

**THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS AGREEMENTS 2020: A CASE STUDY THE
REASONS BEHIND OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL 2012-2021
UNDERGRADUATE THESIS**



**UNIVERSITAS
ISLAM
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FACULTY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIO-CULTURAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INDONESIA**

2022

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UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

Proposed to the Department of International Relations
Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences
Universitas Islam Indonesia

As a partial fulfillment of requirement to earn
Bachelor Degree in International Relations



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2022

AUTHORIZATION PAGE

**The Abraham Accords Agreements 2020: A Case Study the Reasons
Behind of the United Arab Emirates Normalization with Israel Period
2012-2020**

Defended in front of Board of Examiners
in the Department of International Relations
Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences

Universitas Islam Indonesia

As a partial fulfillment of requirement to earn
Bachelor Degree of International Relations

Date

12 August 2022

Validated by

Department of International Relations
Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences

Universitas Islam Indonesia

Head of Department


Hangga Fathana, S.IP., B.Int.St., M.A.


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STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

I hereby declare that this undergraduate thesis is the result of my own independent scientific work, and that all material from the work of others (in books, articles, essays, dissertations, and on the internet) has been stated, and quotations and paraphrases are clearly indicated.

No other materials are used other than those contained. I have read and understood the university's rules and procedures regarding plagiarism.


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Yogyakarta, 09 August 2022



Usman Tri Wahyudi

DEDICATION PAGE



All Praise to Allah swt. Who has abundantly provided His sustenance and bounty for the blessings that exist in this world. All my gratitude goes to You, the Most Compassionate and Most Merciful, so that this simple research can be completed properly. The author in this case dedicates this simple research to my beloved parents and brother. Thank you to my father and mother who have raised me all this time with all the hard work and love given to me. All of your advice taught me to understand the meaning of life in this world and in the hereafter. Hopefully this achievement can be the first step for our family in realizing all hopes and being an introduction to happiness in this world and in the hereafter.



MOTTO PAGE

إِنَّ اللَّهَ مَعَ الَّذِينَ اتَّقَوْا وَالَّذِينَ هُمْ مُحْسِنُونَ

"Indeed, Allah is with those who are pious and those who do good."

(QS. An-Nahl: 12)

لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ فِي أَحْسَنِ تَقْوِيمٍ

"Indeed, We created humans in the best form."

(QS. At-Tin: 4)

"Think positive, no matter how hard your life is."

(Ali bin Abi Thalib)

"Never give up and believe that there must be a way for those who earnest"

(Usman Tri Wahyudi)

الجمعة الأمية الإسلامية
الاستدلالية

FOREWORD



All praise to Allah SWT. Lord of the worlds for His grace, and mercy, which is always given to His servants. Shalawat and greetings are always poured out to the Prophet Muhammad, thanks to his guidance, we can see a bright world as it is today. The thesis entitled "Abraham Accords 2020: A Case Study of The Reasons Behind of The United Arab Emirates Normalization With Israel 2012-2021" was prepared as a requirement to obtain a bachelor's degree in International Relations at the Islamic University of Indonesia. The author realizes that the process of writing this thesis cannot be separated from the guidance, motivation, and assistance both material and non-material from various parties. Therefore, the authors would like to thank:

1. Mrs. Dr. Phil. Qurotul Uyun, S.Psi., M.Si., Psikolog as Dean Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences, Universitas Islam Indonesia.
2. Mr. Mohammad Rezky Utama, S.IP., M.Si. as a thesis supervisor and a great lecturer who gave me a lot of knowledge that I got both during thesis guidance and while being a tutor. Thank you very much for your guidance, motivation, and assistance during the process of working on this thesis so that I was given convenience during the process of writing this thesis. Also thank you for the knowledge that was given during my time as a tutor who provided broad insight for my next career path. May Allah Bless you Mr Uta Amen.

3. Mrs. Karina Utami Dewi, S.IP., M.A. as an academic supervisor who has guided and provided a lot of knowledge to the author while the author was a student. Thank you too Mrs. Karina for her help in the thesis administration process. May Allah bless you Mrs. Karina Amen.
4. Mr. Willi Ashadi, S.H.I., M.A. as an thesis examiner in thesis defence and also an outstanding lecturer for the author during my time as a student. Thank you Mr. Willi has given me a lot of world and hereafter knowledge that really helped author in determining my future career path. May Allah bless you Mr. Willi Amen.
5. Mr. Hangga Fathana, S.IP., B. Int. St., M.A. as Head of Department of International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia. Thank you for providing a lot of knowledge and guidance to the author and for being a very inspirational lecturer for the author while he was a student. May Allah bless you Mr. Hangga.
6. All lecturers of the International Relations study program, Faculty of Psychology and Socio-Cultural Sciences, Universitas Islam Indonesia. Thank you for all the knowledge, lessons, experiences, and countless advice that have enabled me to progress until now. May Allah always bless and ease all the affairs of Mr. and Mrs. Lecturers.
7. Both parents, Mr. Mudiayaka and Mrs. Tatik Indriyati who has raised the author with great love. Thank you for all the prayers and support that has been given may Allah repay all of your kindness Amen.

8. My older brother Ilham Agus Mudono who is also my best friend in the family. Thank you for all the help, support and knowledge provided. May Allah reward more than what has been given to the author. Amen.
9. My cousins Azizah Putri Azzahra and Arief Novian Wicaksono who also became friends with my stories and complaints in the family. Thank you for being my best friend. May Allah bless you. Amen.
10. The author's best friends while author was a student there are Lutfi Wibawa, Firda Tsamaniarachman and Neila Pratiwi. Thank you for being my best friend and thank you for your support and help. May Allah repay your kindness and our friendship will last till old age. Amen.
11. Lutfi Wibawa, Dinda Rosda, and Anggun Setia Yoanda Thank you for helping during and after the thesis process so that it ran smoothly. May all your kindness will be rewarded by Allah. Amen.
12. My best friends from High School until now GGS (Godhong Gedang Squad) Ziauddin, Arrazi, Bima, Salsa, Linda, Safira, Mira and Fitria. Thank you for being my best friends so far. I hope that our friendship will last long. Amen.
13. My Boys Squad from High School. Ziauddin, Naim, Ihsan, and Kelvin. Thank you for being supportive friends so far. I hope that our friendship will last long. Amen.
14. My friends during internship in DPD GPEI DIY Batch 1 Dinda, Anggun, Dila, Bayu, Dewita, Mas Fachan and Mas Afif. Thank you for being new friends to the author and I hope our friendship will continue in the future.
15. My friends at Kost Joglo Puri Anggrek II Wahyudi, Fadhil and Bayu

Lerian. Thank you for being a comrade in arms and complaining during college.

16. My friends from KKN UII Unit 274 Batch 63 who became a new family for the author.

17. My whole family in International Relations International Program Class 2018. Lutfi, Firda, Neila, Bayu, Adil, and the others who have being my friends and played a large role during my learning process as student in the University.

18. My whole fellow in International Relations Class of 2018 who have played a large role in the learning process during lectures.

19. And all parties who have helped and facilitated the author in completing all matters. Thank you for all the help that is very meaningful for the author in completing the lecture process and writing the final undergraduate thesis.

Wassalamu'alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh

Yogyakarta, 09 August 2022

Usman Tri Wahyudi

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGT	: Agency for Green Technology
COVID-19	: Coronavirus Disease 2019
EDGE	: Emirates Defence Group Entities
EHSE	: Emirates Health Service Establishments
FDD	: Foundation of Defense of Democracies
GBU	: Guided Bomb Units
GCC	: Gulf Cooperation Council
IAI	: Israel Aerospace Industries
ISIS	: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCPOA	: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JINSA	: Jewish Institute for National Security of America
MBZ	: Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan
MOU	: Memorandum Of Understanding
NSO	: Niv, Shalev and Omri
OIC	: Organization of Islamic Cooperation
UAE	: United Arab Emirates
UN	: United Nations
USA	: United States of America
USD	: United States Dollar

ABSTRAK

Dinamika politik luar negeri Uni Emirat Arab yang mengalami perubahan khususnya pada posisi mereka terhadap Israel membuat Uni Emirat Arab memilih jalan ‘normalisasi’ untuk mencapai kepentingan mereka dan demi stabilitas regional yang tertuang dalam perjanjian Abraham Accords 2020. Ditambah lagi, aneksasi wilayah Tepi Barat, Palestina yang menjadi alasan utama Uni Emirat Arab memilih opsi ‘normalisasi’ sebagai jalan keluar dari permasalahan tersebut. Namun, jika membahas berdasarkan rangkaian sejarah Uni Emirat Arab dan Israel beberapa kali diketahui menjalin hubungan bilateral diantara keduanya. Seperti yang diketahui bahwa Uni Emirat Arab yang notabene negara muslim menjalin ‘normalisasi’ dengan Israel yang merupakan musuh terbesar negara muslim. Setidaknya setelah terbitnya tulisan opini dari salah satu pejabat pemerintah Uni Emirat Arab di salah satu media massa Israel hal ini kemudian memancing para pejabat dari UEA lainnya untuk mempertimbangkan jalan ‘normalisasi’. Dalam hal ini sesuai dengan rumusan masalah “Bagaimana kepentingan Uni Emirat Arab dalam melakukan ‘normalisasi’ dengan Israel pada perjanjian Abraham Accords 2020?”. Oleh karena itu, dalam hal ini penulis menggunakan teori Decision Making dalam menganalisis faktor dan kepentingan para pejabat pemerintahan Uni Emirat Arab terkait sikap mereka yang memilih melakukan ‘normalisasi’ dengan Israel melalui perjanjian Abraham Accords 2020 demi terwujudnya kepentingan mereka di kawasan Timur Tengah.

