{ }^{\circ}$ |  |
| 0 | 29120000 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | $\downarrow$ | 892L886 | 950000－ | $601000^{-} 0^{-}$ |  |
| 0 | 6S18000\％ | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 1 | £ع85001 | 90100\％${ }^{-}$ | $6 \mathrm{~L} 01000^{-}$ | Yq1 6uoulq！o uamas 1d |
| 0 | S080100\％ | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 1 | 9192816 | $920000^{-}$ | t＞000 ${ }^{-}$ | Yqı esexu2d le66un $\perp$ quameวopul $\perp$ d |
| 0 | 91Lヤ000\％ | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | $\downarrow$ | 8LZSIて8 | 6800000－ | 62000 ${ }^{-}$ | Yqı esozues seun 1 ¢d |
| 0 | とャZ900000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | $\downarrow$ | てLIZ06 | Z800000－ | 62000 ${ }^{\circ}$ |  |
| 0 | 686E100\％ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | てャ6816 | 910000 | 98000 | Yq．Jnuxew ！uem！S Id |
| 0 | 20110000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | SE6Lbs ${ }^{\circ}$ | $901000^{-}$ | $90100{ }^{-}$ | eld 1 d$)$ Yqı enodıoう e！s $\forall$ uled 1 d |
| 0 | LoIZLE00 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 66920L8 | SعE00＇0 | LEEOO 0 | Yqı leuouneujeju opule 11 d |
| 0 | Sl－Lt000＇0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | †089LE8 | 280000－ | ¢1000\％ | Yq． 1 p 77 Knsnpul y |
| 0 | SZS0000\％ | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 9GLGLLL | 21000－ | 910000－ |  |
| 0 | t9Z6000＇0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | $\downarrow$ | StL08E8 | $61000^{\circ}{ }^{-}$ | 901000－ | Yqı opuiseld ehney yepul nul 1 d |
| 0 | 5916000＇0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 98912L 8 | t80000－ | 960000－ |  |
| 0 | こと08000＇0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 1 | して8としが8 | 28000＇0－ | ¢60000－ | Yq $\perp$ 7seldeuKo 1 d |
| 8682000 | SL6EZOO＇0 | $\downarrow$ | 1 | $\downarrow$ | 1 | E8S0St8 | ع000＇0 | － $506000^{-}$ | Y $9 \perp$ P P7 $0 \bigcirc$ eu！ 1 2eg 1 d |
| snsp | 170 | snsıqəp | snsejol | 11890 | $7 \forall 5$ 이 | 1－7 3Z1S | s6039 |  | yqı seunsnpul iselde！s $\forall \perp d$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | posdq ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | sun！－6ulnyoefnuew |


| 0 | L68000000 | 0 | 0 － | 0 | 0 | 6して06ャ6 | 82100 ${ }^{-}$ | 81100\％${ }^{-}$ |  |
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| 0 | LEL8600＇0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | でくt9t－8 | 10200＊${ }^{-}$ | 2ヤ100 ${ }^{-}$ | Yqı mey exils |
| 0 | 10710000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6StLSc゙8 | 1い10000－ | 90100 ${ }^{-}$ | Ya 1 e！seuopu mopuew 1d |
| 0 | 89510000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | S2100\％${ }^{-}$ | ELL00\％ | Yqı 1 msed ues odur 1 Id |
| 0 | S1．18100\％ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6ヶレL8LL | 66000 ${ }^{-}$ | ع8000 ${ }^{-}$ |  |
| 0 | 1LS00000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | SSEt8 2 | L2100 ${ }^{-}$ | ELL00＊0－ |  |
| 0 | 16L1000＇0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9LE9とで8 | 9ヤ100 ${ }^{-}$ | Lヤ100＊＊－ | Yqı YJJOW $1 d$ |
| 0 | LLS90000 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | SZち910 6 | 86000 ${ }^{-}$ | $66000{ }^{-}$ |  |
| 0 | LTLOLOOO | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | L6Eャ0と 6 | SS100\％${ }^{-}$ | $681000^{-}$ | Yqı eunej aqiey id |
| 0 | 02820000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 86060¢ 8 | 891000－ | ๑6000＊0－ |  |
| 0 | 89150000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8910288 | 6b100 ${ }^{-}$ | ع9100\％${ }^{-}$ | Yqı seunjenoqe 7 soxura 1 d |
| 0 | ES998000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 888と21．8 | ESE00 ${ }^{-}$ | $19800{ }^{-}$ | Yqı E！səuopul qqunbs ssakw－107sug Id |
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| L90b0＇0 | 00＜90ヶ0＇0 | 1 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | LOLLOO 6 | LLZOOO | $66 \vdash 000$ | Y9 $\perp$ Kueduoう Mi！ Oloud uepow Id |
| 0 | てZSLLOOO | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | Z8LELL 6 | S8200＇0 | S9800\％ |  |
| 0 | ع®85000＇0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 8185ヶ0 6 | 811000 | ヤ1．000 | Yq $\perp$ ueaply seun $\perp \perp 1 \mathrm{~d}$ |
| 0 | ع0L1000＇0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | EOSE9LL | S0100 ${ }^{-}$ | $98000{ }^{-}$ | Yqı epesıədewes ！ 6 S 1 ¢d |
| 0 | †9とZ0000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Sع199L8 | 6000＇0－ | 99000 ${ }^{-}$ | Yqı eunduas pewejas 1 d |
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| 0 | 98EGZ0000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ESSLZ0 8 | 160000 | S8000\％ | Yqı ssadd！ N Id |
| 0 | $18 \angle 98000$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 189ャ60＊8 | ع9000\％${ }^{-}$ | $12000{ }^{\circ}$ | Yqı ejele！as euld ！！nW 1 dd |
| 0 | てOヤ08000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Sعャ928．8 | 62100＇0 | 292000 | Yq．equed ojequ｜ 1 d |
| 0 | てったLZ000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | LE80St＇8 | 8S100＇0 | 1L200＇0 | Yal buildsopul 1 d |
| snsp | 170 | snsıqep | snsejol | 11930 | $1 \forall 0$ O | 1－7 ヨZIS | s6009 | posdq ${ }^{\text {b }}$ |  |


| 2100020000 | LS892ヶ000＊0－ | 86196 S 1000 | てLES00＇0 | 000＇000＇009＇sp | LS000 ${ }^{-}$ |  |
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| S0－ヨ986LEE | 969 LZLO00\％ | S0－ヨZELES＇9 | －1ヶ000＇0 | 000＇000＇000＇sZZ |  |  |
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| 99689ヶ0000 | $8888860000^{-}$ | 80291ヤ1000 | 七てS000＇0 | 000＇009＇LSL＇EL | 920000－ |  |
| S9sczz1000 | 2EL098000 ${ }^{-}$ | L9S19ヤ000＇0 | 910200＇0 | 000＇000＇089＇Lع | 921000＇0 | Ya $\perp$ opu！ |
| ¢ヵS0ヶて00000 |  | ELt62000．0 | $180200{ }^{\circ}$ | 000＊000＇0ヶ8＇ LbL | $90-38^{\prime} \square^{-}$ | Yqı $\times 2 \perp$ sfoulogg ued $\perp$ d |
| 608102000＇0 | S0－ヨ8926ヶ9－ | カレとてかて0000 | とてってO00 | 000＇L09＇ZEL＇0ヤて | ¢81000＇0 |  |
| S0－39L8Sち＇8 | 8でてZ990000－ | Z8ZE\＆S $100{ }^{\circ}$ | SZZ1000 |  | 6ゅ9000＇0 | Yqı ssinepuks eweiopul Id |
| LLEち0と000＇0 | 160Z990000 | £88898000＇0 | 699ヶ00＊ | 09ャ＇LLO＇91で8L | $627000 \%$ | Yaı emetn ！nsmpul uosueh Id |
| ¢0－ヨદ¢ヶてでて | 66L16ヶ0000－ | ZZLE8L100＇0 | －82000＇0 | 000＇000＇000＇ャャレ | 1210000 | Yqı E！sauopul |
| とャ6てZ10000 | S0sE91000\％－ | 69E0tヤ000＇0 | 9861000 | 000＇060＇ $106^{\prime}$ LGZ | 6ャ10000 |  |
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| L186Z90000 | ZLSS8Z000＇0－ | S0－ヨ8ヤてZどと－ | ELOLOOO | 000＇000＇009＇৮¢¢ | LLIOOO\％ | Yqı E！səuopul $\perp \forall 8 \perp$ dd |
| S0－ヨZ1609＊L | S0－38\＆と80 | S0－ヨLヤOZ8＇ャ | ELヵ000＇0 | 000＇008＇ZSE＇SS1＇L | S0－380 $\frac{1}{}$ |  |
| 9ヤ8LSS000＇0 | 15000 | ع01LZ000 ${ }^{-}$ | L29900＇0 | 000＇000＇008＇ャ9 | 82000 ${ }^{-}$ | Ya $\perp$ yepul eqnS $\perp d$ |
| てレL896000＇0 | Z6scoeloo ${ }^{-}$ | EゅS 2951000 | 1586000 | 099＇LOE＇LSL＇ヤナ1 | S0－381＇Z | Y $1 \perp$ esnpodd peatels 1 d |
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| Z6ヶ0 L1000＇0 | S0－ヨャ0991＇ャ | S0－3689L | 9590000 |  | 七¢10000 | Yqı epesnH ！les 1 d |
| 8696180000 | S0－ヨSt906．9－ | S0－ヨı8t91．9 | St100＇0 | 000＇000＇เ0ャ＇0レL | 8L1000＇0 |  |
| て8でS 20000 | S0－ヨャLOES＇${ }^{\text {cos }}$ | LZSSSZ000＇0 | LZZ1000 | 000＇000＇sZヤ＇6LS | 6920000 | Yqı e！sauopul 6uetu！g ！in W $\perp$ d |
| LELZLOOO＇0 | カ09198000＇0 | 20ヤしヤ60000 | LELヤ000 | 000＇026＇10¢＇162 | 9980000 | Yqı पepul ejokew Id |
| 80¢Stヤ000＇0 | 6ES6ちZ000＇0 | 90－ヨレレS9を8 | 2818000 | 000＇000＇0ヶ6 ${ }^{\prime} 0$ ¢9＇S | LZE000 0 | Ya $\perp$ Inuxew sas ${ }^{\text {n }}$ S poojopul 1 d |
| 281912100\％ | † ¢661000＇0 | $18 \varepsilon \downarrow$ ¢ 0000 | SlZZ000 | 000＇000＇sZ9＇10t | $\angle \triangleright 20000$ |  |
| 86L8LZLO 0 | S90ESELLOO | 6L9ZLZSE00 | LLZStで0 | 06で981＇レカナ＇ | S81020 0 |  |
| S0－ヨしE969 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 6Lヤ6LZZ00＇0 | 8عヤ $\angle 891000$ | 9ヶ26000 | 088＇レ0カ＇Eと9＇レレレ | 2LIZO00 | Yqı ！peq $\forall$ semosed $\perp$ d |
| ZLO6E1000＇0 | 90LLOLO00＇0 | てعャ81000＇0－ | L6EZ000 | 000＇009＇Z16＇69 | カレヤ000\％ | Yqı Jeqıey ekeyeo 1 d |
| S0－360t0L＇s | Z80ZL10000 | S6ヶ8 $50000^{\circ} 0$ | LOLZ000 |  | 1210000 |  |
| 8LIZL91000 | 8891／8000＇0 | ZعEL8LO00＇0－ | 6LZZOO＇0 | 000＇000＇001＇ss | 8000＇0－ |  |
| $\ddagger$ dxa！av | L－ISV | 758 | 15 | $\underline{-1}$ NW | 10」0 | su！！ 6 6u！inperjnuew |