Kata kunci: normalisasi, Abraham Accords, kepentingan, pejabat pemerintahan, Decision Making, politik luar negeri. Uni Emirat Arab, Israel

ABSTRACT

The dynamics of the United Arab Emirates' foreign policy, which has undergone changes especially in its position towards Israel, have made the United Arab Emirates choose the path of 'normalization' in order to achieve their interests and for the sake of regional stability, as stated in the 2020 Abraham Accords agreement. In addition, the annexation of the West Bank, Palestine is a major reason why the United Arab Emirates chose the 'normalization' option. However, if we discuss based on the historical series, the United Arab Emirates and Israel have several times known to have bilateral relations between the two. As it is known that the United Arab Emirates, which is a Muslim country, establishes 'normalization' with Israel, which is the biggest enemy of Muslim countries. At least after the publication of an opinion piece from one of the United Arab Emirates government officials in one of the Israel mass media, this then provoked other officials from the UAE to consider the path of 'normalization'. In this case, it is in line with the formulation of the problem "What are the interests of the Arab Emirat Union in carrying out 'normalization' with Israel in the 2020 Abraham Accords agreement?". Therefore, in this case the author uses the Decision Making theory in analyzing the factors and interests of the United Arab Emirates government officials regarding the attitude of those who choose to 'normalize' with Israel through the 2020 Abraham Accords agreement for the realization of their interests in the Middle East region.

Keywords: normalization, Abraham Accords, interests, government officials, Decision Making, foreign policy. United Arab Emirates, Israel

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The United Arab Emirates is a Muslim country located in the Persian Gulf with Islam as the foundation of the country. The country, which became independent from Britain in 1971, has the form of a semi-constitutional monarchy led by a president, the first of who was Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. At the beginning of its formation, the United Arab Emirates was active in several regional and international organizations. It is evident in its participation, such as its contribution as the founder of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), a regional organization of Gulf countries that collaborates in the economic sector focusing on the oil industry (Zahlan 2016).

In addition to being active in the GCC, the United Arab Emirates also actively participates in the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation). The majority of the members of this organization are Muslim countries and they engage in international issues concerning Islam and humanity. This organization also aims to liberate the Palestinian people from the suffering of the shackles of Israeli Zionism. The United Arab Emirates openly claimed that Israel was an enemy of Islam after the country had declared independence. Their hatred towards Israel was the same as that of other Islamic countries. At that time, the United Arab Emirates vehemently opposed what Israel was doing to Palestine, as revealed by Sheikh Zayed (Alkim and Niblock 1989).

Tensions between the United Arab Emirates and Israel have been relatively unheard of since Sheikh Zayed's declaration. The relationship between them for the next few years tended to be cold, but without reaction from either country. In the years between 1971 and the 2000s, no issues regarding Israel-United Arab Emirates relations came to surface and things were said to be calm (Abed and Hellyer 2001). Conflict between the two only heated up in around 2010 as a result of the murder of an alleged member of the Hamas group, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, who was Israel's most wanted person.

Mabhouh, who was also a co-founder of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades - the military wing of Hamas, was found dead in a hotel room in Dubai (Kasolowsky and Johnson 2010). Several allegations were made by the head of the Dubai Police at that time, Lieutenant General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, suggesting that the victim had been killed by the Israeli intelligence agency, the Mossad. In response to this, the Dubai Police summoned Interpol to arrest Meir Dagan, the Mossad director suspected of being involved in this murder. As a result of this incident, tensions rose between the two countries. After the murder, Lieutenant General Tamim stated that all foreign tourists suspected of being Israeli citizens were prohibited from entering the country even with a foreign passport (Murphy 2010).

Later, the United Arab Emirates had good intentions to improve relations with Israel, but these intentions from the UAE were rejected by the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, because he thought their relationship would jeopardize Israel's position in the eyes of the US.

The relationship between the two countries moved into a bright spot two years later. The two countries held a secret meeting in New York, the USA, on 2012 bringing Prime Minister Netanyahu and UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed together. During their conversation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs promised to Netanyahu that the UAE would strengthen its relationship with Israel if the peace process between Israel and Palestine progressed (Ravid 2017). These two countries have the same view regarding Iran's nuclear project – they both oppose it. For this case, Israel urged the United Arab Emirates to vocalize its opinion on nuclear energy in Iran and oppose the agreement between the US and Iran in the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions) (Goldenberg et al. 2015).

The two countries became increasingly close-knit when the Israeli Energy Minister visited a website in January 2016 belonging to the International Renewable Energy Agency in Abu Dhabi, UAE, after he had announced the inauguration of an Israeli office there. This further improved relations and signs of normalization showed between the two countries. Besides working together in the energy sector, they have also been involved in bilateral relations in various fields, such as military, health, socio-culture, and sports. Although the year before 2012 had not been harmonious, the situation afterward was different, and the normalization process between the United Arab Emirates and Israel continues to develop yearly. It started in 2017, with Saudi Arabia opposing Iran's nuclear program and closeness further grew when the UAE approached one of the pro-Israel organizations, the FDD (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) as an effort closer with Israel through that organization (Jilani, June 3, 2017, and P.m

n.d.). Then in 2018, the relationship between the two began to appear again when Abu Dhabi became a secret meeting place for Israel and Turkey to discuss restoring cooperation ("Israel, Turkey Hold Secret Talks in UAE" 2018). One year later, the relationship of normalization became even clearer when the UAE invited Israel to attend an exhibition called the Dubai Expo 2020 innovation fair ("Israel to Take Part in Dubai Expo 2020" 2019).

Then, in 2020, when the world was facing a widespread pandemic due to COVID-19, Israel and UAE were no exceptions. However, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, these two countries took advantage of momentum to take further actions to normalize their relations. As a result of this incident, the UAE, which was previously known to be cold toward Israel, opened even closer bilateral relations in 2020. On August 13, 2020, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, Anwar Gargash, reported normalization between the two countries (Bohdan 2020). On the other hand, the ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the US, Yousef Otaiba, argued that the agreement to normalize relations between the two countries was nothing more than to stop Israel's planned annexation of Palestinians in the West Bank, which Netanyahu was known to have planned. That following Otaiba's opinion also suggests that the UAE has unique interests and policies toward Israel to maintain a "two-state solution" (Holmes, Borger, and correspondent 2020).

Based on this background, the writer of this research aims to analyze the interests of the UAE and the factors that have made the UAE normalize its diplomatic relations with Israel. This will be analyzed from one of the perspectives of one theory in international relations. The writer will attempt to analyze some

of the factors behind the UAE normalizing relations with Israel using Decision Making theory, which looks at what factors underlie this normalization from the point of view of the United Arab Emirates.

1.2 Research Question

Why was The United Arab Emirates should normalization with Israel through Abraham Accords 2020 in the period 2012-2021?

1.3 Research Objectives

1. To analyze the factors that have caused the United Arab Emirates to normalize relations with Israel from the perspective of UAE foreign policy.
2. To investigate the foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates in regards to their national interests through normalization with Israel.

1.4 Research Scope

The main focus of this research is the behavior of change in the foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates towards Israel, leading to normalization from 2012 until 2021. More specifically, this research has a historical scope and takes a look at the diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE, which fluctuated before normalization. Furthermore, the interests of each actor of the UAE in the negotiation process of the Abraham Accords Agreements, from 2012 until 2021, is investigated.

The author will explain in detail the normalization process between the United Arab Emirates and Israel, noting that in 2012, the countries had close

relations and expressed similar attitudes regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) to the United States against Iran. Meanwhile, in 2020 the two countries were involved in an agreement called the Abraham Accords 2020, which ensured the normalization of relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel and a new phenomenon in the Middle East region. In this research, the author uses a *Decision Making* perspective to investigate the influences on a country in the process of deciding its foreign policy.

1.5 Literature Review

Dr. Doron Itzchakov has explained the Israeli-UAE bilateral cooperation from the Iranian point of view expressing Iran's concern about Israel's hegemony in the Gulf state. The literature states that Iran is very worried about Israel-UAE cooperation, which they say will damage their Islamist regime in the region. Furthermore, Itzchakov said that the Iranian people view this skeptically by assuming those cooperating with Israel are traitors. However, Itzchakov has refuted this with the following sentence: "Muslim countries should not view Israel as an enemy that must be annihilated but should see Israel as a potential ally for mutual prosperity and security." Through this statement, Itzchakov tries to change the perception of the cooperation by arguing Israel might be the perfect partner for Muslim countries (Itzchakov 2020).

Jonathan H. Ferziger and Gawdat Bahgat's analysis states that Israeli hegemony has created a regional threat to Iran and Turkey in terms of domestic and foreign policy. Ferziger and Bahgat added that the initial factor was the ideological differences between Iran, Turkey, and the GCC member countries,

including the UAE. The UAE and GCC countries' members reject Iran and Turkey's influence. Moreover, the UAE and its allies suspect the excellent intentions of Iran and Turkey, who are assumed to be protectors of Palestine, are a lie. From here on, Israel has had a good opportunity for open cooperation with GCC countries, including the UAE. In addition, Ferziger and Gawdat added that the US role is no less critical in efforts to approach Israel with the GCC countries because of Trump's closeness to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, this does not lessen the GCC's anxiety about US policy in Iran but rather they assume it is the initial stage of the US strategic withdrawal from the Middle East (Ferziger and Bahgat 2020).

In line with the previous article, was an article written by Yoel Guzansky entitled *"Sparta in the Gulf: The Growing Regional Clout of the United Arab Emirates"* also argues that Iran and the UAE have had heated tensions since the events of the Iranian Revolution. The UAE and Iran have also been involved in an island dispute between their territories ever since British forces left the Gulf. This article also states that the UAE later became closer to Israel and its allies due to its conflict with Iran. Yoel describes the UAE military power as a superpower in the Gulf, which became one of the leaders of the GCC countries along with Saudi Arabia, and dubbed it *"Little Sparta."* Although Iran is their second-largest trading partner after China, the UAE still has heated tensions with Iran in the history of their bilateral relations. The article even stated that the UAE planned to create a nuclear program in 2017 as a step toward developing power in the Gulf as well as a form of Emirates' doubts about Iran's uranium enrichment. In the last sentence, Yoel added that Israel has recognized the UAE's strong power in the Gulf region

and has sought to strengthen cooperation with other Sunni Arab countries (Guzansky 2017).