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| L66769000＇0 | 9ヤてL1000＊－ | S0－J6\＆ELS ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | LELO0\％ | 000＇000＇081＇98 | 815000\％ | Yqı e！seuopul senəl！un 1 d |
| Z90LZS000\％ |  | 6989ヶt 0000 | \＄812000 | 000＇000＇009＇998 | LZ2000＇0 | Yqı ņey exlls $W$ Id |
| Z69LS20000 | S0－ヨレヤヤOで9 | S0－ヨャ6くLE6 | 868000\％ | 000＇000＇000＇${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{SG} 9^{\prime} \mathrm{Z}$ | 9210000 | Yal oilsed uess odmel 1 dd |
| ZS80LS100\％ | SでSヤZ0000 | －S $\downarrow$ LLLO00 $0^{-}$ | 998000 | 000＇000＇009＇0¢ | S0－36．9－ |  |
| عOLLZヤO00＇0 | SZO1LZ100\％ | L189S10000 | ¢6L000＇0 | 000＇00ャ＇908＇で | 9010000 | Yqı ewne」 wepli $K_{\text {d }}$ Id |
| Sl86SE000＇0 | S8EOLZ000＇0 | 206ヶL20000 | 2ヶ01000 | 000＇000＇00ヤ＇898 | 6E2000\％ | Yqı YOJON 1 d |
| ¢OS $\angle t \rightarrow 000^{\circ} 0$ | L 108 CO O－3000 | S0－ヨヤL6と6 | 1991000 | 01て＇000＇0ヶを＇991＇ | S0－ヨャワ9－ |  |
| ¢tS6ヶL0000 |  | S0－39S0st 9 | Zヤ000\％ | 000＇000＇009＇レで＇8 | S0－ヨ®で9 | Yqı eune $\ddagger$ əq｜ey 1 dd |
| LعZ92ヶ00000 | てヤ0¢510000 | S0－39986E8 | ع86000＇0 |  | 821000＊ |  |
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| 91896900000 | 190L28000 0 | S0－ヨॄLLDでく | ヤ\＆6Z00\％ | 000＇000＇0ヶ1＇02 | ¢896\％${ }^{\text {¢－}}$ | Yqı e！sauopul qqunbs ssakW－101s！ug 1 d |
| 1 $1982 \angle 1000$ | 89L9L6000 ${ }^{-}$ | ャ660Zを000 ${ }^{-}$ | Lヵ8600\％ | 009＇ 18 l＇$^{\circ} \mathrm{EL} \mathrm{\prime}$＇991 | L9000＇0 |  |
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| 8¢6Z0Z0000 | S0－36ヤくヤ6．6 | 81عLLZOO0＇0 | ャてレてO00 | 000＇Zとて＇Lヤし＇ヤヤ¢ | とャ1000\％ | Yq．eundmes łemejos Id |
| 680Z0LOOO＇0 | てLS6E95000 | 80ヶ6¢Zっか0 | ャSES100 | 000＇000＇08で¢ | － $20000^{-}$ | Yqı loens Kollv eulld Id |
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| 1 ＋dxə！${ }^{\text {¢ }}$ | L－1SV | ISV | 15 | L－7NW | 10.30 | sunty 6ulumpejnuew |



| $\square 90000$ | 95000＇0 | ES000 ${ }^{-}$ | 0 | SOZOESZO＊－ | S1E00＇0 | EOヤOLEO | LLES000 | 678700＊0 | Yqı sounsmpul fse｜de！s $\forall$ Id |
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| $11000^{-}$ | $96000{ }^{\circ}$ | $67000{ }^{\circ}$ | 0 | StSt016E10 | EOS00\％ | 6689660 | E601000 | 7801000 |  |
| － $20000^{-}$ | $95000{ }^{\circ} 0^{-}$ | $\checkmark$ ¢000＇0 | 1 | 669668ャ000 | Z $\angle \triangleright 00{ }^{\circ}$ | SILSL8 0 | 6ЪLl00 0 | 1．9100\％ | Yqı |
| 901000－ | $880000^{-}$ | 9000\％ | 0 | て68Zャ6900－ | ャ6ヶ00\％ | t¢E6s9 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 698000 0 | t000\％ | Maı Inuxew opulqu ekins id |
| $121000^{-}$ | 90100 ${ }^{-}$ | GLOOO＇0 | 0 | 6ZZZ960S10 | ャ8ヤ00\％ | 6L9b61． | ع981000 | 8981000 | Yqı ejeg nıedas Id |
| 68000 ${ }^{-}$ | $850000^{-}$ | GS000＇0 | 0 | とちを8ャ6レヤ0－ | Z6ヶ00＇0 | S099 29 ¢ | 650000 | 9ャ 10000 | Yqı eyenfonn eseres id |
| 78000 ${ }^{-}$ | 22000＇0－ | 1000 | 0 | 866LEとで0－ | †OS00＇0 | 1LEL8で0 | 10000－ | 690000 |  |
| $20000^{-}$ | 99000\％ | ヶ0000＇0 | 0 | 296ャレSEOLO | ＋00＇0 | 18980 ¢ 1 | tSZS00＇0 | t96t00\％ | xqı opu！eqolo exnd Kx？ |
| 290000－ | $6 \pm 000{ }^{\circ}$ | 980000 | 0 | 9L1 2919200 | 9stoo 0 | t99ヶ66． | \＆28100＇0 | E8LL000 |  |
| 6ヶ000 ${ }^{-}$ | L2000＇0－ | ع20000 | 1 | 61Z980100＇0 | $1 \angle \triangleright 00^{\circ} 0$ | 8tLSI9 | 86ZZ000 | S602000 |  |
| $18000{ }^{-}$ | ع9L10＇0 | \＆+0000 | 0 | Z9ELLL600＇0 | LLLOOO | 6ES6SIO | ع16E100 | 9011000 | Yqı sonjuks eweıopul Id |
| 920000 | 98000\％ | 920000－ | $\downarrow$ | ZZO9LOち00＇0 | 9ャワ000 | ャ91くレで0 | LSSt000 | 1上 | Yaı emein unsnpul uosueh Id |
| $101000^{-}$ | 28000＇0 | 290000 | 0 | ヶ9ZL6ELE＇0－ | LSS00＇0 | 8819160 | 2810000 | S880000 |  |
| $85000{ }^{-}$ | $8 \vdash 000{ }^{-}$ | 820000 | 0 | S08LLSEO ${ }^{-}$ | 69ヶ00＇0 | 99200L0 | ES81000 | 1781000 |  |
| －1100\％${ }^{-}$ | tOLOO＇0－ | L90000 | 0 | 6ヵをてZES610 | Z6ヶ00＇0 | 6Z99E\＆0 | 6690000 | 8890000 | Yqı emzodues ejepuew eke！ueh Id |
| LOLOO ${ }^{-}$ | $9 \vdash 0000^{-}$ | 50000 | 0 | 9ع18ヵてEO10 | ع8ャ000 | 98LS8\＆＇Z | 6SLLOOO | $\square \square L 0000$ | Yqı weses 6uepns id |
| SZ10000－ | $610000^{-}$ | 260000 | 0 | てZ2869200－ | 26ヶ000 | と9く19で | 9581000 | 9850000 | Yqı E！sauopul $1 \forall 9$ Id |
| 815000－ | LOLOO＇0－ | 290000 | 1 | S62986800 0 | 68t00\％ | ててャャてで1 | LZE000\％ | ZZ\＆0000 | Yqı Kuedwos 6upped $\perp$ pue Kısnpul Yi！W eker emin id |
| ع92000 | 9 COOO 0 | ES0000－ | 0 | 60عZ9110－ | ع 8000 | カレて6ャャて | LE6L000 | LLS 2000 | Yq $\perp$ yepu eqns $1 d$ |
| $\bigcirc 2000$ | 292000 | 98000 ${ }^{-}$ | 0 | 208S6Lて10－ | 81800＇0 | 9ヶ00＜0 0 | －1600＇0 | 288000 | Yqı 2 enpodd perels 1 d |
| L9000＇0－ | $\dagger 5000{ }^{\circ}$ | 610000 | 0 | 698ャ 2 S9S00 | 997000 | LSちEEL1 | 9891000 | 98LL000 |  |
| S2100\％${ }^{-}$ | $115000^{-}$ | $29000{ }^{\circ}$ | 0 | ヤ6とเこて910 | 96ヶ00\％ | と8ะ628． | Z88000\％ | £sع000＇0 | Yqı epesnH |
| ES1000－ | $1 \mathrm{ELOO} 0^{-}$ | 1L1000 | 0 | ヤLSOL88100－ | 6ち00＇0 | てLS61E゙ヤ | 1 ¢ 0000 | ELS000＇0 |  |
| ع2100\％${ }^{-}$ | 61500\％${ }^{-}$ | 20000 | 0 | LGZL998L10 | S67000 | ヶ96S「でて | ع1L000＇0 | เ690000 | Yqı e！səuopul buequ！g ！innw Id |
| عと000 ${ }^{-}$ | St000 ${ }^{-}$ | S1000＇0 | 0 | でらでて $990{ }^{\circ} 0$ | S¢ヤ0000 | 819ヤヤ¢＇0 | L9LE00\％ | ¢sce00 0 | Yqı पерul ejokew Id |
| S9000 ${ }^{-}$ | $8 \mathrm{COOO} 0^{-}$ | 820000 | 0 | LSZS69tCo 0 | Z8ヤ0000 | 8レヤ88G＇1 | 8LEZ00\％ | 998Z000 | Yqı Inuxyew sasxns poojopul Id |
| $6 \mathrm{Sl00} 0^{-}$ | 9S100 ${ }^{-}$ | ع100＇0 | 0 | 89St18Lて10 | 18ヤ000 | 6てZしでて | S98000\％ | 628000＇0 | E！souopul pooylsey Id |
| †9900＊＊－ | 6と1200－ | 9ヤ8000 | 0 | ZOZL102600 | 91080\％ | 68tャ000 | EL60E10 | 1802E10 |  |
| 121000 | てZ0000 | $\angle 1000^{-}$ | 0 | 98LZ890150 | $\downarrow$ ¢ $00^{\circ} 0$ | £Z0001＇Z | 9Z9L00＇0 | 七Z9LOO 0 | Yqı！peq＊semose］Id |
| 91000 ${ }^{-}$ | $600000^{-}$ | 810000 | 0 | 6LLLG8L0＇0－ | 80900\％ | 89LS0 ${ }^{\circ} 0$ | ていIZ000 | レレヤZ000 | Yq．Jequey ekeyej id |
| Eع000 ${ }^{-}$ | ＋00000－ | 100000 | 1 | 61LGLL0000 | 8St000 | $\downarrow \square 60000$ | StヤZ000 | EレヤZO0＇0 | Yqı ！dd！ss！ss！ W Uәplo |
| LS000 ${ }^{-}$ | 110000 | 891000 | 0 | しをヤ8とてLL0－ | LSt000 | LOEヤLLE | †68100 0 | †¢6100\％ | Yqı enəosełnd opuly sep $\forall \perp d$ |
| s6039 ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | poddq ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | dxəs！pg | 7SnS | † อwosul fon | OjP9＊ | －l 1 ¢ | 7 poddV | 7 ¢50つ『 | sunty |