With a slightly different take on the development of the UAE's foreign policy towards Israel, Yoel Guzansky has also written *"Israel, the Gulf States, and Annexation,"* which analyzed the Israeli policy to annex the Palestinian West Bank. In this case, the Gulf States responded to the actions taken by Israel. The UAE, the first Gulf country to decide to normalize relations with Israel, tried to strengthen bilateral ties over Israel's annexation and ensure the Israeli-Palestinian issue progressed. Guzansky also demonstrated the closeness of the UAE and Israel through the entering of two senior officials into a normalization agreement with Israel - Anwar Gargash, the UAE Foreign Minister, and Yousef Otaiba, the UAE Ambassador to the US - in Washington. In the article, Anwar Gargash argues that there is a misperception about Israeli and Palestinian issues and relations can still be built with Israel on other regional issues. In his statement, Gargash said, *"We can disagree with Israel on political issues and still cooperate in other areas, such as the coronavirus and technological matters."*

Moreover, Gargash added that the UAE has not changed its position on the rejection of Israel's annexation of Palestine. Guzansky revealed that if the annexation of Israel continues, The UAE will not cut their relationship with the Gulf. However, it must be known that the Gulf cannot escape their view of Palestine, which may weaken their capability of cooperation. (Guzansky 2020).

The previous article stated that the factor underlying the normalization between Israel and the UAE was Israel's annexation of the Palestinian West Bank. However, an article written by Dr. Edy Cohen and Dr. Frank Musmar entitled *"The*

Israel-UAE Peace Agreement Opens the Door" suggests that the main factor behind the normalization of Israel and the UAE is the active role of the US in spreading the doctrine of peace in the Middle East. Former US President Donald Trump said that this condition was a good step for the two countries' future for building regional cooperation and peace, and that he expected other Arab countries to follow in the steps taken by the United Arab Emirates. In the article, Cohen and Musmar argue that the Israel-UAE Agreement provides new hope for Israeli collaboration with other Arab countries. Furthermore, it is a joint effort to fight the influence of Iran and its allies in the Middle East, build bilateral cooperations, such as in military, health, and economy, and place the UAE as a leader in the Gulf. (E. Cohen and Musmar 2020).

Based on the explanations of previous articles, this research will further review the decision-making policy of the United Arab Emirates towards Israel during the negotiation process of normalization from the author's point of view, which has, of course, never been discussed in existing literature. The main focus of this research is none other than the driving factors of this normalization policy carried out by the UAE government. The author will attempt to analyze the dynamics of the UAE's foreign policy, especially the interests of each actor involved in this agreement. The author will analyze this research through the perspectives of one model of the theories of international relations, namely Decision Making Theory, which is the Government Politics Model or Bureaucracy Politics Model by Graham T. Allison.

1.6 Research Framework

Based his book *Essence of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis*, Graham T. Allison explains that there are several models of foreign policy analysis in determining decision making. These models include Rational, Organizational, and Government Politics or Bureaucratic Politics. The Organizational Model is a condition where the government controls the entire decision-making process through organizational representatives. In this model, when faced with a crisis, the government breaks it down into several pre-determined organizational factions. Government actors put more emphasis on short-term solutions in which an organization must take these actions according to agreed procedures. In addition, in this model, the government has finalized plans in advance to mobilize large-scale organizational actions.

In the Rational Actor Model the state is the leading actor of the relationship between countries. The state, in this case, is seen as an actor who can make rational decisions. According to the rational actor model, the decision-making process looks at the goals to be achieved, considerations in making choices, assesses consequences or risks that will arise afterward, and maximizes the benefits obtained in the results of the policies it determines. In this theory, government actors unite to determine foreign policy direction and act rationally on what is carefully planned. Furthermore, in this model, the government can use alternative solutions according to the conditions that existed at that time to analyze foreign policy (Allison 1971).

The final model is the Government Politics model. The Government Politics model has a different concept from the previous two theoretical models. The basic principles of the Government Politics model are as follows:

1. The Government Politics model assumes that the actors involved have different positions, ambitions, interests, and so on.
2. The Government Politics model argues that the position taken by an actor can influence the decision-making process.
3. The Government Politics model assumes that a country's policy comes from a bargaining game made by several actors involved in decision-making.

It is clear that the Government Politics model is very complex, as factors that arise are based on the interests of different actors. In addition, the Government Politics model also states that the actors who play a role are individual and assume that decision-making is a product of an existing conflict resolution. (Allison 1969).

Of the above outlined models, the author of this paper has chosen to use the Political Government Model. The reason the author uses this branch of the Decision Making Theory model, namely the analysis of the Government Political Model, is based on the decision-making process carried out by several officials from the United Arab Emirates, which is quite complex and has a significant role in the normalization process with Israel for the sake of common interests. Through this context, the Government Politics or Bureaucracy Politics model emphasizes the role of every government official actor who has an interest in the ongoing negotiation process in the Abraham Accords 2020. In this case, the actors who

negotiated the Abraham Accords agreement with the UAE government had differences. Opinions according to their respective interests in the bargaining process took place until the signing of the Abraham Accords 2020.

Matters associated with problem or cases related to the ‘normalization’ of the UAE with Israel can roughly be described as follows:




Figure 1 1 **Diagram The UAE’s Decision-Making Process Based on Model III Government Politics**

Based on the diagram, it can be seen that the actors involved were influenced by several factors when making the decision to normalize with Israel resulting in the agreement known as the Abraham Accords 2020.

1.7 Provisional Argument

The provisional argument of this research refers to the real reasons and interests of the United Arab Emirates behind the ‘normalization’ with Israel. It is

known that Israel annexed the West Bank, Palestine area in early 2020, causing concern for the UAE. Israel's annexation of the West Bank, Palestine, harms the interests of the UAE, especially on regional issues. These concerns are related to the fear of nuclear threat from Iran, which is still a nightmare for the UAE as is the dispute over Abu Musa island on the border between Iran and the UAE. The close relations of the UAE and the US seem to be paving way for the UAE to add troops to their potential ally in the Middle East region, namely Israel, with the aim of maintaining regional stability from Iranian hegemony. This happening behind scenes is also why the negotiation process to create 'normalization' of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel is running successfully.

Based on these provisional arguments, the analysis in this research uses the Decision Making Theory III model from Graham T. Allison, namely the Bureaucratic Politics Model or the Government Politics Model. Allison's theory behind the decision-making model has been helpful to the author in revealing the early stages leading to the UAE making significant changes in the state's position towards Israel during the negotiation process carried out by officials from the UAE. This negotiation process allowed to formation of a 'normalization' agreement with Israel which is embodied in the Abraham Accords Agreements 2020.

1.8 Research Methodology

1.8.1 The Types of Research Methodology

In this research, the writer uses the qualitative method. This method does not use numerical elements and tends to prefer social approaches. Social scientists

often use this method, which includes collaboration between researchers and the parties to be studied to develop a product that will positively change their relationship. In addition, this method is also used to investigate a problem to be discussed by understanding and digging deeper into the symptoms that are the main topic of a study. (Kuper, Reeves, and Levinson 2008).

1.8.2 The Subject and Object of The Research

. In any research, there are subjects and objects to study and related problems. The subject of this study is the United Arab Emirates as the leading actor in the normalization of relations with Israel. The object of this study are the policies of the United Arab Emirates government that underlie the normalization of relations with Israel, which have been subject to various debates among researchers of international relations, especially in examining this case. In this study, the author tends to emphasize the perspective of Decision Making as a basis for a deeper approach to the topic.

1.8.3 Data Collection Method

The data collected in this research is from several secondary data sources as basis in the data processing process. The reference sources of types include written documents and media, such as books, and academic texts consisting of international journals, trusted articles, and so on. Credible and reliable international news has also been included as a reference in this research.

1.8.4 Research Process

In the collection of research data, the author first collected several kinds of literature directly related to the research topic. Then, the data was reviewed independently and discussed with a lecturer or someone who is an expert in their field to discuss which ideas were appropriate for inclusion in this research. After that, this literature was reviewed again to identify any errors, before revisions were made to create accurate and comprehensive research on the data collection process.

1.9 Thesis Outline

Chapter I discusses the standard rules of scientific writing, including discussion of the background, research question, research purpose, research significance, research scope, literature review, conceptual framework, research rationale, and research methodology. The aforementioned details are discussed in relation to the dynamics of the UAE foreign policy toward normalization relations with Israel during the period 2012-2021.

Chapter II explains the history and factors behind the closer UAE relations with Israel and the process of initiating public normalization in the Abraham Accords 2020. In addition, this chapter also describes the dynamics that occurred in the UAE before and after Abraham Accords.

Chapter III describes the actors involved with the negotiation process between the UAE and Israel leading up to the signing of the Abraham Accords. The actions of these actors are analyzed using the Decision Making Theory Government Politics Model III or Bureaucratic Politics Model from Graham T. Allison. The influences, interests, and bargaining game of each UAE government actor involved

in the Abraham Accords 2020 agreement are explained according to their respective interests in this 'normalization' event. Finally, this chapter also explains bilateral agreements or cooperations between the UAE and Israel, which will be of benefit to the UAE after 'normalizing' with Israel.

Chapter IV concludes the entire research and contains constructive suggestions or recommendations for this research.



CHAPTER II
THE REASONS BEHIND OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL IN 2012-2020

2.1 The Government System and The Political Condition of The United Arab Emirates

Basically, before knowing more about the government system and political conditions of the United Arab Emirates itself. In this case, understanding these two points is necessary to do considering that this is the basis for understanding the principles of the government of the United Arab Emirates, especially in their political system, which of course has links to the next discussion later.

2.1.1 The Government System of The United Arab Emirates

Since the founding of the United Arab Emirates in 1971, the political form of the UAE has been in the form of a federal presidential elective constitutional monarchy in which the administrative area is divided into seven monarchical administrative regions, namely, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Quwain. Constitutionally, the highest power holder or president is hereditary in the hands of the Abu Dhabi leader, and the prime minister or government control holder is in the hands of the Dubai leader (Emir of Dubai). Each emirate or state of the UAE led by the Emir has considerable power, for example from control over natural resources to income. In terms of power, the United Arab Emirates itself has branches of power in its constitution, such as executive, legislative, and judicial (Herb 2009).