| SS000 ${ }^{-}$ | St000 $0^{-}$ | $29000^{\circ}$ | 0 | 6192192000－ |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| S8200＇0 | $8 \angle 8000$ | LLOOO ${ }^{-}$ | 0 | とんL6けE8000 | 8S200＇0 | くヤ8L2レ0 |  | LSEZ000 | Yq＋erejelos ew！d ！inw id |
| Z10000 | －LLLOOO | $81000{ }^{-}$ | 0 | と6Z8102000－ | 858000 | とでくでった | L6ヤC100 | 8G50100 | Yqı equed osenu｜ $1 d$ |
| 0 | EعL00＇0－ | $62000{ }^{-}$ | 0 | Z8S00t9sto | 82ヶ00\％ | LOblsLo | 2¢ 2 ¢ $\dagger 000$ | 1928000 | Yqı leuonewełul sesxns l！qouopul 1 d |
| $t 0000$ | S00000 | ZE000 $0^{-}$ | 0 | ૪860LE9000 | $1+000$ | 80Z9 ${ }^{\text {co }}$ | SOSt000 | ¢ $¢ 8 \downarrow$ ¢ 0000 | Yq 1 esey |
| $91000{ }^{-}$ | $97000{ }^{-}$ | $110000^{-}$ | 0 | EL8LZ6E0＇0 | SSt00 0 | Stoz6e | ESOE00\％ |  | Yq $\perp$ e！sauopul jeakpoos 1 d |
| ع $60000^{-}$ | LE000 ${ }^{-}$ | ع1000＇0 | 0 |  | 69ャ00 0 | LE889s＇0 | Z08Z000 |  | Yq 1 1e66un $\perp$ पe！eo 1 d |
| 29000＇0－ | $690000^{-}$ | 620000 | 0 | L00E10ヤL゙0 | St 600 | 8GLZ680 | ャعLてO0＇0 |  | Yq1 E！pnW Ejuejg Id |
| $82000{ }^{\circ}$ | 68000 ${ }^{-}$ | 98000＇0 | 0 | 8ZZOSZ26100 | $9 \vdash 00^{\circ} 0$ | 16E86ちゃ | 92100＇0 |  | Yqı suedouo ens $\forall$ 1d |
| 12100\％${ }^{-1}$ | 100：0－ | 850000 | 0 | ZOZE0Z8ELO | ¢8ャ00 0 | 6¢9LZ1． | 88ヤ000＇0 |  | Y $9 \perp 1$ leuoneujul enfs $\forall 1 d$ |
| L1500＇0－ | ヤヤ000－0－ | 60000 | 0 | LZ6ELL6E00 | $\angle S 00^{\circ} 0$ | 9ع0セ¢8＊0 | ¢ |  |  |
| ELLLOO | 299000 | ๑EOLO ${ }^{-}$ | 0 | LL8ヤ6900＇0－ | 51900\％${ }^{\circ}$ | S†E6ヤを\％ | 6ャらヶヤ0＇0 |  | Yqı el！uelsn $\forall$ e！！$\perp \perp d$ |
| ＜ $50000^{-}$ | て $\downarrow 000{ }^{-}$ | ع000\％ | 0 | LLLSヤ8100－ | 61t00\％ | 9S9896 ${ }^{\circ}$ | てع6เ00＇0 |  | Yqı ueuemes ejnnw e6equo 1 Id |
| Zと100\％ | ع6000 ${ }^{-}$ | 七S000＇0 | 0 | とtt9szs610 | LSt00\％ | 9009ど0 | ヤて81000 |  | Yq1 opulue |
| $\rightarrow \angle 800^{\circ} 0$ | 981000 | 80800 ${ }^{-}$ | 0 | 9ャ0レヤレレ910 | ssz00\％0 | 69ZZとャ＊ | ES6ヶ100 | 2lerooo | Ya 1 syom letaw uol 1 Id |
| 920000 | S 20000 | \＄8000 ${ }^{-}$ | 0 | 9LL6SbLLT0 | Z6Z000 | てZさSL80 | 9899000 |  | Yq／emild usew uoli Id |
| L89000 | 8500\％ | 七七\＆00 ${ }^{-}$ | 0 | عと\＆ $21 E \angle 00^{\circ}$ | St000 ${ }^{-}$ | L686880 | Z8LIZO |  | Yqı leots le ${ }_{\text {d }}$ eKer 1 d |
| 616000－ | 99000 ${ }^{-}$ | 990000 | 0 | ヤちてL090200 | bてS00．0 | 90Z6をでし | S0－ヨ£6． | 101000\％ | Yq＾Kısnpul un！u！unlv Iepul $\perp$ dd |
| 6L000＇0－ | LLL00\％ | 880000 | 0 | と8ヤOLS6600 | 6St5000 | E189＇1 | として1000 | 261．00\％ |  |
| $9 \mathrm{~b} 00^{\circ} 0$ | 96S00＇0 | Z1E00 ${ }^{-}$ | 0 | 9Z9968SEOO | 102000 | て882レで0 | とてS9100 | SEEs10\％ | Yq $\perp$ leb6unuew ekeluoteg 1 d |
| 898100 | S8E00＇0 | 81800\％${ }^{-}$ | 0 | SLSLLITLOO | ¢Sb00\％${ }^{-}$ | 91L60＇01 | てくもち¢0\％ |  |  |
| L8000＇0－ | 650000 | 160000 | 0 | ヶ95゙888800 | $8 \square 9000$ |  | ع68000 0 | 98000＇0 | Yqı opu！$\ddagger$ snpu｜esexe｜$\forall \perp d$ |
| S6000 ${ }^{-}$ | 18000 ${ }^{-}$ | S9000＇0 | 0 | 891レL69000 | 98ヶ000 | S10891． | EL0000 | 802000＇0 |  |
| L1200＇0－ | ${ }^{\text {t9000 }}{ }^{-}$ | 190000 | 0 | L6E9をャレレ0＇0 | 6L500\％ | EScZL＇ | 9680000 | 96800 | Yq1 6uoulq！U umes 1d |
| SLOOO ${ }^{-}$ | L8000 ${ }^{-}$ | 98000＇0 | 0 |  | $\square \angle \downarrow 000$ | 9とくもで「 | 8عE100\％ |  |  |
| 81000＊－ | †0000 ${ }^{-}$ | 七00000 | 0 | 10LZ6Z6E0＊0 | と¢ヤ00＇0 | 8Lt8L＇G | 6ع£と000 | とをとし000 |  |
| $86000{ }^{\circ}{ }^{-}$ | ZOLOO ${ }^{-}$ | 25000＇0 | 0 | でE6Z00 | S $\angle 7000$ | LOSOS9 6 | 9990000 | 6ع90 | Yqı inuyew ！uem！S Id |
| 812000 | ZSE000 | $9000{ }^{\circ}$ | 0 | L8L621010－ | L®¢00＇0 |  | 2966000 | 90ヶ600\％ | xqı jeuoileuezul opulde 1 Id |
| S000＇0－ | 0 | S1000＇0 | 0 | 602t99601＊0 | St000 | 98L0ヶ9\％ | LZヤて000 | 90ヶ600 | 77 Klisnpul y！seld dnuyew 6ua66ue7 Id |
| $\downarrow 9000{ }^{\circ}{ }^{-}$ | Z20000－ | 8七000＇0 | 0 | 1ع588080 ${ }^{\circ}$ | $\angle \pm 00^{\circ} 0$ | LZS8080 | 90ヶ1000 | SLELOOO |  |
| ع8000 ${ }^{-}$ | 28000 ${ }^{-}$ | $68000{ }^{\circ}$ | 0 | 18てレレレ2900 | $6700 \%$ | จ $2980^{\circ}$－ | 18ヤ1000 | SLEL000 |  |
| $8000{ }^{\circ}{ }^{-}$ | $180000^{-}$ | ع000\％ | 0 | 829¢91090＇0 | LLt000 | 91ZOZLO | S18100\％ | 88L2000 | Y 91 7seldeuka 1 d |
| s603q ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | posdq＊ | dxas！pq $\forall$ | 7 Sns | 7 อسosul 1 N | O¢aq＊ | レ－ł 81W | 7 PoddV | $\frac{882000}{7-5007}$ |  |