In addition, legislative and executive powers are divided into federal and emirate jurisdictions. In the constitution, the executive power in the United Arab Emirates consists of a president and vice president who are elected and determined by the Federal High Council consisting of the leaders of each emirate. It is through this federal authority that the president and vice president have responsibilities including foreign affairs, security and defense, citizenship and immigration matters, education, public health, currency, postal, telephone, and other communications services, air traffic control, aircraft licensing, relations labor, banking, delimitation of territorial waters and extradition of criminals. In addition to the things already mentioned, the president and the Federal High Council have other powers to appoint and manage the ranks of his government's cabinet, especially in terms of managing all the internal and foreign affairs of the federation under constitutional and federal laws (United Arab Emirates The Cabinet n.d.)

2.1.2 The Political Condition of The United Arab Emirates

Based on the explanation of the government system in the United Arab Emirates, they explicitly assume that the government implemented by the UAE refers to a semi-authoritarian state (Nationalism and Nationhood in the United Arab Emirates n.d.). This refers to the president's significant role, especially in terms of decision-making both at home and abroad. Even though they had been hit by the Arab Spring phenomenon in the early 2010s, this did not necessarily change their government's authorization. Even though there were some small protests during the Arab spring period, the government of the United Arab Emirates at that time did not hesitate to give consequences to anyone who acted against the government, one of the real consequences was the loss of their citizenship (Shah 2011). Therefore,

in this case, the government has its way of carrying out a reform strategy in government that they carried out from early 2007 to 2008. In this case, the UAE government has carried out large-scale development in various sectors such as the economy and infrastructure as well as made several improvements related to efficiency in performance. UAE government. This is intended so that they will be able to modernize the UAE in the future so that their partners from other countries are interested in investing in the UAE (United Arab Emirates n.d.).

2.2 The Brief History of The Abraham Accords 2020

The phenomenon of The Abraham Accords Agreement 2020 reaped the pros and cons at the beginning of its appearance. The Abraham Accords 2020 event, also known as the normalization of relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, did not happen immediately but took place in a short time. Negotiations took place between countries until each state actor had made various considerations, as stated in the Abraham Accords Agreement 2020, allowing the reaching of an agreement. Historically, relations between the three countries have not been as harmonious as in recent years.

The United Arab Emirates, early in its independence, strongly criticized the existence of the state of Israel itself. However, in 2012, normalization of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates began. In September 2012, two top state officials held a secret meeting in New York, USA. At the meeting, held in the hotel room of the Israeli leaders during the 67th United Nations General Assembly meeting, the officials discussed two of the main topics at the meeting (“Haaretz:

UAE FM Held Secret Meeting with Netanyahu” 2017). Israel was represented by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while the United Arab Emirates was represented by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan. They discussed holding the same position regarding Iran's nuclear development, which threatens the stability of security in the Middle East region. However, at that time, discussions had not reached the normalization plan between the two countries because there was no improvement in case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict towards peace. (Arab 2017).

The closeness of Israel and the United Arab Emirates was visible during one of Israel's diplomatic missions for the planned opening of a representative office of the International Renewable Agency in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The mission referred to here was not a formal Israeli diplomatic mission to the United Arab Emirates because there was no agreement to normalize relations between the two countries at that time. According to the then Israeli Foreign Minister, the visit was a regular formal visit and not a special mission; it just happened to coincide with his place in Abu Dhabi, where the United Arab Emirates served as a facilitator. Besides that, the visit also did not change the attitude of Israel and the United Arab Emirates towards the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Reuters 2015).

When, entering the year 2020, Israel had annexed most of the West Bank area of Palestine, the global COVID-19 outbreak was also beginning, which gave Israel additional momentum. However, in July 2020, Yousef Al-Otaiba, an

Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the United States in Washington DC, conducted negotiations with Jared Kushner and Avi Berkowitz, the primary advisers to Donald J. Trump, regarding the issue of the annexation of the West Bank. At the same time, Otaiba further discussed the issue of annexation and alternative solutions to the problem. The issue came to a climax on September 15, 2020, when the United Arab Emirates and its neighboring country, the Kingdom of Bahrain, normalized relations with Israel at the White House, the United States, with the requirement that Israel postpones its annexation of the West Bank, Palestine. This agreement between the three countries was named the Abraham Accords Agreements 2020, as Abraham himself emphasized the religious beliefs between Islam and Judaism, which both came from the Abrahamic religion (Guzansky and Marshall 2020).

2.3 United Arab Emirates Decision on Abraham Accords 2020

Given the history of the Abraham Accords process, especially from the perspective of the United Arab Emirates, the author will now discuss how the Abraham Accords agreement was carried out after the signing, especially in the UAE which has received various responses to the signing. There have been good responses from international politics as well as responses condemning the UAE's normalization of Israel. This section also clarifies and explains the normalization of Israel, based on the point of view of the United Arab Emirates.

2.3.1 UAE Standpoints on Abraham Accords 2020

According to the United Arab Emirates government, normalization with Israel was a proper step to take. The steps taken by the government of the United Arab Emirates towards normalization were not a form of betrayal of the Islamic world, as reported in several media, but actually a victory for the Islamic world, especially for Palestine, as it stopped the annexation of the West Bank region that Israel planned to carry out. In addition, the efforts made were also a form of support from the United Arab Emirates regarding the 'two-state solution' and maintaining the stability of the Middle East region, especially between Israel and Palestine (Sankar 2020).

Establishing diplomatic relations with Israel is very important for the United Arab Emirates. The relations reinforce the secret cooperation between the two countries on security-political and economics issues before the formal normalization. Establishing cooperation with Israel is a good decision for the UAE itself and the Middle East region. Both countries have the same goal: to stop Iran and Turkey's influence which threatens regional stability (Guzansky and Feuer 2021). Cooperation between Israel and the UAE has also strengthened after the Abraham Accords 2020 agreement, with evidence such as the UAE being the most active country in entering into cooperation with Israel, such as holding MOUs, exchange of ambassadors, joint military training, trade cooperation, and many more. This cooperation is outlined in Table 1 below:

	UAE	Bahrain	Morocco	Sudan
Exchange of ambassadors/ official representatives	✓	✓	✓	✗
Continuation agreements	✓	✓	✓	✗
Direct flights	✓	✓	✓	✗
Increased trade	✓	✗	✓	✗
Security cooperation	✓	✓	✓	✗

Table 1 1 Table of Countries Which Have Agreements with Israel on Abraham Accords 2020 (Source: The Institute For National Security Studies).

2.3.2 United Arab Emirates After the Abraham Accords Agreements 2020

The United Arab Emirates' commitment to fully support Palestine's independence from occupation is still pursued. The UAE still maintains its position regarding the fate of Palestine despite normalization with Israel. One of the representatives of the UAE ambassador to France, Ali Abdullah Al-Ahmed, said that the UAE remains firm in its decision regarding the UAE's position on Palestine. Ahmed further explained that normalization with Israel was an attempt by the UAE to prevent the expansion of territory by Israel against Palestine. (Takieddine 2020).

Furthermore, the UAE government has explained that problems with Israel can not be separated from religious issues. In its decision, the Emirati Fatwa

Council stated that the decision taken by the UAE government to normalize relations with Israel was 'maslaha' (an act based on Islamic law for the common good). Chairman of the Fatwa Council Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah concluded that the decision was at the discretion of the executive ruler. According to him, the agreement would prevent Israel's sovereignty over the Palestinian West Bank and avoid the threat of war amid a pandemic, promoting peace and benefiting humankind. (Winter and Guzansky 2020).

The Abraham Accords 2020 agreement elicited a response among extremist organizations, especially those from ISIS and Al-Qaeda. In their responses, they threatened to re-occupy Al-Aqsa if the Abraham Accords agreement was signed. However, in reality, ISIS was actually silent on this problem even though one of the newspapers they published contained news from the Abraham Accord. However, rejections of the agreement were not as vocal as when Trump moved the US embassy to Israel in Jerusalem in 2017. Then, this is in contrast to ISIS. Al-Qaeda seen this as a betrayal of Muslims. They argue that the blame here is on the Gulf States, and they suggest overthrowing the regime on its territory rather than targeting Israel itself. (Qandil 2020).

There have been various responses to the agreement between Israel, the UAE, and the United States in the Abraham Accords agreement, and the positive and negative responses from countries worldwide seem to come alternately. Countries that give full support to the agreement, such as Egypt, Britain, France, Sudan, Bahrain, and Jordan, appreciate the decision taken by the UAE to normalize their diplomatic relations with Israel. Even Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi said that the agreement could bring peace and allow the goal of achieving prosperity

and security stability in the Middle East region be realized in the future (Reuters 2020). Meanwhile, Jordan and Bahrain, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that the agreement with Israel was one of the efforts to encourage Israel to recognize Palestinian sovereignty and achieve peace in the Middle East (Asmar 2020).

On the other hand, some countries consider the actions taken by the UAE to be a 'betrayal' of the Islamic world. Many Islamic countries have criticized the UAE's actions, including with Iran, which considers the decision taken by the UAE to have threatened the Islamic world. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said that the UAE had become a partner in Israel's crimes. Furthermore, Iran also warned the UAE that if anything happens in the Gulf or threatens Iran's sovereignty, the UAE is the country most to blame in this regard (BBC Persian 2020). This response didn't differ much from the responses of Qatar and Turkey. These two countries even sent funds or supplies of equipment for Hamas to strengthen the Palestinian military in response to the disappointment of what the UAE had done ("Hamas Hails Turkey's Intra-Palestine Unity Efforts as Israel Bombs Gaza" n.d.).

2.4 Factors Which Affected Normalization of the UAE toward Israel

Even though the UAE-Israel incident shocked international politics, the two countries seem to have cooperated long before the normalization, as detailed in chapter 1. Iran's hegemony in the Middle East region is the most serious problem; the UAE ; The UAE is at least given the option of doing something. Normalization

with Israel is considered by many as making a good ally. Israel's annexation of the West Bank of Palestine can undoubtedly affect the future of their bilateral relations in the region, but with normalization between the two, it is hoped that they will become strong allies in the region who can maintain regional stability in the Middle East.

As outlined in Conceptual Framework in Chapter 1, this research uses one of the theoretical models proposed by Graham T. Allison in the Decision-Making theory, namely the Government Politics model or the Bureaucratic Politics model. Allison has explained that, in this model, state actors have a vital role in the ongoing decision-making process. In this case, the Government Politics theory model refers to three things: the interests and different positions of each actor in decision making, how much influence the actor has in making decisions, and the bargaining game between actors, which ultimately results in decisions.

Thus, this research aims to analyze these three aspects in the decision-making process carried out by the United Arab Emirates, such that it could finally decide to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel resulting in the Abraham Accords 2020 agreement. Based on the theoretical model of Government Politics, the model is also capable of looking at what factors are behind the UAE normalizing with Israel, which is the basis of the analysis in the next chapter.

2.3.1 The Geopolitical Situation of Middle East Region

The Abraham Accords 2020 agreement created momentum for a new era in the geopolitical views of the Middle East, especially the views of Muslim countries towards Israel. Even though history indicates that Egypt and Jordan have previously

conducted normalization with Israel, namely in 1979 and 1998, the normalization event between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel seems to have had a significant impact on other Arab countries in terms of them considering normalization with Israel (Hoffman 2020). For the UAE itself, normalization with Israel is a positive step in geopolitics, considering the heated tensions between Iran and the UAE. Iran's nuclear program, which is undoubtedly a significant threat to the sovereignty of the UAE, is one of the reasons why Israel deserves to be a regional ally of the UAE, in addition to the Gulf countries. Moreover, the shared view between the UAE and Israel on Iran's nuclear power plans, which has already worried in the Middle East, is another reason for cooperating as regional allies (Shams-uz-Zaman 2011).

The secret meeting in New York in 2012 between Abdullah bin Zayed and Benjamin Netanyahu was the first signal for the UAE and Israel to normalize. From this event, movements toward normalization continued with the visit of the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations to the UAE in the context of activities as chairman of the UN Legal Committee (Segal 2016). This incident then was followed by the former Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence, visiting Abu Dhabi as part of a conference at the 2019 UN event, which opened the way for normalization (Barghoti 2019). Furthermore, the initial bilateral cooperation between Israel and the UAE took place when they reached an agreement in the cyber security and intelligence field worth nearly US\$3 billion for regional security needs between the two countries (Barakat 2020).

2.3.2 The Annexation Planning of Israel in West Bank, Palestine

On the journey before normalization, Israel made a move that surprised many parties in 2020. This was the planned annexation of the West Bank, Palestine, by elements of the Israeli government which posed a threat to stability, including to Jordan and its surroundings. In this matter, many parties have opposed the decision made by the Israeli government. This is proven May 2020, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu submitted a proposal to annex the West Bank, Palestine area of 30 percent of the entire territory. The action, of course, received opposition from various regional and international parties. In this case, tensions may flare up again regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Almohamad 2020).

The Gulf States and Egypt responded to Benjamin Netanyahu's statement with criticism of the annexation plan and reminded Israel to comply with the rules of international law. This incident gave rise to speculation of closer ties between the Gulf States, Israel, and Egypt. Behind their statements, especially in the case of the Gulf States, there were indications of wanting a 'normalization' process, for example, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates reminded Israel that there was a problem more critical than annexation, namely preventing Iran's hegemony from expanding in the Middle East (Beck 2019).

After seeing the incident, Yousef Al Otaiba, Ambassador of the UAE to Washington DC, USA, wrote an opinion that shocked many circles at the time. The opinion which has been written by Otaiba, published in one of the well-known newspapers in Israel, provoked both parties from the UAE and Israel to publicize their 'normalized' relationship. The United States saw this opinion in the newspaper

as an historic moment regarding Muslim-Jewish relations (Ahren n.d.). The step that then took place was a meeting between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain to sign the normalization of relations between the three countries, at which time the UAE was represented by Abdullah bin Zayed AL Nahyan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of The UAE). Just after negotiations reached the Trump deal and before the publication of their normalization, Benjamin Netanyahu and Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed held a conference. The Minister of State For Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash announced this event to the public and said that his country would continue to support the 'two-state solution' regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and matters relating to this issue will remain at the negotiating table (Baker et al. 2020).

2.3.3 The Close Relations Between The UAE and The United States

In the discussion of the 'normalization' between the UAE-Israel, it is important to note the role of the United States in assisting the negotiation process between the two countries to reach an agreement. As is well known, the United States of America has fairly close diplomatic relations with Israel and the UAE. If we look at the relationship between Israel, the US, and the UAE, it may be possible to trace the UAE's interest in the Israeli military's sophisticated drones. This remote-controlled aircraft technology seems to be a strong reason for the UAE to be interested in normalization with Israel. The UAE's serious intention to improve the quality of its defense sector was then proven by the UAE's interest in buying one of the US' fighter jets, the F-35. However, this was hindered by Israel's approval,

considering that the US' closest partner in the Middle East at that time was Israel. (Tarzi 2020).

The closeness of the UAE, the US, and Israel in the military field was also seen when the UAE and Israel carried out joint military exercises three times, which the US and Italy directly sponsored (G. Cohen 2017). The UAE's approach to the US is not simply diplomatic relations, but is also an attempt by the UAE to carry out transactions with US-owned sophisticated weapons and another step in approaching Israel to carry out its desire for normalization. The proximity between the UAE and the US is often evident in records of arms imports where there are records of the UAE being one of the largest arms importers from the US, with 200 million USD annually. The UAE's approach to the US is not without reason (Amit 2020). The UAE buys this military equipment to strengthen their military for Middle East regional defense purposes. It is a Gulf country that actively sends troops for peacekeeping in conflict areas such as Yemen, Libya, and Afghanistan. In addition, their efforts are also part of the UAE's agenda in protecting the region from attacks by Iran's radical Shia ideology, especially in the Middle East. Therefore, the presence of US military bases significantly assists the defense of the UAE in preventing the expansion of Iran's ideology in the region (Ibish 2017).

The UAE-US relations track record was also recorded in 2013 when the UAE purchased US military equipment, namely by adding to its fleet of 30 F-16 jets and additional ammunition (Guided Bomb Units GBU-31 and GBU-12). This reaffirmed the UAE's commitment to defending its territory from air raids, threats, and Iranian domination (Kazman 10 May). Seeing this seriousness, the US certainly

views this as a good step in efforts to normalize Israel and the UAE in the future. Given that Israel is a long-time partner of the US and is their closest partner in the Middle East, this is also what the UAE used to approach the US as a step to realize normalization with Israel, which will benefit the UAE in the future the Middle East regional stability.

2.3.4 The Secret Relations of UAE and Israel Before Normalization

In addition to the harmonious closeness between the UAE and the US, the UAE's steps in approaching Israel have been seen before. As mentioned earlier, the UAE and Israel had a secret meeting in 2012 in Washington DC, USA. Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan represented the UAE in this meeting, while Benjamin Netanyahu represented Israel. They discussed Iran's movements in the Middle East and their nuclear developments at the meeting. In the meeting, the UAE also sought to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (Ravid 2017).

In other cases, the UAE has also exhibited close relations with Israel, such as cases involving Israeli expatriates, dual nationals, or immigrant workers from Israel who work in the UAE. This case then caused several problems regarding visas for the citizens of these countries because there had never been diplomatic relations between the two countries. In addition, members of Israeli companies wishing to travel on business to the UAE had to go through a third-party intermediary as a liaison in their business (Friedman 2010). In response to a large number of Israeli citizens in the UAE in 2019, the Abu Dhabi authorities announced a plan to open a synagogue for Jews residing in the UAE, as part of an interfaith complex, by 2022 (Staff 2019). Further closeness between the UAE and Israel is

seen in sports tournaments. At a Judo tournament held in 2018 in Abu Dhabi, the UAE allowed representatives from Israel. The Israeli national anthem was also allowed to play when one of the Israeli athletes won the tournament (Hacohen and Lazaroff n.d.).

Another behind-the-scenes collaboration between Emirates and Israel has existed since 2008, when the Committee for Vital Establishments and Facilities Abu Dhabi signed a security and military contract with AGT International, a company owned by Israeli entrepreneur Mati Kochavi based in Switzerland. In terms of cooperation with Israel, the UAE focuses on advanced Israeli military defense technologies, such as acquiring UAE spyware technology developed by Israel's NSO Group. According to a University of Toronto Laboratory study, this is being watched by politicians from the UAE (Barrington and Williams 2020). The next most extensive cooperation in security and military fields between the UAE-Israel is the UAE MOU with the Israel Space Agency, which has enhanced new cooperation for scientific research, space exploration, and knowledge transfer to accelerate economic growth and human progress. On this occasion, the two countries even reached an agreement on a planned lunar launch mission called "Beresheet 2," which is scheduled for 2024 (Aamir and Saleh 2021).

On the other hand, economic cooperation between the UAE and Israel prior to normalization was considered positive, particularly in terms of dealing with the problem of pandemics. The Israeli Aerospace Industries and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems signed an agreement with the Emirati Group 42 technology company to solve the COVID-19 pandemic problem effectively and efficiently in

their respective countries (Jerusalem Post Staff 2020). This collaboration also benefited Palestinians, who, in June 2020, received an Etihad Airways plane at Ben Gurion Airport delivering necessary medical supplies for the pandemic (Magid n.d.).



CHAPTER III

THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES IN ISRAEL IN THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS AGREEMENTS 2020 VIEWED THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT POLITICS MODELS OF *THE DECISION MAKING THEORY*

3.1 Positions, Ambitions and Interests of The UAE Actors Which Involved in Abraham Accords 2020

The previous chapter explained the factors behind the creation of normalization between the UAE and Israel. This chapter analyzes the decision-making process carried out from the point of view of the United Arab Emirates, based on the concept of the Decision-Making model III Government Politics model from Graham T. Allison. This chapter also provides an elaboration of the analysis based on the theoretical model of the Government Politics model and the related factors in the previous chapter, which are mutually sustainable.

This sub-chapter considers the position, ambition, and interest of each government actor from the United Arab Emirates who had an essential role in the decision-making process of the normalization. According to diagram 1 there are four main actors from the UAE that played an essential role in the decision-making: Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Yousef Al Otaiba, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Anwar Gargash. Each actor had his own considerations and interests when choosing the option of normalizing Israel to the Abraham Accords 2020.