| 0 | 66192700 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | S16060＇8 | Yqı ejere！es emud ！inw 1 d |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 900てZ000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 696818＇8 | Yqı Equed ojenul Id |
| 0 | $8 \vdash 08000{ }^{\circ}$ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6988ャワ6 |  |
| 0 | $10 \angle 8100^{\circ} 0$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | E6L99L8 |  |
| 0 | LヵL $20000^{\circ}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | LLSE65＇8 | Yq1 e！sauopul Jeakpooo 1 d |
| 0 | $8 \vdash t+000^{\circ}$ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | L৮¢8001 |  |
| 0 | 2L92000 0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 6ヤ881．6 |  |
| 0 | 06150000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 89916で6 | Yqı syedoło ens $\forall$ Id |
| 0 | 89890000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 28LEが01 | Yqı leuoupeutuu ens $\forall 1 d$ |
| 0 | －LS00000 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | \＄86691．8 |  |
| 0 | LS69000＇0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | と0ごちらか8 |  |
| 0 | EL692000 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | かて69ャL゙8 | Yq，ueuemes e！nnw ebequel 1 dd |
| 0 | †8L91000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | LOZてレが8 |  |
| 0 | 0¢Zヤ0000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | レもヤ180゙8 |  |
| 0 | LZLSE00＇0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | LSSEES＇L | Yqı eumd ysaw uoli id |
| 0 | SヤE81000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 688911．8 |  |
| 0 | †てZL900＇0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8ャ600s 8 |  |
| 0 | LLEL000＇0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ELSSZ88 | Yq $\perp$ opulan $\perp$ en！ 1 Id |
| 0 | 99ヤ10000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | で¢0＜${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{L}$ | Yqı IEб6unuew eke！ |
| 0 | 86009000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | SEsE00 6 | Yq．Kısnpul Ietaw $246!7$ Opulumply id |
| 0 | 0てtoc00\％ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | SゅC0E8 ${ }^{\circ}$ | Yq＋opulizsinpul eseyel $\forall 1 d$ |
| 0 | S6980000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Z8てZ8．6 |  |
| 0 | 6ELLO00\％ | 0 | 0 | 1 | $\downarrow$ | 8Z9E88． 6 | Yqı 6uoulq！ |
| 0 | OtヤL000\％ | 0 | 0 | 1 | $\downarrow$ | S2900 Ot |  |
| 0 | 8LLE000＇0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | S89てLZ 8 | Y91 enueqəıul |
| 0 | 8 B ¢ 0000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6LOLZLL |  |
| 0 | 8LELOOOO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\checkmark$ 206S 2 | Yqı |
| 0 | 8ャカ9てZ0＊0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ャ800028 |  |
| 0 | 9098000＇0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 198ELE8 |  |
| 0 | 8891L00 | 0 | 0 | 1 | $\downarrow$ | SLS9SS 8 | Yqı！！nsnpul esnn opulodente $\frac{1 d}{}$ |
| 0 | て¢LLO00＇0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | $\downarrow$ | 9¢ 2 ¢888 |  |
| 0 | ZS95000＇0 | 0 | 0 | $\downarrow$ | 0 | 68LSで8 |  |
| snsjo | 170 | snsıqəp | snseool | 11830 | $7 \forall 0$ O｜ | $1-7$ ZZIS | sun！y buinnjejnuew |


ャ00Z леәд suגy Guиn!oejnuew

| S0－3601Lで6－ | Lも8ャLZ000＊0 | LZSZ00＇0 | 000＇000＇ $269^{\prime} \angle 8$ | 9عZ6S90000 |  | Yqı E！səuopul qq！nbs sıəKW－107s！ 1 dd |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| L609s10000－ | 1E9ヤレて0000 | 6861000 | 000＇000＇000＇9Lt | LSELLL0000 |  |  |
| S0－38926ヶ9－ | ヤレとてヤて00000 | とてってO00 | 09t＇LLO＇91で8L | LZLE810000 |  | Yq\＆e！səuopul｜lәmey 1d |
| 160Z99000＇0 | ع88898000＇0 | 699ャ000 | 09がLLO＇91て＇8L | しعと6てヤ0000 |  |  |
| S0－ヨ8をと80＇L | S0－ヨLヤ028 $\downarrow$ | ELb000\％ | 000＇008＇Z9E＇GG1． | 90－ЭZ\＆080\％ | Yqı Kued |  |
| Z802110000 | 9678L90000 | LOLZOOO | 009＇LEL＇${ }^{\prime} 6 \mathrm{~S}^{\prime}$＇ 6 ¢ | ととヤレLLOO0＇0 |  | yq1 ！dd！ss！ss！W ueplos enb $\forall 1 d$ |
| Z68819000＇0－ | S18909100 ${ }^{-}$ | 1899100 | 009＇608＇レヤO＇801 | LO－ヨE8LEL゙レ－ |  | Yqı Kuedwo m min oloud uxepow id |
| 982109000 ${ }^{-}$ | S6L189100＇0 | 9002000 | 000＇000＇000＇で， | 68898000＇0 |  |  |
| S0－ヨع966 ${ }^{\circ}$ |  | $\angle 890000$ | 000＇000＇000＇LZ | 60－ヨレヤLOヤ＊ |  | Yqı ⿺辶б6unuew ekeluoleg 1 d |
| LEZLャ9000＇0 | LLZZLZ000＊＊ | Z0Z9000 | 000＇000＇009＇Zと | L0－ヨ9ャ8を6．1 |  |  |
| LE80690000 | S0－ヨャレヤレでで | 8LZレ000 | 000＇00ヤ＇066＇6ャレ | レレELヤ10000 |  | Yad eseydadener eueueM Id |
| 90－ヨLOGLZ ${ }^{-}$ | ャSELLOOO ${ }^{-}$ | 8ャ9000＇0 | 00ヤ＇064＇998＇ャャ9 | 90－ヨ992LL6 |  |  |
| とをZGZ60000 | 6189190000－ | 29LL000 | 000＇000＇09ヤ＇9 | GL8919000 0 |  | yqı exesnd un6ueg euepıed 1 d |
| ZEZSL60000 | LL69EZ000＇0 | 七928000 | 000＇000＇029＇0Z | L6L96EZ000 |  | Y $1+1$ loels Kollv eulld 1 d |
| 890292000＊＊－ | 962Lて9100＇0 | 29Lb00 0 | 000＇80t＇089＇6LL | 9†ع¢99000＇0 |  | Yqı e！souopul 6ueju！g ！InW $\perp$ d |
| 1－7SV | ISV | 15 | $1-7 / N W$ | 10 J |  | sux！$\ddagger$ 6uluntoe， |


Syヲヨ入 wપyly $10 \exists d S \cap s$

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 6698Lで8 | 691000－ | S100\％${ }^{-}$ | $\angle$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | ヤ902EL 6 | － $20000^{-}$ | 9ヶ000 ${ }^{-}$ | －22000 | $\underline{209000}$ | Yqı elsauopul qq！nbs sjokW－10，sula $\perp$ d |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 19LG198 | 6ヶ000 ${ }^{-}$ | L1000＇0－ | を¢0000 | CLD00 0 | $49 \perp$ Kısnpul emidd ekiey eubl $\forall 1 \mathrm{~d}$ |
| $\downarrow$ | 0 | 1 | 6SカレE88 | 92000 0 | 980000 | 22000 ${ }^{\text {¢ }}$ | $\underline{9 \vdash \vdash 000}$ |  |
| b | 1 | 1 | 8ヵ¢6ヤ0．6 | 81100 ${ }^{-1}$ | LOLOO＇0－ | 290000 | 68ヤ000 |  |
| b | 0 | $\downarrow$ | SL8LLLL | عと000 ${ }^{-}$ | ヤ000＊－ | $10000 \cdot 0$ | 885000 |  |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | LOLLOO 6 | LLZOO＇0 | 66ヶ00＇0 | 8000 ${ }^{-1}$ | L28000 | Yq\ ！dd！ss！ss！W ueplos enb $\forall \perp d$ |
| $\downarrow$ | $\downarrow$ | 1 | 29998.8 | 21000 ${ }^{-}$ | 96100 ${ }^{-}$ | 180000 | 109000 | Yq\＆Kuedwo mily oloud urepow 1 d |
| $\downarrow$ | 0 | $\downarrow$ | L2000t 2 | $86000^{\circ}{ }^{-}$ | $18000{ }^{\circ}{ }^{-}$ | 950000 | $\angle 8 \vdash 000$ | Yqı $\operatorname{\text {2l！uetsn}\forall \text {e}!+\perp \perp d}$ |
| $\downarrow$ | 1 | $\downarrow$ | E8S0St＇8 | 10000 | 101000 | 97000＊＊－ | \＆ 5000 | yqı é6бunuew ekeluofeg $\perp$ d |
| 1 | 1 | $\downarrow$ | ع88992＇6 | 97000 ${ }^{-}$ | S8000＊0－ | ヤち000＇0 | Z6ヤ00 0 |  |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | レレ6698＊ | $86000{ }^{\circ}$ | EL000＇0－ | tG000 0 | 900 | Yqı eseyded eker eueue $M 1 d$ |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 8ع9E28 ${ }^{\circ}$ | $10000^{\circ}{ }^{-}$ | L000\％ | 8ع000＇0 | ESt00 0 |  |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | LZ9989 8 | 860000 | E100\％ | 80100＇0－ | †0900＇0 | 隹 |
| 1 | $\downarrow$ | L | 960LE9 8 | 92100 ${ }^{-}$ | 681000－ | 180000 | Sbt0000 | Yqı［əols Kolly emud 1 d |
| snsejol | 71830 | $7 \forall O$ 이 | 1－7 ヨZIS | s603q ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | posdq＊ | dxes！pq ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | Ojoq४ |  |


| LS9000＇0 | 9999000＇0 | 0 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $9 \mathrm{Sc} 000{ }^{\circ}$ | 9SZS000＇0 | 1 | Yqı Knsnpul emud e\sex eubiv Id |
| L181000 | 99181000 | 0 |  |
| $818800{ }^{\circ}$ | 9818800．0 | 0 |  |
| S0－39L2 | 9LLO000＇0 | 1 |  |
| $\square \angle 1000{ }^{\circ}$ | 1ヵLL0000 | 0 |  |
| $\angle 90700^{\circ}$ | 00290t0＇0 | $\downarrow$ | Yqı Kuedmos wily |
| 670000 | L687000＇0 | 1 | Yqı Ә！ |
| ¢0－ヨャ8 $\downarrow$ | －870000＇0 | 0 | Yqı le66unuew eke！ |
| $868200{ }^{\circ}$ | 9L6E200＇0 | 1 |  |
| $8 \angle 6000{ }^{\circ}$ | LLL6000＇0 | 1 | Yqı eseyad eरer eueye $M$ Id |
| ELE000＇0 | 9ZLE0000 | 1 | Y $¢ \perp$ Kı |
| $\angle Z 900^{\circ}$ | EOLZS00\％ | 0 | Ya $\perp$ exesnd unбurg euepıod Id |
| 6199100 | L6Ls9100 | 1 |  |
| Zg 21000 | －29 21000 | $\downarrow$ |  |
| snsp | 170 | snstqap | Sulutreinuew |

## Appendix 6

Output Regressions of Test Equation 3.5

## Regression abnormal CFO

## Descriptive Statistics

|  | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| abcfo | , 0000003 | , 07834183 | 319 |
| size | 8,7182568 | , 67311895 | 319 |
| mtb | 2,8226499 | 11,60521227 | 319 |
| ni | , 0556797 | , 12752350 | 319 |
| sus | , 05 | , 212 | 319 |

## Correlations

|  |  | abcfo | size | mtb | ni | sus |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pearson Correlation |  | 1,000 | ,079 | , 010 | , 045 | ,013 |
|  | size | ,079 | 1,000 | , 050 | , 147 | ,037 |
|  | mtb | , 010 | , 050 | 1,000 | . 029 | -,034 |
|  | ni | . 045 | , 147 | , 029 | 1,000 | -,093 |
|  | sus | . 013 | . 037 | -,034 | -,093 | 1,000 |
| Sig. (1-tailed) | abcfo |  | ,079 | , 430 | , 210 | , 406 |
|  | size | , 079 |  | , 184 | -,004 | , 252 |
|  | mtb | , 430 | , 184 |  | , 301 | ,272 |
|  | ni | ,210 | ,004 | , 301 |  | ,048 |
|  | sus | , 406 | , 252 | ,272 | . 048 |  |
| N | abcfo | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | size | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | mtb | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | ni | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | sus | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |

Variables Entered/Removed

| Model | Variables <br> Entered | Variables <br> Removed | Method |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | sus, mtt, <br> size, ni |  | Enter |

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: abcfo

## Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | , $087^{a}$ | , 008 | ,- 005 | , 07853686 | 2,007 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), sus, mtb, size, ni
b. Dependent Variable: abcfo

ANOVA ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model |  | Sum of <br> Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | Regression | , 015 | 4 | , 004 | , 606 | , $659^{\mathrm{a}}$ |
|  | Residual | 1,937 | 314 | , 006 |  |  |
|  | Total | 1,952 | 318 |  |  |  |

a. Predictors: (Constant), sus, mtb, size, ni
b. Dependent Variable: abcfo

## Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$


a. Dependent Variable: abcfo

## Collinearity Diagnostics

| Model | Dimension | Eigenvalue | Condition Index | Variance Proportions |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | (Constant) | size | mtb | ni | sus |
| 1 | 1 | 2,408 | 1,000 | - ,00 | ,00 | ,02 | , 05 | ,01 |
|  | 2 | 1,014 | 1,541 | ,00 | ,00 | , 13 | , 10 | , 68 |
|  | 3 | ,903 | 1,633 | ,00 | , 00 | , 80 | . 15 | . 05 |
|  | 4 | ,673 | 1,892 | ,00 | , 00 | , 05 | ,68 | , 25 |
|  | 5 | ,003 | 28,823 | 1,00 | 1,00 | ,00 | . 02 | ,00 |

a. Dependent Variable: abcfo

Residuals Statistics ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | ,- 0221091 | , 0291988 | , 0000003 | , 00685487 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | $-3,225$ | 4,260 | , 000 | 1,000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | , 005 | , 073 | , 008 | , 006 | 319 |
| Predicted Value | ,- 0263968 | , 0907991 | , 0002365 | .00864173 | 319 |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | -1.38348 | , 03060381 | , 0000000 | , 07804136 | 319 |
| Residual | $-17,616$ | , 390 | , 000 | , 994 | 319 |
| Std. Residual | $-17,709$ | , 390 | ,- 001 | , 999 | 319 |
| Stud. Residual | -1.39820 | , 03096684 | -.000236 | , 07903114 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | $-504,170$ | , 390 | $-1,526$ | 28,231 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | , 073 | 270,172 | 3,987 | 16,015 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | , 000 | , 667 | , 003 | , 039 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | , 000 | , 850 | , 013 | , 050 | 319 |
| Centered Leverage Value |  |  |  |  |  |

a. Dependent Variable: abcfo

## Charts

## Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual



## Nonparametric Correlations

Correlations

|  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
${ }^{* *}$. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level ( 2 -tailed)

## Regression abnormal discretionary expenses

Descriptive Statistics

|  | Mean | Std. Deviation | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| abdiexp | , 0000001 | , 00206400 | 319 |
| size | 8,7182568 | , 67311895 | 319 |
| mtb | 2,8226499 | 11,60521227 | 319 |
| ni | , 0556797 | , 12752350 | 319 |
| sus | , 05 | , 212 | 319 |

Correlations

|  |  | abdiexp | size | mtb | ni | sus |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pearson Correlation | abdiexp | 1,000 | -,023 | -,006 | ,057 | ,017 |
|  | size | -,023 | 1,000 | ,050 | ,147 | ,037 |
|  | $m \mathrm{tb}$ | -,006 | ,050 | 1,000 | ,029 | -,034 |
|  | ni | - 1-057 | . 147 | -,029 | 1,000 | -,093 |
|  | sus | , 017 | , 037 | -,.034 | -,093 | 1,000 |
| Sig. (1-tailed) | abdiexp |  | ,338 | , 461 | ,156 | ,380 |
|  | size | , 338 |  | ,184 | ,004 | ,252 |
|  | mtb | , 461 | ,184 | . | ,301 | ,272 |
|  | ni | ,156 | ,004 | ,301 | . | ,048 |
|  | sus | ,380 | ,252 | , 272 | ,048 |  |
| N | abdiexp | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | size | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | mtb | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | ni | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | sus | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |

Variables Entered/Removed

| Model | Variables <br> Entered | Variables <br> Removed | Method |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | sus, mtb, <br> size, ni |  | Enter |

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: abdiexp

Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | $\mathbf{R}$ | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | , $070^{a}$ | , 005 | ,- 008 | , 00207203 | 1,967 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), sus, mtb, size, ni
b. Dependent Variable: abdiexp

a. Predictors: (Constant), sus, mtb, size, ni
b. Dependent Variable: abdiexp

## Coefficients ${ }^{2}$

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | B | Std. Error | Beta |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 (Constant) | , 001 | ,002 |  | ,546 | , 585 |  |  |
| size | ,000 | ,000 | -,034 | -,588 | , 557 | ,974 | 1,027 |
| mtb | -8.7E-007 | , 000 | -,005 | -,087 | , 931 | ,996 | 1,004 |
| ni | ,001 | , 001 | ,064 | 1,122 | . .263 | ,968 | 1,033 |
| sus | ,000 | . 001 | . 024 | . 429 | ,668 | , 987 | 1,013 |

a. Dependent Variable: abdiexp

Collinearity Diagnostics

| Model | Dimension | Eigenvalue | Condition Index | Variance Proportions |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | (Constant) | size | mtb | ni | sus |
| 1 | 1 | 2,408 | 1,000 | ,00 | , 00 | ,02 | ,05 | , 01 |
|  | 2 | 1,014 | 1,541 | ,00 | ,00 | ,13 | ,10 | ,68 |
|  | 3 | ,903 | 1,633 | ,00 | ,00 | , 80 | ,15 | , 05 |
|  | 4 | . 673 | 1,892 | ,00 | , 00 | , 05 | ,68 | ,25 |
|  | 5 | , 003 | 28,823 | 1,00 | 1,00 | , 00 | , 02 | . 00 |

a. Dependent Variable: abdiexp

Residuals Statistics ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | ,- 0008272 | , 0006572 | , 0000001 | , 00014420 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | $-5,737$ | 4,556 | , 000 | 1,000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | , 000 | , 002 | , 000 | , 000 | 319 |
| Predicted Value | ,- 0012301 | , 0051538 | , 0000149 | , 00032847 | 319 |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | -.026483 | , 00841353 | , 00000000 | , 00205896 | 319 |
| Residual | $-12,781$ | 4,061 | , 000 | , 994 | 319 |
| Std. Residual | $-12,803$ | 4,069 | ,- 002 | , 999 | 319 |
| Stud. Residual | -.026575 | , 00844665 | -.000015 | , 00210154 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | $-18,491$ | 4,174 | ,- 020 | 1,254 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | , 073 | 270,172 | 3,987 | 16,015 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | , 000 | 1,599 | , 006 | , 090 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | , 000 | , 850 | , 013 | , 050 | 319 |
| Centered Leverage Value |  |  |  |  |  |

a. Dependent Variable: abdiexp

## Charts

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual

Dependent Variable: abdiexp


## Scatterplot

## Dependent Variable: abdiexp



## Nonparametric Correlations

## Correlations



[^1]
## Appendix 7

Output Regressions of Test Equation 3.6

## Regression abnormal production

Descriptive Statistics

|  | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Abprod | ,- 0000003 | , 00282395 | 319 |
| size | 8,7182568 | , 67311895 | 319 |
| mtb | 2,8226499 | 11,60521227 | 319 |
| ni | , 0556797 | , 12752350 | 319 |
| sus | , 05 | , 212 | 319 |

Correlations

|  |  | Abprod | size | mtb | ni | sus |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pearson Correlation | Abprod | 1,000 | ,066 | , 035 | -, 172 | -,005 |
|  | size | ,066 | 1,000 | ,050 | , 147 | ,037 |
|  | mtb | ,035 | ,050 | 1,000 | ,029 | -,034 |
|  | ni | -, 172 | . 147 | , 029 | 1,000 | -,093 |
|  | sus | -, 005 | , 037 | -,034 | -,093 | 1,000 |
| Sig. (1-tailed) | Abprod |  | , 121 | ,266 | ,001 | ,464 |
|  | size | , 121 |  | ,184 | , 004 | ,252 |
|  | mtb | ,266 | , 184 |  | , 301 | ,272 |
|  | ni | ,001 | ,004 | ,301 |  | ,048 |
|  | sus | ,464 | , 252 | , 272 | , 048 |  |
| N | Abprod | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | size | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | mtb | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | ni | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | sus | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |

Variables Entered/Removed

| Model | Variables <br> Entered | Variables <br> Removed | Method |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| 1 | sus, mtb, <br> size, ni |  | Enter |

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | , $200^{a}$ | , 040 | , 028 | , 00278463 | 1,957 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), sus, mtb, size, ni
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

a. Predictors: (Constant), sus, mtb, size, ni
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Collinearity Diagnostics

| Model | Dimension | Eigenvalue | Condition Index | Variance Proportions |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | (Constant) | size | mtb | ni | sus |
| 1 | 1 | 2,408 | 1,000 | ,00 | ,00 | ,02 | ,05 | ,01 |
|  | 2 | 1,014 | 1,541 | ,00 | ,00 | , 13 | , 10 | ,68 |
|  | 3 | ,903 | 1,633 | ,00 | ,00 | , 80 | ,15 | ,05 |
|  | 4 | ,673 | 1,892 | ,00 | ,00 | ,05 | ,68 | ,25 |
|  | 5 | ,003 | 28,823 | 1,00 | 1,00 | ,00 | ,02 | ,00 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Residuals Statistics ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | ,- 0026920 | , 0033166 | ,- 0000003 | , 00056394 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | $-4,773$ | 5,882 | , 000 | 1,000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | , 000 | , 003 | , 000 | , 000 | 319 |
| Predicted Value |  |  |  |  |  |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | ,- 0075168 | , 0038320 | ,- 0000278 | , 00071313 | 319 |
| Residual | -.021163 | , 02355068 | , 0000000 | , 00276706 | 319 |
| Std. Residual | $-7,600$ | 8,457 | , 000 | , 994 | 319 |
| Stud. Residual | $-7,615$ | 8,472 | , 003 | 1,001 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | -.021246 | , 02363224 | , 00002748 | , 00285929 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | $-8,420$ | 9,630 | , 007 | 1,066 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | , 073 | 270,172 | 3,987 | 16,015 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | , 000 | 2,703 | , 010 | , 151 | 319 |
| Centered Leverage Value | , 000 | , 850 | , 013 | , 050 | 319 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