3.1.1 Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi)

Each of the actors had influence as well as their own vision and mission during the consideration of the 'normalization' of UAE diplomatic relations with Israel. The first actor from the UAE with a strong influence was Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. At the time of the 'normalization' event between the UAE and Israel, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan served as the Crown Prince of the then Emir of Abu Dhabi, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In his journey towards the normalization events, Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) had significant influence. The strong influence of Mohammed bin Zayed in the Abraham Accords 2020 event is based on the substantial domestic political influence of Mohammed bin Zayed, who was the Emir of Abu Dhabi at the time of the event (Worth 2020).

Even political scientists mention Mohammed bin Zayed as the leader of the UAE's influential people and the country's authoritarian regime. According to political scientist Christopher Davidson, Mohammed bin Zayed was the de facto leader of the UAE, which involved *"a real and rapid intensification of autocratic-authoritarianism."* (Davidson 2021). This influence was evident when Mohammed bin Zayed supported the Saudi invasion of Yemen as a form of The UAE's support for Yemen from the Houthis (Gray 2015). Furthermore, Mohammed bin Zayed's closeness to the United States since the Obama era led to assumptions that this closeness was the trigger for 'normalization' event to begin. Prince Mohammed regarded the United States as their main ally. Mohammed also consulted with former US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, and former US national security adviser and counter-terrorism expert Richard A. Clarke and followed their constant

advice on fighting terrorism and improving defense and intelligence in the UAE military. However, the relationship began deteriorating when Obama refused to consult and notify the UAE of the US nuclear deal with Iran.

However, the relationship between the UAE and the US began to improve when the next US president, Donald Trump Jr., was elected. Mohammed and Trump often shared their views on nuclear Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, two issues of which that shared similar views on (Kirkpatrick 2019). In addition, on the advice of senior US national security staff, Trump also shared his views on Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Libya with Mohammed bin Zayed. This discussion later became part of the background for the "normalization" of the Israel-United Arab Emirates, which was announced in August 2020 by the representatives of the three countries, namely Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel) and Donald Trump (US), and Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (UAE).

3.1.2 Yousef Al Otaiba (Ambassador of The UAE to Washington DC, USA)

After Mohammed bin Zayed, the next actor known to be involved and influential in the Abraham Accords is Yousef Al Otaiba. Yousef Al Otaiba is the son of the UAE's first oil minister Mana Saeed Al Otaiba. Yousef Al Otaiba was appointed as the UAE ambassador to Washington in 2008 and became a minister in 2017. He also had an affinity with Israel when he attended an event organized by JINSA in 2018 and he sat at the table with Israel's ambassador to Washington, Ron Dermer. In connection with that, Yousef Otaiba himself also has quite a close relationship with several ranks of the US government during the Donald Trump administration, such as with Awi Berkowitz and Jared Kushner (Nahmias 2020).

Even before the 'normalization' process between the UAE-Israel began, Otaiba often met Jared Kushner behind the scenes on issues concerning normalization and continued negotiations on his advice. Awi Berkowitz also said that Otaiba was someone he could trust when meeting him in person. Otaiba's other influence was evident in the early days; he initiated the idea of carrying out 'normalization' efforts through his opinion writing in the Israeli media, Yedioth Ahronoth. However, before publishing the opinion, Otaiba had asked his colleague, a Jewish-American businessman, Haim Saban, for advice (S. Z. Cohen 2020).

Saban advised Otaiba to use Hebrew in his writing and which pages and media he should choose. After the publication of this article, Yousef Al Otaiba immediately met his previously mentioned colleague Awi Berkowitz. With Berkowitz, Otaiba discussed plans to prevent Israel's annexation and his proposal to create a new strong alliance in the Middle East to counter Iran's hegemony. After this discussion, Berkowitz then held further discussions with the parties concerned and identified a better solution at a safe negotiation table. Finally an agreement was reached on normalization on August 13, 2020 (Federico-O'Murchú 2020).

3.1.3 Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of The UAE)

In addition to the two previously mentioned actors, two further actors are considered to have strong influence and involvement in the normalization process of the Abraham Accords 2020. These two actors are Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Anwar Gargash. Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the son of the founder of the United Arab Emirates, Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. Currently, in the

government of the UAE, His Highness Abdullah bin Zayed serves as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. The influence of Abdullah bin Zayed has been significant, especially in the process of 'normalization' and the position of the UAE in international politics. He often attends delegations at special state events related to bilateral and other international cooperation.

In respect to the normalization process, Abdullah bin Zayed has had the role of determining the UAE's position in international politics, including its proximity to Israel. As is well known, Abdullah bin Zayed also had a secret meeting with the then Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington in 2012. In addition, Abdullah bin Zayed is also known to have a strong influence in determining the position of the UAE in international politics, such as determining the position of the UAE after Israel attacked the Iranian alliance in Syria. Abdullah bin Zayed justified Israel's actions (Ahren n.d.). Moreover, Abdullah bin Zayed also condemned the 'colonial' actions carried out by Iran and Turkey in Syria and urged them to end them immediately (Browning 2017). Then, on 15 September 2020, Abdullah also had an essential role in the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accord agreement with Israel and Bahrain at the White House, Washington DC, USA which President Donald Trump also attended (Crowley 2020).

3.1.4 Anwar Gargash (Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The UAE)

The final of the four actors is Anwar Gargash. Anwar Gargash was known in the UAE as Minister of State For Foreign Affairs during the era of the first president of the UAE, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Similar to Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Anwar Gargash also had a relatively strong influence on the

foreign policy of the UAE. As seen in the UAE-Israel 'normalization' process, Gargash often provided ideas regarding Israel and his views on responding to the phenomenon of Arab state strategy, which has still been unable to defuse the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ahren n.d.). In this case, Gargash emphasized the need for a change of strategy by Arab countries in responding to this conflict. In his opinion, Arab countries should not continue to boycott Israel but instead, use open communication and establish cooperation with Israel so that the realization of the dream of peace can be realized in the future (Ahren n.d.).

3.2 The Influence Positions and *Bargaining Game* of The UAE Actors Which Involved in Decision Making Process on Abraham Accords 2020

According to Allison, the Government Politics Model assumes that the actors involved have considered determining a decision. In this model the actors have different interests and ways of thinking in every decision. For this case, each of the previously mentioned actors, Mohammed bin Zayed, Yousef Al-Otaiba, Abdullah bin Zayed, and Anwar Gargash, have their own way of thinking in their involvement in the Abraham Accords 2020 agreement. Taking a look at Mohammed bin Zayed first, based on an analysis through Government Politics, Mohammed bin Zayed was the most influential actor and had a significant role in the Abraham Accords 2020. The actor, now the third president of the United Arab Emirates, replacing his brother Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, strongly influenced the UAE government at the time and continues to do so. The man, known as one of

the strongest Arab leaders because of his influence, has ended the long feud between the UAE and Israel thanks to his superior diplomatic skills.

However, Mohammad bin Zayed, often known as 'MBZ,' had his considerations before making the 'normalization' decision. The first was MBZ's close relationship with the United States ever since MBZ was seen visiting Camp David with US President George W. Bush (McFarlane 2019). Given that the US is Israel's most dominant ally, Mohammed bin Zayed may have factored this into his

consideration of 'normalization.' Although, as previously mentioned, MBZ's relationship with the US deteriorated during the leadership of Barack Obama, the relationship improved with the election of Donald Trump as the next US president.

Mohammed bin Zayed 2019 even had a telephone conversation in which they shared their views on Iran and Qatar (National 2019). Exactly two years earlier, in 2017, Trump and Mohammed bin Zayed had also met and held joint discussions at the White House, Washington DC, USA. At that time, they were seen talking about cooperating on counter-terrorism actions, Iran's hegemony, and increasing other bilateral cooperation (Embassy of the UAE Washington DC 2017). It was later revealed in 2020 that the closeness of Mohammed bin Zayed and Donald Trump was crucial in the 'normalization' event, especially after MBZ said after winning the prestigious award as the Scholar-Statesman Award, which given by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy for his role in cementing the Abraham Accords. He said that the UAE aspires to make great peace and forgiveness for all, even though we live in a complex and risky area, the results and incentives obtained will be much more significant and will be realized through what is known as the Abraham Accords agreement 2020 (Sankar n.d.).

Unlike Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who had earlier close relations with several US state officials, Yousef Al Otaiba did not respond to the 'normalization' event. Otaiba saw this event from the perspective of stability, security, and the region's future. What he considered was the possibility of Israel annexing the West Bank, Palestine. Yousef Al Otaiba argued that the annexation would make it challenging to enhance security and economic and cultural cooperation with the Arab world and the UAE itself. Furthermore, his written opinion also stated that the normalization option would be better than annexing occupied land (Embassy of the UAE Washington DC 2020).

Therefore, Otaiba tried to carry out the 'normalization' process by writing articles in Hebrew and publishing them in Israeli-centric media on the advice of his friend, a Jewish-American businessman, Haim Saban. As well as the proposed annexation, Yousef Al Otaiba also had other considerations in carrying out 'normalization' with Israel. Otaiba was known to have good friendships with the people closest to President Donald Trump at the time, Jared Kushner and Avi Berkowitz (Aljazeera 2018). Otaiba helped Kushner obtain information about Qatar, which was a country supporting terrorism and the obtained information made Kushner cancel the cooperation agreement between Qatar and his company. Prior to the 'normalization' incident, Otaiba had asked Kushner and Berkowitz, in joint negotiations with Israel, for the continuation of their relationship. During the “normalization” process, Jared Kushner's teammate, Avi Berkowitz, said that Otaiba was a necessary figure. Berkowitz even said that Otaiba was a negotiator and the leading actor in this event; he said without his presence, this 'normalization' might not have gone according to plan (Gerber 2021).

Consideration for 'normalization' also came from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The figure of Abdullah bin Zayed was often seen in the media when it comes to issues of UAE foreign policy and the UAE's position in the world's eyes. As discussed in previous chapters, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed had a secret meeting with the then Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, in 2012 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. At the meeting, where the UAE representative to Washington accompanied Abdullah bin Zayed, US Yousef Al Otaiba met with Benjamin Netanyahu in order to discuss the possible Iran nuclear deal as well as the fate of Palestine.