## Charts

## Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual



## Scatterplot

## Dependent Variable: Abprod



Nonparametric Correlations

|  |  |  | size | mtb | ni | sus | Standardized Residual |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Spearman's rho | size | Correlation Coefficient | 1,000 | . 026 | ,136* | ,032 | -,111* |
|  |  | Sig. (2-tailed) | . | ,649 | , 015 | ,567 | ,048 |
|  |  | N | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | mtb | Correlation Coefficient | , 026 | 1,000 | , 234** | -,113* | -,262** |
|  |  | Sig. (2-tailed) | ,649 |  | ,000 | ,043 | ,000 |
|  |  | N | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | ni | Correlation Coefficient | ,136* | .234** | 1,000 | -,200** | ,011 |
|  |  | Sig. (2-tailed) | , 015 | ,000 |  | ,000 | ,839 |
|  |  | N | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | sus | Correlation Coefficient | ,032 | -,113* | -,200** | 1,000 | ,014 |
|  |  | Sig. (2-tailed) | . 567 | ,043 | ,000 |  | ,806 |
|  |  | N | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
|  | Stand | Correlation Coefficient | -,111* | $-, 262^{*+}$ | ,011 | ,014 | 1,000 |
|  |  | Sig. (2-tailed) | . 048 | ,000 | ,839 | ,806 |  |
|  |  | N | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |

[^2]**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

## Appendix 8

Output Regressions of Test Equation 3.7

## Regression abnormal discretionary expenses


a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

ANOVA ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model |  | Sum of <br> Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | Regression | .000 | 10 | .000 | 3.899 | $.000^{\text {a }}$ |
|  | Residual | .001 | 308 | .000 |  |  |
|  | Total | .001 | 318 |  |  |  |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Model |  | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized <br> Coefficients <br> Beta | t | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | (Constant) | . 001 | . 002 |  | . 640 | . 523 | Tolerance |  |
|  | size | -7.6E-005 | . 000 | -. 025 | -. 428 | . 669 | . 859 | 1.164 |
|  | mtb | -3.3E-006 | . 000 | -. 018 | -. 340 | . 734 | . 989 | 1.011 |
|  | ni | . 001 | . 001 | . 043 | . 735 | . 463 | . 830 | 1.205 |
|  | Sus | . 000 | . 001 | . 012 | . 108 | . 914 | 235 | 4.247 |
|  | loca | . 000 | . 000 | . 055 | . 894 | 372 | 776 | 1.289 |
|  | Debt | . 000 | . 000 | -. 074 | -1.264 | . 207 | . 845 | 1.184 |
|  | cl | -. 102 | . 017 | -. 342 | -5.948 | . 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
|  | locasus | . 000 | . 001 | -. 028 | -. 274 | . 784 | . 276 | 3.625 |
|  | debtsus | . 000 | . 001 | . 027 | . 287 | . 774 | . 331 | 3.018 |
|  | clsus | . 062 | . 062 | . 075 | . 998 | . 319 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

| Model | Dimension | Eigenvalue | Condition Index | Variance Proportions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | (Constant) | size | mtb | ni | Sus | loca | Debt | d | locasus | debtsus | clsus |
| 1 | 1 | 3.862 | 1.000 | . 00 | . 00 | 00 | . 00 | . 01 | . 02 | . 02 | 01 | . 00 | . 01 | . 00 |
|  | 2 | 2.272 | 1.304 | . 00 | . 00 | 01 | . 02 | . 02 | . 00 | . 01 | . 00 | . 02 | . 03 | . 02 |
|  | 3 | 1.200 | 1.794 | 00 | . 00 | . 01 | . 00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 00 | . 22 | . 04 | . 00 | . 17 |
|  | 4 | 1.025 | 1.942 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 42 | . 00 | . 14 | . 00 | . 06 | . 00 | . 00 | 00 |
|  | 5 | . 912 | 2.058 | . 00 | . 00 | 94 | 01 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 02 |
|  | 6 | 610 | 2.515 | . 00 | . 00 | 03 | . 03 | . 00 | . 01 | . 13 | . 54 | . 05 | . 01 | . 18 |
|  | 7 | 416 | 3.048 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | 15 | . 00 | . 47 | . 41 | . 05 | . 00 | 03 | . 12 |
|  | 8 | . 346 | 3.339 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | 31 | 03 | . 27 | . 20 | . 10 | . 00 | 03 | . 12 |
|  | 9 | . 220 | 4.186 | 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 13 | . 00 | . 17 | . 00 | . 11 | . 90 | . 12 |
|  | 10 | . 135 | 5.351 | . 00 | 00 | . 00 | . 02 | . 80 | . 04 | . 00 | . 01 | . 77 | 00 | 37 |
|  | 11 | 003 | 38.355 | 1.00 | 1.00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 00 | . 01 | . 06 | . 00 | . 00 | 00 | 00 |

Residuals Statistics ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | -.0059101 | .0006686 | .0000001 | .00069187 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | -8.542 | .966 | .000 | 1.000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | .000 | .002 | .000 |  | .000 |
| Predicted Value |  |  | 319 |  |  |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | -.0076042 | .0030516 | .0000063 | .00079020 | 319 |
| Residual | -.020600 | .01321268 | .00000000 | .00194459 | 319 |
| Std. Residual | -10.426 | 6.687 | .000 | .984 | 319 |
| Stud. Residual | -12.000 | 7.373 | -.001 | 1.066 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | -.027292 | .01606418 | -.000006 | .00230851 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | -16.418 | 8.112 | -.013 | 1.262 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | 1.277 | 276.155 | 9.969 | 26.585 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | .000 | 4.253 | .021 | .247 | 319 |
| Centered Leverage Value | .004 | .868 | .031 | .084 | 319 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

## Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual

Dependent Variable: Abdisexp


## Scatterplot

## Dependent Variable: Abdisexp



Variables Entered/Removed

| Model | Variables <br> Entered | Variables <br> Removed | Method |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | clsus, size, <br> mtb, <br> locasus, <br> ni, Debt, cl, <br> loca, <br> debtsus, <br> Sus |  |  |

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: Abcogs

Model Summary ${ }^{b}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| 1 | $.419^{\mathrm{a}}$ | .175 | .148 | .00295505 | 1.995 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abcogs

ANOVA ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model |  | Sum of <br> Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| 1 | Regression | .001 | 10 | .000 | 6.544 | $.000^{\circ}$ |
|  | Residual | .003 | 308 | .000 |  |  |
|  | Total | .003 | 318 |  |  |  |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abcogs

## Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Model |  | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | StandardizedCoefficients | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | (Constant) | -. 002 | . 002 |  | -. 698 | . 486 |  |  |
|  | size | . 000 | . 000 | . 029 | . 519 | . 604 | . 859 | 1.164 |
|  | mtb | $1.55 \mathrm{E}-005$ | . 000 | . 056 | 1.082 | . 280 | . 989 | 1.011 |
|  | ni | -. 003 | . 001 | -. 120 | -2.115 | . 035 | . 830 | 1.205 |
|  | Sus | -. 001 | . 002 | -. 034 | -. 321 | . 749 | 235 | 4.247 |
|  | loca | . 000 | . 000 | -. 062 | -1.051 | - 294 | . 776 | 1.289 |
|  | Debt | . 000 | . 000 | . 048 | . 853 | - 394 | . 845 | 1.184 |
|  | cl | . 190 | . 026 | . 410 | 7.393 | T 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
|  | locasus | . 001 | . 002 | . 035 | . 359 | . 719 | . 276 | 3.625 |
|  | debtsus | -. 001 | . 002 | -. 028 | -. 306 | . 760 | . 331 | 3.018 |
|  | clsus | -. 089 | . 093 | -. 069 | -. 960 | . 338 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abcogs

Collinearity Dlagnostics

| Model | Dimension | Eigenvalue | Condition Index | Vaniance Proportions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | (Constant) | size | mit | ni | Sus | loca | Debt | cl | locasus | deblsus | clsus |
| 1 | 1 | 3.862 | 1.000 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 01 | . 02 | . 02 | 01 | 00 | 01 | . 00 |
|  | 2 | 2.272 | 1.304 | . 00 | . 00 | . 01 | . 02 | . 02 | . 00 | . 01 | 00 | . 02 | . 03 | . 02 |
|  | 3 | 1.200 | 1.794 | . 00 | . 00 | . 01 | . 00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 00 | 22 | . 04 | . 00 | . 17 |
|  | 4 | 1.025 | 1.942 | 00 | 00 | . 00 | . 42 | . 00 | . 14 | . 00 | . 06 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
|  | 5 | . 912 | 2.058 | . 00 | . 00 | . 94 | . 01 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | 00 | . 02 |
|  | 6 | . 610 | 2.515 | . 00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 03 | . 00 | . 01 | . 13 | 54 | . 05 | 01 | . 18 |
|  | 7 | . 416 | 3.048 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 15 | . 00 | . 47 | . 41 | . 05 | . 00 | . 03 | . 12 |
|  | 8 | . 346 | 3.339 | . 00 | 00 | . 00 | .31 | . 03 | . 27 | . 20 | . 10 | . 00 | . 03 | . 00 |
|  | 9 | 220 | 4.186 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 13 | . 00 | . 17 | . 00 | . 11 | . 90 | 12 |
|  | 10 | . 135 | 5.351 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 02 | . 80 | . 04 | . 00 | . 01 | . 77 | 00 | . 37 |
|  | 11 | . 003 | 38.355 | 1.00 | 1.00 | . 00 | . 03 | .00 | . 01 | . 06 | 00 | . 00 | 00 | . 00 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abcogs

Residuals Statistics ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | -.0020926 | .0108611 | .0000000 | .00134053 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | -1.561 | 8.102 | .000 | 1.000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | .000 | .003 | .000 | .000 | 319 |
| Predicted Value |  |  |  | .00141692 | 319 |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | -.0047414 | .0121816 | -.0000205 | .000 | 319 |
| Residual | -.017389 | .02917893 | .00000000 | .00290821 | .984 |
| Std. Residual | -5.885 | 9.874 | .000 | 319 |  |
| Stud. Residual | -6.369 | 11.365 | .002 | 1.060 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | -.020369 | .03865756 | .00002054 | .00342140 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | -6.824 | 14.892 | .012 | 1.211 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | 1.277 | 276.155 | 9.969 | 26.585 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | .000 | 3.815 | .020 | .223 | 319 |
| Centered Leverage Value | .004 | .868 | .031 | .084 | 319 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abcogs

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual


## Scatterplot



Appendix 9
Output Regressions of Test Equation 3.8

## Regression abnormal CFO

Variables Entered/Removed ${ }^{\text {P }}$

| Model | Variables <br> Entered | Variables <br> Removed | Method |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | clsus, size, <br> mtb, <br> locasus, <br> ni, Debt, cl, <br> loca, <br> debtsus, <br> Sus |  |  |