Considerations of the closeness of his close confidant, Yousef Al Otaiba, with the pro-Israeli neo-conservative think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), fueled Abdullah bin Zayed's growing relationship with Israel. Abdullah bin Zayed's next consideration stemmed from his concern about Iran's geopolitical conditions, especially Iran's hegemony (Sabah 2017). In April 2010, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed made a statement comparing Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Iran's occupation of the island of Abu Musa, UAE, which was a statement that caused heated tensions between Iran and the UAE (Almezaini and Rickli 2016).

Abdullah bin Zayed is one of the UAE government officials who strongly emphasized the importance of Iran's threat in the Middle East. He and Mohammed bin Zayed also told US officials not to sympathize with Iran any further because of the consequences it would have given their nuclear weapons (Sadjapour 2011). On another occasion, Abdullah bin Zayed also criticized Iran's actions against their

intervention and their interference on the side of the Houthis in the Yemen War, which, according to him, resulted in chaos, instability, and a perverted ideology that caused the Middle East region to become unstable (Middle East Monitor 2016).

The final consideration came from the Ministry of State for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Gargash. Anwar Gargash is also said to have had the same considerations as the other actors involved. Gargash himself said that the three previously mentioned people, Mohammed bin Zayed, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Yousef Al Otaiba, played a crucial role in the "normalization" process. Gargash's view of Israel also changed, which he considered a change of strategy for the realization of peace to consider for Arab countries where which allows the creation of peace in the region (Reuters Staff 2019).

According to Gargash, the Israeli annexation of the West Bank would also impact regional peace and would be a severe problem for the UAE (Ahren n.d.). He also stated that everything would change in the next 15 years. The possibility of integration between Palestinian and Israeli policies could trigger a new state for both in which the 'two-state solution' would no longer be relevant. Therefore, Gargash expects Arab countries to increase political contacts or other matters outside the topic through several small bilateral agreements or cooperation with Israel for peace in the Middle East (Batrawy 2021).

Based on the analysis of the above actors through the Government Politics Model theory from Graham T. Allison, Mohammed bin Zayed was the most dominant figure in this negotiation process. This was proven when MBZ, together with the 46th president of the United States, Donald Trump, and the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, completed a series of normalization processes

between the two countries. This became known through the Joint Statement between the UAE, the US, and Israel, which was recorded on August 13, 2020 (UNITED ARAB EMIRATES MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 2020). Meanwhile, the negotiations for normalization were fully supported by the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba. Otaiba, who helped with the normalization process, asked for help from Trump's closest people, Jared Kushner and Avi Berkowitz, to ensure the smooth process of normalizing the UAE-Israel at the negotiating table brokered by the US.

However, different views were displayed by other actors, such as Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Anwar Gargash. On certain occasions, Abdullah bin Zayed AL Nahyan openly condemned Israel's annexation, violating international law provisions and indirectly opposing his brother Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (UNITED ARAB EMIRATES MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 2019). This was also different from Anwar Gargash's view; however, he did warn of Israel's actions regarding their annexation of the West Bank, Palestine. He also gave a number of statements to other Arab countries to look at Israel from a different perspective: a positive perspective. Moreover, he added that the normalization of the UAE and Israel would not be perfect and, unfortunately, this has happened. Gargash also added that the issue of Palestine and Israel was handed back to them. This conflict is no elaboration of the UAE-Israel normalization case (Ng 2020). Through the analysis, it can be concluded that there is still an authoritarian tradition, which can be seen in Mohammed bin Zayed's more dominant role, in this case, followed by his loyal

supporter Yousef Al Otaiba. Then, it was followed by their constitutional ratification of Israel at the United Arab Emirates Council of Ministers session chaired by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (Al Arabiya English 2020).

3.3 Foreign Policy Action and Forms of Bilateral Cooperation UAE-Israel

After Abraham Accords 2020

The Abraham Accords 2020 agreement, in addition to raising various pros and cons, also provides a reciprocal relationship between the UAE and Israel after the signing of the agreement. In the political field, particularly with the Abraham Accords 2020, the two countries can establish bilateral relations in political cooperation, which will create lasting peace between the two countries. In addition, benefiting from the Abraham Accords 2020, they can then each establish an embassy office as a manifestation of active and progressive cooperation between the UAE and Israel to enhance their diplomatic mission (The National 2021). This evidence can be seen when the Israeli Foreign Minister, Yair Lapid, visited the UAE for the first time to inaugurate the Israeli embassy and consulate offices in Abu Dhabi, UAE, and vice versa, which the UAE established their ambassadorial representative office in Tel Aviv, Israel, on 14 July 2021 (Scheer 2021).

Before this incident, four months earlier, the government of the United Arab Emirates had first established its embassy in Tel Aviv on March 1, 2021. The establishment of the embassy in Israel by the UAE was carried out by the UAE ambassador whom the UAE government directly appointed, namely His Excellency

Mohamed Mahmoud Al Khaja. He is the person who then submitted his warrant to the then President of the State of Israel, Reuven Rivlin as the UAE's first ambassador to Israel. During the visit, Al Khaja met with several critical Israeli figures, such as the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Israeli Foreign Minister, H.E. Gabi Ashkenazi. During the visit, Al Khaja also delivered a speech about the purpose of establishing the UAE embassy in Israel and their vision and mission with Israel in future regional stability affairs (UNITED ARAB EMIRATES MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION n.d.)

Furthermore, cooperation in the military and defense fields, especially after the 2020 Abraham Accords Agreement, further strengthened their dominance in stemming the hegemony of Iran and Turkey. In connection with this, the Israeli Defense Minister, Benny Gantz, will consider security cooperation by planning a 'special security arrangement' with their allies in the Gulf countries, such as the UAE (Williams 2021). During the visit time of the Israeli Defense Minister to the Israel-Gaza Border, he stated that Israel would consider a defense agreement with the Arab Gulf countries and would work for security in the Middle East region. This realization began to appear after a weapons manufacturing company in the United Arab Emirates named EDGE and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) signed their cooperation to design a crewless vessel capable of anti-submarine warfare (Aljazeera 2021). In a follow-up argument, the UAE defense company stated that this sophisticated design ship would later be able to operate for military and commercial facilities. Regarding its function in the military field, this ship is

planned to be used as intelligence in a security missions, reconnaissance, surveillance, and mine detection in war situations.

Cooperation in the military field between the Emirates and Israel had existed since 2008 when Abu Dhabi's Committee for Vital Establishments and Facilities signed a contract in the security and military sector with AGT International, a company owned by Israeli businessman Mati Kochavi based in Switzerland. In addition, ten years later, in 2018, the UAE purchased a cell phone tracking technology from Israel's NSO Group, which is used to track rebels via cell phones both from within and outside the country. Furthermore, the UAE and Israel have recorded military cooperation in the context of joint exercises organized by the US Air Force in 2017 and 2019, which took place in Greece (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies 2020). The most extensive cooperation in the security and military fields between the UAE-Israel is the UAE MOU with the Israel Space Agency. In this case, they enhance new cooperation for scientific research, space exploration, and knowledge transfer to accelerate economic growth and human progress. On this occasion, The two countries reached an agreement on a plan for a lunar launch mission called "Beresheet 2," which is scheduled for 2024 (Jewish Virtual Library n.d.).

Given that the UAE is one of the Gulf Arab countries with a reasonably strong economy, this benefits Israel. In this case, besides the UAE's ability to take advantage of Israel's military solid defense to stem their opponents in the Middle East, Israel can also use the UAE's economy to strengthen their cooperation. Based on the results of the Joint statement between the UAE and Israel, the two countries can develop their commitment to cooperation in the economic field through the

development of the flow of economic relations and services by holding an exhibition, cooperation between chambers of commerce, Etc (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation The UAE 2021). In addition, the existence of an economic committee led by each Minister of the Economy, of course, can be expected to increase bilateral relations, free trade agreements, barrier tariff agreements, and discourse on long-term investment between the two countries in various business fields.

At the same time, it seems that the UAE's discourse to increase the value of economic activity with Israel by 1 trillion USD, which is planned to be expanded to 3 trillion USD in the next three years, can be a breath of fresh air for both countries (Saba 2021). The reason is that with these funds' existence, the doors of UAE-Israel trade are increasingly opening up, further strengthening their diplomatic relations. On the other hand, this economic activity is also supported by the Israel Export Institute and Hapoalim (POLI.TA), one of Israel's largest banks, which will plan to send 250 business people and entrepreneurs on a special mission to seek various fields of cooperation in long-term investment.

Then, in 2022 the UAE and Israel agreed on an agreement they had previously planned, namely a free trade agreement. The free trade agreement covers 95% of the total traded products. These products are carried out in stages, including food, agricultural and cosmetic products, medical equipment, and medicines. The agreement covers regulation, customs, services, government procurement, and electronic commerce. This agreement removes or reduces tariffs on various incoming goods, increases market access between the two countries, promotes investment flows, and creates mechanisms for expanding small and medium

enterprises. The free trade agreement between the two countries, which is estimated to be worth 1 billion dollars, is also expected to help the UAE-Israel trade grow by more than 10 billion dollars for at least the next five years (Aljazeera 2022).

The Abraham Accords' agreement on political, military, and economic security greatly influenced the UAE's and Israel's benefits. However, other aspects, such as socio-cultural, seem to provide other significant impacts. Bearing in mind that both countries are countries that share religion as a way of life and a culture that is very integrated with society (Zaga 2020). Based on the previous history, the Jews who have lived side by side with Muslims since the time of the Prophet Muhammad to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the early 20th century were identified with religious and cultural wars. The existence of the Abraham Accords 2020 Agreement at least provides a solution to misunderstandings between Muslims and Jews so that it becomes a momentum in ensuring peace between Jews and Muslims in the future. Besides that, with this collaboration, the UAE and Israel can take advantage of this momentum to carry out interfaith dialogue in reducing the current ongoing conflict, considering that Islam and Judaism originate from the same root of faith from Abraham (J. P. Cohen 2012).