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

> Model Summaryb

| Model | $\mathbf{R}$ | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.102^{\mathrm{a}}$ | .010 | -.022 | .07918824 | 2.002 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Model |  | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized Coefficients | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | B | Std. Error | Beta |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | (Constant) | -. 065 | . 060 |  | -1.071 | 285 |  |  |
|  | size | . 007 | . 007 | . 057 | . 933 | . 351 | . 859 | 1.164 |
|  | mtb | 1.33E-005 | . 000 | . 002 | . 035 | . 972 | . 989 | 1.011 |
|  | ni | . 033 | . 038 | . 054 | . 864 | - 388 | 830 | 1.205 |
|  | Sus | . 014 | . 043 | . 037 | . 317 | . 751 | . 235 | 4.247 |
|  | loca | . 008 | . 011 | . 046 | . 709 | . 479 | . 776 | 1.289 |
|  | Debt | . 005 | . 010 | . 030 | . 490 | . 625 | . 845 | 1.184 |
|  | cl | . 028 | . 688 | . 002 | . 041 | . 968 | . 872 | 1.146 |
|  | locasus | -. 013 | . 051 | -. 027 | -. 250 | . 803 | . 276 | 3.625 |
|  | debtsus | -. 004 | . 047 | -. 008 | -. 085 | . 933 | . 331 | 3.018 |
|  | clsus | -. 159 | 2.491 | -. 005 | -. 064 | . 949 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

ANOVA ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model |  | Sum of <br> Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | Regression | .020 | 10 | .002 | .324 | $.975^{a}$ |
|  | Residual | 1.931 | 308 | .006 |  |  |
|  | Total | 1.952 | 318 |  |  |  |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

Collinearity Diagnostics

| Model | Dimension | Eigenvalue | ConditionIndex | Variance Proportions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | (Constant) | size | mitb | ni | Sus | loca | Debt | cl | locasus | debisus | clsus |
| 1 | 1 | 3.862 | 1.000 | . 00 | . 00 | 00 | 00 | 01 | 02 | . 02 | . 01 | 00 | . 01 | 00 |
|  | 2 | 2.272 | 1.304 | . 00 | 00 | . 01 | . 02 | . 02 | . 00 | . 01 | . 00 | . 02 | . 03 | . 02 |
|  | 3 | 1.200 | 1.794 | . 00 | 00 | . 01 | . 00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 00 | . 22 | . 04 | . 00 | . 17 |
|  | 4 | 1.025 | 1.942 | . 00 | 00 | . 00 | . 42 | . 00 | . 14 | . 00 | . 06 | 00 | 00 | . 00 |
|  | 5 | . 912 | 2.058 | . 00 | $\bigcirc .00$ | . 94 | 01 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 02 |
|  | 6 | . 610 | 2.515 | 00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 03 | . 00 | . 01 | . 13 | . 54 | . 05 | . 01 | . 18 |
|  | 7 | . 416 | 3.048 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 15 | . 00 | . 47 | . 41 | 05 | . 00 | . 03 | . 12 |
|  | 8 | . 346 | 3.339 | 00 | .00 | . 00 | . 31 | . 03 | . 27 | . 20 | . 10 | . 00 | . 03 | . 00 |
|  | 9 | . 220 | 4.186 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 13 | . 00 | . 17 | . 00 | 11 | . 90 | . 12 |
|  | 10 | . 135 | 5.351 | 00 | . 00 | 00 | 02 | . 80 | 0.04 | 00 | . 01 | 77 | . 00 | . 37 |
|  | 11 | . 003 | 38.355 | 1.00 | 1.00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 00 | . 01 | . 08 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

## Residuals Statistics

|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | -.0224641 | .0243567 | .0000003 | .00799119 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | -2.811 | 3.048 | .000 | 1.000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | .007 | .074 | .012 | .008 | 319 |
| Predicted Value | -0270933 | .1035871 | .0002963 | .01010450 | 319 |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | -1.37965 | .03300693 | .00000000 | .07793320 | 319 |
| Residual | -17.422 | .417 | .000 | .984 | 319 |
| Std. Residual | -17.540 | .460 | -.001 | .991 | 319 |
| Stud. Residual | -1.39839 | .04013033 | -.000296 | .07922757 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | -529.277 | .459 | -1.605 | 29.637 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | 1.277 | 276.155 | 9.969 | 26.585 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | .000 | .380 | .002 | .022 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | .004 | .868 | .031 | .084 | 319 |
| Centered Leverage Value | .0 |  |  |  |  |

a. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

## Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual



## Regression abnormal discretionary expenses

Variables Entered/Removed ${ }^{\text {P }}$

| Model | Variables <br> Entered | Variables <br> Removed | Method |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | clsus, size, <br> mtb, <br> locasus, <br> ni, Debt, cl, <br> loca, <br> debtsus, <br> Sus |  |  |

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.335^{a}$ | .112 | .084 | .00197590 | 2.034 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Coefficients ${ }^{\mathbf{a}}$

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized <br> Coefficients <br> Beta | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 (Constant) | . 001 | . 002 |  | . 640 | . 523 |  |  |
| size | -7.6E-005 | . 000 | -. 025 | -. 428 | . 669 | . 859 | 1.164 |
| mtb | -3.3E-006 | . 000 | -. 018 | -. 340 | . 734 | . 989 | 1.011 |
| ni | . 001 | . 001 | . 043 | . 735 | . 463 | . 830 | 1.205 |
| Sus | . 000 | . 001 | . 012 | . 108 | . 914 | . 235 | 4.247 |
| loca | . 000 | . 000 | . 055 | . 894 | . 372 | . 776 | 1.289 |
| Debt | . 000 | . 000 | -. 074 | -1.264 | . 207 | . 845 | 1.184 |
| cl | -. 102 | . 017 | -. 342 | -5.948 | . 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
| locasus | . 000 | . 001 | -. 028 | -. 274 | . 784 | . 276 | 3.625 |
| debtsus | . 000 | . 001 | . 027 | . 287 | . 774 | . 331 | 3.018 |
| clsus | . 062 | . 062 | . 075 | . 998 | . 319 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

| Model | Dimension | Eigenvalue | Condition Index | Variance Proportions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | (Constant) | size | mtb | ni | Sus | loca | Debt | cl | locasus | debtsus | clsus |
| 1 | 1 | 3.862 | 1.000 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 01 | . 02 | 02 | . 01 | . 00 | . 01 | 00 |
|  | 2 | 2.272 | 1.304 | . 00 | . 00 | . 01 | . 02 | . 02 | . 00 | . 01 | . 00 | . 02 | . 03 | . 02 |
|  | 3 | 1.200 | 1.794 | . 00 | . 00 | - 01 | . 00 | . 00 | . 03 | 00 | 22 | . 04 | . 00 | 17 |
|  | 4 | 1.025 | 1.942 | . 00 | 00 | 00 | 42 | . 00 | 14 | 00 | 06 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
|  | 5 | . 912 | 2.058 | . 00 | . 00 | . 94 | . 01 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | 02 |
|  | 6 | . 610 | 2.515 | . 00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 03 | . 00 | . 01 | .13 | . 54 | . 05 | . 01 | . 18 |
|  | 7 | . 416 | 3.048 | . 00 | 00 | . 00 | 15 | . 00 | . 47 | 41 | . 05 | . 00 | . 03 | 12 |
|  | 8 | . 346 | 3.339 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | .31 | . 03 | 27 | 20 | 10 | 00 | 03 | 00 |
|  | 9 | . 220 | 4.186 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 13 | . 00 | 17 | . 00 | . 11 | . 90 | 12 |
|  | 10 | . 135 | 5.351 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 02 | . 80 | . 04 | . 00 | . 01 | . 77 | . 00 | 37 |
|  | 11 | . 003 | 38.355 | 1.00 | 1.00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 00 | . 01 | . 06 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Residuals Statistics

|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | -.0059101 | .0006686 | .0000001 | .00069187 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | -8.542 | .966 | .000 | 1.000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | .000 | .002 | .000 | .000 | 319 |
| Predicted Value |  |  |  |  |  |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | -.0076042 | .0030516 | .0000063 | .00079020 | 319 |
| Residual | -.020600 | .01321268 | .00000000 | .00194459 | 319 |
| Std. Residual | -10.426 | 6.687 | .000 | .984 | 319 |
| Stud. Residual | -12.000 | 7.373 | -.001 | 1.066 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | -.027292 | .01606418 | -.000006 | .00230851 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | -16.418 | 8.112 | -.013 | 1.262 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | 1.277 | 276.155 | 9.969 | 26.585 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | .000 | 4.253 | .021 | .247 | 319 |
| Centered Leverage Value | .004 | .868 | .031 | .084 | 319 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

## Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual



## Regression abnormal production

## Variables Entered/Removed ${ }^{\text {P }}$

| Model | Variables <br> Entered | Variables <br> Removed | Method |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | clsus, size, <br> mtb, <br> locasus, <br> ni, Debt, cl, <br> loca, <br> debtsus, <br> Sus |  |  |

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Model Summaryb

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.362^{\text {a }}$ | .131 | .103 | .00267474 | 1.949 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

ANOVA ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model |  | Sum of <br> Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | Regression | .000 | 10 | .000 | 4.647 | $.000^{\text {a }}$ |
|  | Residual | .002 | 308 | .000 |  |  |
|  | Total | .003 | 318 |  |  |  |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

## Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized <br> Coefficients <br> Beta | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 (Constant) | -. 004 | . 002 |  | -2.047 | . 042 |  |  |
| size | . 000 | . 000 | . 117 | 2.034 | . 043 | . 859 | 1.164 |
| mtb | 1.25E-005 | . 000 | . 051 | . 964 | . 336 | . 989 | 1.011 |
| ni | -. 004 | . 001 | -. 187 | -3.211 | . 001 | . 830 | 1.205 |
| Sus | -. 001 | . 001 | -. 048 | -. 443 | . 658 | . 235 | 4.247 |
| loca | . 000 | . 000 | -. 077 | -1.283 | . 200 | . 776 | 1.289 |
| Debt | . 000 | . 000 | -. 020 | -. 348 | . 728 | . 845 | 1.184 |
| cl | . 117 | . 023 | . 287 | 5.051 | . 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
| locasus | . 000 | . 002 | . 020 | . 194 | . 846 | . 276 | 3.625 |
| debtsus | . 000 | 5.002 | -. 015 | -. 162 | . 871 | . 331 | 3.018 |
| clsus | . 029 | - 084 | . 025 | . 340 | . 734 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Colinnearty Diagnostice

| Model | Dimension | Eigenvalue | Condition Index | Variance Proportions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | (Constant) | size | mtb | ni | Sus | loca | Debt | cl | łocasus | debtsus | clsus |
| 1 | 1 | 3.862 | 1.000 | . 00 | .00 | 00 | . 00 | . 01 | . 02 | . 02 | . 01 | 00 | . 01 | . 00 |
|  | 2 | 2.272 | 1.304 | 00 | . 00 | 01 | . 02 | . 02 | . 00 | . 01 | . 00 | . 02 | . 03 | . 02 |
|  | 3 | 1.200 | 1.794 | . 00 | . 00 | .01 | . 00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 00 | . 22 | . 04 | . 00 | . 17 |
|  | 4 | 1.025 | 1.942 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 42 | . 00 | . 14 | . 00 | . 06 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
|  | 5 | . 912 | 2.058 | . 00 | . 00 | . 94 | . 01 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 02 |
|  | 6 | . 610 | 2.515 | . 00 | . 00 | . 03 | . 03 | . 00 | . 01 | . 13 | . 54 | . 05 | . 01 | . 18 |
|  | 7 | . 416 | 3.048 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 15 | . 00 | . 47 | 41 | . 05 | . 00 | . 03 | . 12 |
|  | 8 | . 346 | 3.339 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 31 | . 03 | . 27 | . 20 | . 10 | . 00 | . 03 | . 00 |
|  | 9 | . 220 | 4.186 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 13 | 1.00 | . 17 | . 00 | . 11 | 90 | 12 |
|  | 10 | . 135 | 5.351 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 02 | . 80 | . 04 | . 00 | . 01 | . 77 | 00 | . 37 |
|  | 11 | 003 | 38.355 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 00 | . 03 | 00 | . 01 | . 06 | 00 | . 00 | 00 | . 00 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Residuals Statistics

|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | -.0028037 | .0066474 | -.0000003 | .00102244 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | -2.742 | 6.502 | .000 | 1.000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | .000 | .002 | .000 | .000 | 319 |
| Predicted Value |  |  |  |  |  |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | -.0053040 | .0113423 | -.0000170 | .00117343 | 319 |
| Residual | -.026922 | .01697255 | .00000000 | .00263235 | 319 |
| Std. Residual | -10.065 | 6.345 | .000 | .984 | 319 |
| Stud. Residual | -11.098 | 7.304 | .001 | 1.048 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | -.032732 | .02248600 | .00001669 | .00302854 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | -14.304 | 8.019 | -.004 | 1.190 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | 1.277 | 276.155 | 9.969 | 26.585 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | .000 | 2.417 | .017 | .168 | 319 |
| Centered Leverage Value | .004 | .868 | .031 | .084 | 319 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

## Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual



## Appendix 10

Output Regressions of Test Equation 3.9

## Regression abnormal CFO

Variables Entered/Removed ${ }^{p}$

| Model | Variables <br> Entered | Variables <br> Removed | Method |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | clsus, size, <br> mtb, <br> locasus, <br> ni, Debt, cl, <br> loca, <br> debtsus, <br> Sus |  |  |

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.102^{\text {a }}$ | .010 | -.022 | .07918824 | 2.002 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Model |  | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Standardized } \\ \text { Coefficients } \\ \hline \text { Beta } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 | (Constant) | -. 065 | . 060 |  | -1.071 | . 285 |  |  |
|  | size | . 007 | . 007 | . 057 | . 933 | . 351 | . 859 | 1.164 |
|  | mtb | 1.33E-005 | . 000 | . 002 | . 035 | . 972 | . 989 | 1.011 |
|  | ni | . 033 | . 038 | . 054 | . 864 | . 388 | . 830 | 1.205 |
|  | Sus | . 014 | . 043 | . 037 | . 317 | . 751 | . 235 | 4.247 |
|  | loca | . 008 | . 011 | . 046 | . 709 | . 479 | . 776 | 1.289 |
|  | Debt | . 005 | . 010 | . 030 | . 490 | . 625 | . 845 | 1.184 |
|  | cl | . 028 | . 688 | . 002 | . 041 | . 968 | . 872 | 1.146 |
|  | locasus | -. 013 | . 051 | -. 027 | -. 250 | . 803 | . 276 | 3.625 |
|  | debtsus | -. 004 | $\square .047$ | -. 008 | -. 085 | . 933 | . 331 | 3.018 |
|  | clsus | -. 159 | 2.491 | -. 005 | -. 064 | . 949 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abcfo


Residuals Statistics

|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | -.0224641 | .0243567 | .0000003 | .00799119 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | -2.811 | 3.048 | .000 | 1.000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | .007 | .074 | .012 | .008 | 319 |
| Predicted Value |  |  |  |  | 319 |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | -.0270933 | .1035871 | .0002963 | .01010450 | 319 |
| Residual | -1.37965 | .03300693 | .00000000 | .07793320 | 319 |
| Std. Residual | -17.422 | .417 | .000 | .984 | 319 |
| Stud. Residual | -17.540 | .460 | -.001 | .991 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | -1.39839 | .04013033 | -.000296 | .07922757 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | -529.277 | .459 | -1.605 | 29.637 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | 1.277 | 276.155 | 9.969 | 26.585 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | .000 | .380 | .002 | .022 | 319 |
| Centered Leverage Value | .004 | .868 | .031 | .084 | 319 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abcfo

## Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual



## Regression abnormal discretionary expenses

Variables Entered/Removed ${ }^{\text {P }}$

| Model | Variables <br> Entered | Variables <br> Removed | Method |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | llsus, size, <br> mtb, <br> locasus, <br> ni, Debt, cl, <br> loca, <br> debtsus, <br> Sus |  |  |

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

## Model Summary ${ }^{b}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> R Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.335^{\text {a }}$ | .112 | .084 | .00197590 | 2.034 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp


| Model |  | Sum of <br> Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | Regression | .000 | 10 | .000 | 3.899 | $.000^{a}$ |
|  | Residual | .001 | 308 | .000 |  |  |
|  | Total | .001 | 318 |  |  |  |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl , loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients |  | Standardized <br> Coefficients <br> Beta | $t$ | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | B | Std. Error |  |  |  | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1 (Constant) | . 001 | . 002 |  | . 640 | . 523 |  |  |
| size | -7.6E-005 | . 000 | -. 025 | -. 428 | . 669 | . 859 | 1.164 |
| mtb | -3.3E-006 | . 000 | -. 018 | -. 340 | . 734 | . 989 | 1.011 |
| ni | . 001 | . 001 | . 043 | . 735 | . 463 | . 830 | 1.205 |
| Sus | . 000 | . 001 | . 012 | . 108 | . 914 | . 235 | 4.247 |
| loca | . 000 | . 000 | . 055 | . 894 | . 372 | . 776 | 1.289 |
| Debt | . 000 | . 000 | -. 074 | -1.264 | . 207 | . 845 | 1.184 |
| cl | -. 102 | . 017 | -. 342 | -5.948 | . 000 | . 872 | 1.146 |
| locasus | . 000 | . 001 | -. 028 | -. 274 | . 784 | . 276 | 3.625 |
| debtsus | . 000 | - . 001 | . 027 | . 287 | . 774 | . 331 | 3.018 |
| clsus | . 062 | . 062 | . 075 | . 998 | . 319 | . 514 | 1.945 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp


|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | -.0059101 | .0006686 | .0000001 | .00069187 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | -8.542 | .966 | .000 | 1.000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | .000 | .002 | .000 | .000 | 319 |
| Predicted Value | -0 |  |  |  |  |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | -.0076042 | .0030516 | .0000063 | .00079020 | 319 |
| Residual | -.020600 | .01321268 | .00000000 | .00194459 | 319 |
| Std. Residual | -10.426 | 6.687 | .000 | .984 | 319 |
| Stud. Residual | -12.000 | 7.373 | -.001 | 1.066 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | -.027292 | .01606418 | -.000006 | .00230851 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | -16.418 | 8.112 | -.013 | 1.262 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | 1.277 | 276.155 | 9.969 | 26.585 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | .000 | 4.253 | .021 | .247 | 319 |
| Centered Leverage Value | .004 | .868 | .031 | .084 | 319 |

a. Dependent Variable: Abdisexp

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual


## Regression abnormal production

Variables Entered/Removed ${ }^{\text {P }}$

| Model | Variables <br> Entered | Variables <br> Removed | Method |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | clsus, size, <br> mtb, <br> locasus, <br> ni, Debt, cl, <br> loca, <br> debtsus, <br> Sus |  |  |

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

## Model Summary ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted <br> $R$ Square | Std. Error of <br> the Estimate | Durbin- <br> Watson |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | $.362^{\text {a }}$ | .131 | .103 | .00267474 | 1.949 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

ANOVA ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| Model |  | Sum of <br> Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| 1 | Regression | .000 | 10 | .000 | 4.647 | $.000^{\text {a }}$ |
|  | Residual | .002 | 308 | .000 |  |  |
|  | Total | .003 | 318 |  |  |  |

a. Predictors: (Constant), clsus, size, mtb, locasus, ni, Debt, cl, loca, debtsus, Sus
b. Dependent Variable: Abprod

Coefficients ${ }^{\text {a }}$

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

| Model | Dimension | Eigenvalue | Condition Index | (Constant) | size | m |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - | 1 | 3.862 | 1.000 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
|  | 2 | 2.272 | 1.304 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
|  | 3 | 1.200 | 1.794 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
|  | 4 | 1.025 | 1.942 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
|  | 5 | . 912 | 2.058 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
|  | 6 | . 610 | 2.515 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
|  | 7 | . 416 | 3.048 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
|  | 8 | . 346 | 3.339 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
|  | 9 | . 220 | 4.186 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
|  | 10 | . 135 | 5.351 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
|  | 11 | . 003 | 38.355 | 1.00 | 1.00 |  |
| a. Dependent Variable: Abprod |  |  |  |  |  |  |


|  | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Predicted Value | -.0028037 | .0066474 | -.0000003 | .00102244 | 319 |
| Std. Predicted Value | -2.742 | 6.502 | .000 | 1.000 | 319 |
| Standard Error of | .000 | .002 | .000 | .000 | 319 |
| Predicted Value | -0053040 | .0113423 | -.0000170 | .00117343 | 319 |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | -.026922 | .01697255 | .00000000 | .00263235 | 319 |
| Residual | -10.065 | 6.345 | .000 | .984 | 319 |
| Std. Residual | -11.098 | 7.304 | .001 | 1.048 | 319 |
| Stud. Residual | -.032732 | .02248600 | .00001669 | .00302854 | 319 |
| Deleted Residual | -14.304 | 8.019 | -004 | 1.190 | 319 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | 1.277 | 276.155 | 9.969 | 26.585 | 319 |
| Mahal. Distance | .000 | 2.417 | .017 | .168 | 319 |
| Cook's Distance | .868 | .031 | .084 | 319 |  |
| Centered Leverage Value | .004 | .868 |  |  |  |

a. Dependent Variable: Abprod

## Charts

## Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual




[^0]:    a. Dependent Variable: Abcogs

[^1]:    *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
    **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

[^2]:    *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