Talking about interfaith dialogue in 2022, Israel and the UAE and the United States launched a new program on promoting interfaith and intercultural dialogue, as well as countering intolerance and religious hatred. At the first face-to-face meeting, each country's participants in the Trilateral Religious Coexistence Working Group were attended by representatives of Israel's Intelligence Minister Elazar Stern, Emirati Minister of Health Abdul Rahman Al Owais, and Uzra Zeya, US Undersecretary of Civil Security, Democracy and Human Rights.

This group was initially initiated by several figures from each country, such as Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan. According to Anthony Blinken, this is momentum for them in their efforts to eradicate issues related to religion in the world, such as anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. According to him, it is only natural that the US, UAE, and Israel cooperate on this program to build tolerance and ensure that all religious groups can worship in their traditional ways without violence, intimidation, and discrimination. Al Owais added that the Abraham Accords are a milestone of positive changes in the Middle East to reverse long-standing mistrust, misunderstandings, and doubts about one another. In addition, it is also a new way to encourage people-to-people engagement that bridges religion, culture, and nationality (US Department of State 2022).

After knowing several forms of UAE-Israel cooperation in the political, military, economic, and socio-cultural fields, there are other areas of UAE-Israel cooperation after the signing of the Abraham Accords 2020. The first collaboration is in the health sector, which is currently being attacked by the world. The COVID-19 pandemic is no exception in the UAE and Israel. Therefore, in this global pandemic, they are collaborating to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus, which is currently still massive, by collaborating on the supply of vaccines between the two countries and developing technological innovations for handling COVID-19 (Tercatin 2021).

Then in further developments in 2021, the Emirates Health Services Establishment (EHSE) announced that it would cooperate with the Israeli Ministry

of Health regarding public health services and improve the quality of health care between the two countries. Where. Based on the agreement signed by Dr. Yousif Al Serkal, Director General of EHSE, and Israeli Minister of Health Yuli Edelstein said the cooperation would cover joint efforts to combat the global pandemic, medical data protection, cybersecurity, medical education, innovation, and use of artificial intelligence and other areas of advanced technology (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation United Arab Emirates n.d.). Sometime after the agreement between the UAE and Israel, they also collaborated by providing a place for doctors from Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center to establish a disaster treatment center in Abu Dhabi (Reuters 2022).

Apart from the health sector, the UAE and Israel, at this stage, plan to discuss their cooperation on energy further. During the discussion, Israel and the UAE agreed to expand their oil, gas, and green energy exports to the European market through pipelines (Reuters Staff 2020). In addition, the investment of several Fintech companies from Israel to the United Arab Emirates is a good step in developing technology-based businesses and giving birth to new startup companies. Considering that startups and the world technology market have reached their peak, it is hoped that in the future, it will be able to encourage the economic progress of the two countries (Bob 2021).

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

4.1 Conclusion

The dynamics of UAE-Israel relations are fascinating if they are historically drawn. The UAE, which at the time of its independence in 1971, openly condemned Israel's actions toward their occupation of the Palestinian territories and considered Israel an enemy of Arab countries and the Muslim world. The ups and downs of UAE-Israel relations seemed to have come to light when the 'normalization' of diplomatic relations was created in an agreement signed and ratified in 2020. However, this normalization process did not take place so quickly or instantly. The UAE went through several long processes and journeys before being convinced of its decision to normalize relations with Israel, considering that they are common enemies of Arab and Muslim countries worldwide.

Although, historically, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Arab countries was preceded by Egypt and Jordan in 1979 and 1994, the 'normalization' incident between the UAE and Israel is a new historical moment that may still be fresh in the media today. The UAE-Israel normalization process started when Abdullah bin Zayed (UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation) and Benjamin Netanyahu (Israeli Prime Minister) met secretly in Washington DC, USA, in 2012. This secret meeting is also said to be the forerunner of change. UAE's position and perception of Israel. During the meeting, the UAE and Israel shared their views on the hegemony of Iran and Turkey in the Middle East region, which threatens the region's stability according to the UAE. In

this case, after the meeting, UAE_Israel is often involved in bilateral cooperation even though the two have not done normalization publicly, one of which was the International Renewable Agency event in Abu Dhabi in 2016 which directly invited Israeli representatives to come to the event.

However, the cooperative relationship also received mixed responses from the international community due to the 'normalization' activities carried out by the UAE against Israel. Whereas we know the UAE is a Muslim country, most other Muslim countries also have sentiments towards Israel because of their occupation of Palestine. However, it seems that the UAE has surprised international politics by 'normalizing' with Israel and Bahrain. This evidence has received criticism from countries such as Iran and Turkey, who call the UAE a traitor,' and the Palestinians, who feel that they have been lied to by the UAE. On the other hand, countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Britain, and France think that the steps taken by the UAE are proper. Even Egypt believes that what the UAE has done can create stability and security in the Middle East region.

What the UAE has done is not instantaneous results can be decided; it will take years before they reach a 'normalization' agreement. In this case, the author uses the analysis of the decision-making theory from Graham T. Allison in his book *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. After that, in this thesis, the author uses the branch or decision-making model III from Allison, namely the Government Politics Model or the Bureaucratic Politics Model. In the author's view, this theory relates to the case of 'normalization' between the UAE and Israel. In this case, based on the model III Government Politics model from Allison level

of analysis starting from the input, which includes the factors underlying the incident carried out by the actors concerned, producing output consisting of policies taken by the parties concerned, which is long-term. In this case, the factors that underlie the 'normalization' decided by the UAE are the geopolitical conditions of the Middle East, Israel's annexation of the West Bank, Palestine, the proximity of the UAE to the US, and the intimate relations between the UAE and Israel that were carried out before the 'normalization.' Furthermore, the leading actor, in this case, is, of course, from the UAE, based on the analysis of the Government Politics model from the UAE government itself, such as Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Yousef Al Otaiba, and Anwar Gargash. The final policy of the negotiations between these actors emerged from the actors, as mentioned earlier, known as the Abraham Accords Agreements.

In this case analysis stage, the author, as previously mentioned, uses the Decision-Making Theory analysis model from Graham T. Allison model III Government Politics model where this analytical model emphasizes the role of each bureaucratic actor involved in decision making. In this analysis, the actors involved are more concerned with their respective interests and the bargaining process during the decision-making process, as is the first case seen through actor Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan who has a relatively strong influence on the Abraham Accords 2020. Although he was known as the Emir of Abu Dhabi during the Abraham Accords process, he had a fairly substantial role or influence, especially his proximity to the United States. It is known that MBZ has a reasonably close relationship with US presidents such as George W. Bush and Donald Trump. In

particular, with Donald Trump, MBZ has close ties with Trump regarding their discussions on regional stability, such as the Iran and Qatar threats.

Furthermore, in the next actor, Yousef Al Otaiba, the UAE Ambassador to Washington DC, the US also strongly influences the Abraham Accords 2020 negotiation process. Otaiba is known to have a close relationship with some of the closest people to US President Donald Trump, such as Jared Kushner and Avi Berkowitz. He greatly assisted him in 'normalizing' the UAE and Israel. Then, do not forget his close relationship with a Jewish-American businessman. He gave him advice regarding writing his opinion in the Jewish mass media regarding 'normalization,' which was enough to provoke the state of UAE-Israel relations at that time.

After that, the last two actors have no less important role and influence in the 'normalization' process, namely, Abdullah bin Zayed and Anwar Gargash. Abdullah bin Zayed himself is known to have had a secret meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2012 in New York, USA, which influenced the position of the UAE towards Israel. Abdullah bin Zayed is also often seen as a delegation related to the UAE-Israel bilateral cooperation. This UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is often involved in tensions with Iran regarding regional threats launched by Iran to regional stability in the Middle East. Last but not least is Anwar Gargash. Gargash himself is the Ministry of State For Foreign Affairs which, of course, has almost the same interests as Abdullah bin Zayed. Like the previous actors, Gargash rejected Israel's annexation of the West Bank, Palestine. On certain occasions, Gargash has also warned Arab countries

regarding the change in the UAE's perspective on Israel, which also has the potential for other Muslim and Arab countries to see Israel from a different perspective. Moreover, in the end, Gargash also thinks that maybe one day, the 'two-state solution' will no longer be relevant to Israel-Palestine, where the two countries' policies will integrate into a single entity as a sovereign state.

In this case, this research did not forget also go through the analysis of the Governmental Politics Model at the level of bargaining competition between the actors can also be seen before this agreement is ratified. The difference of opinion between them, namely Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who more condemns Israel's actions which he considers to violate international legal regulations, is viewed by Mohammed bin Zayed as the opposite. Mohammed saw this as an opportunity for his country to make efforts to 'normalize' through negotiations that he said were practical and could even be mutually beneficial between the two countries. In addition, other supporting actors, such as Yousef Al Otaiba, who, based on the analysis, had a significant influence on the normalization process, and Anwar Gargash. He was neutral about this event and clarified the UAE's status that the normalization of the UAE-Israel will be mutually beneficial, which is to put aside first. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

4.2 Recommendation

This research refers to the process and outcome of the negotiations as well as the interests of United Arab Emirates officials in 'normalizing' relations with Israel. This research answers the political dynamics of changing the position of the UAE towards Israel from 2012 to 2021, which during the negotiation process,

resulted in an agreement known as the Abraham Accords 2020. In addition, this study also adds a little explanation about the cooperation that has been carried out. The UAE and Israel agreed before and after the 2020 Abraham Accords agreement. Given that this research still has shortcomings, the authors have suggestions regarding this research:

1. Seeing the complexity of decision-making carried out by the United Arab Emirates, the author provides suggestions for further research to analyze other possibilities for the UAE to 'normalize' with Israel other than those already mentioned in this research.
2. Since this case is still relatively new and the lack of literature discussing this case, the authors suggest analyzing the real motives of the UAE in carrying out 'normalization' with Israel concerning the stability of the Middle East regional security in the future. How the UAE's attitude towards Israel after the Abraham Accords in the international political arena and the UAE's efforts to continue supporting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict's peace after their 'normalization' with Israel?.

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